| OPINION |
A Since military operations against such an enemy would involve use or violation, depending on the way they looked at it, of territories of sovereign states, the President of the United States enlarged the scope of operations. He declared that states harbouring the suspected elements were responsible for aggression and liable for retributive action. For purposes of military planning and preparation the group led by Mr. Osama bin Laden, located in Afghanistan was specified as the target for destruction and annihilation. Afghanistan would have to be prepared for the attack as a consequence. Afghan leaders immediately pleaded that Mr. Osama bin Laden had no command and control capability to direct such an attack on a far away continent and warned the US against any precipitate action. Since the western allies perceive Afghanistan to be its client state, Pakistan was also put on notice. A list of political and military demands, including provision of intelligence and use of air space, was handed over to Pakistan. That was the moment of truth. Pakistan was asked to make a choice. Realities of power and level of emotional disequilibrium would not brook delay or cover behind semantics. Pakistan was being called upon to face the consequences of events over which it has had no control. What had brought such a situation about? Authors of Pakistan’s essentially weak and often dichotomous Afghan policies would certainly need to make some long explanations. For the decision-makers of today the text was simple. Pakistan had implicitly accepted its role, howsoever small, in the triumph of Taliban over other factions contending for power in Afghanistan. It became the first country to recognise the new regime. Pakistan acted as bridge for Afghan trade and international interaction. Pakistan also continued willy nilly to share the economic burdens of the regime and above all maintain well over a million Afghanis displaced as a result of continuing war against the Northern Alliance. All this was accepted but Pakistan admitted no influence over the internal and external policies of the regime. Afghanistan’s history and temperament of its people were cited to drive the point of constraint home. Outsiders recognised the difficulties but did not concede utter helplessness. To them carrying huge burdens without quid pro quo did not sound convincing. Perceptions of outsiders aside, the informed segment among the people of Pakistan also lamented on their successive governments’ inexplicable shyness over enunciating and vigorously pursuing our full political and military goals in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet Union. The miniscule advantages that did accrue were not consolidated and were frittered away partially due to lack of focus. Unmindful of dynamics of realpolitik and time Pakistan failed to articulate and engineer realistic options that would bring permanent peace to Afghan people and safeguard strategic interests of Pakistan. Events continued to dictate policy and Pakistan lost the opportunity to actualise a role that history had provided. Worse than that, Pakistani failure is seen by many to be responsible for current Afghan isolation and frustration. Today, on the issue of terrorism the whole world is in unison with America. On the question of assigning responsibility to the group of Mr. Osama bin Laden for attacks on US buildings, there could be, pending full investigation, some understandable demur. US resolve to punish the people of Afghanistan for harbouring the bin Laden group is questionable. But their move to force Pakistan — an ally for 50 years, to make an immediate choice to the exclusion of all other realities, was perplexing. The only upshot of such a policy would have been complete destabilisation of the region in which they have permanent strategic interests and unbridled domination of India as a regional bully. It would only be a matter of time when the protege will break its bounds and pose a threat to the patron. India’s precocity in jumping the gun without many waits provides an insight into their mindset and anxiety to do Pakistan in on any available excuse. India has lost no time in starting its preparations for a possible westward foray. Can anyone mistake the message of Mr. Vajpayee broadcast on the 14th September? Stretching logic to the limit the Prime Minister of India exhorted upon his newfound allies to forget Osama or Afghanistan and go for Pakistan. To that end India offered full-fledged military alliance and use of all its bases located in close vicinity of Pakistan. European allies of the United States who have much experience of this region could not have failed to see through the game and counsel restraint. China that so openly sided with the US on the issue of terrorism was surely disturbed at India’s blatant effort to disturb the balance of power in South Asia under the pretext of punishing international terrorists. Russia too needs a stable Pakistan for the success of her strategic initiatives in the Middle East and has to that extent guard her own interests. Now if India feels sidelined and miffed once again she has her own propensities to blame. Government of Pakistan on its part has come clean and acted in accordance with the principle that safety and security of its own people come first always and every time to the exclusion of any other consideration. The government has demonstrated that it understands the limits of its power especially in the context of international balance that has emerged in the wake of attacks on US properties in New York and Washington. Acting within realistic parameters Pakistan has boldly accepted its responsibility towards peace and candidly asked Afghanistan to act with wisdom. Inside Pakistan the reaction of part of the religious leadership was typical. They were actually responding to one single factor in the scenario. Working on the emotions of younger elements of the population that are innocent of the issues, they were able to marginally disturb life in a few cities. Contrary views aired by some retired service officers are enigmatic and unconvincing. Mainstream public opinion is solidly supportive of the government policies. This is not to say that it may never change. |