An Analysis

The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59

(The first thirteen chapters of this book were serialised in DJ from July 1999 till October last year. This analysis covers the first 150 pages, and is now being serialised in DJ).

Columnist A H AMIN re-interprets the so-called 1857 Indian Mutiny.

British Strategic Position never as bad as Portrayed in Contemporary British Accounts

On the overall strategic scale the British position was never really as serious as portrayed in contemporary British accounts of that time. The situation, however, was unstable till the capture of Delhi in 1857 where the British suffered almost 70% of their total casualties. The total distance between Allahabad and Delhi which was out of British control between June to July 1857 for a short period of just about six weeks was about 360 miles. By 16 July the British had captured Cawnpore, thus only the area between Delhi and Cawnpore was left. This meant an area about just 240 miles. Even in numerical terms the following were the rough odds:-

1. Bengal Army which had rebelled approximately — 30,000 to 35,000 troops

2. Loyal Indian troops 558a:-

            a. Punjabi — 80,000 558b

            b. Bombay Army — 36,710

            c. Madras Army  — 59,391

            d. Nepal troops   —10,000 558c

                               Total—171,001

3. Royal Troops — 24,263 and later reinforced to a total figure of approximately 80,000 558d.

The British naval supremacy meant that India could be reinforced from overseas without any external naval interference. There was no breakdown in communications between Bengal, Bombay or Madras Presidencies. Thus by March 1858 following additional Royal Army Regiments had reached India apart from the initial 22 infantry and 4 cavalry regiments stationed In India in May 1857:- “42 Cavalry and Infantry Regiments 558”.

The odds were not as serious as portrayed. The quote Winston Churchill a man who is always trying very hard to magnify all British achievements “The scale of the Indian Mutiny should not be exaggerated. Three quarters of the troops remained loyal, barely a third of British territory was effected”559. Churchill has again exaggerated the territory. Barely a fourth was affected!

Specifically Military Weaknesses

The sepoys committed various blunders which were specifically tactical as well as strategic. Some of these were:-

a)         Failure to organise as brigades or division.

b)         Failure to effectively threaten the British line of communication.

c)         Failure to launch timely counter-attacks.

d)         Failure to use cavalry to protect flanks.

e)         Failure to have contingency plans in case of unforeseen enemy movement.

f)          Failure to resort to manoeuvre warfare.

The sepoys fought as a regiment or maximum as a brigade in case of Bareilly, Nimach or Indore Brigades. The Gwalior contingent was ably led by Tantia Topi. But being a civilian he was not really effective in prevailing upon the sepoys. The sepoys cannot be blamed for not having organised themselves as brigades or divisions. They were commanded by JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) who had never commanded anything larger than platoons. These were mostly of men between 50 and 60 years of age who had no formal military education or training in handling large troop formations. It was an age when despite having imported European tactics and European weapons native states had repeatedly failed in defeating much smaller forces commanded by European officers. No nation or race of the region was an exception to this rule. The Afghans, Gurkhas, Persians, Mahrattas, Sikhs all had been defeated as convincingly as the sepoy rebels of 1857. Leadership and not race seems to have been a core factor since even in the British force at Delhi out of a total of some 7,794 men on the effective strength as on 11 Sept 1857 some 4,608 were natives560. Out of some 1,012 men killed about 440 were natives561. The greatest force multiplier in the whole affair was the British officer who by virtue of vigorous and aggressive leadership turned numerical inferiority into moral superiority. Having served in the Pakistan Army and having observed the Pakistani officer cadre it is my personal opinion based on a study of the performance of the Indian Army before 1947 that the British officers provided relatively superior leadership as compared to the Pakistani or Indian officers. I am speaking of small unit leadership or maximum till battalion level; beyond which British leadership also was quite thick headed!

Failure to make a deliberate offensive move and threaten the British line of communications were major sepoy military failures not only at Delhi but also at Lucknow and Cawnpore. In Delhi the situation was not as simple as it appears on the first sight. The right flank of the British was protected by the Western Jumna canal which flows north to south and from 5 to 15 miles west of the Delhi  —Karnal Road. The Jind and Patiala troops numbering between 5,000 to 6,000 and armed retainers of Nawab of Karnal de jure grandfather of Liaqat Ali Khan the first Prime Minister of Pakistan; played an important part in protecting the line of communication between Karnal and Delhi. In addition the British had more cavalry than the Delhi sepoys. Intelligence was another major failure in ensuring that every serious move that the sepoys made against the British line of communication failed. Although the Northwest provinces and Oudh were most actively anti-British, there were always too many volunteers who wanted to do some good business by selling information to the British. The society was too much divided and there were simply too many people in every region who wanted to sell information. Too many far-sighted pragmatic people whose descendants were to subsequently secure their position in the ranks of the Indo-Pak aristocracy which led the Muslim league in particular and had a representation to a lesser degree in the Indian National Congress. Thus, every move that the sepoys made was leaked out to the British at the Ridge or at Lucknow and as they say “forewarned is forearmed” the EEIC was always one week ahead of the sepoys in information. The Indo-Pak sub-continent is a big hotch potch of races and religions and castes. To call it a country or a nation is an apology of a nation. This strange mixture of races and castes and religions and sects makes it an easier place to rule and amply explains why foreigners from Afghanistan or Central Asia or Britain came here and so confidently knocked its people and ruled it entirely at their own convenience! India was always conquered by intrigue and treachery!

Failure to launch timely counter- attacks was another major sepoy military failure. We have seen that at Delhi the British position was highly vulnerable and the British commander was seriously contemplating withdrawal. Had the sepoys launched a serious and determined counter-attack on 15/16 or 17 September, it was quite possible that the British would have been defeated or at least repulsed. If the Hindu Jats could do it at Bhurtpore and the Sikh Jat at Chillanwalla it was possible for the sepoys to do it at Delhi. Yet it is an irony of Indo-Pak history that they failed to do so. It is also an irony of intellectual slavery that the so-called educated people of Indo-Pak think that sepoy defeat in 1857 was inevitable.

Failure to effectively use cavalry to protect their flanks was another major sepoy failure. Thus repeatedly they were outflanked at Badli Ki Serai, at Aherwa, at Lucknow in November 1857 and March 1858, at Cawnpore in December 1857. Once in the danger of being outflanked the sepoys miserably failed to change front or to use an additional reserve force to refuse a flank.

Here the pre-1857 EEIC policy of not allowing natives to become officers seems to have paid rich dividends. The Indian Army was not to have natives as officers till 1919. It seems that even after 79 years of training our officer cadre is not really upto the mark! The conduct of 1965 and 1971 wars amply proves that we have too many Hewitts and Archdale Wilsons and very few Nicholsons! This is true for both the armies since racially there is not much difference between Indians and Pakistanis.

Failure to have a reserve to meet unforeseen enemy manoeuvres was another major sepoy failure. Their initial plans to meet a British advance were normally reasonable, but their plans always lacked flexibility and any enemy action contrary to their expectations seriously disrupted their defensive posture. Thus when the British used Outram’s force to cross Gumti and threaten the sepoy line of communication from the north, the sepoys were unable to read just their positions since they did not plan against any force which could cross the Gumti and threaten their rear from north of the river.

Failure to resort to manoeuvre was a major sepoy failure. They always thought and planned in a defensive manner and left all the initiative to the enemy. Tantia Topi’s attack on Cawnpore in December 1857 was the only worthwhile example of a significant “Sepoy” offensive plan to sever the British line of communication. Also there was only one Tantia Topi on the sepoy side. The sepoys were, however, lucky that there was only one Nicholson on the British side and that Nicholson died in September 1857! Once I praise British leadership it is British small unit leadership because it was very offensive and resolute. British leadership at higher level except Nicholson was timid and highly unimaginative as it has been in most of the wars of the British Army! But comparatively speaking in Asia the British were  the one eyed Kings in a land of blind!

Atrocities in 1857

The sepoys took the initiative in killing women and children although in most cases this was done by riotous civilians and the riff raff. Still the sepoys are to be blamed since overall they were in charge. The British reprisals took place mostly in retaliation but as the adage goes i.e. two wrongs don’t make a right. The British reprisals were, however, much less in magnitude if we compare them with atrocities against civilians committed by Nadir Shah in 1739 or by Ahmad Shah in 1756-61 or even by the Indo-Pak armies in 1971 in Bangladesh, or later in Balochistan, Indian Punjab or Kashmir.

The British behaviour may perhaps be closely compared to Pakistan Army behaviour in East Pakistan in 1971. The initial atrocities were committed by the Bengalis but the martial races settled the ‘duby’ a very large margin, exceeding at least by 100,000 to 200,000 men perhaps! But then Karl Marx made some very profound remarks about 1857 and these can be applied to any such situation. Karl Marx said “However, infamous the conduct of sepoys, it is only the reflex, in a concentrated form, of England’s own conduct in India, not only during the epoch of the foundation of her Eastern Empire, but even during the last ten years of a long settled rule. The characteristics that rule it suffices to say that torture formed an organic institution of its financial policy. There is something in human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historic retribution that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself562.

Seven Factor Analysis of the success or failure of rebellion in each particular case

Outbreak of rebellion at each place can be logically analysed by a seven factor analytical frame. This analytical frame reconciles all contradictions and paradoxes of the rebellion:-

a)         Sentiments of local population.

b)         Presence of European troops.

c)         Personality of local European Commander.

d)         Geographical factors.

e)         Degree of sepoy cohesion and leadership.

f)          Distance from nearest major centre of rebellion.

g)         Ethnic composition of troops.

In the North West provinces Oudh and in Central India the local population was more anti-British. This factor assisted the rebels. In Punjab, Frontier, Bengal and Rajputana the local population and the sepoys had very limited communication or interaction. In these areas the locals sided with the British. But local population factor was little more than zero multiplied by zero if the other factors were favouring the sepoys.

This was the most important factor but had a direct dependence on personality of the European Commanders. Thus Hewitt and Archdale Wilson failed with 2,028 Europeans whereas Brasyer did much more at Allahabad with a largely Sikh force and just a very small number of Europeans. Similarly Brigadier Innes at Ferozepur miserably failed even though there were sufficient number of European troops available at Ferozpur. Similarly Thorburn beautifully describes Brigadier Johnstone at Jullundhur by saying “He was fitter for a nurse and a bath chair than a command in crises562a”.

Geographical factors played the most important role. In Punjab primarily the sepoys failed because the region was divided into five compartments by wide unfordable rivers without bridges. Thus only four regiments of the Jullundhur and Phillaur garrison succeeded in crossing the Sutlej and that too only due to indecisiveness of Brigadier Johnstone. The Jhelum sepoys were betrayed; hunted by the local Muslim population of Jhelum562b! It was the Ravi which at Trimmu Ghat combined with Nicholsons decisiveness played an important part in the destruction of the 46NI and 9th Light Cavalry at the Battle of Trimmu Ghat.

The sepoys at Multan were doomed by geography and above all by degree of internal cohesion between 1st Irregular Cavalry (Skinners Horse) and their British officers. It is surprising since the Skinners Horse had no Punjabis and was composed of Hindustani, Pathans and Muslim Ranghars who were really the pioneers and leaders of the rebellion.

Degree of sepoy cohesion and leadership played an important part in the rebellion. It was resolute leadership on part of Lance Daffadar Barkat and Basharat Ali which played an important role in the success of 3rd Light Cavalry. The “European Troop factor” was against them at Meerut but all other four factors favoured them i.e. “Geography” “Civilian Population” “European leadership” and “Sepoy leadership and cohesion”.

Distance from the nearest major centre of rebellion also played an important part in the rebellion or loyalty to the EEIC of a particular region or a regiment. Thus the 1st Irregular Cavalry’s loyalty despite being 100% Hindustani Muslim or Ranghar had a deep connection with Multan’s distance from Delhi which was more than 600 miles and off course surrounded by an alien Seraiki Muslim population. It is an irony of history that today the Ranghar and other Rohtaki Urdu speaking Muslims constitute some half or more than half of Multan city’s population following the partition of India in 1947. Had the 1st Irregular Cavalry been stationed at Amballa or Meerut its chances of staying loyal to the EEIC may have been reduced by more than half. The positive aspect of Skinner’s Horse 1st Irregular Cavalry’s neutrality was that Cavalry remained an open arm for Ranghars and Hindustani Muslims in the post-1857 scenario. Similarly the 31 NI neutrality at Sangor had a connection with its great distance from Delhi and off course its great internal cohesion as a regiment keeping in view its glorious battle performance at Bhurtpore in 1805 and in 1827.

Ethnic composition of the troops was another factor. This was almost constant except at Benares where due to mishandling during a disarming parade the Ludhiana Sikhs were mistakenly fired at and rebelled. This incident led to rebellion in the companies of the same regiment stationed at Jaunpur. Except this incident, by and large following was the standard formula of ethnic factor versus rebellion:-

1. Punjabi and Pathan Muslims 100% Loyal to EEIC.

2. Hindustani Troops both Hindu & Muslims joined the rebellion in 80% cases

3. Sikhs 98% Loyal.

4. Gurkhas 100% Loyal.

5. Madras Army 95% Loyal except some cavalry troopers who were Hindustani Muslims or Ranghar Muslims.

6. Bombay Army 95% Loyal except Hindustani ethnicity troops.

7. Baloch Tribes on Sindh and Punjab Frontier------Created rebel but were too poorly armed to cause any serious problem.

End Notes

558Pages-389 & 390-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XIII-Op Cit.

558aAppendix-Incidents in the Sepoy War-Op Cit.

558bPage-307-Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny - Lieutenant General Mc Leod Innes-London-1895

558c Page-836-Henry Beveridge-Volume-III-Op Cit.

558d Page-307-Mcleod Innes-Op Cit.

558e Pages-391 & 392-J. W Fortescue-Vol-XIII-Op Cit.

559Page-68- A History of the English Speaking Peoples-Volume Four - Winston. S. Churchill-Bantam Books-New York-June-1980.

560Refers- Calculated from Return of Effective British Strength on the Ridge as on 11th September as given in Appendix Page-350 of-Incidents from the Sepoy War-Gen Sir Hope Grant-Op Cit.

561Calculated from Return of Casualties from 30th May 1857 till Final Capture of the city on 20th September 1857 as shown on Page-492-Selections from Letters Despatches and Other State Papers-Volume Two-Op Cit.

562Page-91- The First Indian War of Independence- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels-Peoples Publishing House-Moscow-1960.

562a Page-205-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit.

562b Page-216-Punjab Chiefs-Volume-II-Op Cit. The Janjuas of Jhelum gave valuable information to British in tracking down the rebels of the 14th Native Infantry!