Stormy weather ahead

Columnist M B NAQVI predicts rough times in the future for Pakistan.

Sunday, August 26 ’01 saw a gathering of over 40 religious and Jihadi parties meeting in Islamabad. It was styled ‘Defence of Afghanistan Seminar’. It was more of a conference than a mere seminar. Almost all important rightwing leaders were there. The reason for the conference was the earlier decision of the UN to monitor the observance of its sanctions against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan (only). These sanctions had outraged the rightwing opinion throughout the country that stands behind Taliban four square. Now in pursuance of that resolution, the UN has now decided to send monitors to assess the observance of the sanctions by various neighbours of Afghanistan. Insofar as these Pakistanis are concerned, they are greatly exercised by the prospect of physical presence of international inspectors-cum-monitors to assess how far these sanctions are being honoured by Pakistan or are being flouted.

In view of the world opinion, especially in America and Britain, the impression is abroad that the power behind the Taliban is Pakistan. The sanctions, in the first place, are solely for that part of Afghanistan which is controlled by Taliban. That it happens to be 90 per cent or more of the whole country may be true. But Taliban and others are taken as two sides to what is a civil war. And in this many Pakistanis witness a certain discrimination against Taliban. Thus, opinion in Pakistan is actually divided among those who support Taliban and their sway over Afghanistan and those that oppose them. The former was quite disturbed and indeed angry with the UN decision. It calls it unfair and biased — against Taliban.

The position of the Pakistan government is not easy. It has traditionally been a supporter of all recent Afghan governments since 1992. It is one of the just two countries that recognise Taliban now. Having done so, Pakistan is now honour bound to stand behind it if it is unfairly treated. It is true that the opinion in the country is divided because a lot of people, particularly the leftwing groups and some liberals, do not want the government to go on supporting Taliban who were seen as one of the most intolerant and bigoted lot. There was also a lot of other politics, not excluding the factions that owe allegiance to different foreign powers. Pakistan government did show its unhappiness with the American-sponsored resolution in the UN Security Council that finally resulted in the imposition of mandatory sanctions. It did express its view that the resolution is not fair and even handed. That it was partial and biased one goes without saying and the Pakistani diplomacy made no secret of its views. But at that stage Pakistan’s susceptibilities were ignored and the American view prevailed.

The basis of the American animosity to Taliban is said to be twofold: first, the American government and the public opinion is obsessed with the presence of Mr. Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. It will be recalled that the Clinton Administration in August 1998 attacked Afghanistan through the Pakistan territory with missiles. They were intended to kill Osama and to knock out some of the training camps for Mujahideen said to be running in that country. The act was none too friendly to Pakistan though it was glossed over by Pakistan Foreign Office for the simple reason that it did not wish to confront the only superpower there is. The Americans tried to put a gloss of their own on it by sending Gen. Anthony Zinni to talk things over so that it is not misunderstood as an Indian attack.

But Pakistan was unlikely to mistake that rocket attack for an Indian one when it could see virtually with the naked eye that the rockets were being fired from American ships just south of Gwadar and other parts on the Mekran coast. What explanation was offered by Gen. Zinni for using Pakistan air space without its permission should be known to higher officers in the army with whom Zinni interacted. In all this Osama factor was said to have been predominant. But there is also another factor: the Americans dislike Taliban in general for their political stripes. They are seen as reactionary bigots. They are too illiberal for American tastes.

That may be so. But it is hard to believe that it was a major reason. Why? because they are quite at home in West Asia such as in Saudi Arabia where the local people and their sets of practices are much the same as of Taliban; they can hardly be distinguished from the Taliban. Both have virtually the same sort of beliefs and practices. The ruling systems in the two sets of countries — say the Gulf states and of the Taliban in Afghanistan — are not too far apart. The observance of human rights in both is very nearly the same. Nevertheless it is claimed that the abject backwardness and orthodoxy of Taliban is one of the reasons why Americans and other western public opinion do not approve them.

For Pakistan the victory of Taliban in Afghanistan is perhaps the only success story there is for a political project of the Pakistan Army. All its other political projects in the past had fallen flat on their faces. Everybody knows about the East Bengal crisis and the sad and saddening denouement it led to. But they do not reflect upon the various other enterprises that Pakistan’s military has attempted. There was the Operation Closed Door in Bengal in the 1950s. Would anyone honestly claim that it was a great success? There were at least two, if not more, military operations in Balochistan, viz. in 1964 and 1973. One is ignoring the 1948 and 1958 ones because of their different contexts and purposes. Would anyone proclaim these operations to have achieved their primary objective which must and should have been promoting national integrity. Only one, the 1948 show of force over Kalat passes the test. But then it was not an Army’s own operation. Therefore, the only Army project that was perceived by some to have achieved its purpose was the Taliban operation.

A word about 1994-96 Afghanistan operations, or even the earlier ones. Opinions differ whether Pakistan should have gone ahead and done all that it has done. But it must also be said that a problem was dropped on its lap. It is said that it could have extricated itself and remained aloof. In point of fact, it owned the problem and set about doing what it could to ensure a government in Kabul that would remain friendly to Pakistan in 1992. The pro-Soviet government of Dr. Najibullah had collapsed under its own weight; he had left the Presidential palace and there was just no one in authority and no continuity. Pakistan filled the vacuum by transporting the leaders of seven Mujahideen parties that were headquartered in Peshawar. A C-130 that carried the Pakistan-supported leadership of the seven Afghan factions because it had become the only formal victor in the Afghan war in the western eyes. The first government in Kabul was set up by Nawaz Sharif in 1992, who offered a Namaz-e-Shukrana in the Kabul’s Jama Masjid for the great victory achieved.

Pakistan had acquired a dependency and it became an imperial power. True, there were people in Pakistan who thought it to be a foolhardy enterprise. Pakistan had become an imperial power piggyback on America. The victory in Afghanistan, if it belongs to anyone, was that of the resources mobilised by the US CIA. That with the departure of the last Russian soldier, the Americans lost all interest in Afghanistan and, as they had earlier promised, left all the subsequent problems of what should follow to be tackled by Pakistan. Pakistan went about the task of running and managing what was a true dependency. It was too costly and too risky. This rather critical opinion is based on the fact that Pakistan is a small and weak state, quite dependent on foreign aid itself. It has no business trying to act as a big imperial power. It was essential for Pakistan to build itself up and be economically viable. It should not fritter away its meagre resources in imperial ventures. It was strenuously said that it is a foolish attempt to punch above one’s height.

Nevertheless, Pakistan has been stuck with the problem since 1992. It helped fabricate two successive governments first of President Mujaddadi and the second by President Burhanuddin Rabbani who is now the present chief of Northern Alliance. Those governments were, as broadly perceived, inefficient and unequal to the task of running a modern state. The administration had gone haywire and the whole countryside was actually being run by over a 100 district commanders. There was virtually no central government. Meantime, Pakistanis lost patience with both governments which has shown anti-Pakistan sentiment quite early on. True, during each government’s time demonstrations against Pakistanis and attacks on Pakistan embassy took place, quite like those in 1956. It was surmised by all that it was Pakistan’s ISI that virtually brought them out of its hat. Later from that hat dropped the rabbit called Taliban. Some students went forth from JUI-run Madressas and went and conquered the whole of the country in less than two years. By 1996 they had established themselves in Kabul, defeating both Hekmatyar and pushing back Northern Alliance into the northern fastnesses.

But the politics of Taliban being what it is, they soon started attracting charges of ultra orthodoxy. Similar elements from around the globe flocked to them. Pakistan’s Home Minister, Lt. Gen. Moinuddin Haider, has a list of about 130 persons, all wanted in Pakistan for heinous crimes, who are said to be enjoying the hospitality of Taliban. Pakistan has tried to coax Taliban for their extradition several times and drawn a blank each time. Insofar as the question of their repatriation is concerned, there was a flat no to Pakistan in just the same fashion they are refusing to hand over Osama’s custody to any foreign government today, including Pakistan’s. Pakistan sat back and accepted the position that the Taliban would not hand over someone who has sought their asylum and they have given it. But the Americans are not quite as complaisant. They have bombed them once for the sake of Osama and the reports have been proliferating that they are thinking of attacking them on the land.

Obviously, the US would send commandos to do the job from one of neighbouring countries. The Americans, according to various undenied reports, had requested Pakistan for a temporary or permanent base for operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan appears to have refused. It is also reported that Tajikistan has accepted the American proposal and has given them a base for operations. If so, we may expect an American commandos attack for the purpose of arresting or killing Osama bin Laden and his entourage. This would be an indirect and unfriendly challenge to all Pakistan’s policies. It would virtually undo many of them. It would reduce Pakistan’s prestige and influence everywhere else — but most certainly in Afghanistan. It is a difficult moment for Pakistan diplomacy. The latest UN decision to station monitors on the Pakistan-Afghan border is correctly seen as an affront to Pakistan’s sovereignty and a threat to its security. If Pakistan had taken the same view of the Taliban as, for instance, the Americans and British and the rest of the western countries have done, then it would be no such thing. But as it happens, Pakistan is the creator of Taliban and anything that detracts from the power, authority and prestige of the Taliban would also detract those very attributes from Pakistan. It would do the same damage to Pakistan as it would do to the standing and prestige of Taliban. This is the background in which the seminar-cum-conference on Defence of Afghanistan took place in Islamabad the other day.

That men like Gen. Hamid Gul, the former ISI chief, have said that the stationing of foreign inspectors is an affront to Pakistan and is a threat to its security will resonate. There were fierce speeches by the various religious leaders and commanders of the various Jehadi outfits like Jaish-i-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen and so forth. The 40 rightwing and religious parties and Jihadi organisations were there to denounce the UN action. They have all proclaimed that they would resist the stationing of the UN monitors. That means trouble.

Insofar as Pakistan is concerned, it has legally accepted the UN sanctions and is committed to implement them. It has also accepted the stationing of the UN monitors. Now, there is this decision to resist. What does it portend? It is a first rate crisis for Pakistan government. All these 40 organisations are soul-mates of the Taliban. What does the government plan to do? Shoot the demonstrators and those who would shout imprecations or even try to shoot at the UN personnel? It wont do to mow down the crowds in the NWFP and tribal areas. Already there are reports that lashkars are being assembled in various parts of tribal areas for the purpose. One way or another, the crisis has to be dissipated by political means. And let not one bullet be fired in anger or during the crisis. What is required is political accommodation between the governments and various Jehadi organisations, without the former losing the image of a firm authority.

Having said this, it is also necessary for government of Pakistan to review its overall policy orientation and see whether this particular crisis is a one time affair or it is going to repeat itself in different forms in future. It is a much larger question than a simple law and order one.