The Editor

Defence Journal

Karachi.

Dear Sir,

Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed

The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine carries a letter by Brig (Retd) Mohammed Ahmed which mentions as under,

“Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur. The little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur the others were turned back half way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.

I would like to correct the record here.

The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been covered in a single article appeared in Oct 1997 edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded what Brig Ahmed has ascribed to me. An editing error has appeared in the March 2001 edition of DJ which the Brig should have corrected rather than confirming it.

The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on its way to Jassar. The regiment was detained at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to Jassar which reached Narowal at 0300 hours and turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.

BATTLE  OF CHAWINDA

The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the subject and another by Mr A H Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the gentlemen have made reference to me. I, therefore, feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record straight.

Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have reservations about the description of the battle by A H  Amin who was not a participant. He has merely conducted research and has adequately defended his point of view by quoting his source  of knowledge. A H Amin has quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has reflected upon command quality of Brig Ali and how 35 FF was massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971. To support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can quote  one out of several ill planned attacks which fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in 1965. On the morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were ordered to attack  Jassora with a company. A detailed discription has been published in May 1998 issue of DJ. For those who could not reach that edition and also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the attack precisely. The company was commanded by Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by my troop of three tanks.

I submitted to CO 3FF that before  attacking Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away from Railway line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way between Railway line and Jassoran. I also informed him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by a tank regiment supported by an infantry battalion which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually my troop was shot up by that force. It was impossible to dislodge an armoured brigade by attacking with a company and three tanks. My plea was brushed aside with remark that Butterdograndi had been cleared during the night. As we formed up behind railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us causing casualties to our infantry. In the FUP we located a centurian in Battalion one which was destroyed. Finally we attacked without artillery. Capt Raheem Shah  and his company displayed tremendous courage.

8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high maze crop. As our men reached the trenches they were fired at from point blank range. Many of them fell other turned and went to ground. They were surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola from a distance of 50 yards. I moved the tank up and mounted the trenches. By this time I had reached the killing range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran. My tank was shot up and went into flames. My second tank was also hit and damaged. The third tank turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal prudently did come up and was saved. In this swift action two enemy tanks were also destroyed. Here the attack fizzled out.

It is now for the reader to assess the competence of higher command. In my opinion it was callous act to launch a company and three tank against an armoured brigade. To further illustrate my point of view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman) will be in place.

Quote “When the moment of live ammunition approaches, the moment to which his professional training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the fate of the  campaign may depend on his decision. What is happening in the heart and vitals of a commander. Some are made bold by the moment, some irresolute, some carefully judicious, some paralyzed and powerless to act” Unquote. I place ours higher in the last category.

After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam and his two earlier scripts, on the subject (“Hero of Chawinda” published in daily The News in April/ May 1992 and “THE ALI OF CHAWINDA”published in UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can say that his writing is more of fiction than honest description of the events on the battlefield. On reading his script of 1992,  I expressed my views which have been published in daily THE NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce below the opening paragraph of the article which delivers goods to those who are interested to know the facts.

Quote”On the outset I shall mention here that I have never served in the direct command of Brig Ali. Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or malice towards him. However, I feel that both the writers have tried to aggrandize the revered general out of proportion. I hold this opinion as I have first hand knowledge about the Battle of Chawinda. I was a troop leader and squadron commander in 25 cavalry which was a part of Brig Ali’s brigade. Mr Agha Babar should show Adam’s article to his literary  friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a good piece of literature. Anyone with little knowledge about army matters and warfare will confront him with awkward questions such as, Why should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks did he have? Was he ignorant of the organisation and deployment of his only tank regiment?. Why did Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when enemy tanks were still more than a mile away? Why did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they reached the killing zone of his ante tank weapons? Why was Chobara captured and abandoned time and again?. Was a pitched battle fought at Chobara? If so what was the score of casualties? And many more such questions.’Unquote.

The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share with the readers is of no consequence unless he first fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon /company commander or a staff officer. I have gone through his three scripts mentioned above. Only at one place (UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he was attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose company was to follow 25 cavalry tanks on the morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major Mohammad Hussain to advise him.

I will not go in details here, which of course I have, to prove that whatever Farooq has written is all truth. Only one example is enough to prove what I state.

On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes while describing the dialogue between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. “How many tanks do you have? One squadron of tanks right here, another dismounting from transporters nearby”. He claims that these words were exchanged at Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on 8 Sept. This is totally untrue. The whole regiment was concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar was called by Brig and told “enemy had come think about it”. He must have also told him that enemy tanks were advancing on Charwa-Cawinda track. What happened thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8 articles in D J starting from Oct 1997 to May 1998. 9th and concluding article will appear in near future. My suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17 days as he saw the battle moving day by day, mere eulogy is not welcomed.

Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort a commander makes to insure the implementation of the order is what that matters. The extent of personal  involvement, his control and direction of the events, his presence at the place and time where the fate of the battle is being decided are the factors which go in to assess  the competence of a commander. In this light I found our leader wanting.

Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan

From: “Mohsin Meer” <mohsin_meer@yahoo.com>

To: <letters@editors.com>

Subject: Amnesty for Barbarism

Date: Thursday, August 23, 2001 4:03 PM

By proposing amnesty for Indian troops in Kashmir, Advani has indirectly denied India’s own claim of “cross-border terrorism”. The security forces do not need amnesty to kill a ‘terrorist’ from ‘across the border’. This is part of their ‘duty’. Yes, they do need amnesty to crush the people’s fight for freedom by persecuting civilians and perpetrating the worst kind of cruelties on the people, including women and children. India has gone to the extent to even get a foreign country’s (Israel) assistance to murder ‘her own Kashmiri citizens’.

Mohsin Meer

Lahore, Pakistan

From: “Asad Ali” <asad@lsil.com>

To: <sms@pathfinder.com.pk>

Subject: Maj A H Amin’s article

Date: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 6:04 PM

Dear Mr Ikram Sehgal,

My letter refers to Maj. (Retd) A H Amin’s article ‘Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities’ published in the Sep 2000 issue of DJ. Let me first say that Maj Amin is a gem of a writer. He manages to bring together a wonderful mix of passion, intellectual honesty and boldness of thought in his writings that leaves, at least, this reader in awe of him. I have become, over time, what you might call a fan of his. In a society where instead of overcoming taboos and misplaced touchiness we boldly enshrine old ones and fervently look for new. Maj Amin is a breath of fresh air.

Going back to the above mentioned article, this was again a masterful analysis, balanced and thought provoking and a tribute to the real heroes of that era. Maj Amin takes us through the initial stages of the battle including the point where a surprise change of command of the division took place. He concludes that this change of command is probably more due to lack of war-craft on the part of GHQ etc. than any external pressures keeping in view that Ayub had most to gain from a military success during Grand Slam. Surely it was to Yahya’s advantage too, then how do we reconcile ourselves with the following excerpt from the said article — ‘One direct participant stated that even after 6 Brigade had replaced 10 Brigade on 6/7 September 1965 Eftikhar Khan (6 Bde Comd) told General Yahya that he could capture Akhnur since his forward troops are at ‘Mahwali Khad’. Yahya, however, told Eftikhar to stay put and to forget about Akhnur’. In a previous DJ serialisation of Brig (Retd) ZA Khan’s book ‘The Way It Was’ (DJ April ’98), Brig Khan gives an account of another direct participant of the battle - ‘Risaldar Mohammad Yousuf, a troop leader in C Squadron, 13 Lancers, once called at my house after both of us had retired. He told me that after his squadron commander, Major Mohammad Abbas, was wounded, he had advanced and stopped at a report line from where he could see the Akhnur bridge, it seemed that there was no enemy holding it, he did not receive any orders to go any further and did not do so. 13 Lancers have the milestone at which they stopped, it says Akhnur 4 Kilometres... In Brigadier (Retd) Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry’s book ‘September ‘65-’Before and After’ he gives an account of a conversation with Gen Yahya where Yahya reportedly claimed that he was stopped from going any further due to orders! None of this makes sense, perhaps a case of the lingering fog of the ‘65 war. What was going on?

Maj Amin makes a convincing case here and elsewhere of the then dictator suffering from a condition common in the sub-continent even today, a slave-of-the-west mentality, where even minor attention or rejection of the west is cause for great rejoicing or despair (Look at India and it’s new found friend, may their friendship last as has ours). What would Ayub have done if an impolite earful had come his way. He wasn’t to know then that the US sanctions were to be near on permanent. I am left thinking that a small operation called ‘Gibraltar’ went badly out of control leading to an unplanned full fledged war - Brig ZA Khan states that 25% of the troops were on leave (vacation as they say in the US) during operation Grand Slam.

I am not a military man, nor a historian, but I feel that we must critically and objectively discuss and analyse all our past in order to strengthen and grow as a nation amongst other nations. After 54 years can we not come to terms with the fact that we are sovereign and alone. We never did nor will we ever have ‘brother’ nations, we have only interests, only our interests as other nations have theirs. All this talk of a greater Muslim entity — Pakistan, Afghanstan, Central Asian Republics etc., with Islamabad as it’s capital is a bad joke. We have to suffer Islamabad why would others choose to do so. Pakistan’s nuclear capability is only for our defence and threatens no one, near or far. It doesn’t help to have been a US surrogate against the USSR. If we sold ourselves then why would we not do it again? That is the millstone that hangs about our necks today. Harping on about our hurt feelings after being a faithful and reliable friend only emphasises this. How can we convince others of our sincerity in nuclear non-proliferation. Afghanistan may be our solution to the lack of strategic depth but it will have to be kept perpetually unstable to serve that purpose, at what cost to our nation. We need to make a hard-nosed cost-benefit analysis devoid of silly prejudices of our relationship with each and every other nation. For example, what do we lose in terms of the Arab goodwill if we were to recognise Israel (perhaps not immediately), what benefit does that ensure — the Arabs may learn to overcome their hurt, but how do we sell it to our people. We have no option but to become tough and resourceful. Pakistan is full of talent but it can’t seem to get over its hang-ups. It had better if it’s going to survive — hypocrisy is not an option.

Full marks to the DJ and Maj Amin.

From: <Mybacha@aol.com>

To: <defjrnl@pathfinder.com.pk>

Subject: Defence Journal

Date: Wednesday, August 29, 2001 1:58 AM

Dear Editor:

I’m a regular reader of your internet edition.  Your’s is the only journal in Pakistan about defence matters of the country.  Indeed it is a difficult task to publish regularly about defence matters of the country where the culture of constructive criticism and indepth analysis is not fully developed.  Colleges and Universities are usually the centres of such debates,  discussions and centres of new ideas about all matters important for the nation. Unfortunately, in case of Pakistan, the centres of learning didn’t  evolve to that level.  Although many Pakistani scholars reached eminence but  that was mainly due to their publishing activities outside Pakistan.

Each successive issue of Defence Journal shows some signs of improvement but I think it can be transformed into a much better entity.  Some regular contributors give very good presentation but still a number of them are just repeating known facts and familiar rhetoric. In some cases, the authors give disjointed accounts jumping from one topic to another with no continuity of thought process.  A more rigorous editorial review and feedback to the author can significantly improve the quality.  Some regular contributors like A.H. Amin, Nasim Zehra and Shireen Mazari write very lucidly.

Although, a section can still be alloted for opinion section but I would suggest that the editorial board should seriously consider publication of more reasearched and bibliographed articles on various topics of national security.  Due to peculiar circumstances of Pakistan, I think there should be more indepth discussion of civil-military relations and regional security issues. 

Sincerely,

Hamid Hussain

Port Jefferson, NY

humza@dnamail.com

From: “Ravi Krishna” <krishna_from_bahrain@yahoo.com>

To: <defjrnl@cyber.net.pk>

Subject:  India’s Battered Image

Date: Wednesday, August 29, 2001 9:09 PM

India has failed to repair its battered image on human rights despite tireless efforts of its diplomats all over the world.

And what has really smeared the image of India abroad are the grave violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir over the past eleven years. The catch-and-kill policy pursued by some of the security agencies in the state has done no good to the country. Fake encounters, killings in custody and using rape as a weapon against people has brought India opprobrium it will find hard to live down.

Inspite of the central government preventing international human rights organizations from visiting the state, scores of alarming reports have been published from United States and England. Hair-raising accounts by the Amnesty International, the Freedom House, Asia Watch and many other international organisations on human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir have horrified civilised societies. From Switzerland to New York human rights violations in Kashmir have been dominating the international debates.

Most of the times it becomes difficult for the Indians abroad to defend the country. Now Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani is saying that the government was considering a ‘general amnesty’ for all security personnel facing charges of human rights violations while fighting militants. By announcing amnesty to security personnel guilty of committing heinous crimes like killing of innocents and raping of women, the Home Minister has sent the wrong message to the people of the state in particular, and to the world in general.

Ravi Krishna

Adliya, Bahrain