Security threats  for US missile defence

Columnist SOBIA NISAR looks at threat perceptions in US National Missile Defence policy.

The US is likely to face new risks and challenges to US security interests that are not easy to meet.

SECURITY THREATS POSED BY NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. The continued proliferation and potential use of NBC weapons directly threatens the United States. Over 20 countries, several of which are virtually on Europe’s doorstep already possess or are developing such weapons/delivery systems. US  dominance in the conventional military arena will likely encourage potential adversaries to resort to asymmetric means for attacking US forces and interests overseas and Americans at home.US defence planners must assume that use of NBC weapons to disrupt US operations and logistics is a likely condition of future warfare. To address the NBC weapons threat, the US pursues a multidimensional strategy which must be in close cooperation with her transatlantic allies and partners.eg.

Export control regimes. The US has no monopoly on the development, application, and sale of  ‘dual-use’ equipment, technologies and technical information. A large and growing range of ‘dual use’ goods and expertise are actively sought by proliferaters for offensive weapons programme. Through international regimes like Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and Nuclear Suppliers Group, the US  works with many states to limit the transfer of sensitive ‘dual use’ items to states posing a proliferation concern.

Arms control and international non-proliferation agreements.  Close cooperation between the US and its allies on a routine basis is required to ensure effective implementation of and compliance with existing agreements eg. 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 1972 Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention, 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.1994 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty once it comes into force. While US primary objective is to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons /delivery systems but US recognizes that prevention might not succeed in every case.

Deterrence. The US deters threats and potential threats to its national security, including those from NBC weapons states maintaining powerful nuclear and conventional forces. DoD also has undertaken a comprehensive programme to equip, train and prepare USA forces to prevail in conditions in which an adversary threatens to use these weapons against US population, territories or military forces. This combination of offensive and defensive capabilities both strengthens deterrence and ensures that US will prevail if deterrence fail. The independent British, French and Allied nuclear forces play an important role in deterring any attack on US respective vital national interests. US allies and potential coalition partners also must be prepared to counter NBC threats or attacks to ensure that US maintains a cohesive political and military front during a crisis. Since 1994, NATO’s Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) has broadened a consensus within NATO about any threats to US national security, identified concrete steps needed to counter threats and injected those requirements into NATO’s Force Planning process. The DGP is focussed on improvement  of the concepts, doctrine, training and exercises needed for counterproliferation operations. Force Goals (including key areas agreed under DCI) emphasize interalia, capabilities for biological  and chemical weapons detection, identification and warning; individual and collective protection equipment  and NBC hardened automated and deployable command, control and communication systems. In concert with the  DCI, counterproliferation-related capabilities must be fielded and commensurate NBC defence doctrine, training and exercises improved.

As a result of  the Washington Summit WMD Initiative, several complementary efforts are underway. Nato’s Senior Politico-Military  Group on Proliferation (SGP) has expanded its discussion of non-proliferation issues in support of the alliance’s primary prevention goal. At NATO headquarters, there is a newly established WMD Centre comprised of political, defence, military and intelligence experts to integrate and coordinate work on the wide range of missile defence related issues.

Ballistic Missile Defence. For America, the threat posed by ballistic missiles capable of delivering NBC weapons from several states of concern is substantial and increasing.

1. Iran is developing long range missiles. It has flight tested a 13,000 km Shahab-3 missile and within a decade, could test a missile capable of reaching all NATO territory and much of the US. Iran has chemical weapons and is seeking nuclear and biological capabilities.

2. Before Gulf War, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological weapons into missile warheads  and was close to achieving a nuclear capability. UN sanctions have slowed but probably not stopped, Iraq’s efforts  to produce NBC weapons and develop or buy long range missiles to develop them.

3. Libya has chemical weapons capabilities  and is trying to aquire long range missiles.

4. North Korea is building and selling long range missiles and has assembled an arsenal with chemical, biological and probably nuclear capabilities. It has developed  and may soon test the Taepo Dong 2 missile that could reach US territory.

Thus, all the above states will have missile forces in the next 5 to 15 years that could be used to threaten the homelands of all NATO members including US.

Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). To enhance the USA security, the US is pursuing opportunities for TMD cooperation with NATO partners in order to provide effective missile defence for coalition forces in both Article 5 and non-article 5 operations against short to medium range missiles. In its strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed the risk posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles and derived an agreement for addressing these threats.

As part of NATO’s DCI, allies agreed to develop alliance forces that can respond with active and passive forces from NBC attack.

As the ballistic missile threat to Europe evolves in the direction of longer ranges, the alliance will need to consider further measures of defence incorporating upper-tier TMD or a defence against longer-range missiles. The recent US TMD cooperation with Russia  is an excellent example of how cooperative approaches to dealing with new regional security challenges of mutual interest, such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles can advance US security interests.

National Missile Defence (NMD). Based on US assessment of the threats that can be posed by Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea, the US has concluded to counter these threats before one of these states  attempts to blackmail the US from protecting its interests. Thus the US  is developing a NMD system that would protect all 50 states from a limited attack of a few to a few tens of warheads. China has a more modest nuclear force than Russia, but has a multi-faceted nuclear modernization  programme that predates NMD. The US NMD system is not designed to neutralize China’s strategic capabilities.

The NMD would reinforce the credibility of US security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole.The US is open to discuss possible cooperation with Allies on longer range ballistic missile defence. As President Bill Clinton said in May 2000, “every country that is a part of a responsible international  arms control and non-proliferation regime should have the benefit of this protection”.

In September 2000, Clinton announced that while NMD was sufficiently promised and affordable to justify continued developing and testing, there was not sufficient information about operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment. In making this decision, he considered the threat, cost and impact on US national security of proceeding with NMD. The president’s decision will provide flexibility to a new administration and will preserve the option to deploy a national missile defence system in the 2006-2007 time frame.

Nuclear Proliferation. Nuclear proliferation presents special problems for US force planning.The risks in terms of potential losses to US forces, damage to allied nations and escalation to a superpower confrontation and conflict are immense. Such threats are not controlled by the careful process of deterrence that has been established between the superpowers. They can confront the US with a wide range of possible contingencies that its forces have not been designed to fight.

This is particularly true in the Middle East and South Asia. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains the most explosive and continuing threat that third party conflicts pose to US strategic interests. The Iran-Iraq war ranked second by only a slight margin and the overall security of Persian Gulf is of far greater strategic importance to the US than that of the Middle East. While South Asia is of limited intrinsic value to the US, the containment of Chinese economy and security of Gulf’s eastern flank, and of transit through the Indian Ocean remains as important as ever.

At the same time, the US faces extremely serious resource constraints in implementing its existing force plans and force goals. Accordingly any recommendations made regarding US force planning   and SNFs (Small Nuclear Forces) must take the issues of time and resources into full account.

The US already faces severe resource constraints in providing forces for its Rapid Deployment Task Force (RDTF) in improving any aspect of its theatre force capability, basic structure in Middle East and Gulf, obtaining lift and strategic mobility forces and assets and in carrying out its ambitious ship-building programme. It seems unlikely that any burden sharing activities will do more than preserve the status quo in terms of allied force levels and commitments. The US will certainly lack the resources necessary to meet its most imminent and urgent strategic commitments. The US is equally careful in approaching nations like Saudi Arabia about the risk the region may become nuclearized, whether in terms of local nuclear forces or any other form. The end effect could be to cause such states to distance themselves from the US and the risk of involvement in a nuclear conflict or to support covertly third nation efforts at proliferation to gain a compensating nuclear capability.

The threats created by independent SNFs are not unique and require many of the same force improvements necessary to enable US to cope with the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and technologies; to meet broader US needs to create the capability to fight theatre nuclear wars outside NATO, Japan and Korea  and to implement the US administration’s emphasis on deterring any nuclear weapon state from prolonged war.

Impact of Conventional Weapons. Conventional proliferation will put fighter aircraft  even more similar to the F18 or F16 C into the hands of major Middle Eastern, Gulf and  South Asian nations. It will give them more conformal fuel tanks and air munitions technology that will extend their range to that of yesterday’s medium bombers  but with superior capability to penetrate enemy air defences, to navigate precisely to their targets, to use electronic warfare and to deliver munitions from stand off  or low vulnerability attack profiles with great accuracy.

At the same time, third world nations will be acquiring replacements for their current surface-to-surface rockets and missiles. Their conventional capabilities will be further backed by advanced long range radars and probably by some form of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) with the ability to manage attacks at long ranges and often from over the horizon of ground or sea based radars.

From a practical viewpoint, US forces will be in the same position as their British counterparts were in the Falkland war, facing an enemy with equivalent or near equivalent conventional technology. Unlike the British, the US will face an enemy with the ability to deliver tactical technology roughly equivalent in its effect on military targets to small nuclear weapons. The nations in the region will also be able to buy advanced munitions ranging from air-to-ship missiles to self-homing area munitions and rumway killers. Several of these munitions can achieve the same damage against the key targets like armoured units, air fields, and ships as low-yield nuclear weapons.

Like the Israelis, the US forces will face the practical problem that will not be able to take casualties or losses without an extraordinary popular cause. The moral, ideological, and political ambiguity of most conflicts in the Third World and particularly in the Middle East and South Asia will mean that a US president will be unable to act if action means significant US losses and that he will be particularly limited early in a crisis when the importance of the situation is ambiguous but when action offers the best hope of limiting escalation.    

China’s Capabilities.  Although China today has the world’s largest Armed Forces, it is not a “peer competitor” of the US. Nevertheless, the current Chinese military possesses four important characteristics  that differentiate it from the standard major theatre war (MTV) planning cases, such as Iraq and North Korea.

1. China has nuclear weapons that can reach US territory.

2. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) fields a variety of surface-to-surface missiles that would prove especially problematic for current and near-term future US ballistic missile defences.

3. The absolute size of the PLA would present challenges.

4. China’s geographical extent make it very difficult for US forces to reach and attack the full-range of targets that the US military would anticipate striking in the course of an MTV.

Thus, even today PLA , the poorly trained and ill-equipped as it is —present operational challenges to US strategists contemplating a possible confrontation with China. China is engaged in arms purchases from abroad and indigenous development to modernizing PLA, which can greatly intensify those challenges. Indigenous development is also facilitated by espionage as well as by the covert acquisition of export-controlled components, manufacturing equipment and other technology.

China could emerge by 2015, as a formidable power, one that might be labelled as multi-dimensional regional competitor. Such a China could credibly

1. exercise sea-denial with respect to the seas contiguous to China.

2. contest aerospace superiority in a sustained way in areas contiguous to China’s borders.

3. threaten US operating locations in East Asia with a variety of long range strike assets.

4. challenge US information dominance.

5. pose a strategic nuclear threat to the US.

US policy makers suggest that containment would be a more realistic way to deal with the prospect of a powerful China in the future. However Containment would be a difficult policy to implement; First, it would be hard to obtain a domestic consensus to subordinate other policy goals eg. trade and investment to dealing with the Chinese threat.

Second Containment would require the wholehearted cooperation of the regional allies and advanced industrial countries of the world again such cooperation would be difficult to obtain.

Third, containment policy of US can have an unfavourable outcome and could create a confrontation where none existed.

US Armed Forces must be prepared to defeat China militarily if it threatens vital US interests. China military modernization pose many potential challenges for the US Armed Forces. The USAF most important implications are:

1. Dealing with the Potential Threat of Chinese Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons and Missiles. The US military including USAF  seeks  to provide defence against ballistic and cruise missiles. The USAF  places  increased emphasis on larger range platforms that could be based outside the range of future Chinese attack systems.

2. Assuring Air Superiority. The USAF continues  to field aircraft and munitions with low observable characteristics and reevaluate the planned purchases of next generation munitions as planned numbers may be insufficient to wage an effective campaign against a modernized PLA.

3. Protecting US Space and Information Systems. The Chinese perceiving themselves to be far less independent on space than the US, could initiate a counter space campaign. The Chinese might also seek to disrupt US ability to respond to its aggression by attacking US information systems.

4. Ensuring Access to Theatre. The USAF considers options for improving access to Western Pacific. According to US defence planners a greater emphasis on South East Asia is required to enable US to respond to contingencies in that region and South China Sea as well.

5. Putting Greater Emphasis on longer range systems. The current force mix is dominated by short legged systems. The USAF  reviews  its modernization plans for the middle term and consider changes that would emphasize longer range systems such as medium range bombers and stand off long range cruise or ballistic missiles and over the very long term, space based systems.

6. Dealing with Taiwan Issue. The US is engaged in arms sale package to Taiwan in order to reduce effects of Chinese potential military threats. The US would emphasize the importance of a peaceful resolution of Taiwan issue that could bring peace in the region.

Non-Traditional Transitional Threats. The US  has important security interest in cooperating in the fight against terrorism and international crime in all forms. Terrorism, international crime and illegal trade in fissile materials and other dangerous substances are examples of “non-traditional” transitional threats to the security of the US  transatlantic community and its citizens. These threats come in many forms. Terrorist groups might have nationalistic, ethnic or religious motivations or a combination of these. Their means of terror range from conventional firearms and explosives to chemical, biological and possibly radiological weapons, to cyber attacks on state            or privately run information systems. Transitional criminal organizations based on trafficking in drugs and human beings are growing more diversified and sophisticated.

The US and Europeans are of the view that they  are the future possible targets and victims of these scourges. Though the US military forces  and infrastructure and particularly US and Allied Forces  can often become targets  of terrorist attacks, the most trenchant example being the attack against the USS Cole in Yemen.

At the strategic level, the US seek to ensure that the emerging threat of NBC terrorism  and the proliferation of NBC materials and expertise are vigorously addressed. The 1999 Washington Summit provided an opportunity for NATO to set in motion  concrete steps to strengthen its political will and military capabilities to deal with the threat of modern terrorism and NBC weapons.

NATO’s Strategic Concept acknowledged the threat of such weapons pose to Allied territory and citizens and launched an effort under the WMD Initiative to strengthen common understanding about NBC issues, improve intelligence and information sharing and integrate political and military aspects of alliance work in responding to NBC proliferation. The US remains a target for terrorism, according to some observers but US is upgrading security  at home and remains steadfast in her determination to protect American citizens and diplomatic and military personnel and continues to use all necessary means to counter terrorism.

Steps to be taken by US Policy Makers

American leadership has come to be understood as a  “dominating” or “overbearing” superpower. To address this situation, US should take the following steps:

First, US must continue to set an example, by word or by deed, that convinces others to join efforts to strengthen transatlantic security. If America does not demonstrate the political will and devote the resources necessary to sustain these efforts it will be harder for partners to do so.

Second, the watchwords of transatlantic security relations should engage in “cooperation” not  “competition” or “confrontation”. Historically, there has been few examples where US has been at odds with Europe as a whole over a significant security policy issue.

Third, US must anticipate that as NATO and the EU enlarge, their internal decision making processes  will become more complex and possibly slower. While this should not be a problem in normal circumstances, it cannot be allowed to lead to paralysis in a crisis. The US should  continue to work with all its allies and partners to ensure that they have the fullest possible access to information necessary to participate meaningfully in transatlantic security deliberations and to take effective and  timely collective action. This will require contact between US officials and their counterparts in national capitals as well as in NATO and EU headquarters in Brussels.

Fourth, US must be straightforward in acknowledging that the US  like every other country reserves a right to act alone,  or within a coalition of the willing when US’s vital interests are at stake. The US perceives a broad and growing spectrum of issues that are important to her security and where close cooperation with partners is a requirement. While some foreign policy commentators on both sides of the Atlantic are quick to level charges of American “unilateralist” or “isolationist” tendencies, the US should direct efforts and set examples whereby such claims could be denied.

Finally, the US must need to be prepared to share responsibility and leadership. The self-interest of the US will not be served by rhetoric  or actions that encourage some Europeans to abdicate their security responsibilities and encourage others to reaffirm their European identity by weakening transatlantic bonds. Indeed, the US seek to encourage greater leadership by Allies and Partners/States in areas such as improvements in defence capabilities, outreach to partners and support for democratic values beyond the transatlantic community that reinforce US common security.

In the 21st Century, America can best achieve its long term goals by acting resolutely — and always  in a spirit of true partnership as a catalyst, builder, symbol and defender of an overgrowing coalition of democratic, prosperous and  secure not only the US peoples but also the world community at large.