Weapons and Tactics
Chapter 12

Columnist Brig (Retd) ZA KHAN gives an overview of the changing concepts over the years.

Future Land Warfare

“The very variety of opinion proves how difficult it is to recognise, in peace time, the extent and influence of improved or new weapons on the conduct of war and of combat; and also to conceive a picture of war . . .” - Field-Marshall Ritter von Leeb.

The fast changing and the dynamic nature of modern military technology makes it difficult to predict land warfare trends with accuracy. Tactics are the technique of employing the resources that are available, countries with advanced technology will base their tactics on their technology and countries that lack advanced technology will have to plan to counter the advanced technology of their opponent. In a war where one side has complete air and technological superiority it will use it to cripple its opponents with air attacks and avoid ground combat casualties.

Technology is changing weapons. In tanks, mobility has not changed much from what it was at the end of the Second World War and no radical change is in the offing in the near future, protection has improved with reactive armour and advanced active defence systems with sensors; tank and anti-tank weapons are becoming ‘a shot a tank’ with very high velocity ammunition, laser spot seeking, laser beam riding and fibre optic guidance imaging tank and anti-tank systems.

Artillery has advanced considerably, the present weapon system with mobility, target acquisition system and communications, locates targets, analyses target data, applies firepower to destroy the target and prepares for the next action. Target acquisition has improved due to surveillance and observation systems; fire effect has been increased manifold by the “multi-launched rocket system” and tactical nuclear weapons. Artillery with smart munitions and fed target location data of pin point accuracy obtained with ‘global positioning systems’ and transmitted by ‘unmanned aerial vehicles’ will neutralise tank, infantry and other concentrations and bring counter-battery fire against enemy artillery.

 The future infantry will be ‘mountain’ and ‘mechanised’; mobility has been a decisive factor on the battlefield, the helicopter has given it a new dimension. Infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) are improving in armour protection and in all types of weapons, anti-personnel, anti-tank and anti-aircraft, they (IFVs) will replace armoured personnel carriers (APC).

 Electronically the changes have been in geometric progression since the end of the Second World War. Microelectronics are revolutionising communications and the guidance of missile; at night, in adverse weather and in battlefield conditions sensors guide missiles and other munitions to their targets, tanks, helicopters and aircraft will not have the freedom that they have enjoyed till recently.

Electronic warfare will play a vital role, electronic counter measures (ECM) will neutralise weapon systems, counter measures must be effective, and personnel must be well trained in it. Within a few years, if not already, computers should replace the command headquarters paraphernalia of maps, message pads etc and speed the passage of information and other data; the C3 has changed to C4, the fourth C for computers. Computers are being used for databases of various types and dedicated purposes - command and control, terrain information, weapon employment, information and communication, war gaming, battlefield simulation are some of the uses and this will increase. Future land combat will be dependent on Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). The obtaining of accurate information and its dissemination for the planning and conduct of operations will be vital. Advanced technology, use of electronic sensors, command, control, communications, (C3), requires that the best science educated personnel available should be employed in communication and electronic warfare.

The land battlefield will be dominated by the side that has ‘air superiority’, ‘local air superiority’, augmented by helicopter ‘gun ships’, will be necessary for offensive and defensive actions to succeed. Integrated air defence systems consisting of early warning radar, guns and surface to air missiles will be essential; combat air patrols will not prevent low level helicopter attacks, these will have to be taken care of with anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missiles; the number of anti-aircraft missile launchers will vary with the terrain, aircraft and helicopters will be neutralised to a great extent by ground to air missiles fired by ground troops.

Tactics, traditionally fire and movement, the fire will depend on the ability to obtain target data, movement will depend on the ability to deny target information and on the control of air space to prevent air attacks. Ground operations will require a continuos tactical picture to locate artillery, surface to air, surface to surface, anti-tank weapons and troop concentrations; this may be through spy satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or suitably located sensors. Troops in forward lines may keep the enemy under observation with cameras, record observations on tape and display the front line scene on screens for target location and other tactical needs.

The effect of terrain on land warfare will be as vital as in the past, properly used it will conceal, protect and multiply strength; advanced technology will be neutralised by difficult terrain. The more complex and difficult the terrain environment, the simpler the technology that will be needed.

The organisation of land forces is likely to tend towards self-contained teams of fighting arms capable of defending against aircraft, tanks and artillery and with separate organisation for operating in mountains, plains and deserts. The helicopter will be important for battlefield mobility and for attacking.

The mountain division equipment will continue to be man and animal portable and helicopter transportable, fire support will be from mortars and howitzers; battle field mobility will be limited to walking, use of horses and mules and helicopters, light armoured fighting vehicles might also be employed.

For fighting in plains and deserts, battlefield mobility will have to be based on road and cross-country vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters.

To maintain a ratio of force to space where there are extended fronts, ‘economy of force’ units will have to be organised. These units will hold extended fronts, reconnoitre forward when not in contact with the enemy and withdraw in contact if necessary to enable striking forces to take appropriate action.

Troops within artillery range will have to be equipped with body armour for protection and if the enemy has nuclear capability, troops will have to be equipped and trained for war under nuclear conditions.

Tactics will remain the same, time tested, “fire and movement” and troops will have to be trained to automatically follow day operations with night operations and vice versa. Surprise will remain the most important factor not withstanding satellites, RPVs, sensors and modern electronics.

Artillery ammunition expenditure will be heavy in all types of terrain. In mountainous terrain it will be an infantry battle supported by artillery, in the plains and deserts, tanks supported by the Air Force will be decisive. Armour battles will be fought at ranges up to 4000 metres; camouflaged and stationary tanks will have an advantage as in the past. Tank units launched against prepared defences without proper artillery and air support will be destroyed.

Lessons from the short conventional wars that have been fought after the Second World War, are that intensive actions that take place after the out break of hostilities, demand an immediate re-supply of ammunition and technical maintenance of high technology weapons without which the participants collapse from physical, mental and logistical exhaustion after a few days fighting and casts doubts on the ability of most countries to fight more than a few days with sophisticated high technology weapons without assured re-supply. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war it was estimated that it required eighty “surface to air missiles” to down one aircraft, that 3000 tanks were lost by both sides in the short duration (this emphasises the requirement of efficient tank recovery on the battlefield). The high rate of consumption of spares for aircraft, supplies of sophisticated weapons, guided missiles and tanks that cannot be replaced quickly even by technologically advanced countries. Countries dependent on imported weapons will require second line of forces with indigenous simpler, more plentiful, and replaceable weapons.

 In most aspects war has not changed, it is dominated by danger, which generates fear, it is terrifying and confusing, it is exhaustive and messy. War requires men who are steadfast and have mastery over the weapons and equipment that they will operate and motivation to continue with steadiness under adverse conditions.

 In military thinking there exists a paradox of conservatism and a penchant for Utopian tactical methods. The minds of soldiers are influenced more by habit and tradition than by reason, there are always interests at stake which prevent improvements, the army hierarchy, like other hierarchies, believes that ‘wisdom comes from seniority’ which creates conservatism which often survives the circumstances that created it. The lessons must be learnt from the past and must be utilised; it is the task of tacticians to work out combinations from the past and present, to study the means available and to arrive at a workable doctrine for use in the next war.

 A country’s military doctrine is influenced by factors of manpower, industrial production, the national temperament, tradition, and the geo-political situation in relation to its likely enemies. Generally, qualitative and quantitatively superior equipment enhances the chances of success yet seemingly inadequate resources properly utilised have repeatedly proved successful; the thought of man is the best weapon and thinking men constitute the best war machine.