The Pursuit of Victory from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein

By Brian Bond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

240 pages. ISBN 0-19-820497-3.

Lt Col Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army (Retd) reviews this book exclusively for DJ.

Eminent British military historian Brian Bond has written this extremely interesting, thought-provoking, and insightful study to dissect and analyze The Pursuit of Victory From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein.  As military tactics, technology, and society have evolved over the last two centuries, so have the definition of victory, the methods employed to achieve victory, the frequently ephemeral or illusory nature of victory, and the use of war as an instrument of policy.

Battles, in classical warfare, were frequently “decisive” in that they seldom lasted longer than a single day with one side being clearly “victorious” and its opponent slaughtered or driven from the battlefield and otherwise deprived of any further means of resistance.  The nature of warfare changed as did the political structure and system of Europe, with rapid, decisive victories being more difficult to achieve in the dynastic conflicts waged by their mercenary armies in the eighteenth century.  Battles were frequently avoided by the weaker side in this era of limited war, the ethos of the Enlightenment considering vast destruction and high casualties to be immoral.  More pragmatically, armies were expensive to maintain, took a long time to train, and their tactical employment was unwieldy and cumbersome.  The campaigns of Frederick the Great, in which warfare and position, with limited political objectives, were preferred over the quest for the decisive battle, are chronicled to illustrate the concept and practice of limited war.  Bond believes Frederick was a great general not only because of his tactical successes, but more so because he “admirably balanced political judgement and the conformity of his strategy with political reality” (p. 25).

The French Revolution, the establishment of the levee en masse in 1793 which mobilized all citizens and introduced nationalistic fervour into an army, and the rise of Napoleon, marked a true watershed in warfare.  “By harnessing and exploiting the full military and political potential of the Revolution as developed by 1800,” Bond reminds us, “Napoleon was empowered to unleash a form of warfare of unprecedented boldness, geographical range, and intensity, so earning Clausewitz’s accolade of ‘the God of War’ (p. 29).  Napoleon, who also implemented a highly-effective division and corps structure, was determined to destroy the enemy in the field as the quickest means of overthrowing his opponent’s government, the most notable examples being Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt.  Eventually Napoleon over-extended himself, suffered high casualties not readily replaced, and never seemed to realize that his militarily-heroic campaigns were politically futile.  Nonetheless, Napoleon remained the outstanding proponent of the decisive battle.

Napoleon’s legacy was perpetuated primarily by the military theorists Jomini and Clausewitz, with the latter consistently advocating the direct annihilation of the enemy force.  Jomini, however, due to his further successful military service, prolific writing, and longevity, was initially more influential than Clausewitz.  Prussia’s sensational victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1871 suggested that the Napoleonic/Clausewitzian model of decisive warfare could still be waged under more modern conditions. They also seemed to be perfect examples of Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an instrument of policy.  The four-year-long American Civil War (1861-1865), ignored to various degrees by European powers, was more of an indicator of future warfare, in that a conflict pitting mass armies against each other, supported by a modern industrial base, would turn into a long war of attrition.

Germany, formed in the wake of Prussia’s 1870-1871 victory, was thereafter concerned with Franco-Russian cooperation and a simultaneous attack on two fronts.  An evolving German operational plan was designed to defeat France, then redeploy troops via railroad to the east where they would then defeat the slower-mobilizing Russians.  The Germans believed in the paradigm espoused by the elder Moltke: total victory in a short decisive campaign.  The feasibility of this concept was given added reinforcement by the Japanese defeat of the Russians in 1904-1905. 

In practice, however, this was not to be the case.  In 1914, execution of the German Schlieffen plan failed to decisively defeat enemy forces on either front and ensured the prolongation of a war of attrition.  Governments, which had generally yielded too much authority to the generals, continued to hope for victory after “one more” offensive.  Escalation of both the military effort and war aims made victory the only outcome that could justify the tremendous national sacrifices.  The definitions of victory and defeat, moreover, evolved throughout the First World War (1914-1918).  “The victory itself,” according to Bond, “had been worth winning and impressive, but the issues were too complicated and the means lacking to convert military success into an enduring peace settlement” (p. 122).

Perceptions of, reactions to — and evasions of — the Versailles Treaty were vigorously debated by various factions during the ensuing years.  The major opponents (especially the defeated Germans) assessed and distilled their “lessons learned” from the world conflagration to enhance their prospects of victory in the event of a second great conflict.  It also did not take long to realize that German militarism had not been permanently crushed.  From the British perspective, even through the lens of disenchantment, victory in World War I was clearly better than and distinguishable from defeat — although that, too, was (and continues to be) debated.

German desire to redress the Versailles Treaty, and Japan’s fear of an economic stranglehold, among other factors, resulted in World War II (1939-1945).  Both countries had an initial series of victories noted for speed of execution, economy of force, and relatively small losses.  While peace negotiations were considered or conducted at various times, Hitler resolved to never capitulate, and the Japanese surrendered only after the obliteration of two of their cities by atomic bombs.  The Allies never wavered from their war aim of “unconditional surrender.” 

The continuing relevance of the concept of victory in the nuclear age, using as case studies the main conventional and unconventional conflicts waged since 1945, is also discussed.  In the latter, it is especially difficult to ascertain the differences between the meaning of victory and defeat.  Pertaining to the Gulf War, however, Bond is unequivocal in his conviction that, “There can rarely have been a case in history where the chasm between a decisive military victory and an unsatisfactory political outcome has been so wide.  It was a ‘triumph without victory’” (p. 197).

This excellent, stimulating study succeeds admirably in placing the pursuit of victory, and the avoidance of defeat, within their proper historical context over the last two centuries. The Pursuit of Victory deserves a place on the bookshelf of every serious military thinker and student of military history.