Military Strategy —The next step

Cdr (Retd) Muhammad Azam Khan opines what should be our actions VIS-a-VIS India in the near future.

In the period post-Sept 11, Pakistan was compelled to review many of its policies, both internal as well as external. By disengaging itself and through radical changes in some of the previously flawed policies, government is recharting the country’s course to bring stability. But finding Pakistan in a tight spot and having itself lost the initiative India, with an openly pro-nuclear government, set out by sending aggressive signals to the world at large and neighbours in particular.

 From the use of exceedingly fiery language and amassing troops along Indo-Pak border using the ploy of Dec 13 attack on Parliament to the test firing of nuclear tipped Agni missile with capability of striking deep into China, the top BJP leadership has shown little restraint in words or deeds. Despite Pakistan’s strong and sincere overtures for rapprochement India has been unrelenting in its bellicose stance.  Even in the prevalent circumstances, with troops on either side in an eye ball to eye ball confrontation instead of de-escalating, our eastern neighbour found it fitting to conduct war games and indicate plans of test firing, yet again, a newer generation of a ship based missile. Named ‘Dhanush’, the missile is capable of striking land targets with nuclear as well as conventional warheads.

The veiled designs of Indian leadership notwithstanding; there cannot be any doubt about India’s expansionist policies in South Asia that have come to stay. Pakistan, over the years, is believed to have acquired considerable expertise in the development of land-based medium and long-range missiles that presently constitute the core of our nuclear deterrent capability. However, under the changed global situation and the so-called ‘strategic depth’ theory now lying in the rubble (created as a result of incessant raining of ‘daisy cutters’) of ‘Tora Bora’ mountains and elsewhere in Afghanistan, its time perhaps to review the threat perception and subsequently refashion an enduring military strategy.

The nucleus of such a strategy should be the development of mobile strategic platforms (both land and sea based) outfitted with long-range missiles that could carry either conventional or nuclear warheads to facilitate striking enemy’s heartland. This however must be undertaken with simultaneous reduction in the strength of conventional forces and removing fat, where necessary, for cost cutting purposes.

The perception that imbalance in conventional force ratio, the first line of defence, being, already too lopsided in favour of India and, therefore, cannot be permitted to enlarge any further is as absurd as was the previous notion of  ‘gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan’. The existing proportion between Pakistan and India in case of land forces is 1:2 and much higher for P.N and PAF. This, however, needs deep reappraisal.

Pragmatically, the current imbalance of conventional forces (in particular Army) becomes inconsequential since in any crisis or combat situation a sizeable amount of Indian troops would remain deployed on Sino-Indian borders and may not be pulled out for obvious reasons. On the contrary, with coalition forces well entrenched in Kabul, our regular troop requirement in the west has abated considerably. Thus almost the entire Pakistan’s armed forces could be deployed to face the enemy on the east.

Compared to Pakistan, India has a large infrastructure for indigenous manufacture of military hardware and it is only hi-tech weapon and sensors for which the latter seeks outward assistance. India’s dependence on foreign support to sustain its conventional weaponry is as such quite low. On the other hand, despite being a severe burden on the national economy and its operational availability, particularly in PN and PAF, heavily dependent on the uninterrupted flow of foreign support, Pakistan continues to provide for a large conventional outfit. Such a view has neither served us well in the past nor is likely to profit our national interests in future.

There is no gainsaying that, as and when we have fallen from grace, military support has been the first casualty of embargo by the west. Typical cases are the paid for F-16’s of PAF and P3C’s belonging to PN. While PAF had to cut on its F-16’s flight training schedule, in the absence of technical expertise and spare support the naval P3C’s, till few years back, had become more of a museum artifact than a potent weapon, which it is.

And we are yet to know what came of the ill-fated P3C that went down in the Arabian Sea along with the entire crew during a routine exercise sometime back. Though part of wreckage was reportedly recovered after a while, not much is known if it was a technical failure or crew error that led to the tragic mishap. But in either case it was a huge setback for the tiny aviation wing of the service that was still reeling from earlier shock of Atlantic aircraft shot down by the Indians while operating well within own territory.

Imposition of embargo seriously jeopardizes the operational availability of front line military hardware like fighter aircraft, ships and submarines. Further more, for a variety of reasons and despite efforts, the development of indigenous military hardware industry has not made any significant headway. Two glaring examples are Pak Army’s main battle tank Al-Khalid and the PAF contemplated front line combat aircraft, the F7-P  (in collaboration with China) that has for years not lifted the ground. To what extent technology is or will be transferred by the French manufacturers in case of the upcoming Agosta subs of P.N, only time will determine but the platform is likely to wield lot of prototype equipment; not experimented with earlier and hence its efficacy remains uncertain.

The platforms in the inventory of PAF and PN are equipped with short to medium range missiles. These missiles being of west origin can easily be subjected to embargo, as has been the case till recently. A PAF strike aircraft with a nuclear payload penetrating thick enemy air-defence umbrella during war is also highly questionable. Moreover, with its limited endurance, use of an air platform for nuclear second strike cannot be counted upon. In other situation, any accidental crash of a nuclear laden aircraft in or near own borders spells dooms day scenario.

On the opposing, our test firing of indigenously developed missiles like Ghauri and series of nuclear detonation during May 1998 in response to India, clearly demonstrated that the covert investment was not only sound but had made significant progress since its start in late 70’s. The reality on ground today also proves that our nuclear deterrence has been worth its value. Despite all the war hysteria created by Indian leadership, the current stand off has not escalated into a full-scale war.

Both sides are completely sensitive that even a small overreaching may trigger a chain of events that, to contain would be impossible and which in time can bring about catastrophe of monumental scale. A manifestation of this fact was witnessed recently when a senior Indian strike corps commander was summarily dismissed after he is believed to have deployed his troops in an overly aggressive posture along Indo-Pak border.  We can safely assume, therefore, that our nuclear doctrine has been effective in curtailing any misadventure on part of the enemy.

That being so, why not augment a capability whose efficacy stands proved? Why not redirect funds, if at all we have to, for developing a formidable deterrent force rather than investing in conventional hardware, availability of which in times of crisis hinges largely upon foreign technical or material support and has thus questionable availability. Of late, as the war clouds gathered, PAF had to beef up its inventory through rush supplies from China?

Oil and its by-products is perhaps the most critical strategic commodity for our country’s survival and to it are closely linked so many other national resources. With the phenomenal increase in population, lack of national consensus over building large dams and changing ecological environs (affecting water level in rivers), the hydel power generation is likely to be progressively substituted by thermal power in the country. This is liable to increase the demand of oil. Not only that, for general mobilization oil remains an inescapable requirement.

The current deployment of forces has already cost Pakistan an estimated $150 million (major portion, by any conservative estimate, being consumed in bearing fuel/oil expenses). And how long this stand off may continue is anyone’s guess. It is believed that the oil reserves predicted for a short and intense war are already dwindling. The overall cost will have to be recovered from subjects of this country through direct and indirect taxes or war taxation, as has been the case in India.

Building new strategic reserves for rationing like refineries is again a cost intensive exercise besides being vulnerable to air attack (principal target) and still remain uncertain if the tension period last longer than envisaged as is the case today. In the absence of any breakthrough in the realization of Iran-Pakistan, Qatar-Pakistan and (or) Turkmenistan-Pakistan gas pipeline and with country’s oil import bill expected to reach $8 billion by year 2010-11, there remains a distinct possibility of this strategic commodity being continually shipped in times of crisis.

Even if the Iran-India pipeline via Pakistan becomes reality, trading of the national goods (both imports and exports), bulk of which is through sea and large oil shipments are likely to continue. The protection of ‘sea lines of communications’, therefore, remains an indispensable requirement for the country’s endurance. The period preceding actual hostilities may be a long drawn during which friendly cargo shipping would continually require protection, as is the case at present.  It needs to be appreciated that an aircraft (fighter or otherwise) with its limited staying power is not a substitute to a warship or submarine that can conduct sustained operations over a period of time, even in adverse weather condition. Besides, in time immemorial, surface ships have been used by navies around the world as a formidable platform for display of might. The recent case being the assembly of large number of coalition ships in the Arabian Sea that unleashed their tremendous firepower in operations against Afghanistan.

To say that sinking of ships at high seas would not affect the land campaign is to be devoid of all realism. Even during peacetime if an oil tanker does not berth in Karachi port for a week or so to discharge its ballast of oil it can bring about a national crisis of vast proportion. A demonstration of this fact has been occasionally witnessed in the past as and when the tanker drivers, ferrying oil supplies from Karachi to north of country decided to go on strike. Panic abounds as people are seen massing at petrol stations. 

The planned port at Gwadar in collaboration with China is still a far cry for meeting even the essential needs of navy let alone fulfil national requirements. Further, in the events following Sept 11 and given the strategic importance of the Gwadar, Pakistan is likely to come under increasing pressure from the United States to withdraw Chinese partnership. To what extent Islamabad may resist such a proposition remains to be seen but in any case the requirement of transporting oil to Karachi (for upcountry refineries and other needs) will persist, at least in the foreseeable future. PN will, therefore, be required to provide escort to friendly shipping carrying strategic commodities. This, primarily, is a defensive role but has nonetheless strategic value for the country.

PN ships/submarines accompanying friendly cargo (from and to Gulf/Red Sea) can only restrain the enemy if suitably equipped with homegrown long range conventional but preferably nuclear tipped missiles along with potent air early warning and air defence capability. Our submarines duly equipped with long range missiles will not only deter the enemy but can inflict severe counter blow on the enemy’s vital sea lines from and to its west coast.  Such weapon outfit would, therefore, provide the necessary offensive capability to these platforms. As of now these ships only symbolize a sitting duck to the enemy whose lethal mix of air surface and sub-surface stand-off weapons continue to grow rapidly.

Beyond the Indian land-based missiles, conventional or otherwise, today entire Pakistan is well within the strike range of IAF. PAF, on the other hand, does not have much reach beyond Bombay. To add to that is the ‘size’ advantage that India enjoys and which facilitates pre-positioning of nukes

(in silos) and launch of nuclear second strike. Little wonder then during the ongoing crises irresponsible BJP leadership had pronounced that in a nuclear stand off while India may suffer substantial damage, it would result in total annihilation of Pakistan.

Redefining force goals and judicious cut down in conventional force strength would serve two fundamental purposes. Whilst allowing diversion of funds for ‘research and development of strategic weapons’ it will alongside engage and employ domestic scientific skills and brains that are currently being drained or wasted unnecessarily as also result in reinvesting left over savings in other national projects. All this, however, cannot be achieved overnight and certainly requires long-term setting up, nonetheless in the end this, possibly, remains the only solution to bring round our ailing national economy. 

In China our time tested ally, we have an example to emulate. During the last decade or so the country has managed to build a formidable arsenal of strategic forces (second only to United States) whilst maintaining a high GDP growth rate. This was made possible only after PLA decided to heavily trim down its conventional forces and involve the rest in national development projects thus saving valuable foreign exchange. But much before that, national goals were duly reprioritized; boundary disputes shelved and all national resources were mobilized in strengthening economy, the sine qua non for a prosperous and strong country. 

In our case, however, much of what has been said in the foregoing all but depends on the latitude provided by Washington to Islamabad and the grit of latter to withstand pressure from the west.

Be that as it may, while the military think tanks in Strategic Plans Division are on the job to draw contours of a fresh military strategy, following facets need to be pondered in the backdrop of changed global situation and domestic compulsions:

*  Expansion of the existing R&D infrastructure to augment ‘research and strategic force development’    including rapidly deployable mobile missile platforms.

* Development of second-strike capability through submarines on the new Agosta subs.

* Development of strategic launch facilities along Mekran coast.

* Examining possibility of enhancing strike range of PAF through mid-air refuelling.

* Arming PN ships/other platforms with long-range missiles both for sea and land based targets.

* Improving Command & Control, Air Defence network as well as Early Warning Systems.

*  Reducing the fat and overall size of conventional strength to:

• Improve efficiency and reinvest in strategic forces or other meaningful national development projects.

• Widening scope of research and development and harnessing innovative young science/technical graduates in the related projects, preferably through lucrative incentives.