A study of evolution of Pakistan’s decision to fight terrorism and its historic dimensions

OPINION

A study of evolution of Pakistan’s decision to fight terrorism and its historic dimensions

Brig (Retd) Muhammad Mahboob Qadir discusses the most potent subject of security.

Pakistan has decided to provide ‘Unstinted Support’ to the United States and the emerging global coalition against terrorism. This was the first policy statement that was issued from Islamabad within days of the destruction of World Trade Centre in New York and part of the Pentagon on September 11. This declaration followed US resolve to wage a global war against terrorism and the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman’s blunt demand or rather ultimatum ‘Choose sides, either you are with us or our enemy’. Thus Pakistan found itself presented with a Hobson’s choice albeit quite unnecessarily. The decision to cooperate was further precipitated by the indecent haste — that is even before US appealed for help — with which India offered to cooperate in military and intelligence fields with USA, more in anticipation of Pakistan’s expected refusal to do so. Thereby foreseeing an opportunity to not only further isolate Pakistan but also completely suppress uprising in Indian Held Kashmir including rooting out its support from across the border. To India, Pakistan appeared to be on the edge of a precipice with the only option left to support Taliban leading inevitably to her being bracketed with Taliban for retaliatory US led coalition strikes. India may have anticipated a ringside view of the destruction of Pakistan more than any active participation in coalition against Osama and his mentors in Afghanistan. It also eyed a friendlier Government in Afghanistan after dissipation of Taliban regime as a result of expected US military action. In a nutshell, an extremely desirable regional scenario appeared to be materializing in India’s calculation at the cost of Pakistan.

However, the swiftness of Pakistan’s completely unexpected decision surprised everybody. According to Doctor Rasul Bakhsh Rais (The News, September 22, 2001) it was truly a defining moment in Pakistan’s history. Seeing the reach and range of effects it is a watershed decision in the region’s political history which is going to equally affect India as it alters the regional equilibrium decisively. Visualizing its future impact it should be considered of as great a significance as that of 1947 partition of India. Except President Musharraf and his close aides this aspect seems to have been lost on most of the Pakistani and whole of the Indian leadership. This unbelievable oversight is an eloquent proof of partisan and shortsighted nature of leadership in both the countries.

On the occasion of this major change of political vision in Pakistan’s leadership, India seems to have repeated Indian National Congress’ historic prepartition mistake1 that led to the Muslim demand for Pakistan. They failed to appreciate the real significance of President Musharraf’s decision beyond the limited scope of their petty diplomatic gains or losses. Missing the forest completely for the trees the Indians have embarked upon a fruitless campaign of revilling Pakistan amongst coalition and elsewhere. India is likely to come to grief by chopping at its own feet in the hope of weakening Pakistan when political sagacity demands strengthening President Musharraf’s hands for the better future of the region. To oppose or impede him can push him and the region into the lap of irrationality of religious fanaticism and racial divide for a long time. These Siamese twins are the real bane of the Subcontinent and not the two antagonists’ nuclear weapons of mutually repulsive diplomacy.

Genesis of the Decision

Having said this it is time to trace the factors that may have led finally to the evolution of this far reaching change in Pakistan’s world view. We may appreciate that the resolve to oppose Taliban in their present dispensation by aligning with anti-terrorism coalition indicates a massive shift in Pakistan’s national direction and a qualitative change in her political priorities. This could neither be the spot result of a coercive US pressure nor a temporary measure to avert an impending disaster. It may have been both but seeing more objectively it is the result of a cumulative effect of forces and factors that were affecting Pakistan’s body politic even before Independence. So the chain of causes is as old and its repercussions as far-reaching. It needs a little more elaboration.

Most political analysts while talking about Pakistan have consistently worked on one exceedingly wrong assumption that is religion. Very few had realized that in the undivided or pre-partition India religion had not been the predominant medium of business of life, far less business of state or tool of political power for Muslims. Islam had mostly served as an overarching but porous umbrella under which Muslim campaigners took shelter from sun and shower. It acted like a kind of mooring for sea weary ships but not the text book for seamanship. It has more been an ambience and a school of simpler religious thought than the religious dogma as made out by most researchers on Islam in the Sub-Continent. The result has been a major error in basic assumptions about the place of religion in the life of Muslims in undivided India and as its corollary in Pakistan.

As a consequence of wise and practical policy to live amicably in a multi-religious society Muslims of India ruled in predominantly non-Muslim areas and served under non-Muslim rulers in their armies and administration. They also lived and thrived in unwalled enclaves within vast Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist strongholds like Benaras, Amritsar and Bihar. This practice was adopted by non-Muslims also. Socially, there were hardly any frictions. A respectful distance from inter-religious controversies and a practical mutual deference was habitually shown to each others religious sensitivities. Dogma and sectarian or religious intolerance never appealed to the majority of Muslims in ancient India. Liberal2 Emperor Akbar rather than strictly Spartan Emperor Aurangzeb was more popular there. Arts and crafts, music, painting, poetry, architecture and theatre were patronized and thrived under Muslim rulers and owe their present form mostly to Muslim artists. Colourful village and country fares regardless of their sectarian or religious hue were officially organized and encouraged throughout the length and breadth of the country round the year. These folk festivals were great social mixers and tools to diffuse any pent-up socio-religious tensions. Basant, Besakhi, Holi, Diwali, Eid, Shab-e-Barat, Urs and so many more occasions of the like were indigenized and redesigned for just such purpose.

Sufis Saint and the Society

Strictly puritanical, reformist and dogmatic religious movements did erupt in Indian Muslim society but never took root or gained wide acceptance among the masses. At best they caused a temporary ripple in the otherwise well-adjusted Muslim mass. And also acted as a reminder of their distinct religious identity but never as a tool of oppression or state policy. It is a noteworthy fact that the sharp tip of the sword was not the favourite vehicle on which Islam travelled and multiplied in the Indian Sub-Continent. Much against the generally held notion Islam hardly spread in the wake of the expanding Muslim conquest in this region. Sword was actually the guarantor of political power. Islam spread mostly through a method nearly unique to this region and by its otherwise unlikely preachers — the Sufi Saints of Muslim India. Since Islam spread less by coercion and more by private persuasion, therefore, the pattern of its social and theological ethos developed in a participatory and accommodating manner. Muslims of the Sub-Continent learnt to co-exist with fellow men in social harmony through common economic and political activism. They moved religion to a functional, localized place where issues were normally not taken up with other religions. This policy was generally reciprocated by Hindus and Sikhs and latter by Christian converts also. This is the conventional religious wisdom of Muslims of the Sub-Continent which should always be kept in sight when attempting to gauge their reactions in most future scenarios.

Sufi saints originated in Central Asia, Iran and Iraq more as a reaction to widespread anarchy, devastation, vast hordes of marauding armies and mass human and social suffering. The whole region was in the grip of massive turmoil. The misery was further compounded by violent sectarian strife and confusion. Masses had been deprived of state protection and security of life and material. In this sea of miseries Sufi orders began to provide small islands of tranquility through non-inquisitive brotherhood, care and non-violence. Marauders generally overlooked them, thus these Sufi orders began to spread amongst lower rungs of the Muslim society in these regions. Simultaneously, India had become the favourite campaigning zone for dispossessed Central Asian Muslim princes and other rulers on its periphery who were fearful of fast emptying treasuries. Few cared to colour their invasions with a latter day religious wrap. For most it was plane conquest and expansion of territories under their rule. These frequent invasions and the broadening fringe of Central Asian turmoil created a social cauldron of ever increasing dimensions in western and north-western territories of the Sub-Continent. Sindh in the South had already absorbed the cultural shock of the rare earlier Muslim conquest from the sea and the society had adjusted itself to the newcomers. This melting pot was fertile ground for the soothing and humane Sufi orders to take root and prosper. Since in this case the invaders were Muslims mostly against non-Muslims, the Sufis enjoyed a kind of immunity from their incest as well as provided a guarantee of security under their umbrella. This was a fortunate coincidence which was very helpful in the creation of a tolerant local Islamic culture as Muslims and non-Muslims alike flocked to their fold and found solace. Thus, also these Sufis were the harbingers of religious harmony within Islam and with other religions in the Sub- Continent. In addition wellknown seats of Sufi saints also became the centres of social symmetry, poetry, Sufi music and social welfare works in their areas. Their poetic licence allowed them to highlight prevailing injustices and soften miseries of the masses through poetry. To the masses they personified as their non-violent spokesmen to whom rulers would listen without retribution. In essence Sufism became the society’s safety valve. This safety mechanism is mainly responsible for the kind of accommodative and tolerant Islam that generally prevails in Pakistan among the majority of the people.

It is, therefore, misleading to adjudge the religious sentiments of the vast majority of Pakistanis from the belligerent posture of the vocal and non-representative sectarian and religious hardliners and their leadership. A conscious differentiation between the two must be made to arrive at logical and objective conclusions about Pakistan and its people. Our brand of Islam does not feed on hatred and violence. Pakistan is too important a country to be viewed through stereotype glasses or pre-conceived perceptions.

The Nebulous Nexus

At this point a question arises as to why this non-representative extremist religious fringe has been able to exercise such a disproportionate influence over political decisions in Pakistan? The answer to this leading question comprises many parts. Going back into the genesis of Pakistan Movement, it would be seen that basically it was not Islam but the Muslims that were in danger of being overwhelmed politically and economically in the wake of British departure from the Sub-Continent. Thus, the movement that started for the politico-economic emancipation of the Muslims of the Sub-Continent was ambushed en-route by religious emotionalism. Creation of Pakistan that was mainly adopted as the next best political alternative to separate Muslim electorate within united India was painted as a state created in the name of Islam. This notion is erroneous in the sense that universality of Islam is not to be bound by physical borders of a homeland. It is also indefensible due to the glaring impracticality that the entire Muslim population of the Sub-Continent could not have shifted to Pakistan at the time of Independence and never really did. This was not the original political vision of Pakistan. Its founder, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was not a starry-eyed fantasizing product of an obscurantist religious movement. He was a highly educated, progressive, thorough bred lawyer and a fully polished practical politician. Never did he pronounce Pakistan to be a theological state. Then what went wrong?

His untimely death soon after the creation of Pakistan and his3 successor’s assassination plunged the country into a serious leadership crisis. East Pakistan that could have provided visionary and committed political leadership was denied their rightful role in the country’s executive political decision making and there was no constitution for the first 11 years. In this constitutional and political void, West Pakistan’s incompetent and expedient feudal leadership played right into the hands of first the bureaucracy and later the Army High Command. This triangle of power was firmly established in 1952 with the Governor General’s fateful decision to let a serving Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan) sit in his cabinet as the Defence Minister retaining both his portfolios simultaneously. Pakistan Army had already some taste of political power when it waged its semi-private Kashmir War in 1948 over the heads of its political masters. It was Major General Akbar who as Commander of Kohat Garrison began to organize and send Pathan Lashkars into Kashmir. A passionately patriotic act alright but a serious breach of discipline that was overlooked with drastic results. A firm corrective action at that time would have sent just the right political message across the board.

Sitting as Defence Minister in the cabinet meetings the spectacle of double talk and political incompetence must have been not only educative for him but also a convincing evidence of superiority of Pakistan Army’s organization over the civilian leadership. The Army

C-in-C must have been able to influence many decisions in favour of the Army specially when he knew that grant of extension after extension in tenure to him will raise many an eyebrow amongst the senior officers. The Army in Pakistan acquired a specially privileged position just as Field Marshal Ayub worked on his political ambitions. In a few years he decided to occupy the driving seat and declared Martial Law in 1958. There was no worthwhile political opposition to the Army assuming power but the nagging problem was that the arrangement lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the people despite the notorious4 ‘doctrine of necessity’ proclaimed by the country’s Supreme Court. This was also the beginning of the country’s superior judiciary’s long association with the khaki in particular and prevalent powers in general. A recourse to elections was out of question, therefore, the next best choice was to deploy behind Islamic injunctions for which it was being consistently claimed that Pakistan was made.

At that time country’s religious leadership were looking for political or state patronage and the Martial Law administration for an instrument of legitimacy. A convergence of these interests created the first nexus between the Army and the clerics. This convenient alliance has persisted ever after regardless of civilian representative administrations between the repeated military takeovers. Infact, this awkward courtship gave rise to some truly comical situations such as proclaiming a man like late General Yahya Khan as the Great Fighter of Islam when he clamped down upon Awami League in East Pakistan in 1971. These power hungry clerics were instrumental in the tragedy of errors that denotes Pakistani politics. On dismissal of late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s second premiership in 1977 a leading Islamist party’s leadership were the first to join late General Zia’s regime as federal ministers. Another such party was quick to see political and financial advantage in supporting Pak-American efforts to arm Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation during Eighties. One way or the other they have been working against the elected governments in Pakistan, urging the Army to remove them. Thus, despite their claims to be populist they have been playing an anti-people role. Successive military, regimes invariably found a reservoir of support in Pakistan’s religious parties and in their well oiled street power to drum up agitation while popular vote mostly rejected them.

Pakistan Army’s internal culture has always been a desirable mix of professional competence first and personal belief later. That is why as late as 1995 a Christian Major General commanded an infantry division and a Parsi General Officer commanded another in 1998-99. All this despite late General Zia’s Islamic sloganeering and persistent sectarian ingress into Armed Forces rank and file. To the contrary a non-Muslim cannot expect to become member of an Islamist political party in Pakistan let alone be given any leadership role. There is a vast gulf between both regarding their world view. It should be difficult to spot any other commonality between these two unlikely mates except control over state power. Afghan War of Freedom and late General Zia’s political expediency introduced religious leadership to the corridors of state power and the gun. Thereby turning the power equation of feudal politicians, bureaucracy and the Army into a foursome partnership. In Pakistan’s power structure this should be considered the most dangerous development which would be discussed in a short while. Press joined as the junior partner during Nineties, mostly due to inexperienced and wobbly civilian administrations of Prime Ministers Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. Thus, the power arrangement expanded to become a powerful fivesome which remains so till today. Press in Pakistan wields wide influence and a fairly commanding position.

Post-Afghan Freedom War Era

The political clergy in Pakistan had for the first time tasted the power of the gun and abundant US dollars. They also felt the pleasure of manipulating state power for their political ends. Afghanistan, became a veritable training school for their cadres to wield guns and coercive political power without any responsibility for the consequences. It was patently the wrong model to train on. Pakistan was to pay dearly for their misdirected and ill-conceived adventurism. Inevitably, their armed induction into Afghanistan had to be facilitated by the Army during the reistance.5 This resulted in a deeper relationship between the two. Armed Forces rank and file were affected by the scale and dazzle of events in Afghanistan resulting in an internal cultural asymmetry within the soldiery. This divisive development had an ugly consequence in the shape of the aborted 1996 coup in the Army which if successful could have been disastrous. High Command was rightly alarmed on this attempt and resolved to address the underlying causes. However, the need for caution against excessive intimacy with armed religious cadres stood out clearly and lodged in the minds of Army High Command. This could be considered the beginning of a wave of retrospection within the Armed Forces.

By that time the phenomenon of Taliban had risen in Afghanistan whose forces were made up of Freedom War veterans and graduates of Madrassas run by a powerful Islamist political party on both sides of Pak-Afghan border. Its leader relished unprecedented political clout and wealth. While Army High Command remained cautious during the rise of Taliban, political governments of Prime Minister Benazir and Nawaz Sharif hastened to appease the powerful Maulana and his protege, the Taliban. If one raised the Maulana to become the Chairman of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, the other hurried to extend diplomatic recognition to Taliban administration in Kabul. He could dictate his terms almost as he wished. The other religious parties and aspirants quickly followed suit. They began to raise their own militias and train cadres this time to be employed not in Afghanistan but in Indian Held Kashmir where the field seemed open and situation ripe for replicating Afghan model of resistance, thereby gaining a similar clout.

Implication of the proliferation of politically motivated armed militias and trained cadres roaming around in the country were quite obvious. They appeared to become an armed threat in being within the country and also impinge upon the authority of the Armed Forces to bear arms and implement national military policy especially in its external dimensions. In the absence of a clear policy, relations that had prospered between the Armed Forces and by now militarized religious parties continued despite serious misgivings between the two. However, it became essentially an uneasy relationship especially due to the latter’s intransigence, meddling in foreign policy, indiscretion and outreach to volatile elements in friendly countries. International attention was beginning to focus unfavourably on Pakistan on this score. The heat was beginning to be felt, the time for reckoning was fast approaching. Even as close a friend as China showed discomfort on this score and joined regional anti-terrorism security arrangements, practically bracketing Pakistan and Afghanistan together. This was an alarming development and posed an evolving threat to Pakistan’s security from a different direction on account of these wayward militias and their bellicose leadership.

Internally, their attitudes were hardening and tones were becoming unbearably aggressive. Taliban creed was being projected as a model to be emulated in Pakistan. Private agendas were being set and followed regarding Kashmir and other sensitive areas of foreign relations. State was being sounded regarding limits of state policy, political and economic governance as set by them. In short the writ of the Government of Pakistan was being undermined. In anticipation of the approaching anarchy local and foreign capital began to shy away and national economy went nearly into a nose dive.

On a different but related plain these armed militias were increasingly resorting to occasional small scale harassing raids to impose their will in their areas of influence, with a view to dominate the militant landscape. This landscape included Kashmir cause, support for Taliban regime and sectarian sub-sector within the country. This was causing bloodshed and quite a few people were getting killed. A scenario of future turf wars was also emerging. Beside the apprehension among the general population of the impending armed clashes, state administration and country’s integrity were clearly threatened. Crime, sectarian and Jihadi factions got hopelessly intermingled, dimming the fine difference between the moral and the criminal. Conceptual and parochial fault lines began to appear in Pakistani society which was already weakened by ethnic and inter-provincial differences. Pakistan was teetering on the verge of being declared a state sponsoring terrorism. A diplomatic isolation was taking shape. Into this melting pot add two incidents of grave importance. Islamabad was inevitably coming under unbearable stress it seemed.

The Breaking Point

The volatility of the situation further aggravated when in December 1999 few faceless hijackers claiming to be Kashmiri freedom fighters hijacked an Indian Airliner on its way to New Delhi from Nepal and forced it to land at Lahore Airport in Pakistan. Islamabad reacted sensibly, ordered the plane out of the country after refuelling and refused to enter into any negotiations with the hijackers. The plane landed at Qandhar. This was a highly dubious hijacking by itself and due to its affects on Pakistan. Immediately it tended to confirm Pakistan’s perceived complicity in militancy in Indian Held Kashmir. As a result of the deal struck between the hijackers and the Indian negotiators among others an unknown Maulana Masood Azhar was also released from Indian jails. The hijackers simply melted into Afghan desolation. However, this well-fed and an unlikely freedom fighter Maulana turned up shortly in Pakistan, went on to address public rallies and formed an even more militant umbrella organization called Jaish-e-Muhammad6. This organization raised the heat in Indian held Kashmir and carried the fight into mainland India. He moved about with curious impunity, compounding the situation and helping to plant Pakistan on the map of terrorist sanctuaries. This was clearly unacceptable and self-defeating.

As a result of years of putative adventurism and attempts to overturn at least one major lesson of Afghan history, Islamabad was now facing the consequences of its dangerous liaisons. The Frankstein’s monster it had nursed and fed had come of age and was now beginning to devour its master. The debris was beginning to fall in Islamabad’s backyard and the noxious pile was rising quickly. The next blow came in early 2001 while the administration vascillated between action and inaction against this expanding mass of militancy in the country over the year. A firebrand Maulana from Central West Punjab issued an ultimatum to Islamabad to implement Islamic Sharia law by March 2001 otherwise he and his hundreds of thousands followers will march upon the capital and seize power. This should have been expected as the final push to grab state power in Pakistan in the process of rise of religious radicalism. The seat of national power was directly being threatened. It sent shudders up the spines of all those who could see the gravity of the coming situation. The matter was diffused with much effort but the state appeared even more vulnerable.

In the following months, many well-conceived measures to curb radicalism and the power of militancy were put into effect. These included deweaponization, ban on public display of arms, crackdowns on criminal and sectarian elements, establishment of a Federal Madrassa Board to exercise control, vigilance and modernize Madrassa education and a ban on collecting contributions by Jihadi organizations. These corrective steps had a positive effect but the major players in this game of armed radicalism remained outside the net. It was obvious that the nature of relationship between the administration and the hardliners was being reviewed actively and a firm decision was yet to be taken. Meanwhile, the events were moving towards a point of no return. Realism, diplomatic pressures and objectives of radicalism were at cross purposes, therefore, sparks were flying in all directions.

From this angle the Agra Summit held in July 2001 could not have materialized at a more auspicious time. President Musharraf as the champion of Kashmir cause and his patriotism were firmly established in the process. He emerged as an effective spokesman of Pakistan and a leader of regional status. He was now equipped to tackle the radicals at home with majority of compa-

triots behind him and the needful grit. He had already indicated his inclination while addressing the National Seerat Conference of religious scholars and leaders at Islamabad in April 2001. Pakistani society was feeling terrorized by the increasing strength and clamour of these exclusive, armed and aggressive bands of fanatically motivated men. Islamabad’s official diplomatic stance in this regard was becoming increasingly tenuous. The time for decision had arrived only a suitable handle was required to break surface. In other words a catalyst was needed.

Rediscovering Pakistan

The stage was set for a split as the partners were now on a divergent course as far as their world view and regional priorities were concerned. Religious parties were being urged by the hardliners and more militant factions to challenge the power of the state but their leadership were reluctant to confront the might of the Armed Forces. Which in practical terms meant if the Army determined to check the tide of radicalism it could do so. That determination was becoming visible lately quite emphatically pronounced by President Musharraf on various occasions. His Seerat Conference address had boldly touched one of the major concerns of the people. Growing coercive power of religious extremism and its choke-hold over the society must be broken, was the general consensus. People crave to see their faith as a source of harmony and peace, not as a vehicle of hatred and devastation. Violence in the pursuit of faith had been quite uncharacteristic in our part of the world. It militates against ethos, developed over hundreds of years of religious and social balance under the deep influence of Sufi saints. People were genuinely bewildered and the moorings of faith were in real jeopardy as also the structure of the country.

The break had to come but the decisive moment was hastened under the combined impact of three mutually reinforcing factors. The terrorist attack on World Trade Centre and Pentagon, Osama bin laden and his network headquarters in Afghanistan and finally US resolve to fight terrorism in the world by taking the war to the terrorists. Pakistan, was a familiar and a natural ally in this shadowy war against religious fanaticism. She was asked to choose sides, Pakistan made its natural and logical choice to side with anti-terrorists forces thus ending its already fractured marriage of convenience with religious radicalism.

It was a stunning body blow to the whole structure of fanaticism that was built up so painstakingly over more than a hundred years. The centre piece of this construction was the armed might that is the Armed Forces riding on which they wished to pursue their theological agenda in and out of Pakistan. Taliban regime were an experiment in theological governance and an incubator in the region for export of the model. This mighty crash caused confusion in the ranks and leadership of religious extremism bringing down their dark tent with one stroke. Their initial reaction was disbelief followed by frustration and then anger. That is why their reaction took time to build-up and took to the expected argument — a betrayal by sell-out to the West.

What they and most others have failed to realize that Pakistan is rediscovering itself. The rational, original bearing of its statehood through an agonizing rebirth. Although the jaded radical religious leadership has an effective street power yet every passing day would decrease their mass appeal. People are no more prepared to let their faith be exploited, not on gun point any more. They are also not prepared to endure criminalization of Islam. The drama of invasion of Afghanistan is quite secondary compared to the transformation taking place in Pakistan.

The world must beware and take note of the great change that is occurring in Pakistan. This is going to be decisive and its success is crucial to regional peace, stability of nuclear Pakistan and in the long run to creation of a truly moderating influence in Islamic world. It is time for the world to be thoughtful. Especially the US, EU and India should assess the situation sensibly. They must help the transformation succeed. Stephen Cohen may be happy to note that Pakistan Army has finally found the country. Appreciate that Pakistan is transcending into rationality and needs understanding.

The best way to do so would be to swiftly pull Pakistan out of poverty, unemployment and debt by pouring in great doses of investment and writing off her debts. Help build infrastructure, industries and extensive agriculture. Simultaneously, improve governance by rebuilding police, judiciary and representative institutions. Transfer technology and broaden the base of education and health cover. Finally, recognize the proper place of faith in the life of Muslims in Pakistan. The whole thing now hinges on the true and total empowerment of the people of Pakistan for which a window of opportunity has opened. They have a great potential to contribute to the world peace and prosperity. Make haste, there is no time for indecision or moralizing.

End Notes

Publication of Indian National Congress’ Nehru Report in 1928 rejecting the right of separate electorate to Muslim minority in India. It led finally to Indian Muslim League’s demand for a separate homeland for Muslims of India in 1940.
Mughal Emperor Akbar the Great ruled India from 1556 AD to 1605 AD and was known for religious tolerance, inter-religious harmony and a vast prosperous empire.
Pakistan’s first Prime Minister and an able politician Liaquat Ali Khan fell to an assassin’s bullet in Rawalpindi on October 16, 1951 during a public address.
Pakistan’s Supreme Court invoked the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to validate military take-over in 1958. This ingenious doctrine has since been applied by the Superior Courts in Pakistan to justify subsequent military takeovers.
Afghan War of Freedom 1979-1989.
Jaish-e-Muhammad has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US Administration in the wake of destruction of World Trade Centre and attack on Pentagon.

About the Author

Commissioned in Pakistan Army in 1968. Graduate of Command and Staff College Quetta and National Defence College Islamabad. Holds Master’s Degree in Defence and Strategic Studies. Held various command and staff appointments, remained Director General Pakistan Military Mission in Saudi Arabia 1998-2002. Contributes research articles regularly to Pakistan’s leading military journals.