Remembering Our Warriors

Maj Gen (Retd) S Wajahat Husain

How did you move from the Indian Army to the Pakistan Army?

A simple enough affair, which fortunately for me turned into an interesting operation with a lucky twist. In the last week of October 1947 events in Indo-Pakistan relations moved very fast. The so-called tribal invasion by the tribesmen of NWFP into Kashmir spurred these events.

The operations of Boundary Force were nearing completion and it was going to be disbanded. The 4th Indian Division’s first Indian Commander; Gen Thimayya relieved the British General returning to England and similarly my Commanding Officer Col Bill Ridley. The day after the incursion, I was summoned to the HQ to ascertain my future options. I told them very clearly I had opted for Pakistan Army and would soon be leaving. They tried to dissuade me and insisted to stay in the Indian Army having done well at the Indian Military Academy and the Boundary Force with the fact that my family was in India. However, I refused to budge from my original decision, all the more having seen the carnage brought upon the Muslims in East Punjab. Consequently was told to leave for Pakistan as the C.I.H. (Central Indian Horse) was leaving for Kashmir. Col Bill Ridley arrived from Ahmednagar and drove me to Peshawar. We stopped for lunch at Rawalpindi at Flashman’s Hotel. There I was surprised to run into our IMA Adjutant, Maj Wilson having lunch with Col Shahid Hamid, former Secretary to FM Auchinleck, and Col. Ingle commandant designate P.M.A. To my surprise Wilson informed me that I had been posted as Captain Instructor at the IMA Dehra Dun, told him was on my way to Peshawar to join my Regiment. When he asked me about my family I told him that I had not been in touch with my parents since the last 4 months. He then suggested having been posted Instructor IMA he could arrange for me to have transport and escort from Dehra Dun to enable me to collect my family from Aligarh and return to Lahore. Was grateful and agreed to accompany him to Delhi and Dehra Dun. My C O, 19 Lancers Peshawar was informed. So I left with Maj Wilson, Col Ingle and another officer and flew in a Dakota DC3 to Delhi, stayed for the night at the Commander-in-Chief’s House. Early next morning left for Dehra Dun. Jim Wilson arranged Movement Order for me, on temporary duty from Dehra Dun to Lahore with an escort of a British Sergeant, couple of Gurkha soldiers and two vehicles.  Directed me to collect Brig Tariq Mir’s family from Dehra Dun, proceed to Aligarh, collect my family and leave for Lahore. The vehicles and the guards were to be returned.

When I reached Aligarh my parents were very pleased to see me. My father was also having problems as the house had been searched several times by the local authorities accused for supporting the local Muslims, quickly, made up his mind, left everything behind. My mother packed some boxes and early next morning left with my parents, my two younger brothers and my younger sister. We reached Lahore via Delhi where I left my parents with my elder brother arrived earlier. Escort with the vehicles were returned to Dehra Dun.

Leaving my family in Lahore proceeded to Peshawar joined my Regiment, 19 Lancers. A month later was moved to The Guides Cavalry as the G.H.Q carried out adjustments in the Corps and the Guides were short of officers.

“You were ADC with C-in-C Pakistan Army during 1948-49. This was a time which was most formative period in Pakistan Army’s history. Please tell us in detail about this stint?”

Was undoubtedly the most formative phase in Pakistan Army’s history needs to be touched with details. With the Guides at Bannu message was received for interview for the Commander-in-Chief’s ADC, reported at the C-in-C’s Secretariat in mid-January. Maj Wilson promoted to Lieut Col, Private Secretary to the C-in-C, informed me on his recommendation the interview had been arranged. The C-in-C seeing me said, “Lieut Husain, you have done well at the Academy. Your good work with the Boundary Force has been conveyed by Bill Reese also. I have selected you my ADC and ask you some questions”. His first question, took me aback, was “Do you intend to be a professional officer or are you interested in politics like to open doors of Prime Ministers and Governor General’s cars?” I immediately replied having joined the Army as regular officer intended to stay professional officer not interested in politics. He said, “Good, in that case stay with me and you will learn something. I will not keep you for more than a year and half after that you must go back for regimental soldiering.” He further added, “The reason I asked was I have also recommended you for Liaquat’s ADC. Now that you have answered me clearly, I will keep you with me. Go back to your Regiment, get your baggage and come to stay with me at the House.”

So I joined the officiating Commander-in-Chief. The set up at the GHQ was that the old Northern Command HQ had been turned into GHQ. The Commander at the time of Partition, Gen Messervy of Northern Command continued to stay as temporary Commander-in-Chief away on leave. Gracey was the Chief of Staff. Doing two jobs Chief of Staff and officiating C-in-C in the absence of Gen Messervy I was relieving the British ADC, Capt Lord Hughes Darlymple returning back to his Guards Regiment. Another ADC, Capt Bashir Ullah Babar from Probyns Horse, my course mate from IMA also joined later.

Gracey took over as C-in-C Pakistan Army in February 1948. On joining Gracey’s staff found life extremely busy with the General mostly occupied with the Kashmir operations, the raising and organization of Pakistan Army, gigantic task, starting the various training institutions, the first priority, and meetings with India regarding division of our assets and their movement to Pakistan. Since we were still a new born baby with our umbilical cord with India continuing, existing communications with India were still open, all the telephone lines, railways between India and Pakistan inspite of the disturbances and the roads were all openly functioning through our open borders. Refugees were pouring in from every direction filling up pavements in Lahore and Karachi and all available open spaces. Many problems regarding the movement of Army units, their families from across the border, induction and collection of stores, from India etc were faced. Both the civil and military leaderships at GHQ India and GHQ Pakistan were in constant touch with each other.

The first task of Gen Gracey was to re-orientate and relocate Pakistan Army, locations and establishment of the training institutions and the Regimental Centres. We had received only one major training institution from the Indian Army, the Command and Staff College at Quetta, all other Training Institutions went to India. Gave orders to start the first Staff Course within three months. Selected the location of the Pakistan Military Academy at Abbottabad starting it soon after. The Army was reoriented from north to south. Most of the British Indian Army, in view of the German and Russian threats and the fighting with the tribesmen, had been located in N.W.F.P. As no such problems from the north were now expected though Afghanistan was hostile, so Operation Curzon was taken up with the bulk of the army withdrawn from the forward areas, replaced by Scouts and the Divisions with their HQs relocated. The biggest problem was to start the training of the army on a uniform footing for which training Pamphlets were required. Inspite of all his efforts Gracey could not get our share of Training Pamphlets from the Indian Army. So he started writing his own Training Pamphlets to give the army basis on which training could be imparted: a Herculean task undertaken writing the Pakistan Army Battle Instructions in his personal longhand, working late into nights and early in the mornings produced within a few weeks and issued to the Army Units.

The next major issue was the movement of our troops, units and officers from across the border and their placement in the Pakistan Army. Equally important were the requirement of our Defence Stores, ammunition, etc and Finances, as we had no funds and India had not released them. For this purpose regular meetings were held under the Partition Defence Committee, with FM Auchinleck and Lord Mountbatten alternately in Delhi and Karachi. In spite of all the sympathy from FM Auchinleck and loud promises by Mountbatten progress was minimal, created hurdles and excuses without transferring the badly needed funds. There was no money in our coffers so much so we had not been paid for the first six or seven months.

At the GHQ the financial situation was very serious. With empty coffers had to attend to the increasing demands of the fighting in Kashmir. The C-in-C used to attend regular meetings at Karachi with the PM, Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr. Sikander Mirza, the Defence Secretary. They also used to come down regularly to Rawalpindi from Karachi. Gracey’s first call in Karachi was invariably on Quaid-I-Azam reporting on the Kashmir operations and the progress on the formation of Pakistan Army.

Apart from the Kashmir problem there was the pressing question of Hyderabad getting from bad to worse and also of Junagadh. Quaid-e-Azam having promised Mir Laiq Ali of Hyderabad assistance to Hyderabad State Forces specially asked Gracey to do whatever was possible to help out the Hyderabad Army. Dealing directly with the PM and the Quaid, managed to organize a well-known gun-runner from Australia, Mr. Sydney Cotton brought three DC3 Dakotas to ferry small arms support for Hyderabad State Forces. We were detailed to oversee this operation. In spite of our best efforts unfortunately the Hyderabad State Forces collapsed without any fight. The object of this exercise was to give them sustenance for a week or so to allow diplomatic actions. As Gracey put it in disgust “I had told Quaid that General El Idroos, (C-in-C Hyderabad State forces) was a useless commander, gave in without any fight”.

To overcome the problem of logistics support as well as many other administrative needs specially shortage of ammunition Gen Gracey remained in constant touch with Field Marshal Montgomery, C.I.G.S. of UK. FM Montgomery tried to help as much as he could. Specially provided support for the small arms ammunition factory at Wah. Its location was selected by Gen Gracey himself, gave necessary orders to the MGO, spoke to FM Montgomery for movement of the machinery, couple of years later the Pakistan Ordnance Factory was established.

Special mention about the art of decision-making in those days by the senior officers must be made. There were no Commissions, no Task Forces or Committees and the Senior Officer got down immediately to the task at hand. Always quite clear what was required, gave the recommendations, made out summary personally (not leaving to the Staff Officers), taking the file personally to the Defence Minister or the Quaid-e-Azam very quick in giving decisions. No file remained with them for more than 24 hours. Even when Quaid was in Ziarat files sent for his attention by train would be back within 36 hours, always with very clear-cut decisions. That was the way things moved then and that was how the country was governed. Many major problems were sorted out in no time at all.

Regarding the crucial movement of stores from India to Pakistan, during our last meeting in Delhi FM Auchinleck tried very hard to get us our share of spare parts, specially for the Armoured Corps. Out of three regiments of the Armoured Brigade two were practically off-road. The FM’s efforts succeeded in getting some stores moving. On receiving message that a ship containing our stores was arriving, the Chief personally went to receive these at Keamari I accompanied him. When the stores were unloaded we were horrified to see that all the spare parts belonged to Churchill Tanks no longer on the Indian army inventory nor did we have any Churchill Tanks. This World War II junk passed on to us by writing off from Indian Army Ledgers. Same was the case with other stores, all useless, like over sized boots, jerseys, etc. The Chief was extremely disgusted and said “We have to get down to produce our own or get from whatever source we can. We should not expect anything from India.” The same was the case with the arms and ammunition. Except for 5,000 rifles somehow we got in 1947, not a single bullet or rifle was received out of our legal share of millions of rounds of ammunition and small arms.

During the next Defence Committee Meeting at Delhi hot words were exchanged between Gracey and Mountbatten, no good friends at any stage. Lord Mountbatten as the Commander of South East Asia Command was not a popular person, specially with the 14th Army commanded by Field Marshal Slim with Gracey his Div Commander and later Corp Commander. Gen Gracey used to tell interesting stories about Mountbatten’s incompetence in handling land operations. When the meeting ended Gracey in a hurry to get back to Pakistan, waited for lunch with Mountbatten who had disappeared. He peeped in and saw Mountbatten being painted in full regalia unconcerned about the lunch which further annoyed Gracey. After lunch Mountbatten turned round to Gracey and said, “Douglas, as you know I will be leaving shortly and would like to visit Karachi to say goodbye to all of you,” Gracey immediately retorted, “Dick, don’t bother to come to Pakistan, if you do I will make sure my air force chases you out of the sky.” That was the last meeting with Mountbatten!.

During this period there was hectic diplomatic activity relating to the Kashmir issue hotly persued at the United Nations. All the famous personalities involved, i.e. Mr. Graham, Sir Oliver Dixon, Adm. Nimitz and Dr. Joseph Korbel (Father of US secretary Madeleine Allbright) etc were regular visitors to the C-in-C House along with P.M Liaquat Ali, Col Sikander Mirza, Sir Zafar Ullah Khan and Ch Muhammad Ali, received by us at the airport, brought to the House for meetings and working lunches, and seen off at the airport. Was thus silent spectator to the great events unfolding day by day.

Can you tell us about Gen. Gracey’s Policy and control of operations with regards to the developments of events in Kashmir 1947-48?

A special Cell for control and conduct of military operations had been established in Rawalpindi looked after by the then DMO Brig Sher Khan MC. Gen Gracey kept in close touch with Brig Sher Khan briefed every morning at GHQ. The General, after returning from GHQ, used to change into civilian clothes, get into his private car and himself drive to Sher Khan’s office monitoring the Kashmir operations. The field operations were under Maj Gen Tottenhan DSO, MC, GOC 7 Division kept in close touch with Gen Gracey. Soon after the tribesmen invaded Kashmir became imperative to have some control over them to defend Azad Kashmir effectively. To that end Pakistani officers volunteers were inducted immediately to take care of these Lashkars. This number kept increasing, under Gen Tariq, nom de plume of Col Akbar Khan, later Brig Akbar Khan. Brig Akbar had served under Gracey in his Division spoke highly of the Brigadier. He mentioned in the last battles of Burma he had recommended Akbar for a VC for his bravery but unfortunately for not enough witnesses got a good DSO. Gracey had suggested Brig Akbar to Liaquat Ali Khan for the conduct of operations in Kashmir. With the increasing tempo of Indian army operations in mid-48 units of regular army were inducted to defend our vital interests. In the summer of 1948. Gen Gracey presented his Military Appreciation to the government, to prevent further advance of the Indian Army and counter actions. The plan’s execution included for the first time limited offensive actions with heavy concentrated artillery bombardment of the sensitive Indian army’s lines of communications across the border in Beripatan and Nowshera areas. The artillery bombing was accurate, heavy and caused severe damage to the 4th Divisional Headquarters leading to the death of Brig Osman Shah, officiating Div commander. For 6 months the Indians tried very hard without success to achieve strategic advantage. Our counter action in Northern Areas by brilliant operation under Col Aslam to capture Skardu and Kargil was successful removing the pressure from the central front in Kashmir. The Indians were forced to finally ask for ceasefire, sent a signal on 30th December from Gen Boucher to Gen Gracey asking for our government to bring an end to the Kashmir operations. It must be mentioned that from the very beginning Quaid-e-Azam was very upset over the way we got embroiled in Kashmir. Being a Constitutional Lawyer achieved Pakistan through legal and fair means was very upset by the ugly confrontational turn. He directed Gracey and Liaquat Ali Khan to end the fighting in Kashmir without any loss of face or loss of territory. Unfortunately soon after the establishment of Pakistan without any resources, no money and the pressing problems of establishing Pakistan to attend, we got involved in Kashmir operations: heavy drain on our already bankrupt state. The Kashmir operation was initiated, without Quaid’s tacit approval, without consulting the army or the Ministry of Defence. Khan Qayyum Khan along with Mr. Ghulam Mohammad and some former INA officers conceived the idea without any appreciation of the consequences, logistic support or preparations, launched these tribesmen across the border.

On receipt of the request for the ceasefire from the Indian army, Gracey immediately informed the Quaid and Liaquat Ali Khan and got down to getting the best possible advantage out of the situation. On 30th and 31st December, as mentioned, heavy bombardment was carried out on the enemy lines of communications after which repeated phone calls from the Indian C-in-C started for ceasefire. After about 6 or 8 hrs of delay having inflicted, maximum damage, Gracey, on getting approval from The Prime Minister and Quaid-I-Azam, finally agreed to Gen Boucher’s request for the ceasefire.

It must be emphatically impressed that there was no conspiracy, no underlying plan, as both the countries were interested to stop the war. We needed the ceasefire very badly but on India’s request. Consequently delegation was sent to work out the details with Brig Manekshaw DGMO Indian Army effective 1st January 1949.

Can you tell us about the alleged controversy regarding Gen Gracey not carrying out Quaid’s orders for Pakistan Army’s move into Kashmir soon after the Indian Army’s deployment?

This has been incorrectly reported and blown out of all proportions. Strangely enough this controversy surfaced years after the death of Quaid-e-Azam and after Gen Gracey’s tenure. During his tenure and the period I was with him no one ever spoke about it nor one heard about this alleged non-obedience of orders. In 1949 I received the book by Alan Campbell Johnson titled “Mission with Mountbatten” where for the first time this matter was mentioned. Staying with Gen Gracey I showed him the reference and asked “Sir, is it true?” After reading it, smiled and said it was incorrect and wrongly reported. He mentioned that Quaid-e-Azam had expressed the desire through the Governor Punjab and later from the Ministry of Defence Karachi. He discussed the whole matter with the Quaid having informed Gen Messervy, the C-in-C on leave, as Gracey was only officiating. Messervy was against the proposition advised Gracey against it. He simultaneously informed Field Marshal Auchinleck who was the Supreme Commander and as per procedure of the Partition Council responsible for all the moves of both the Armies. The FM immediately rushed to Lahore, discussed in great detail with Quaid-e-Azam pointing out serious adverse implications in case Pakistani Army units were sent to Kashmir. Auchinleck mentioned since he was controlling all the British officers as per commonwealth rules would be forced to withdraw about 500 officers from Pakistan army. Adding as India was waiting for a chance to pounce on Pakistan this move would give them the opportunity. Equally the movement of Pakistan’s stores, Armed Forces Units, Officers and their families and Central Government elements from India to Pakistan will be jeopardized. In view of all these serious implications and the fact that the Indian army had already moved approximately two divisions by massive air lift action by meagre resources of Pakistan Army would be counter-productive endangering Pakistan’s security. Quaid-e-Azam appreciating the implications withdrew the orders after discussing it in emergency Cabinet Meeting. The Cabinet agreeing with Quaid’s decision to withdraw the order duly endorsed it and decided not to commit the army.

Subsequently, Gen Gracey presented his plan for the defence of Kashmir and counter measures to Quaid-I-Azam against Indian army actions. Accordingly, GHQ started implementing them as per planned programme mentioned earlier.

Pertinent to note, Gracey was selected as C-in-C by Quaid-e-Azam from three names put up by British Govt: Lt Gen Gracey, Lt Gen Russel and Lt Gen Tuker, Quaid-I-Azam had known Gracey for a long time. He was also the Corps Commander in Karachi living in Quaid-e-Azam House before Partition and had full confidence in his judgment. If the Lahore incidence of disobeying Quaid’s orders was as serious as erroneously reported the Quaid would have immediately dispensed with Gracey’s services. He was only officiating C-in-C. If the Quaid did not like the way the orders were disobeyed obviously he would not have been confirmed. Gracey was also given a year’s extension after the first Pakistani C-in-C designate Gen Iftikhar’s unfortunate death in air crash. As mentioned earlier the Quaid was extremely upset over sending tribesmen in Kashmir and was very uncomfortable with Kashmir operations. It was on this occasion after the cabinet decision at Lahore not to commit Pakistan Army in Kashmir that a senior Muslim Leaguer remarked, “Sir, we missed the bus,” upon which the Quaid immediately snapped, “No sir, we got in the wrong bus,” a frequently misquoted remark.

It can now be said with the experience of hindsight and having analysed all the military and political appreciations since 1947 that Gen Gracey’s advice not to commit the Pakistan Army at that stage was sound: the only correct military and political decision of the army high command so far. This futile controversy deserves to be buried for good.

Please tell us your service profile from 1949 to 1958?

After completing my tenure at the GHQ with the C-in-C, I returned to Kohat, rejoined the Guides Cav as Adjutant. Kohat was a very lively station with 101 Brigade later on commanded by Brig Akbar. Officer’s Training School had also been established and we used to have lot of fun at the club and sports. Col Muhammad Mustafa Khan was commanding Guides, a very fine gentleman, brother-in-law of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with a very charming wife. After a year I was selected by GHQ for a Course at the Royal Armoured Corps School, Bovington, immensely enjoyable, I learnt a lot specially about wireless communications which later throughout my life as Commander of armoured formations proved very beneficial. They really taught me how to establish long distance communications, how to speak effectively and with confidence on wireless and the importance of communications in warfare. On my return from this course I was posted, Instructor at the Armour School in those days at fledgling stage but quite effective. We had limited resources but the school worked well in training young officers and NCO Instructors. I was also Adjutant of the School, part of the Armoured Corps Centre. After a few months was selected GSO3 at the Staff College, Quetta with Brig Lauder. At that time the staff at the Staff College was very small, with only one G3 at the G level to deal with all the training matters. I learnt a lot from Brig Lauder and of course dealing with the Staff College was a great experience. We had some great personalities of the Pakistan Army undergoing Staff courses. After a year returned to the Regiment in 1952. Was Squadron Commander, took part in some major exercises around Rawalpindi. The Regiment had been converted into an Armoured Regiment with Sherman II tanks participating in all the major GHQ exercises. In 1953 qualified at the Entrance examination for the Staff College at the same time selected by GHQ to proceed to Turkey for the Turkish Language Course. Considering the value of the Staff Course decided to forego the Turkish Language Course and went to Quetta for the 54th Staff Course, considered a watershed as the last British Commandant left, replaced by the first Pakistani, Gen Latif Khan, a dynamic personality and a very capable officer. Latif Khan, who contributed a lot for bringing at par with the modern staff colleges of the world. This Staff course was professionally usefully an interesting experience, having been at Quetta before I had no problem in sailing through the course under fine British and Pakistani Instructors. I was lucky to have Col Abrar as one of my DS and other instructors were Hameed, Pirzada and a few British instructors. Brig Noor Hussain was one of my close friends and course mate.

I was appointed Instructor at the Tactical Wing having done well in the Staff course as Tactical Wing was a part of the Staff College entrusted with the task of conducting courses for the senior officers, Lieut Cols and above, was honoured to have officers like Gen Rakhman Gul and Gen Azhar in the senior course as my students.

It may be of interest that in early 1956 on finishing my tenure at the Tactical Wing, I went on leave to England staying with Gen Gracey. Settling down for breakfast at Gen Gracey’s house the first question he asked me was, “When is Ayub taking over the country?” I was flabbergasted and said, “Sir, at my level we have no idea. I cannot see the possibility of such an action taking place.” Upon which he replied, “Wajahat, as you know the biggest problem in Pakistan is the senior officers with ambitions trying to take over the country and Ayub is very ambitious. Mark my words, he will take over the country and is just waiting for the chance.” He further added, “As you know, after the death of Iftikhar we had difficult task in selecting C-in-C. Out of the three, Nasir, Raza and Ayub, I considered Ayub to be the best the only one with some experience of command. Very reluctantly I had to recommend him, but I did warn Liaquat that he had political ambitions, had to be watched. After the death of Liaquat, I do not know who was going to watch him.” These prophetic words came to my mind when two years later. General Ayub took over declaring Martial Law.

Soon after I was appointed Brigade Major to the newly raised 4 Armoured Brigade under Brig Yaqub Khan from whom I learnt a lot and the way an armoured brigade should be commanded. After Brig Yaqub another fine commander Brig Effendi took over and it was on the evening of 7th of October,  got a call from Div HQ that Martial Law had been declared and our Brigade was to take over the administration of Wah, Taxila and Rawalpindi. The Brigade was moved immediately to Rawalpindi. Brig Effendi was away; however without much difficulty I moved the Brigade from Mansar by first light had taken over all the vulnerable points and all the sensitive areas of Wah, Taxila and Rawalpindi. The Brigade ready to operate under the Martial Law. We knew nothing about Martial Law, had no warning about it and it came as a big surprise. However we excelled ourselves in administering Martial Law under very compelling circumstances.

It must be noted that the actual involvement of troops was only for very short time and the Field Marshal was judicious enough to withdraw direct involvement of officers in Martial Law. Except for the top Martial Law Administrators and a few senior officers for the military courts no one else was directly involved and the units and formations reverted to their professional duties. After a fortnight accordingly, the Brigade moved out for collective training, relinquishing Martial Law duties.

Brig Effendi was posted Director General Rangers, Lahore and against my wish took me as his Executive Staff Officer to Rangers. Rangers had just been raised as border security force for the whole of West Pakistan. We got down to organizing this new force with training, equipment, raising new units and establishing border posts. Brig Effendi,  did an excellent job making  this organization fairly effective and efficient force to look after our Indian border. During this time I got married and returned to my Regiment as second in command in 1962. In 1964 I took over the command of the Regiment from Col Jahanzeb.

How would you compare the Royal Armoured Corps School Bovington with the Armour School Fort Knox, USA and your recollections?

Actually Bovington is quite different to Fort Knox since they follow different perceptions and different organizations catering to their respective requirements. Bovington in 1950, doing the Wireless Instructor’s Course, was suffering from the after-effects of World War II. Working under wartime economy everything was very Spartan, including the class rooms in make-shift barracks. Our accommodation in particular was very primitive going back to World War I, As opposed to this Fort Knox is a very well organized big place, in fact the biggest Armour base in the USA.

Bovington was following the British concept of having three different Wings, Gunnery, Driving and Maintenance and Wireless with the Driving & Maintenance and Wireless Wings at Bovington a very small village, and the Gunnery Wing few miles away. The School concentrated on the technical side of the three Wings under one Commander. The Instructors, Captains and Majors were all veterans of World War II. Their training exercises were very practical. Doing tactical exercises manning the wireless sets with no operators, moving long distances in different directions and maintaining communications with the British regiments was good practical experience. On the social side there was nothing at Bovington.

Comparatively, Fort Knox is the largest armour base homing the Armour School and the Armour Centre and had lot of social activities. Allied officers undergoing courses are looked after by a special section, major PR exercise. We were invited by various clubs and organizations. On certain occasions asked to give talks both about the United States and our respective countries. I had unique experience invited as Chief Guest to the Fort Knox Women’s International Club under the Chairmanship of the wife of the Commandant, the only male participant, to address a gathering of about 300 to 400 ladies. Thoroughly enjoyed the function.

The Course was very useful and very well balanced. We had exercises handling armoured regimental groups and formation in all operations of war specially under nuclear warfare settings. All in all I enjoyed the Course thoroughly, very useful, later as armour commander greatly beneficial.

Please tell us your participation in the major events from the Rann of Kutch to the Indian offensive 6th September 65 giving accounts of your taking over 11th Cavalry at crucial time after the battle of Phillaura 11 September and your subsequent experience as Commander Armour Task Force in the decisive battles of Chawinda- Badiana in Sialkot Sector?

I had moved my Regiment, The Guides Cavalry from the 1st Armoured Div to 6th Armoured Div in Nowshera early April. We had barely arrived the Div was alerted on 25th of April in view of the Rann of Kutch developments. Preparations for war started in right earnest. On 5th of May the Regiment was moved, by train from Nowshera to our concentration area in Gujranwala. From then onwards prepared hard for the war looming on the horizon. Carried out very extensive reconnaissance and training. By August we were in a high state of operational preparedness. In mid-August with the signing of the Rann of Kutch Agreement, the war clouds receded, the lull in Army preparedness gradually slipped into peace atmosphere. Having extensively trained my Regiment for the expected war I was surprised to receive posting orders as Directing Staff Command and Staff College Quetta, protested to Gen Abrar replied that as war was no longer expected postings had started, and General Yaqub wanted me at the Staff College to replace Col Zia-ul-Haq as Armour DS there. Reluctantly, left to join Staff College on 27 of August, but quite positive war was around the corner.

Sure enough on 6th Sept war was declared, the College was closed. Next day the students left for their postings. We the DS left on 9th of Sept. As the train carrying us came to Lahore, were taken off the train sent to our respective assignments, Zia was posted AQ first Armd Div. I reached Nowshera without assignment. Was having breakfast early 11th September morning, received urgent call from G.H.Q to report immediately to the field area to takeover command of 11th Cavalry, the Commanding officer having been wounded. Rushed to Gujranwala, reported at the Corps HQ where Col Jahanzeb briefed me on the enemy situation and the Battle of Phillaura early that morning in which 11th Cav suffered heavy casualties. He directed me to hurry up as an attack was developing. I went first to the Div HQ, was told to proceed to 11th Cav immediately. Got to the Regiment late at night located in the Pasrur Eidgah/Graveyard, not a very happy omen. Was appalled to see the condition of the men and officers: dazed and confused with low morale, uniforms burnt, without boots, without caps. I asked about the enemy and was told  “all around us!” Gave them a quick pep talk, got them moving to man their weapons and vehicles all muddled up. Immediately got down to sorting out the vehicles and putting the Regiment in some order. Learnt there was little left as one squadron had been badly mauled in the morning’s battle of Phillaura and the other squadron under Maj Iqbal had been attached with The Guides Cav. The third squadron of the old M36B2 tankbusters was in a bad shape with only 5 serviceable tanks, all mixed up with the administrative echelon vehicles. However, quickly organized the unit for battle and placing each element in its proper position. Got officers to pull themselves together. Felt very sorry for the unit and for myself that only a fortnight back had left my own Regiment, well-trained and well- equipped and now was handling this crisis! There was no time to lose, hurriedly reorganized the unit. Time moved fast with panic messages coming about enemy armour attacks, confusing the situation all the more.

Then Div HQ ordered to proceed to the Gun area of Brig Amjad Chowdhry to protect his Guns under attack enemy armour. By that time it was first light and sure enough, as expected, with all the vehicles concentrated in the graveyard the enemy air came for us, fascinated watching the aircraft chased by our aircraft, my Adjutant pulled me down in a half dug grave saying “Sir, what are you doing. Come down”. After a few minutes the aircraft left with no damage done. Picked up young Iqbal Jan and Yahya Effendi the only officers with some semblance of wits and left for Amjad’s Headquarters. Remembered it in Pasrur School nearby. Brig Amjad was very pleased to see me and briefed me on the latest situation. Was very confident, appreciated my assistance. Told him could not do very much. Placed four tank busters around the gun area to defend his Guns and HQ. As I was returning was directed to report immediately to Div HQs to take over Task Force. Left the regiment with necessary instructions. At the Div HQs met Gen Abrar, already seen earlier. He said, “As you know we have no brigade headquarters causing big problems. There is confusion, as we cannot control so many units. I want you to take over Task Force comprising 22nd Cav, Guides Cavalry, 14FF and remnants 11th Cav”. Said I was honoured and will do my best. Looking around and noticing half a dozen red hats having tea asked Gen Abrar, “Sir, what are these chaps doing?” Turning to Brig Effendi standing there, had complimented me and was very glad to see me back, acting as second in command of the Div, I said, “Sir why don’t you come to command the force, I will help you out as I may have difficulty in handling officers senior to me in the Task Force”. He said “Don’t worry, we will take care of it.” Gen Abrar said the same thing. Very quickly Abrar briefed me and told me to do whatever I could to stop the enemy advance taking control of the units in the area. When I asked for the headquarters was told there was none being very short of wireless sets and vehicles, should use whatever was available from 11th Cav. Took couple of battered jeeps from 11th Cav, and a Dodge wireless truck as the entire command setup of the regiment was destroyed by enemy shelling. As I came out saw the jeep of the AQ staff officer neat and clean, washed standing with two wireless sets, grabbed it leaving message with Jahangir Karamat,  ADC to Gen Abrar, to inform the staff officer. Picked up Major Khursheed just arrived from a Language Course, Capt Ziauddin Javed from Army Aviation and Iqbal Jan. With these three officers, couple of old jeeps, a Dodge from the 11th Cav, the adhoc Task Force HQ established moved in the battle area at Badiana.

11th Cav was pulled back for refit and re-organisation and was out of the battle. One squadron was with the Guides Cav.

Telecommunication arrangements were tied up. My command net had a large number of stations including the Army Chief and the President. Established small ad hoc tac HQ, only 4 vehicles, on high ground overlooking the battle area. On my right was Chawinda and on my left was the road leading to Pasrur-Badiana-Sialkot. The units were deployed keeping the 14th FF Battalion HQ with my tac HQ, having dished out two companies to Guides Cav and 22nd Cav, on the left looking after the left front excluding Sialkot extending short of Badiana while Guides Cav was covering Badiana extending upto the boundary with 25 Cav and 24 Brigade in Chawinda. Went forward to the units, giving them their missions, did the necessary co-ordination, tied up with Kaka Nisar CO 25 Cav and with Brig Ali 24 Brigade. The enemy had done readjustments after the previous day’s successful battle, having suffered heavy casualties but had captured Phillaura his first initial objective. He was pushing hard after knocking out our combat group.

At the Corps HQ Gen Yaqub arrived from Staff College as Advisor to the Corps, gave his appreciation of enemy hypothesis of advancing on two parallel axis confirming GOC 6th Armoured’s Div appreciation. We were accordingly deployed to meet the enemy’s threat advancing on two parallel axis, one on our left going for Badiana, trying to encircle short of Sialkot and on the right advancing towards Chawinda then onto Pasrur and Zafarwal. So my mission became fairly clear: to prevent the enemy from advancing on these two axis, specially the Badiana axis and prevent any encircling movement from the Sialkot side to defend the area. The only way to accomplish our mission was with counter-penetration as our major weakness was absence of strong Infantry, we did not have any infantry element. 25 Cav and 24 Bde frontage was about 550 yds, mine was about 12000 yds, a very wide frontage to hold with only two weak armoured regiments. In fact Guides Cavalry by that time was reduced to about two weak squadrons. 22nd Cav had also suffered casualties with just two companies of infantry. It may, be recalled that in the previous days battle after the enemy captured 11th Cav and 9FF positions he was stopped by a quick attack by Guides Cav, well-executed, though suffered heavy casualties. We lost Maj Abbasi Shaheed and Lieut Hussain Shah Shaheed but did stop the enemy. He had become cautious having suffered casualties. I stopped further forays as they were too strong and with no strong infantry pivots to move around the best way was to make the enemy attack us and take them on with artillery, infantry anti-tank guns and by our armour. The heavy toll taken by the losses of the previous day was very telling. However, we dug our heels and took on the enemy, the battle was on, the enemy tried, as was expected from both the axis and the battle went on the whole day till late hours of the evening when it was called off. We had tried to develop the very first day, coordinated actions by army aviation, artillery and the two regiments in close coordination with 25 Cav on my right. The way we fought the battle was getting advance information from army aviation, and from the forward elements manoeuvred the regiments to counter enemy actions. I had put two wireless sets intercepting the enemy commanders in front and another set took take care of his higher HQ. The battle was fast, the information coming very quick and the orders given were equally quickly. Was consistently on the air, without leaving my mike, even for a cup of tea from early morning till late in evening. By evening we knew had stopped the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties but we also suffered casualties. The front by and large was stabilized.

With the end of the days battle became clear that the enemy firmly established was all set for the next phase of his offensive. In keeping with his technique of caution had the requisite firm bases as springboard for further large-scale attacks: trying to reduce the Badiana and the Chawinda positions to press deeper, with his plan of eliminating both Badiana and Chawinda where the 24 Infantry Brigade with 25 Cavalry was in strong defensive position. The area between Chawinda and Badiana was held by my Task Force, expecting the open area in the front may see the fiercest tank battles. It was also obvious were not going to be battle for movement and manoeuvre in the classic sense but rather of grit, stamina and determination. At the end of the day went forward discussed the day’s battle with the units, tied up arrangements for the next day. Visited 24 Brigade HQ, late in the evening proceeded to Div HQ to report the days fighting and for orders the next day. This as time would later show, used to be real nightmare. Going back after the days fighting, exhausted and tired, driving back about 5 to 7 miles on the dusty track, Informed GOC the commander of the days proceedings, the enemy advance had been stopped though not much activity and could expect more forceful actions following day. Pointed our shortage of infantry mentioning that the armour regiments were not going into night leaguers instead staying in the forward lines at night; (normal battle procedure for tank regiments to refuel, replenish ammunition and essential maintenance of tanks,) The form we followed for the next few days every night. He informed me that with the expected arrival of Brig Tiger Niazi’s brigade situation would improve. At midnight back at my HQ issued necessary order to units for the next day. At 4 O’clock in the morning as if on cue, the enemy started activities. That is how the first day of my command finished.

I will continue with the Round 4 of September 15th fighting in Badiana-Chawinda sector?

On 15th of September the enemy renewed efforts and several attacks were made against Chawinda during the following morning. During the night we intercepted the enemy’s messages for reinforcements particularly for tanks so had anticipated attacks following morning. The first attack came at first light from the North in front of us, the repeat performance of the previous day. Some good fighting by the 24 Brigade, 25 Cav, heavy artillery supported by Guides Cavalry blunted the enemy attack. The second attack was around 0800 hours when the enemy made a desperate effort to create a wedge between Jassoran and our front and Chawinda on my right with a strong tank infantry force. Emphasize that every enemy attack was a combined strong tank infantry effort. After some sharp fighting the attack was repulsed. Shortly afterwards fresh and more determined tank infantry attempts were launched against Chawinda, these too were repulsed by last light. Simultaneously, Badiana was subjected to constant heavy shelling and severe tank attacks: developing thrusts to the main Pasrur-Sialkot road and on the Badiana crossroads. Both the armoured regiments, Guides and 22nd Cav were locked in grim battles throughout the day. I was personally on the air passing information of enemy moves, manoeuvring the regiments to block the enemy penetrations. Strongest attack came at about 1700 hrs, a double thrust from Rakh Baba Bhra Shah in front for Badiana crossroads to envelop Chawinda and Pasrur. 14FF Company, taking brunt gallantly, supported by the Guides thwarted the attack, by now reduced to two weak Squadrons covering wide area. So I gave 14FF missions of plugging the gaps with their meagre resources, my only reserve. One company 14FF was used to hold later at night the Rakh and clear northern half in the morning was nearly lost in the process. Its other company used to clear village Fatehpur in front, got up to the railway line, was pushed back again with losses under withering tank fire from the railway station reinforced by enemy reserves. In spite of all the weight enemy put into these repeated attacks failed to make major headway. With no let-up, fighting continued till late in the evening, At about 5 p.m. intercepted message from the enemy Div Commander impressing upon his commanders the importance of pressing their attacks saying “the Prime Minister wants Badiana and Chawinda captured tonight to be presented in parliament tomorrow morning”.  

15 of Sept was a day of tough fighting, both at Badiana and Chawinda. We had taken some casualties, had inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. From the wireless intercept, learnt that the enemy had also lost their Infantry Brigadier at Badiana. Throughout these operations our artillery, keeping the Artillery Commander with me all the times, gave excellent support. Our interception of enemy radio messages plus the use of army aviation enabled to forewarn us about the enemy thrusts. PAF successfully fended off enemy air attacks. All these combined efforts frustrated the enemy attacks.

Hasty and unchecked reports sent in the confusion of battle accentuated hasty reactions was aptly demonstrated in this day’s fighting. This was a critical day, very heavy and close-range tank-to-tank battles were going on, fighting tenaciously more or less with backs to the walls. HQ Task Force on receiving information that two unidentified tanks, had passed Badiana heading towards Div HQ and warned the HQ to take necessary precautions. Unfortunately, there was some confusion at the Div HQ was soon brought under control. The message had also been intercepted by our units and as the search was still on two tanks, from B Squadron 19 Lancers, just moved in our area from 1st Armoured Div, got detached moving with their guns pointing in the wrong direction. During the battle Brig Effendi telling me the arrival of 19 Lancers in my area, asked me to guide and place them. Contacting Col Bashir tried to place them between Guides and 25 Cav but the Regiment, unfamiliar with the area, without any guides or recce, just bumming along headlong was asking for trouble!. Saw their tanks shooting on my right and in spite of our efforts too late to stop exchange of fire between friendly forces. The two were later discovered ours, facing their guns in the wrong direction were going back for some essential maintenance without informing their commanders and in the confusion of “ fog of war” unfortunate incident took place.

At the end of day’s battle, commander Guides Cav sought permission to pull back couple of thousand yards for much needed replenishment, maintenance and to collect straggler tanks to make up his low tank strength; Told to wait for Div HQ’s approval. Immediately informed Brig Effendi, acting Div second-in-command, the first from the Div HQ visiting my forward HQ, he replied would let me know on getting Abrar’s clearance. On not hearing from Div HQ considering the urgency I allowed Guides to carry out the replenishment reinforcing their position with additional infantry from 14FF. Personally visited them at about 8 PM, replenishing and carrying out maintenance, with 14FF in their positions, instructed them to hurry up to get back to their positions.

Later at night, reporting to the Div HQ excited Brig Effendi asked, “Why have you withdrawn? Taken aback! Replied, “What withdrawal, I do not understand?” Told me to go inside, discuss with Abrar. Discussing with Gen Abrar noted our positions, wrongly indicated on the map, explained the whole situation, indicated exact positions my units were and also the HQ of 24th Brigade Commander, confronting Brig Effendi said, “Sir, I asked your permission for the Guides to carry out replenishment and you had replied would let me know after clearance from GOC and since I did not hear from you, had no choice to allow the Guides to pull back for the replenishment”, stressing by allowing the regiment we would be in a better position to take on the enemy expecting much heavier thrust tomorrow. They had been able to collect 5 or 6 tanks improving their tank strength reduced to a squadron.” There was some heated argument as they were expecting enemy attacks. “No, there is no information about any enemy attack, they do not start before 4 O’clock, right now the time is about half-past twelve so there is a lot of time and I am confident to hold our positions with Guides back in the positions by then, reinforced by 14FF”. He then checked from me Brig Ali’s position. Having visited him earlier corrected his position, also upon which GOC showed concern. The GOC was satisfied and agreed the enemy’s efforts had been blunted getting a bloody nose in the process. The time was now approaching after delivering the knockout blows to go on the offensive. From the GOC’s caravan, I checked with Janjua again on the progress of replenishment, told him to finish quickly to get back to his position. Returning to my HQ at about two in the morning checked: all my units were in position, ready to take on the enemy. Enemy started  action exactly at 4 O’clock in the morning.

The GOC informed elements from 1st Armoured Div had arrived in our area us reinforcement and a Battalion of 1st Punjab, ex 14 Para Brigade from Brigadier Niazi at Pasrur was being moved to Badiana, (supposed to have moved earlier was delayed.) 19th Lancers was already in our area.

The total tank casualty in Badiana-Chawinda sector on that day was 5 tanks while we had knocked out 14 enemy tanks.

The above misunderstanding/ confusion over my alleged withdrawal, played up later, was typical example of the commanders and their senior staff not visiting forward HQ/Units for the correct battle picture carried away by their baseless apprehensions generated by sitting in comfortable HQ’s.

Round 5, Thursday the 16th of September

The day of most fierce tank battles of the war, all units of the Division except Zafarwal were fully engaged. The enemy launched three major coordinated attacks on Badiana and Chawinda simultaneously. The first attack came at 0730 till 1030 hours, the second from 1230 to 1430 hours and the third from 1630 till well after dark.

The main attack on the 22nd Cav group at Badiana with another armoured regiment with infantry and artillery attempting to break through the Guides Cav tried to envelop Chawinda through 3 FF and 25th Cav positions, supported with a frontal assault by infantry brigade plus under intense artillery shelling: to mask Badiana cut Chawinda from the west and rear with concentrated moves of two armoured regiments. It was a brilliant manoeuvre shattered by the rock like determination of our tankers, each one of them taking part with grit and determination. The steadfastness of our men in the trenches and some accurate shooting by our gunners with all our tankers shooting very well and fighting gallantly threw back wave upon wave of enemy tanks: using column formation of tanks to break through on a narrow front. Personally requested the PAF Joint Ops HQ my cousin, Commodore Masroor Hussain (Shaheed), conducting the joint operations for maximum air support, was promptly given, Damaging his echelons, the gun areas and the HQs in the rear. While the enemy was resolutely held did gain some grounds after repeated attacks at a very prohibitive cost. Desperate to outflank Chawinda tried to go for our guns at Pasrur. Considering the enemy’s cautious tactics the bulk of our guns had been boldly deployed centrally well forward, one of the major battle-winning factors. The guns successfully engaged enemy armour assisted by the tankbusters of 11 Cav I had deployed earlier on. For the crucial battle I was personally directing the complete Corps artillery fire of all available guns on the enemy thrust.

16th of September thus saw the toughest and most grim fighting of the entire operations. This was the day Indians desperately tried every possible way all his efforts were thwarted by our gallant defence. Casualties on both sides were heavy, total tank casualties at Badiana-Chawinda sector stood at 15 tanks lost by us, we had knocked out 29 enemy tanks, including the PAF claims.

At night on reporting to Gen Abrar, discussing the day’s battle was apparent that the enemy had suffered heavy casualties and all his efforts failed.  The situation restored, at a very heavy cost, suffering casualties as well as loss of ground. However, the main defence line Badiana-Chawinda was held intact. Having received reinforcements from the 1st Armoured Div and an infantry Brigade confident to take counter actions to regain lost ground. HQ 4 Armoured Brigade from 1st Armoured Div having arrived was to take over the following day, under Brig Riaz ul Karim Khan, the badly needed vacant position of the Brigade HQ relieving me.

Next morning there was not much activity; the enemy was licking his wounds having suffered very heavy losses. Its two leading best Tank Regiments, 17th Poona Horse and 4th Hodson’s Horse were very badly mauled with both the commanding officers killed. The former by 25 Cav in front of 24 Brigade and the latter by my Task Force. (Returned Col Bakhshi’s body personally to his widow after the ceasefire).

 Later from 17th September onwards operation were mounted to clear the area in front to regain lost ground.  I handed over to Brig Riaz ul Karim HQ 4 Armoured Brigade on 17th September and was directed to get back to 11 Cav to reorganize and refit the regiment quickly. 11 Cav was back in the front line at Chawinda on 24th September after ceasefire.

Interesting Features - Electronic Warfare

Certain events during the battles relating to wireless communications were interesting. With heavy fighting going on amidst, extensive communications both sides intercepting messages, there were occasions for passing important orders, knowing being intercepted, we changed to a language enemy would not understand: instructed Khursheed to speak in Pushto relaying important messages. It worked. The enemy was baffled but he also changed to Gurkhali, which we could not understand!

Talking about radio communications, from the start the enemy had used electronic warfare effectively: had deployed radio teams for carrying out jamming of our communications, interception, passing fake messages and also passing wrong orders to our units. This they managed having captured certain documents after the first battle of Phillaura. Till such time we did not have a Task Force HQ there were too many wireless stations on the command net creating confusion, it was corrected once the Task Force HQ was established. And since we knew each other’s voices there was no need for call signs and all messages were passed very quickly after recognizing the units. By these countermeasures we took effective steps to continue giving orders on wireless without even a minute’s breakdown in our command communications. At no stage my Command Net was ever affected and all orders quickly passed to all concerned.

Towards the later stages of the fighting we were paying the enemy back in their own coin, passing wrong orders to them and by giving exaggerated enemy casualties and giving them picture of their low morale and failure in their attempts. All this had some effect and believe these counter-measures did succeed.

Cannot overemphasize the importance of excellent communications, the lifeblood of armour operations and the question of the Commanders manning their command wireless nets and not the Staff Officers or the operators. It was a pleasure to hear Brig Effendi, excellent in commanding Command Nets, his roaring crisp orders a great morale booster. In my Task Force I never used Staff Officers or operators, was on the net from 4 in the morning till late at night during all operations. Felt very proud, later complimented by the Corps Commander and even by Gen Yayha in 7 Div who said “We could hear your voice all the time in 7 Div area.” Later commander GHQ Signal Regiment receiving us clearly mentioned they had completely recorded the entire battles excellent voice communications of the Task Force and the Armoured Div HQ.

In spite of our wireless deficiencies the communications of 6th Armoured Div were throughout excellent, the main reason of maintaining good command and control and success in battle. This was the basic reason of failure of the operations in the Chamb sector for 4 to 6 hours breakdown in communications between the Tac HQ of Gen Akhtar Malik, his units and the Army Chief, losing precious time and opportunity to capture Aknoor in Kashmir. 

How would you compare the Pakistan Armoured Corps with the Indian Armoured Corps based on the results of the 1965 war?

We must remember that the Indian Armoured Corps is much older, more experienced and, a larger Force with excellent training facilities. Has been on the ground longer than Pakistan Armoured Corps. Equally their  “Fakhr-e-Hind”. 1st Armoured Div, raised 60 years ago is well tried, experienced in many campaigns and an excellent armoured formations by every standards. Still there is not much difference between the two Forces. However, in spite of all the advantages the Indian 1st Armoured Div had in mounting the Operation Nepal of a Corps plus with two reinforced Infantry Divisions and a reinforced Armoured Division was unable to carry out what was expected failing to achieve the main objective. Undoubtedly, after crossing the ceasefire line without declaration of war, achieving the element of surprise and with no opposition, they hit Phillaura without much difficulty. However, even in this first battle against a weak force of an armoured Regiment and a motor battalion managed to gain easy victory with losses. After very slow advance from Phillaura to Chawinda, only 3 to 5 miles, having struck this blow on the 6th Armoured Div and having reorganized and re-grouped failed to make any appreciable headway suffering very heavy casualties. They kept on trying and despite all their efforts failed to capture Chawinda-Badiana defence box missing the next objectives. Their infantry strong points undoubtedly were very strong. Their attacks were well planned, well coordinated, resolutely carried out by great determination and all units fought well, specially 17th Poona Horse and 4th Hodson Hours. It must be noted that all their units were well tried out battle-hardened Regiments. Their strong points were good Infantry-Tank cooperation and their old system of replenishment, making up the crew and tanks end of the day with fresh reinforcements. Conversely, we were at a great disadvantage, not having proper system of replenishment and reinforcement as our units had to start next day, exhausted, without reinforcements and depleted tank strengths of our Regiments day after day. In spite of this our regiments fighting with fewer tanks did extremely well not allowing the enemy to move forward of Badiana-Chawinda defence line.

Our major weakness was organisational: inadequate articulation of HQ’s, imbalanced armoured regiment with mixing third old useless tank busters squadrons with modern Patton tanks, and absence of tank delivery units for replenishment of tank and crew casualties.    

You were GOC 6 Armoured Division, Kharian, how was this experience and please tell us your major actions and activities?

Undoubtedly, one felt very proud commanding an Armoured Division and it was, I would say, my finest hour. I think after command of a Regiment, command of an Armoured Division is the next best thing. Very interesting and professionally extremely beneficial. I took over GOC 6 Armoured Division soon after my return in February 1972 from Turkey as President’s special Envoy to CENTO during the 1971 war. Gen Gul Hassan the COAS informed me having been cleared for promotion would be taking over the division but had to wait for Gen Bacchu Karim to be evacuated to Bangladesh. In the meantime told to take over Director Armoured Corps and prepare report on the Reorganization of the Armoured Corps in view of the 1965 and 1971 wars. At the Directorate, concentrated on preparing the report, visited all formations, most of the units, carried out deep research, finalized the report in the next two months and presented to Gul Hassan. I never heard anything about the report. Years later out of the blue in Athens got a call from Gen Zia asking for a copy!

Before taking over 6th Armoured Div discussed with the Chief  the on going enquiry on the “conspiracy” in the Army in which senior officers of the 6th Armoured Div were involved on the fall of Dacca. Requested the court of enquiry to be completed and all the affected senior officers of the Division, must be removed to which he agreed. On taking over started off with new Brigade Commanders and staff. Concentrated the next few months cleaning up the after-effects of the conspiracy which had impaired the overall morale:  to re-establish correct discipline and healthy atmosphere in the Division.

In 1973/74 took the Division progressively from Regimental training to Brigade and finally to Divisional exercises going through each operation of war.   Was quite happy with standards achieved by Division. For individual training established new ranges, good tank driving tracks and battle courses around Kharian. In mid-1974 given the task of receiving PM Bhutto visiting Kharian used this occasion for organizing armour demonstration. Managed to squeeze a complete Armoured Regiment with a Motor Battalion supported by artillery and air at Tilla Ranges giving lot of confidence to the Brigade.

The Division’s various administrative problems were attended by providing better accommodation to the officers and men, organizing sports activities, polo tournaments and the clubs/messes social activities. We also had the Iranian Polo Team visiting Pakistan and Kharian. There was a flurry of foreign guests in Kharian among them the Head of the Egyptian Armed Forces visiting the Armoured, Division.

We also concentrated on the men’s welfare, in fact my wife Talat, did that. She re-activated the various Welfare Organisations and also started a children’s school for the young boys and girls.

During my GOC’s tenure led three delegations abroad, two to Iran and the third to Cairo and Damascus. The first visit was to the Royal Imperial Army in Iran leading senior officers goodwill delegation. I was selected by the PM and the COAS to lead Armed Forces Defence Delegation to study the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to prepare detailed report for the Prime Minister and Govt. of Pakistan. The report was comprehensively prepared and submitted to the Secretary General Defence, Gen Fazle Muqeem, specially commended by the Prime Minister. Subsequently, the COAS directed me to visit all the formation HQs to give talks on the Lessons Learnt for Pakistan from the Arab-Israeli War.

End of 1974 was directed by the COAS to proceed to the Staff College, Quetta  which I did on 1st January 1975 given the special mission of completing and decorating new college building to be commissioned for the expanded college courses ready for inauguration by the Prime Minister in September 1975.

In 74 Kharian was the scene of two famous functions in the armoured corps, 125th anniversary of the 11th cavalry and Prime Minister Bhutto’s installation as Colonel-in-Chief of the armoured corps. Please tell us in detail about the events.

Actually both these events were one combined function. In mid-1974, the 11th  Cav in my Division requested to make arrangements for the celebration of their 125th anniversary. The main suggestion for sanction in the elaborate programme was for the PM to be invited as the Chief Guest and for the PM to be Colonel of the Regiment. Was informed that the proposal had already been considered during the Armoured Corps Commanding officers’ conference held at the Armoured Corps Centre, under Chairmanship of the Colonel of the Corps, Gen Zia Ul Haq commanding 1st Armoured Div. Zia also told me that 11 Cav’s suggestion was discussed but instead of the PM to be Colonel of just one Regiment he suggested for the PM to be considered for the Colonel-in Chief of the whole Corps. All the Commanding officers had agreed. The case was processed with the GHQ.  Subsequently, GHQ approved and Gen Tikka asked us to work out the details.

Accordingly he conferred with Zia and myself. The main point was the possible venue. Three places were mentioned, the Armoured Corps Centre Nowshera, the HQ of the 1st Armoured Div Multan and Kharian. I pressed for Multan since Gen Zia was located as the Colonel of Corps and sponsor. Gen Tikka mentioned the PM was keen to visit Kharian, our modern Cantonment and also he did not want civilians to be mixed in the ceremony, Kharian was settled and I was directed to go ahead with the arrangements. In consultation with the Colonel of the Corps, Gen Zia ul Haq, the programme was finalized. Starting with the arrival of the PM in the morning, a Darbar represented by all the Regiments and senior commanders, retired and serving officers of the Corps, to be addressed by Gen Zia installing PM, followed by PMs reply. Anniversary lunch by 11 Cav at their Mess. I later included armour demonstration of an armoured regimental group in attack.

Finally, the Corps Dinner for the Chief Guest. The PM stayed at the Armoured Div Flagstaff House converted to PM’s Residence. (I moved out to the adjacent annexe). All events went on extremely well. For the dinner the PM was supposed to appear in his new Colonel-in-Chief’s uniform (prepared under arrangements  by Gen Zia ul Haq). It was laid out by my batman but for some reason the PM last minute changed his mind and instead of donning the uniform, put on blue lounge suit. He was pleased with the Dinner, attended by the Army Chief, senior Armoured Corps officers, their wives and mementoes were exchanged. The next morning he left congratulating the Division on the excellent arrangements. Once he was gone the controversy started over his installation by the very sponsors responsible for appointing him! As GOC I did what I thought should have been done, befitting the visit of the Head of the State to the main armoured formation of the Army, as per Army traditions and customs.

Please tell us the circumstances under which you were posted as ambassador and your life and main activities as a diplomat?

To put the record straight I was neither interested in Ambassadorial assignments nor did I ask for it but was caught in the diplomatic crisis emerged from Prime Minister Bhutto vs. Gen Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan’s controversy generated by these Ambassadors holding press conferences at Madrid and Athens against the Government. These two Ambassadors, former Army and Air Chiefs, demonstrated against the alleged rigged elections, condemned the PM who had appointed them, whom they had themselves installed, criticizing the very Government they represented. An extraordinary display of washing country’s dirty linen in foreign countries, stirred diplomatic and political crisis. The PM sacked them.

The PM had seen my professional work during the last couple of years. After the inauguration of the Staff College he liked the College so much became a frequent visitor. To project his foreign policy views he used it as enlightened platform. During the above diplomatic crisis Gen Zia ul Haq rang me to inform that the PM wanted me to proceed as Ambassador wanting my views. Initially I was not interested but later after meeting with the PM agreed. In the meeting gave the real reasons for selecting me. He was aspiring for coming up as world statesman to settle the old Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey in view of his good relations with Greek PM Mr. Karamanlis and the Turkish President. He directed me to proceed immediately, hold press conference, remove Gul Hassan episode’s after effects and prepare ground to negotiate with PM Karmanlis for which some spade work had already been done by the Foreign Ministry. Wondered at Mr. Bhutto’s ambitious perception of becoming world statesman oblivious to the internal serious political developments to unseat him!  

Soon after Zia ul Haq called me to discuss the ensuing political deadlock! (mentioned in details elsewhere). The day I handed over to my Deputy, Brig Iqbal, Chief Instructor, Zia had taken over. I proceeded to Athens spent very pleasant four and a half years in Greece. The first year was tough later the matters settled down. Managed to create considerable cooperation and goodwill for Pakistan. Concentrated on trade between the two countries practically none at that time. Also assisted substantial number of Pakistanis employed by the Greek merchant fleet, Pakistani being the second highest. By the time I left efforts proved fruitful as trade had increased considerably and managed to establish good relations in every field. Specially with the excellent relations with the Armed Forces of Greece, the only Ambassador invited to witness the trials for the selection of modern tank for the Greek Armoured Corps! The first Greek Pakistan Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement was also signed to establish closer commercial and economic relations.

The Cyprus issue was left untouched. Having good relations with the Greek PM Karamanlis told me the whole story: he actually did not support Bhutto’s idea! I informed Zia accordingly.

During the Bhutto trial in the Lahore High Court there was tremendous reaction in Greece, Adverse repercussions both in the press and Government circles. PM Karmanlis had visited Pakistan, the first Greek PM to have done so, at Bhutto’s invitation and the two were friends. I was called by the PM to make friendly representation to Gen Zia appealing for leniency through a formal letter unfortunately not appreciated by Zia.

An interesting matter pertaining to the defence requirements came up. With my good relations with the Defence Minister they were prepared to help us out to get Leopard Tanks for Pakistan Army if our President wished. I wrote to Zia-ul-Haq, was pleased, said would let me know. Nothing happened! After reminders a confused note was received from the CGS GHQ dropping the case: Repeating the saga of our army missing out on acquiring modern equipment!

From Greece was transferred with special mission to Australia to steer our re-entry into Commonwealth. President Zia was keen to get back having realized the damage by Bhutto’s policies. The case was coming up at the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Conference in Canberra in September 1981. The President wanted me to get to Australia to assist in our re-entry. I arrived in Canberra just a week before the Conference and had to face the Indian PM Indira Gandhi’s full blast wrath, had come well armed against Pakistan’s entry. Very little could be done in that meeting. However, consistently worked on it and over the years managed to assist in getting Pakistan back into the Commonwealth.

Australia was very interesting and fruitful experience. Learnt a lot, enjoyed my stay. Concentrating on trade increased from US$ 10 Million to   over US$ 100 Million. Was lucky to have selected good Commercial Counsellors who did a good job. For the first time one country exhibition from Pakistan Export Bureau held in the major cities, becoming regular feature, with our exporters displaying their goods and getting substantial orders. The next activity was closer co-operation with defence Forces. The Services Chiefs, very friendly were supportive and helpful initiating interesting mutual cooperation programmes like exchanges of services chiefs and providing free higher technical training facilities to our personnel. Another field was education. Managed to get and increased scholarships for our students, curtailed after our exit from the Commonwealth. Also got the Australian Assistance Programme to Pakistan substantially increased with considerable assistance for the Afghan Refugees, big problem at that time.

During my assignment carried, the flag to South Pacific States establishing diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Tonga, Western Samoa; representing five countries; Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa. In New Zealand again concentrated on trade, improving relations in the defence sector. In Fiji lot of work was put in to get the support of substantial Muslim minority played leading role to counter the Indian propaganda after establishing good personal relations with their Prime Minister. 

So all in all, my over five years experience in Australia was diplomatically very productive and mutually beneficial for both the countries.

How far do you think the Army has been responsible for the political problems of Pakistan?

Let me say that the army in general, NO. The top officers concerned, YES.

It would be wrong to malign the army for the takeovers and resultant political problems since only a handful of top officers with political ambitions were responsible for such actions. This disease germinated on Independence due to the very nature of our new country’s establishment after the fading away of our Founding Fathers, under weak and inept political and military leadership. It was only the top military hierarchies arbitrary actions, supported for selfish reasons by the Senior General Staff Officers around, were responsible for the induction of military governments. The rest of the professional Officers Corps and the Army in general neither had any inkling nor played any part in the decision making except, of course, implementing the orders along the chain of command. So it can be easily said that none of the take-over could be called classical coups. Each one of these was unwarranted and constitutionally illegal and could have been avoided by judicious handling by the military commanders. It has progressively eroded the professionalism of the Army, smeared its character and international standing and has also aggravated political instability, creating schism between the people, the establishment and the Army. Apprehensive of such unhealthy developments and abhorring such tendencies the Founding Fathers took strong preventive actions.

Our neighbouring country, which has similar background and is facing similar problems, is sticking to the well-tested  British administration, constitutional traditions and democratic institutions and in spite of all the inroads have kept the Army out with better and healthier all-round results appreciated by the world at large.

You visited IMA Dehra Dun in 1996 to attend your course’s Golden Jubilee. What were your impression about the academy and the Indian Army officers after fifty years?

The cadets and instructors of the IMA First Regular Course 1946 in Pakistan were invited by the Commandant of the Indian Military Academy to attend the Golden Jubilee Reunion IMA Dehra Dun Dec 1996. Myself and Brigadier Ejaz Artillery were the only ones to attend. We were collected under special arrangements at the Wagah Border by our course mate Gen Bajwa and driven to Chandigarh. From there again driven to Dehra Dun with our wives. 

An exciting feeling visiting  the old Academy after half a century to meet old colleagues and instructors. IMA has grown considerably in the last 50 years with staff of about 450 officers. Commanded by a Senior Lieutenant General, a Sikh Officer from Sind Horse. Interestingly only two Muslim officers in the staff, one Major and a Captain! The Academy now has 10 Companies of one Battalion. This Golden Jubilee coincided with the passing out of the 100th Course comprising 350 cadets and the Technical Course of about 150. We were there for three days; very hospitable, extremely courteous. My old colleagues, most of them retired  Generals, stressed upon the dire necessity of restoring normal friendly relations between India and Pakistan.

Politics in both the countries was attributed for the deterioration of mutual relations. However, whenever we touched Kashmir or other issues, they all towed the Government line! The standard of the passing out parade was not very high, my colleagues held the same opinion. Nor were the Cadets impressive. Rather thin, small but well educated. I was impressed by the junior officers, (Captains and above) appeared confident, well-spoken and well-turned out. The other observation was the Indian Army has kept the old traditions; did not go for changing badge, ties etc, specially the Armoured Corps sticking to the old traditions. The Commandant IMA was in blue patrols wearing the chain mail and spurs with overalls, Regiments maintain traditions and old uniforms. The only difference is the old crown replaced with the Asoka Lion on the badges maintaining identity of units, Looking through the Cadets training curriculum noted high physical standards. For example rock climbing, mountaineering, expeditions, polo, riding among other games are now mandatory. Senior officers were impressive. They seem to have acquired practical experience in handling large field formations having participated in many insurgencies and operations.

From IMA drove down to Delhi, were entertained at the Gymkhana Club, met old colleagues. During our conversation two pertinent points were learnt. First, their senior officers talking about our wars thought Pakistani commanders (div and brigade Commanders) were shy in coming to the front lines except the armour commanders. Were critical of their 1st Armoured Div’s indifferent, unexpected performance in 1965. They thought our 1st Armoured Div fought gallantly though badly led; were surprised over the absence of any Corp HQ to control the operations of our 1st Armoured Div and 11 Div in Khem Karan operations mentioning had there been better command and control they would have been in very difficult position.

Similar observations were made about the East Pakistan operations. It was mentioned in the initial commanders conference under General Manekshaw they were apprehensive of the General’s plan for going straight to Dacca. They took great risk, were very surprised over no real opposition. Had Dacca been reasonably defended they would have been in serious trouble!

We also discussed the regimental mess life. It was remarked, “we followed your example of turning the regimental messes into brigade and station messes as the army is very big. Officers standard went down specially espirit de corps. After spending lot of money had to get back to the old system of regimental messes”. Their Cantonments are well-run and better organized noticed driving through 6/7 cantonments in East Punjab and Delhi. They have not allowed civilians in the Cantonments, as we have done, nor officers houses. Modest blocks of houses have come up outside the Cantonments. All of them mentioned,  “You people live very luxuriously! Specially your senior officers have very grand houses in Pakistan!”

In short, it was an interesting and useful experience. Concluding my final observation “Thank God I opted for Pakistan and was happy to return home”!