China and India in the great game

Columnist MB NAQVI carries out a detailed analysis of the new geo-political implications in the region.

A red herring is cutting the path of many. It is the proposal, said to be originally a Chinese idea, of a tripartite Asian Axis; it is to comprise Russia, China and India. Whoever may have conceived it or proposed it now, it is not a new idea; it has been around since about a decade with a somewhat varying membership. But what motivates it is clear enough: the US role in Asia should be contained and, if possible, countered by major Asian states’ acting in concert. There was a similar proposal in early 1990s: it was then to comprise China, India and Iran; the idea predates the later development of Sino-Russian relations graduating to what is a Strategic Consensus based on a growing rapprochement between them. While the original proposal — of Beijing, New Delhi and Tehran axis —- did not go far, the Sino-Russian ties flowered: their longer-term strategic understanding and reconciliation have progressed and appear to stand on a firm enough ground. The revival of the idea of a purely Asian major power acting together —- now to comprise Russia, China and India —- could only be a mainly Chinese initiative. Would it now have a better chance than its earlier avatar had? 

The current ambience in Asia has to be closely watched. The situation now is dominated by the sole superpower’s relentless strategic advances resulting from —- stated objectives or intentions or beliefs notwithstanding —- its International War on Terrorism. The precise state of this war is that one set of terrorists —- the Taliban regime that was hosting Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and assorted terrorists —- has been more or less eliminated, save the ongoing mopping up operations. The US President intends to go on expanding the scope and locale(s) of this war; he is focused on an Evil Axis that comprises Iran, Iraq and North Korea. America’s European allies in the Atlantic Alliance and NATO have been alarmed. They disapprove such reckless extensions of the war to such far-flung areas (and regimes) as over half a dozen states in Africa and so many in Asia —- some of them far tougher nuts than Afghanistan. But America’s relentless strategic march in terms of enhanced influence based on high profile deployment of military might in the shape of new bases for US troops has raised hackles throughout the world, especially in Europe, Asia and Africa. People do not fail to see the nexus between the American obsession with Islamic fanaticism being called Terrorism and actual geopolitical and economic and financial benefits for US Big Business. Most observers perceive secondary threats of extensions of war to recalcitrant states in Middle East as tying up the loose ends of its ME policies and plugging the holes through which non-US strategic intrude in ME and much of Asian landmass. It is a grand revival of Great Game with a gusto if also in a much-altered situation and a set of different personnae dramatis. 

As it happens, the chief powers that stand to lose out are Russia and China; their roles are being abbreviated from Central Asia and their influence being pushed out. Naturally, their chances of sharing the development of many of the virgin areas and resources in Central Asian states and to benefit from them is being more or less foreclosed. Europeans too are in the same boat; their possible shares are also likely to be preempted. This was one reason there was a scramble to contribute troops to police Afghanistan; it was a token of their lien on a share in the new business opportunities opening up in not only Afghanistan but also elsewhere in Central Asia. The name of the game in this War on Terrorism is oil, gas, other minerals and much else in Central Asia; these are the prizes in this revived Great Game. The US flaunts a unilateralism and exceptionalism not out of ignorance or underdeveloped sensitivities about the responsibilities of a leader of a large alliance to be fair to all. It is intended. The aim is to deny other possible rivals of the future any significant presence, influence or share in the likely mega projects of hydrocarbons. The commonly disliked unilateralism of the US is intended to contain the influence of all possible rivals, especially in two key spheres in Central Asia: prospecting, mining, transporting (chiefly pipelines) and marketing of oil, gas and other minerals. There is another major prize that the US would not wish to share: most states of Central Asia would modernise their armed forces and infrastructure. Should most of the major contracts go to American corporations or their consortia, the recession in the US would be replaced with a sharp upswing of prosperity. Or so it is hoped. America has good outside reasons to be unilateralist apart from possessing all that it takes to play this exclusivist game.

But who are the possible rivals and supporters of the US in the altered situation. The biggest ‘threat’ comes from the European Union or more specifically from Germany and France. Britain is a safe underling and, in any case, in financial matters there so much interpenetration of financial capital between the British and American companies. So much so is difficult to say which belongs to which state. But that is not the case with other EU countries. So they are being kept out. The chief countries to be kept out by the US are France and Germany; the others in Europe are less important and less strong to challenge. But the question is of far greater interest regarding possible Asian rivals of the US at some stage. Who would they be? Well, let us look through the map of the Continent. There are five states that are large and strong enough: Japan, China, Russia, Australia and India. Let us look at each case. 

Japan is the second largest economy in the world in size and potential. It has the financial resources to become a superpower in a military sense with a matter of five years or so if it wants to. But it does not want to remilitarise itself, after its Second World War defeat and the level of riches it has attained through its peace orientation. Why should it endanger its net surpluses with the rest of the world? Besides, the US, the main victor against the Japanese in 1940s, has so managed and integrated Japan in the world economic, trade and financial systems that it would be a great wrench, and loss, for the Japanese to change their policy orientation. For one thing, all its surplus funds, including its Monetary Reserves are invested in American blue chips. Falling out with the US can mean losing all those countless billions and other assets in the US.

China of course is a wholly different kettle of fish. It has followed a wholly independent course since it normalised its ties with the US over 30 years ago. Earlier it was the designated enemy of the US. The Americans have tried their utmost to integrate China into the international systems —- on the broad understanding that the world is a village under the American thumb. The Chinese policy, pragmatic in the best sense of the term, has responded positively to the American essays in befriending it and to invest in China. The US allowed China to earn a growing trade surplus with itself. By now China earns a neat

$40 billion and more from its US market in trade. Plus the US has invested at least $ 50 billion in the Chinese economy. Chinese GDP was growing, until a few years ago, at double-digit rates. It is now growing at 6-7 per cent rates amidst global recession. It is said, China will overtake the US GDP by 2020, though the America will have grown bigger still. China has the ambition of playing a big and growing role in Asia and it does not welcome the US overlordship of the Continent. But it does not play the great power role in purely military terms. Nor does it challenge the US militarily. It is content to play an independent role and recommends the same to other Asian states: to steer clear of American sponsored schemes. It has favoured the Asians’ coordinating their independent roles to preserve their own economic and political interests, including their own independence of action. But that is done without frontally or militarily challenging the Americans. Where profitable, it is ready to cooperate with the US. It favours those Americans who want to remain ‘engaged’ with China, such as Bill Clinton did in contrast with those American schools and lobbies that want to regard China as a security threat. For keeping Asia free of American domination, it does not favour a military line up against it. What it favours is a set of social, political and economic policies of cooperation among Asian states to keep American tentacles out of Asia. The US is baffled by Chinese policies and the Chinese remain wary of what the Yankees may be up to —- especially in Central Asia.

Russia is the successor state of the Soviet Union; it may still be the largest or second largest state in the world, with plenty of unexplored and unexploited natural resources. It has perhaps the world’s largest pool of scientists and technologists of great competence and world’s most skilled labour force. It still possesses the wherewithal of being a superpower. But it is a politically loose-limbed state with no ideology to unite it. Russian federation is now a historical accident, emerging from the break of the USSR; inside the Soviets it had a different meaning and purpose. But not now. Its economy, despite its basic strengths, is at sixes and sevens more than 10 years after the disintegration of the Soviets. Progress in the transition to capitalism from Communism’s command economy has so far amounted to stopping further downward slide but little actual progress — over and above what the Soviets had achieved. A capitalism led by robbers has certainly come into being, with ‘oligarchs’ at the top. But all the gains for the common Russian that Communists had made —- a cradle-to-grave social security, fine education and healthcare for all, accommodation to all —- are slowly disappearing. No prosperity —- on such a grand resource base —- is on the horizon.

Russia’s rulers have struggled to be treated as a great power. They expected that the west will help them to realise their dreams of glamorous prosperity for all Russians through capitalism. But they had made the mistake of taking American advice on how to become a capitalist economy from one day to the next, without possessing any capital accumulation or business experience or even orientation. Communism was of course destroyed easily enough. But capitalism could not be built even in a decade. Only mass unemployment has resulted and most of the industrial apparatus is idle or is, in world capitalist terms, inefficient. Poverty, misery and crimes are growing. Diseases are also increasing. Governments in Moscow and in the regions are broke. Western nations and institutions are tired of pouring billions down the many Russian drains. Russia has defaulted on its debt payments. It is in no position to challenge the leading western powers, dependent as it is on their understanding and financial help and advice. The G8 play along and hope protocol and soothing words will keep President Vladimir Putin in line. Hitherto the G8 had left Central Asia to the managing skills and pretensions of the rulers in Moscow. 

Meanwhile, the Russians began listening to the Chinese and agreed to a rapprochement and a Strategic Consensus. That seems to have alarmed America’s strategy thinkers and soon, thereafter, Bush Junior appeared with his gung-ho policies. The latter has upped all the antes. Russia, by itself, wishes nothing better than more financial help and accommodation inside Europe; it can be satisfied with symbolic roles — if only the Americans will care to. 

That leaves Australia and India. Australia, for all its potential, is a small state and its racial and immigration policies will keep it in the American camp, well satisfied with the village headman’s role in the string of Pacific islands and a few parts of Asia. It certainly poses no problems for the US, let alone offering any opposition to the US, though it is capable of embarrassing western liberals by its tough anti-refugee policies that stink to High Heavens as being based more on racial hatred than mere caution in preserving economic advantages of the Australian people.

India’s case is different. It has a rich capitalist economy, if also of a small size in a vast sea of humanity. It has high ambitions of becoming an accepted great power with a permanent UN Security Council seat with the veto power that goes with it. It has a middle class that is claimed to be 250 million strong. It is one of the few countries where middle class people swoon on the Americans. The US offered India investments —- till now there are only less than five billion US dollars invested, showing its low absorption capacity —- and strategic friendship. It accepted both with whoops of delight. India was the first, almost instantly, to welcome and support Bush Junior’s NMD plan and offered all its facilities to the US in its War on Terrorism. The US wants it to be a Regional Influential in South Asia. That is most welcome to the Indian political class. In theory America can utilise all Indian military facilities in their further extensions of the war. No criticism of the Axis of Evil (powers) idea has emanated from New Delhi; that underlines the closeness of Indian and the US in the field of military strategy. India can be depended upon for support by the Americans in whatever they do next in Afghanistan, Central Asia or indeed anywhere.

In view of this lay of the land, the chances of a new Asia axis ——China, Russia and India — cooperating and coordinating policies seems a far cry. Just as India made favourable noises for an earlier Asian combination, comprising itself, China and Iran, but quickly wriggled out of it, it is likely to do the same again. Even the chances of the Russo-Chinese rapprochement hang in the balance. While the reconciliation part of it helps both sides and their mutual trade and economic cooperation might go on increasing, the coordination in the security field might yet be a far cry. Why? because Russians’ conscious desires still centre around being accepted by Europe as a European power. That dream keeps them looking wistfully westward. That is their deeply felt need and China has to live with.

What China may have to do —— apart from avoiding Russians mistakes and preserving what net gains the Chinese society had made under Mao while making as rapid progress on free market principles —- is to think of involving all the peoples of Asia, irrespective of the size or riches of their states, in the peace, security and human rights spheres in all of Asia. The secret of China’s astonishing success in the Twentieth Century was involving the ordinary people in rebuilding of state structures. That needs to be extended by it. European Helsinki Model is before us. But that was an inter-state affair because it could be done in Europe. It might be a longer haul in Asia where it might begin at the non-official people’s level. But it must press on. Let Asia’s people order, or reorder, their own security relationships so as to promote self-reliant peace, economic progress with a human face and strict observance of human rights. Would China take the lead without giving up its inter-state preoccupations and role?