The Washington Summit

Terms of Pakistan-US Engagement

By NASIM ZEHRA

Everywhere in Washington he was received with open arms. In welcoming the man many in the West now call a ‘global hero’ the Americans had almost outdone their 1989 reception for the ‘darling of the west’, Prime Minister  Benazir Bhutto. Their President had set the tone for General Parvez  Musahrraf’s  reception. ‘I called him my friend and mentioned him in my  State of the Union address,’ George W. Bush told Pakistani reporters.  Responding to the persistent Pakistani complaint of being ‘used and dumped’ by the US Bush assured the press ‘it is not a short term danceÖwe say we are  committed to this relationship.’ Musharraf was the man who had delivered to  the Americans the Pakistani support they had sought in their military  operation in Afghanistan against Ossama Bin Laden, against the talibaan and  the al-Qaida. For Pakistan there may have been a ‘benefit deficit’ in the  bargain. But  for man who led Pakistan into the American coalition, there  was praise with abandon. For a job ‘well done’ his popularity in Washington  soared high. 

The US Congress and Senate therefore concluded he deserved a welcome  resolution. Both Houses unanimously passed separate resolutions. They noted  a long list of praise worthy actions: ‘showing great fortitude in  confronting domestic extremists, for outlawing terrorism in Pakistan, for  promoting moderation, for improving the political representation of  minorities in Pakistan, sincere efforts to improve security in the region  and give bright hope for his country and its deserving people, for credible  and courageous leadership in cooperating with the US in the fight against  terrorism, for pursuing the return of Pakistan to democracy and civil  societyÖ’ A February 12 US Department of State handout announced that  ‘Musharraf’s Historic Speech Honored by placement in Congressional record.’  Euphoric about the January 12 speech the democrat  senator Richard Durbin,  recommending that Musharraf’s speech be placed in the Congressional record   said that ‘ if real peace and progress are to come to the Islamic world.’  Americans see in Musharraf a leader whose influence extends beyond Pakistan. 

This no holds barred praise for Musharraf the individual would not mean an  instant transformation of Pakistan-US ties. Blind faith and instant trust in  the Pakistani  word and making of false promises to Pakistan is out. There  would be a calibrated response to Pakistan’s requests. In Washington,  Islamabad’s actions not words would count. Hence at every step of this  ‘unprecedented and warm welcome’ the Bush administration, the legislature,  the think-tanks and the media reminded their Pakistani hero why, at this  juncture he was so special for them. Hence leaving no doubt that it was what  he had delivered to the US that made him so special. Like in most bilateral  relations, simple quid pro quo was at work.

Interestingly having played the pivotal role in US’s military operation in  Afghanistan Pakistan never entered into hard bargaining with the US bargain. Infact by virtue of the public acknowledgement by Pakistan of a ‘no-option’  position in the post-September 11scenario, Pakistan had already foreclosed  the hard bargain option for itself. In fact even now with US military and  multi-agency presence in Pakistan and with the logistics-related engagement  of Pakistan’s men, territory and airspace with the US military operations,  Pakistan shows no apparent signs of leveraging this situation to extract  sufficiently from the US. Somewhat surprising has been the government’s  insufficient protest over the imprisonment of captured of Pakistanis in  Afghanistan and in Guantanamo Bay. Pakistan must demand the return of its  citizens and undertake to try them according to Pakistani law-if found  guilty. 

In Washington all of Pakistan’s expectations from the United States were not  met. Of the list of requirements Pakistan presented to the US during the  course of post 9/11 Islamabad-based bilateral discussions included debt  write-off, market access and military sales, some were approved during  Musharraf’s visit. Actual commitment of around $500million for budgetary  support, education, democracy assistance and military training and  education(IMET).For debt relief of around one billion dollar  Bush will seek  Congress’s approval. Constrained by high unemployment among textile  industry, the administration increased market access for Pakistani textile  goods by only $142million. In military sales new equipment including F-16s   is ruled out while embargo over spare parts has been removed. Washington’s  financial assistance dedicated towards improving Pakistan’s economic and  social sector conditions will make it difficult for Washington to resume  sales of F-16s or other high-tech and exorbitantly priced military  equipment. Additionally Washington’s slotting of India as its key strategic  partner for ‘maintaining long term stability in Asia’ while slotting of  Pakistan as a junior partner assisting Washington will militate against  selling military equipment that would undermine Indian interests in the region. 

Musharraf Washington visit does reinforce the post-September 11 Pakistan-US  phase of intense re-engagement. It is a multi-sectoral re-engagement signaling Washington’s holistic engagement with what the Bush team refers to  as ‘the new Pakistan.’ In the American mind linked to the ‘safe delivery’ of  the ‘new Pakistan’ which Musharraf informed American intellectuals is ‘ a  liberal, tolerant, progressive, dynamic and strong Pakistan’ is the end of  ‘Islamic extremism and terrorism’ in Pakistan and the neighboring areas. To  initiate systematic dialogue on areas crucial for the US anti-terrorism  operations and Pakistan’s stability and development the  Defense  Consultative Group, Joint Working Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation and  Joint Economic Forum have been established. 

To this extent the sectors in which Pakistan did receive support do indicate  Washington’s preference-areas for cooperation. IMET support to Pakistan  increases the reliability and efficiency of the Pakistan army as junior  partners, to the extent possible for Pakistan, in the United States  anti-terrorism drive. Military aircrafts and equipment, Pakistan’s  requirement according to the Musharraf government, will not be forthcoming  since Washington, at this stage does not view security concerns of Pakistan  as basis for bilateral cooperation. Conversely current US efforts, in the  words of General Richard Meyers chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ‘ to broaden and transform the relationship to strengthen the free world’s  war against terrorism’, cover sales of sophisticated US military equipment  including weapon-locating  radars to India. 

The outcome of the Musharraf visit does not conclusively define the contours  of future Pakistan-US relations, since bilateral cooperation is  process-linked evolving phenomenon, not an event linked happening. Yet the  outcome does convey the limits which Washington at this juncture would like  to set in the bilateral relationship about which Pakistan’s General  Musharraf said at the February 13 press conference White House press  conference that ‘the momentous events since then (September 11) have  demonstrated the depth and strength of this relationship’ 

How Pakistan chooses to read this recent phase of Pakistan-US relationship  does not detract from the  stated and bipartisan consensus in Washington on  the basis of this renewed Pakistan -US relationship. Joe Biden, chairman of  the Senate Foreign Relations most concisely spelt out this basis after his  February 14 meeting with General Musharraf . He told reporters that the  ‘broad’ and ‘real’ support for Pakistan within the Congress and the  administration was ‘premised upon three things: one, genuine, fair, open  elections in October; secondly assuming that he(Musharraf)will continue to  be committed in dealing with eradicating extremists in Pakistan and  cooperating with us on terrorists who may be infiltrating into and out of  Pakistan; and, thirdly de-escalate the situation on the borders with  IndiaÖWe want good faith efforts on all fronts being pursued by Mr.  Musharraf. We now believe that is the case’ 

Earlier explaining Pakistan’s significance to United States within reference  to its ‘antiterrorism drive’ the head of the Washington-based Wilson Center  Lee Hamilton acknowledged that as ‘America seeks to fight terrorism in  central and south asia and across the globe, the US-Pakistan relationship is  one of its most important bilateral relationships.’ Putting the same in  ethical terms the US president too plainly said that with Pakistan the  post-September 11 relationship would continue ‘so long as we share the same  ideals and values and common objectives.’ As the Americans return to the  terminology of the fifties and of the eighties in describing the current  Pak-US relation, Islamabad cannot hold it against the Americans later. None  of the terms like ‘strategic relationship’, ‘important ally of the US,’  ‘important ally in an epic struggle,’ ‘strategic level of cooperation’  denote permanence or mutuality of interest. Pakistan must evolve its own  autonomous understanding of this important relationship. 

In Musharraf’s public presentations, conspicuous by absence was some of what  he has otherwise repeatedly noted; plight of Palestinians suffering from  Israeli state terrorism, the distinction between terrorism and freedom  struggle he made in his UN speech last November, the reaffirmation of  Pakistan’s relations with Iran and Iraq and North Korea if not rejection of  Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ theme. These ‘misses’ may have been deliberate to  remain focused on the completely troubled Pakistan-India relations, to  ignore other regional issues and keep the focus on anti-terrorism the  current cause of intense bilateral engagement. While pursuit of Pakistan’s  interest must remain the primary objective yet an imperative of this pursuit  is factoring the unintended consequences such ‘misses’ may have on  Pakistan’s standing in and relations with strategically important partners  in the region and the South West Asian muslim world. 

The future of Pakistan-US relations will be determined by specific  contextual factors. Five are significant. One how far does ‘common purpose’,  both domestically and externally, on anti-terrorism hold between the two.  Domestically formerly state- supported and externally funded armed and hate-spewing men must be disarmed  and dealt with legally. Nevertheless a Pakistani society divided by  deliberate state policy and external factors now needs a bridge-builder;  Pakistani society needs a healing touch not the US sledge hammer approach to  hunt down non-American ‘extremists.’ Externally Pakistan cannot afford  partnership in Washington’s unilateralist, destabilizing and illogical  military campaign against the axis of evil.

Two, how far can the US accommodate in its relations with India, Pakistan’s  India-specific security challenges without undermining US-India growing  strategic relations. Three how far will deepening military and economic ties  with a unilateralist and militaristic Washington undermine Pakistan’s own  interests in the region and within the muslim world; especially with our  long-term stable strategic partner China and the important neighbor Iran.  Four, how far will US policies in the Middle East and Kashmir negatively  impact or not impact on Pakistan’s internal security and political  environment vis a vis Pakistan-US military engagement. Five how transparent  and fair will the October elections be and what role, if any, the Pakistan  army will retain post-October in the politics and in the management of the country. 

Given these factors Pakistan too must evolve a strategic road map for future  Pakistan-US relations. The unintended consequences of largely reactive  positioning, of event-based response or of single-institution considerations  as opposed to holistic state level considerations, can ultimately undermine  national interest. If circumstances plus Pakistan’s own decisions have  changed the previously sanction-ridden non-engagement prone relationship  into one of intense engagement then Pakistan alone can ensure that lessons  from the earlier phases of intense engagement ñthe fifties and the eighties-  inform this phase of Pakistan-US ties. The lessons of the past should enable Pakistan to develop a relationship seeking realistic advantages, not for  institutions or cliques alone, but those which can contribute to sustainable development and security of the people of a sovereign Pakistan.