Afghanistan: A Changed Landscape

Columnist Hamid Hussain looks at the changed scenario to our west.

Introduction

‘Afghan supremacy withered as a succession of rivals went at each other’s throats in a perfect orgy of intrigue, treachery, torture and assassination’.  This description of Afghanistan after the death of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1773 ironically holds true at the dawn of twenty first century.  Recent whirlwind, which has swept Afghanistan in the last few months, have made changes of epic proportion not only in Afghanistan but all around the globe.  United States is at the tail end of its Afghan adventure with all others sitting on the sidelines watching the events to unfold.  The immense display of fire power has over awed friends and foes alike and domestic arena of Afghanistan is quiet for now. 

For all those who are directly and indirectly involved in Afghan crisis and most importantly for Afghans themselves, it is time to start thinking about the future.  A large number of experts and pseudo-experts on Afghanistan are appearing in print and electronic media with their prescriptions about the future Afghanistan.  At the time of such intense involvement, people sometimes forget the basics.  For every well-wisher of Afghans, it is important to understand the ground realities and appreciate the changes, which have occurred over the last thirty years.  Even sincere efforts based on previous knowledge, figures, statistics and social factors may not bring the desired results. The simple reason being that a tremendous change has occurred in Afghan state and society.  This change is evident by the fact that all structures of the state have been destroyed and with it the non-violent conflict resolution models.  These changes have to be seriously taken into consideration for any future endeavour in political arena.  It is important to analyze the events of last thirty years so that another chain of reactions could be avoided which can threaten both internal peace inside Afghanistan and can have a destabilizing effect on neighbouring countries.  

Background 

Modern nation state of Afghanistan emerged with the efforts of Ahmad Shah Durrani in eighteenth century and later remained in a precarious balance between two rival great powers.  Internally, a dominant ruling Pushtun elite presided over a land comprising of a dozen ethnic groups.  Pushtuns belonging to various tribes and clans, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbek and Turkmen fill the vast lands of the country.  Pushtuns are divided among those who are residing in the settled districts of Pakistan, in cities of Afghanistan and tribes striding along both sides of the Durand Lines.  In Pakistan, they are in North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) and Balochistan and in Afghanistan, they inhabit southern and eastern parts with a sizeable number in northern agricultural lands, where they migrated during the time of Amir Abdur Rahman in late nineteenth century.   Pushtuns of settled areas of both countries have over the time blended into the nationalism of their respective countries to large extent.  It is the tribal Pushtuns, which are still distinct and have a society of their own.  They have remained for most part autonomous in their internal affairs.  Fully aware of their strategic location and with almost no natural resources, they have successfully used their position to get maximum advantage.  Afghanistan, British and later Pakistan used a mix of subsidies and punitive expeditions to prevent the disturbance in settled areas.   Whenever the tribesmen are pursued hotly, they find refuge on other side of the border with their kin.  Sir Olaf Caroe described them correctly that, ‘... strongly armed and of independent mind, from which dissidence may be encouraged, whether to the east or west, to Kabul or to the Indus’1. Tajiks, the second largest ethnic group is of ancient Persian ancestry and mainly residing in northeast.  They include farmers who cultivate the agricultural lands in northeast and also represented in educated elite of Kabul.  Hazaras include both Sunni and Shia and are concentrated in highlands around Bamian.  A small well knit Ismaili community is in Baghlan while Kyrgyz and Pamiri reside in Wakhan corridor.  Other small pockets of Turkmen, Kazak, Nuristani and Baloch minorities were predominantly in their own small areas.  The ruling Pushtun monarchy attempted to transplant Pushtuns in the north in late nineteenth century.  Various factors, including scarcity of resources in heavily populated lands, defence against Russian constant incursions and removal of rebellious tribes from their base were the driving force2.  Ethnic integration has rarely occurred in Afghanistan, and after a long civil war and migration, the northern regions have reverted to the old single ethnic patterns, especially in the rural areas3. Historically, all central governments in Afghanistan have used some form of local autonomy preferably in the hands of loyal tribal chiefs and financial subsidies to run a modern nation state comprising of many ethnicities.  They kept intact the tribal code.  Afghan rulers being themselves descendants of tribal blood lines, maintained an active interest and influence among the tribes4.  The source of money for the patronage has overwhelmingly been foreign due to the paucity of local resources.   Over the last one hundred years, all types of central governments of Afghanistan — monarchic, republican, Communist, Islamists have sought assistance of foreign powers — British, Soviet, European, United States, Pakistan, Arab countries5 for the tools of patronage to consolidate their rule.  The delicate internal balance between various groups, which has been precariously maintained for last one hundred years, has been disrupted by Soviet invasion, civil war, drought and internal and external migration.  Total population and percentage of various ethnicities has been hotly debated between scholars and political participants.  The figures of total Afghan population in 1978 are anywhere from 10 to 20 million6. About 2 million Afghan refugees are currently in Pakistan while 1.5 million in Iran. 

Daud immediately after the coup in 1973 was very vocal about Pushtun self-determination in view of estrangement in Balochistan and N.W.F.P during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rule.  Later, due to a variety of complex internal and external factors, he moderated his views and embarked on improving relations with neighbours. In 1977-78, his policy of improving relations with Pakistan, Iran and some Arab countries worried the Soviets.  Once Khrushchev has described to Daud about Afghanistan as ‘the only window still open in the south through which the Soviet Union can breathe’. Daud’s fate was sealed after his violent outburst during a meeting with Khrushchev in Moscow in April 19777. 1978 coup changed Afghanistan for ever.  The new regime comprising of urban socialist elite who were constantly conspiring against each other didn’t win any significant followers in the conservative and illiterate rural areas. The regime’s efforts of assertion of central authority with the help of Soviet advisors backfired.  The tribal society saw these efforts both as undermining of their autonomy and introduction of alien ideas.  The initial large scale rebellion against the regime occurred in northern Afghanistan partly due to dominance of Pushtuns in the government.  In March 1979, 17th Division in Herat rebelled under Captain Ismael Khan and Captain Alauddin. Thousands of soldiers deserted after looting the arsenal.  The city was taken back after several days of brutal fighting8. By September 1979, Hazarajat was in full rebellion and a Shura headed by Syed Ali Baheshti was running a parallel administration with taxation and limited conscription9.  This large scale rebellion in north was not only the result of policies of government in Kabul which alienated the whole country but also an expression of Non-Pushtun independence from Pushtun hegemony.  Afghan nationalism has been rudimentary and began to get stronger only in 50s and 60s with increased education. The border ethnic groups have not been affected by positive nationalism10.  The fault lines of Afghan society surfaced very quickly and various groups gravitated to their centres of power and patronage at the cost of national cause.  The acuteness of centrifugal forces has become apparent which are created by ‘terrain, cultural diversity, cultural affinity across international borders and two decades of conflict’.

Resistance During Soviet Occupation

The external supporters of Afghan resistance including Pakistan, Iran, United States, China and Saudi Arabia were unanimous about the objective of tying down Soviet Union in the quagmire of Afghanistan.  This objective was only shared partially by various Afghan resistance groups. The complex internal relationships among various groups and ethnicities were a major concern for the Afghans.  The armed resistance in rural areas was ‘inward looking’, to preserve the traditional Afghan society with its peculiar norms and customs and to resist foreign influences. The aim was to defeat a regime, which was seeking to interfere in traditional way of life12.   Fratricidal infighting on ethnic, sectarian, tribal and clan fault lines prevented any significant international presence. In early 1980, there were 100 different parties of Mujahideen who were running sixty offices in Peshawar alone13. The ground realities despite all propaganda is very well elaborated by the Chief of Afghan Cell of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), who worked very closely with various resistance leaders from 1984 to 1987.  He states, ‘I was speaking to men who, although devout Muslims, although committed to the jehad, were fuelled by personal rivalries, prejudices and hatreds, which often clouded their views and dictated their actions’14. ‘Nearly all leaders of the resistance groups rationalize their affiliations to the resistance through some mode of religious association’15. There was overuse of religious symbolism in different arenas but the common bond of Islam proved to be an elusive thread unable to give any meaningful unity among various groups. Complete lack of any meaningful organization on social, political and military fronts resulted in utter failure to present an alternative to the Soviet puppet regime of Kabul. 

Pakistan, United States and other western countries with striking absence of Afghans did all propaganda work.  In western media, the traditional image of Afghan as a rough-tough fighting highlander with his primitive life style was highlighted and much appreciated.  In Pakistan and many Muslim countries, the ‘Holy Warrior’ image was super-imposed on this picture.  The result of this presentation was that the prevalent thought which emerged among the leaders and diplomats of the countries actively involved in Afghanistan was to see Afghans as only a vehicle to bleed the bear while the more educated and sophisticated people will work on political solution.  This thought process embedded so deeply in the minds of the policy makers in Islamabad that despite many failures of policy, they were unable to change the course at appropriate time. Afghan policy being formulated and executed by a small cliche of army officers assured that only military aspect will get priority, totally ignoring the inner dynamics of Afghan society.  The problems of internal conflicts among the resistance groups, lack of economic and political programmes and total failure to present alternatives to compete with the Soviet and their allies in Kabul were highlighted by only one academic, Zalmay Khalilzad of Columbia University at the height of the struggle against Soviets16. This omission would prove costly as the unfolding of future events showed clearly.  Afghans and their well-wishers failed to understand the basic fact that lack of a viable political entity in exile significantly weakened all aspects of resistance and after the Soviet pullout could not prevent the bloodshed. 

Eastern and Southern Afghanistan: 

Due to geographic and ethnic factors, Pakistan became the home for Pushtun and some Tajiks from Kabul area of the Afghan refugee population.  Over the time, the resistance leaders developed links with religio-political parties, Pakistani state institutions and policy makers and smugglers (these smugglers were involved in smuggling of luxury items, weapons, drugs).  The Islamist parties consisted of those with Pan-Islamist ideas and traditionalists.  They were based in Pakistan.  Pakistan due to deep suspicions about Durrani Pushtun nationalist tendencies preferred Tajiks and eastern Ghilzai or settler Pushtun population of northern Afghanistan.  Pan Islamists were mainly Tajiks and de-tribalized Pushtuns while other groups were composed of traditional Islamic dignitaries and tribal chieftains who didn’t share the idea of a centralized strictly Islamic state.  Due to the nature of the conditions laid by ISI, local commanders have to join one of the seven parties based in Pakistan to be eligible for weapon and funds channelled through Pakistan. This prompted many local influential local leaders and commanders to join parties based in Pakistan although they didn’t share the vision of the particular group.  They tactfully played their part by accepting only nominal overlordship  from party leaders while maintaining their autonomy and influence in their operational area.  The mutual distrust was to such a level that during one of major Soviet offensive against Masud in Panjsher, commanders of other parties even refused to let the supply trains to Masud pass through their territory17.  As far as training of resistance fighters in Pakistan was concerned, every resistance party insisted on separate course and strictly no mixing of trainees from various parties18. Although the Jihad rhetoric was very strong at local commander level but in reality tribal and clan feuds, economic stakes and struggle for power remained the top priority19. The new local leadership saw war as a vehicle to achieve emancipation from whatever they didn’t like.  At the height of the conflict in 1984, one resistance leader admitted that there were two wars going on inside Afghanistan — one against the Soviet invader and one between various resistance groups.  He concluded that latter was more important as this will decide how the future of Afghanistan will look like20.  Foreign aid from Western countries, Saudi Arabia and Soviet Union to their respective clients inside Afghanistan ‘stimulated the tribal norm of competing for influence by obtaining resources from external patrons’21.    Overtime, this process of polarization gained more momentum and reached to the point of complete mistrust, antagonism and open hostilities.

During the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan for obvious advantage of full control of military operations inside Afghanistan kept tight control of the groups based in Pakistan.  This aspect while having excellent results from military point of view had a negative impact on political side.  Leaders who were closely aligned with Pakistan got the maximum patronage while those who didn’t get enough funds or weapons, became resentful and later hostile to Pakistan.  Those who had nationalist tendencies or didn’t want to be seen as puppets of any foreign backer resented the open interaction between some resistance leaders and commanders and Pakistani officials.  The well publicized visits of ISI Chief, Asad Durrani and Jamaat-e-Islami Chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad after the fall of Khost further alienated many nationalist Afghans.  With ISI encouragement and support when Hikmatyar and Sayyaf were dispatched to Qandahar, the locals mainly Durrani Pushtuns resisted them forcing them to leave the province.  At the height of civil war, Pakistan Afghan policy seem to be of a random picking and dumping of proxies, thus further complicating the situation.  Initial failed efforts of direct military attacks on fortified garrisons and constant infighting and dizzying speed of changing alliances of Afghan clients caused frustration among Pakistan policy makers.  They opened channels with previously ignored Afghans. ISI Chief, Asad Durrani met Najibullah’s advisor General Tukhi in Geneva in 1991.  In 1992, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Asif Nawaz met General Abdul Wali, the son-in-law of former king, Zahir Shah in Rome22. In 1992, the changed guard at ISI developed good relationship with Uzbek warlord, General Abdul Rashid Dostum who was in effective control of northern Afghanistan23.  The period of 1992-1996 on Afghan canvas was one of an ‘organized butchery’.  Various factions in cities and countryside killed each other and innocent civilians with impunity and no moral qualms. By the end of 1994, nearly 3,000,000 residents of Kabul mostly highly qualified teachers, doctors, civil servants and army officers have taken refuge in Jalalabad and outside the country24.  The destruction of major urban centres of Kabul, Herat, Qandahar and Mazar Sharif during civil war has made any organized political efforts extremely difficult.  This marked the destruction of a modern nation state along with its institutions. The policy makers of Pakistan ignored this critical part. The overzealous officers, some proud of their own Afghan blood had very little knowledge of Afghan history and society.  Their knowledge of Afghanistan was limited to the Pakistani history book rhetoric of sixteenth century invasions of India and rough image of a fiercely independent minded group of people.  While a big plus while resisting a foreign foe, the same traits become the major handicap to evolve consensus once the enemy disappears.  Contrary to all the evidence of mutual hostility among resistance groups, the major figures of Pakistan Afghan policy like ISI Chief, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman held the naive idea that when the time came for the settlement, resistance leaders will be simply asked and they will comply.  The single minded approach of pumping more and more arms into Afghanistan with no associated political instruments didn’t help the cause in long run. According to a former Chief of Afghan Cell of ISI, by 1986, they were pumping 1000 tons of arms and ammunition a week25. The result was that while only 15,000 godless Soviet soldiers were killed with this enormous load of ammunition, the death toll for Afghans will be a staggering figure of 1.5 million. This number becomes more significant and painful when one realizes that the total population of Afghanistan in 1978 was only about 15 million.  Later, when political manoeuvres were started by Pakistan, they were based on finding ‘clients’ who could safeguard Pakistan’s interests, not acknowledging the vast changes, which have occurred, in Afghan society.  With the hindsight, even senior policy makers of Pakistan can now see the negative effects of such a short-sighted policy. A former Director General (DG) of ISI, Lt. General Asad Durrani states, ‘.... The desire to forge a Pakistani solution — quite evidently for narrow political motives — resulted in confusion, resentment and further polarization within the Afghans’26. 

All those who were disgusted with the civil war received the coming of Taliban with a sigh of relief.  Unfortunately, Taliban became victim of their own version of Sharia and active utilization of war-ravaged Afghanistan by foreign religious zealots.  The dismantling of Taliban with a combination of lethal air power, support of opposition and lavish spending especially along Durand line has resulted in emergence of new realities.  The old warlords are rushing back in to claim their fiefdoms.  The situation is very fluid and unpredictable.  The head of the interim set up, Hamid Karzai has started his approach on the right lines.  He is going to the tribal chiefs, sitting with them and trying to have some understanding while at the same time avoiding to annoy any foreign power broker.  Indeed his job is a Herculian one and will need every kind of support both from the earthly and celestial powers.

Northern Afghanistan

In Northern Afghanistan, there has been a dramatic demographic and social change.  Since 1978, Kabul regime has sought to woe the minorities to their cause.  Eden Naby had astutely observed in 1984 that ‘this activity will not enforce Afghan nationalism but factionalism, that Kabul without Soviet might, would be hard-pressed to control’27. Just like their Sunni counterparts, in Hazarajat, constant infighting among Shia groups prevented any meaningful alliance during Soviet occupation. Shia groups set up their bases in Iran, polarizing Afghan scenario on sectarian lines.  They were suspicious and resentful of  active Saudi government involvement with mainly Sunni Afghan groups. The visible presence of ISI officers during the Shura meeting in 1988 severely damaged the credibility of the meeting28. This thoroughly alienated all groups based outside Peshawar, Shias and nationalist Afghans.  In 1988, Shia groups told Cordovez that they will not recognize the interim government set up in Peshawar29. Iran due to its involvement with long war with Iraq offered only diplomatic support to Afghan resistance to avoid provocation of Soviet Union.  Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and after ceasefire with Iraq in 1990,  Iran became active regarding Afghanistan.  Lt. General (r) Syed Refaqat has very eloquently described the Iranian involvement in these words, ‘Iran entered the tricky and treacherous arena of the Great Game with full vigour, greater interest and evangelistic zeal characteristic of the regime’30. Iran forced the constantly quarrelling Shia groups based in Tehran to organize resulting in emergence of ‘Hizb-e-Wahdat’.  Iran also opened channels with moderate and traditional Sunni leaders who were resentful of ISI-Saudi-Hikmatyar nexus. This included Rabbani, Mujjaddadi and Gilani31. At the height of civil war, Iran airlifted large amount of arms and ammunition to its allies.  The rise of Taliban sent shock waves in Tehran.  The presence of a staunch conservative Sunni clergy controlled government along its borders was seen as a result of a joint effort by Iran’s enemies to keep it isolated. The killing of Iranians in Mazar Sharif brought Iran to almost direct conflict with Taliban.  Random large scale killings by Taliban during their advance in northern Afghanistan and revenge killings by Northern Alliance further poisoned the atmosphere.  Different ethnic groups have gravitated to their respective preferred external backers.  Uzbeks have aligned themselves with their ethnic kins across border and Turkey.  General Abdul Rashid Dostum found a safe place in Turkey when Taliban took over his northern fiefdom.  During the recent US led operations in Afghanistan, Dostum’s military equipment came from Uzbekistan with bill paid by United States32.  Kirghyz tribes of Wakhan corridor, which initially came to Pakistan but finally, settled in Turkey. Hazaras, which include both Sunnis and Shias, with their distinct features, have always been on the lowest part of the social ladder of Afghanistan.  They have gained military strength during the war and have re-asserted themselves and will be demanding more share in the political and economic set up.  The control of a part of Kabul after the fall of Najibullah government and recently rushing of Hazara militia men to Kabul after the Northern Alliance walk over in Kabul are signs of Hazara desire to be a player in the game. The re-migration pattern of return of Pushtuns who were settled in North during the late nineteenth century, to Pushtun lands of their fore-fathers has changed the demography of the country and re-distribution of ethnicities33. Part of the current problem which needs to be faced is the fact that the non-Pushtuns will not be willing to accept the return of Pushtuns as dominant ruling group in their areas (North, Central and Western Afghanistan) without getting significant concessions and guarantees for their autonomy.  If a mutually accepted accord is not reached between Pushtuns and non-Pushtun groups, division of Afghanistan on North-South lines will become a real possibility certainly in political if not in geographic terms.

Conclusion

What the future will bring for Afghanistan is an open question.  Afghans and their well wishers have to understand the political, social, economic and ethnic changes, which have taken, place in the past thirty years.  This is critical for understanding the gigantic problems faced by the country and will be the first step toward right direction.  The total breakdown of national institutions, which are integrative, and ‘the enforcement of regional, ethnic and tribal identities resulting from the demands of guerrilla fighting, has eroded national sensibilities’34. The cleavages among ethnic groups have sharpened during the civil war, ‘making the understanding of the country’s ethnic diversity critical to understanding its political crisis’35.  It will be very difficult task for any Afghan leader as the twenty five year conflict has ‘polarized many and politicized most’36.  Shattering of the social structures inside Afghanistan, effects of local environment on  a new generation of Afghan refugees in their host countries, role of Afghan Diaspora, power of local warlords and host of other factors will have to be taken into consideration for a viable solution for the country.  Time will be the best judge if Afghans will continue on the path of polarization or first hand look at the utter destruction of their homeland will finally convince them the futility of civil war.  In the end, the choice will be of the Afghans which path they want to take?  Will they take the road of revenge, war crime trials and more ethnic cleansing or will they follow the example of Lebanon, forgiving each other for the excesses and working together for a better Afghanistan for their children? 

Courage among civilized peoples consists in a readiness to sacrifice oneself for the political community  — G.W. Hegel

Notes:

1Caroe, Olaf.  The Pathans (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986 (Reprint with a foreword and an epilogue on Russia),  p. 525 

2Kakar, Hasan Kawun.  Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan  (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1979),  p. 131-35

3Magnus H. Ralph and Naby, Eden. Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid  (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) p. 10

4Poullada B. Leon.  Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan in Embree T. Ainslie (Ed.)  Pakistan’s Western Borderlands:  The     Transformation of a Political Order  (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1977), p. 133 

5Shahrani M. Nazif.  The State and Community Governance in  Maley, William (Ed.)  Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1998), p. 227

6Magnus, Ralph. Afghanistan, p. 9

7Ghaus, Abdul Samad.  The Fall of Afghanistan (London: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), p. 179

8Urban, Mark.  War in Afghanistan (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 30 

9Urban, Mark. War in Afghanistan,  p. 34

10Naby, Eden.  The Afghan Resistance Movement in Magnus H. Ralph (Ed.)  Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options and Policies  (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 68

11Magnus H. Ralph. Afghanistan,  p. 7

12Grevemyer, Jan-Heeren.  Modernization from below: The Afghan Resistance between Fight for Liberation and Social Emancipation in  Huldt, Bo and Jansson, Erland (Ed.)  The Tragedy of Afghanistan (New York:  Croom Helm, 1988), p. 122)

13Glatzer, Bernt.  Afghanistan:  Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration in Maley, William (Ed.)  Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1998), p. 179

14Yousaf, Mohammad Brigadier and Adkin, Mark Major.  The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story  (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993 (Second Edition),  p. 39

15Aziz A. Sultan. Leadership Dilemmas: Challenges and Responses in Farr M. Grant and Merriam G. John (Ed.)  Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 65

16Khalilzad, Zalmay.  The United States and the War in Afghanistan in Rose E. Leo and Hussain A. Noor (Ed.) United States — Pakistan Relations (Berkeley: University of California Centre of East Asian Studies. Research Papers and Policy Studies, 1985),  p. 192-93 

17Yousaf, Mohammad. The Bear Trap, p. 71

18Yousaf, Mohammad. The Bear Trap, p. 120

19Roy, Olivier.  Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan in Maley, William (Ed.) Fundamentalism Reborn,  p. 207

20Grevemeyer, Jan-Heeren.  Modernization from Below: The Afghan Resistance between the fight for Liberation and Social Emancipation in Huldt, Bo (Ed.) The Tragedy of Afghanistan, p. 123 

21Rubin R. Barnett.  Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System  (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 196

22Weinbaum G. Marvin.  Pakistan and Resolution of Afghan Conflict in Kennedy, Charles (Ed.) Pakistan: 1992 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 123

23Siddiqi A. R. Brigadier (r).  Pakistan and Northern Alliance.  The Nation (Internet Edition), October 17, 2001

24Griffin, Michael.  Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001),  p. 26 

25Yousaf, Mohammad. Brigadier (r)  The Silent Soldier: The Man Behind the Afghan Jehad (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993 (Tenth Edition), p. 47  

26Durrani, Asad Lt. General (r). Politics and National Security.  Defence Journal, October 1998  

27Naby, Eden. The Afghan Resistance Movement in Magnus H. Ralph (Ed.) Afghan Alternatives,  p. 69 

28Khan M. Riaz.  Untying The Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal  (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 258

29Cordovez, Diego and Harrison S. Selig.  Out of Afghanistan  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 371

30Refaqat, Syed Lt. General (r).  Afghanistan Imbroglio: Then and Now.  Dawn (Internet Edition), October 31, 2001

31Rubin, Barnett. Fragmentation of Afghanistan,  p. 252

32The Nation (Internet Edition), October 11, 2001

33Dupree, Loius.  Cultural Changes among the Mujahideen and Muhajerin in Huldt, Bo (Ed.) The Tragedy of Afghanistan,  p. 34 

34Magnus, Ralph. Afghanistan, p. 92

35Magnus, Ralph. Afghanistan,  p. 12

36Naby, Eden.  The Afghan Resistance Movement in Magnus H. Ralph (Ed.) Afghan Alternatives,  p. 78

About the Author

Hamid Hussain obtained MBBS Degree from Khyber Medical College Peshawar, trained in Internal Medicine and Allergy & Immunology in the USA. He is a member of American Academy of Allergy & Immunology and the American College of Allergy & Immunology. Currently in private practice and also teaching at State University of New York. His field of interest include Pakistan Army, civil-military relations, crisis in Muslim lands especially Afghanistan and Middle East and history of the sub-continent. His articles have been published in Pakistan Link and the Internet Editions of Frontier Post and The Nation.