Turning a New Leaf

Columnist M ZAFAR looks at the changing domestic scenario and the emerging compulsions.

In year 2001 President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan spurted on the world stage like a mountain spring. The waters that flowed propelled and patterned events during the year and inscribed some indelible outlines around which the future history of Pakistan may be written. Three years ago on orders from the bosses General Pervez Musharraf had conceived and directed a war in Kargil that turned small tactical successes into an overwhelming strategic gain. This operation exposed the fragility of Indian defences and aroused ire of her powerful allies who were designing for her a big role in the region. Pakistan found itself in a very difficult political position and soon ran out of initiatives. In the absence of a dexterous diplomatic riposte leaders of the day decided on a retreat. Gains of strategic import were given up and General Pervez Musharraf himself earmarked for the altar. Extraordinary personal luck and traditional loyalty of Army rank and file combined together not only foiled an attempt to end his military career but also invest him with supreme administrative authority by forcing the incumbent out.

People endorsed the ouster of Mr. Nawaz Sharif by remaining silent. The General knew that only solid performance could convert mute acceptance into active support. He was the fourth Army Chief in Pakistan to assume supreme political power. His predecessors had started with high public support but ended in the morass of disapproval and censure. His disadvantages at the beginning of his innings were considerable — the burden of history, heightened public expectations and shortened patience to count only a few. Pakistan at the turn of the century was a disillusioned, tired and traumatized country that had been cheated too often. 

Increased polarization and stagnation within the society, cynicism and corruption of ruling classes and frustration of merit had demoralized the people and deepened the social crisis. Young men  of upper middle class emigrated to the better pastures abroad, their less fortunate countrymen of deprived segment took to lawlessness and to move to operate on the fringes of law. The helpless common man could be counted on to support the new regime provided some economic relief and social movement became visible. 

General Pervez Musharraf proceeded methodically. He prepared a concise and simple seven-point plan for economic, political and moral rehabilitation. To execute the agenda he collected men and women of promise and integrity. These people may not have been the best that the country had to offer in talent but as a team they made an impressive lot.

Mr. Nawaz Sharif’s government had destroyed investors’ confidence, punished savings, and kept credit institutions under relentless pressure. Massive layoffs in state sector compounded unemployment. Carelessly planned schemes like the Rs 400 billion housing scheme for building 500,000 units on appropriated state corporations’ lands, import of luxury buses at a cost of Rs 60 billion, a woolly Rs10 billion self-employment scheme and Rs172 billion revival of 448 sick industries brought the exchequer under tremendous strain. Add expenses on useless Motorway projects and chronic bank default of Rs211 billion you have an idea of the financial overextension that the government had got into. First priority was, therefore, accorded to economic management and financial discipline. Budgetary overruns were strictly disallowed. Subsidies were reduced and revenue receipts improved. Grandiose plans of previous regime were cancelled or revised. International financial institutions and aid giving agencies were clearly delighted.

In his attempts to curb corruption he created and revitalized a number of institutions but  progress remained slow because of the difficulties in proving misdemeanour beyond reasonable doubt. However, his single most effective action against corruption at higher places was his personal example. He declared his own assets within weeks of assuming power. Other service chiefs followed suit. This sent a message and has had an effect. During his regime now entering its third year no fingers have yet been raised. 

General Pervez Musharraf’s gradual march towards democratization seems to be on track. General elections are to be held before 12 October 2002 and preparations are afoot. Few question his intentions in this regard although cynics do remind of Zia off and on. One reason is his attitude towards the press. Freedom enjoyed by the print media is remarkable and that fact alone is enough to strengthen the belief that the General’s commitment to democracy is rock solid. 

But then what use is democracy if it does not bring about a sea change in society? It was clear that for bringing about a social revolution and democracy at grass roots level new institutions had to be created. A new experiment in district management with an elected head of administration was started. It is still going through teething troubles and plenty of problems of coordination and detail remain to be solved. Will the experiment really empower the deprived classes or will it merely strengthen the already powerful feudal and tribal leaders yet remains to be seen. However, the truth that devolution of power to grass roots level is bound to benefit the people is undeniable. 

General Pervez Musharraf realised that for long-term economic prosperity Pakistan required peace and harmony with neighbours. Undaunted by India’s prolonged reluctance to recognise the military leader as a representative of the country he persevered on the path of goodwill. Eventually in middle of 2001 he boldly went across the border with an outstretched hand in peace and amity.  The warrior had become a statesman. There was nothing tentative or unsure in his dealings with his counterparts. He came out as a man of conviction who knew his mind.

Agra may not have produced a joint declaration for the governments of India and Pakistan but it did write a new chapter of hope for the people of the subcontinent. General Pervez Musharraf succeeded where many of his predecessors had failed. International opinion had come around to understanding the General’s assertion that Kashmir was the only one dispute between India and Pakistan —others issues were minor irritants. 

Then the events of 11 September overtook the world. Terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were suspected by America to have been planned and directed by Al Qaeeda leadership based in Afghanistan. This put Pakistan in the eye of the storm and brought its leader under unprecedented pressure from both external and internal forces. This also brought the best out of him. General Pervez Musharraf showed tremendous capacity to withstand pressure and retain balance. He was able to exercise a degree of restraint on US and convince their political leadership on the essentiality of evidence. When the Americans produced impressive leads he put diplomacy in high gear and had some tough truths driven home to the decision-makers at Kandahar. Strange but true, the mullahs refused to listen to voice of sanity and he was clearly disappointed. The war had become inevitable — a war that was bound to be won by the overwhelming strength of America and consign Taliban to history. That would also write a requiem for Pakistan’s Afghan policies of over two decades. 

Some students of strategy assert that for retention of a modicum of influence in post-war Afghanistan, Pakistan should have at that point of time declared support for anti-Taliban elements located in Pakistan and helped them to take over the Pushtun belt in Afghanistan. This would have shortened the campaign, secured the rights of Pushtuns and ensured a role for Pakistan. 

Perhaps the bluff of the pro-Taliban elements in the country did not allow a proactive policy. But the General could not restrain himself from offering largely unsolicited but in essence sound and people friendly advice. ‘Make the campaign short and targeted so as to minimize the suffering of the people’ and ‘discontinue bombing during Ramazan’ were his messages to the US. Reaction of American public personalities was sharp but among the professional planners advice did not go unheeded.

At home he dealt with pro- Taliban forces with acute adroitness. Leaders of such forces were like their mentors in Kandahar at once closed to argument and uninformed of the dynamics of warfare but could command crowds out in the streets. Although their appeal remained confined to their own committed cadres but they did cause commotion. Disturbances were contained quickly and this fact soon came to be regarded as strategic defeat of the forces of extremism in Pakistan. This setback caused undoubtedly due to their own overreaching eagerness for confrontation decidedly moved the pendulum of public opinion away in the other direction. The government that had ever been shy of challenging the religious establishment was handed in success without having had to fight for it. Pakistan’s march towards medievalism that seemed inexorable till a few weeks ago had been checked. In the process General Musharraf had climactically redefined national purpose and effortlessly re-educated the people to reduce their susceptibility to forces of regression.

A new leaf had been turned and by the end of year 2001 Pakistanis had begun to see a ray of hope on the horizon. The people were a degree more confident of their future and a degree less pessimistic of the prospects of the country. There is surprisingly little talk of Pakistan being a failed state. Fears of the country facing an immediate implosion or meltdown have given place to the conviction that somehow the nation will muddle through. General Pervez Musharraf deserves full credit for such an extraordinary turnaround in public morale.

There are some daunting problems that remain unsolved. The economic situation is far from satisfactory, much remains to be done to improve services and the infrastructure, unemployment is rampant and prices sky high. Education, health and human rights especially those relating to women, industrial labour, youth, and minorities need to be addressed. Some more institutional groundwork to restore investor confidence and provision of level playing field in economic and industrial life needs to be put in place. Will General Pervez Musharraf succeed in these areas? If he does, he may reach a step nearer his avowed aim and lay the foundations of truly prosperous and enlightened society in which democratic order rules supreme.