Letters to the Editor

In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal (Summer 97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming his way from his Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I am no historian but some questions immediately come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar also mention that the Brigade Commander told him to “do something”? If not who is to be believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza. And if he was not told to “do something“, what major event galvanized him into taking this unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he get information about the enemy advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and if so who? When he got his information, was he in the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in wireless contact with him? And when he decided to strike out on his own, did he at least inform the Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade merely follow 25 Cav through guess-work?

The point I want to make is that in order to be classified as “history“ we have to first establish whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or was acting in a vacuum. And if it was subordinate to

24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade under its own command. This relationship can only be settled by the communication between the two. So far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any controversy, that this Brigade and all its components fought an outstanding action. After all there have been M Ds and presentation on the subject for the last 36 years and most officers have had a chance to take part in one or another of these. And no adverse comment has come to tarnish the reputation of any officer of the brigade.

It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost all infantry actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the brave conduct of the Bridge Commander has been found fit to be relegated to those who functioned below par.

I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the amalgam of various war diaries, with very little original research , “officially sponsored” to give the “official view“. A very good insight into its historical value and credibility lies in what it has to say regarding the change of command in Chamb, which is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up despite the best official efforts. On page 121 of the book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of Command in Chamb was pre-planned. And then he goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed by most officers in GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation orders for which per force would have to be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and all the lower formations would have known about it, and at least some shred of documentary evidence of this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But there is not a word extant to corroborate this cover-up. And what is worst is that immediately after the war in Staff College under, Gen Riza was serving “a 12 Div officer” who was the GOC of this Division. He was Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time when even subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this subject and get a candid reply, it is impossible to believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this change from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this and then wilfully distorting history is deserving of the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of this “history” and knocks out all infantry actions, and goes further to malign the commander of Chawinda Brigade! And now this is to pass for history?

I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest attacks seemed to come wherever this unit was deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div HQ if there was any possibility for this unit to be relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not possible. War diaries are often not written immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them. Is it possible that this event is being referred to by both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary should also be consulted.

Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik got on to ...............” From this it is obvious that it means the communication was by wireless or telephone. But I have attended an M D on this battle and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari. Both were nearer to Farouk Adam’s explanation of events of

8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official sources” and “officially sponsored” GHQ account of this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially sponsored accounts” unfortunately have been cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important battle without interviewing any infantry CO, or any officer of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel! What sort of history is this?

I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk Adam has referred. I have also heard him on the subject in person. He said that all units gave their very best but also that the Brigade Commander’s conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire, was most inspiring.

After reading the original article one gets the impression that the whole battle was fought by Col Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad Chowdhry’s guns. It seems infantry was non-existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any DEFENSIVE tank battle over two weeks duration without an infantry firm base. And if Chawinda base did not hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also. But the infantry did hold, better than any infantry brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander showed more pluck than any officer of his rank, also on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on this. And if not corrected, will not this make these units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?

REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE “BATTLE OF CHAWINDA” AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES

It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle of 1965 published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue continues to attract flak from critics!

The latest in the series are two letters , both written by retired officers . First of all I must clarify that my sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write “what men did” rather than what “they ought ideally to have done” or what “someone later with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done”. Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. How far I succeeded is for readers to judge.

History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. Enters Defence Journal which in its resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of serving as a medium of intellectual honesty and forthright criticism and published facts which were unpalatable for some and welcomed by the vast multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced to intellectual stagnation because of years of censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written for the Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel but had left military history writing when in 1998 through a dear friend I discovered that there is a new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to some critical writing!

I maintain as one great master of English prose said that “all history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was essentially “Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!

Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat “Heroes were created” ! This was what the article was all about !

What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was “casualties” ! These were deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many were killed in the biggest military blunder “Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures! The real motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to “guard reputations”

a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front deployment” was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! I may add a personal note here. I understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe was commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron was a fine soldier.

b. Alam raises the question about the controversial “Do Something” order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a vacuum. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the Indian Armoured Corps historian stated “The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry) performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured division and its objective, the MRL canal”.

c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day. Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs were awarded to some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on both sides!

d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September no fighting took place as Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be classified as one characterised by “absence of clear and precise orders”!

e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical value since Riza was allowed access to official records.

f. The change of command aspect about which Alam asserts is correct and was officially hushed up but why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the armoured corps of 1960s which was arrogant and looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed right till 1980s as a young officer in Kharian and Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in armoured corps unit messes unless real exceptions based on personal ties and armour officers rarely visited artillery messes.

g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered more casualties. On the other hand Lahore was an infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost something like around 30 killed in battle , more casualties than most infantry units in the much trumpeted Grand Slam.

REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY 1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND 11 CAVALRY

The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was both an infantry and armour battle yet armour suffered proportionately more casualties since the effective battle strength of a tank unit is half that of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10 Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed in officers alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost more in killed casualties in 1965 War than any of the above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No fault of infantry since Chawinda was an essentially a tank battle.

i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which prove that infantry suffered more casualties at Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that the only infantry unit which bore the brunt of Indian assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside the brunt of the attack at Chawinda was borne by armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At Lahore, the brunt of the attack was faced by infantry since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an essentially infantry battle. Thus, there were units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch suffering casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16 Punjab suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of whom were killed (more than total of all regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col Gillani). On the other hand there were formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar Gillani exaggerated the fighting and suffered nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10 Division area (Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).

j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.

k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with operational leadership and personalities. Infantry had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a role. If I have not discussed infantry actions in detail it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda but simply because Chawinda was a tank dominated battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been biased I would not have stated in various articles that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry man .

l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry side of the battle he is free to write an article on the “Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.

m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of armour units in 1965 which will give the reader a fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or less:—

UNIT	Killed casualties	Battle area	Remarks
4 CAVALRY	17	KHEM KARAN
5 HORSE	5	KHEM KARAN
6 LANCERS	20	KHEM KARAN
GUIDES	15	CHAWINDA	Including 3 Officers
11 CAVALRY	34	CHAMB CHAWINDA	Including 1 Officer
12 CAVALRY	8	KHEM KARAN	Did Traffic Control / Flank Protection etc. being Recce Regiment
13 LANCERS	14	CHAMB JAURIAN AKHNUR	Including 3 Officers
15 LANCERS	8	KHEM KARAN
19 LANCERS	18	CHAWINDA	Including 2 Officers
20 LANCERS	Nil	SIALKOT
22 CAVALRY	1	CHAWINDA
23 CAVALRY	18	10 DIVISION	Including 2 Officers
24 CAVALRY	14	KHEM KARAN	Including 2 Officers
25 CAVALRY	16	CHAWINDA
30 TDU	3	RAVI-SUTLEJ CORRIDOR
31 TDU	7	SIALKOT
32 TDU	7	RAVI-SUTLEJ CORRIDOR
33 TDU	9	JASSAR

Note:—These casualties were compiled personally and may not be wholly or totally accurate.

n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting history. A bit naive since articles published in journals are opinions of individual writers and not of the management. This is true for all journals whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff College Citadel.

o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and lacked common courtesy that one would associate or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.

a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig A.A Malik’s withdrawal request of 16 September. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig A.A Malik had requested permission to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF but because of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.

b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official sources are cover ups, all that one can state is that if these are cover ups why don’t experts like Brigadier Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious military history.

c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial and personal as well as Indian accounts. If someone has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to apply his intellect and come out with a better account.

d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm base. I have not denied this anywhere. My emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the armour battle which was fought at Chawinda. It is up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.

e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I contend that the real fact which has not been favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik has not been projected as much in my article as he had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great respect for it , A.A Malik was an individual who did well and rose to three star rank despite launching poorly planned counter attacks as brought out by

“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we all know that no three honest witnesses of a brawl can agree on all the details. How much more likely will be the differences in a great battle covering a vast space of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment and even company naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus of the whole affair! Each of them won the battle. None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded”.

Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about operational leadership, not small unit actions or projecting individuals or maligning them. If someone feels otherwise it is his subjective opinion.

Eliot Cohen asserts that “the enemy is far weaker, and we know him far better than in 1991.” Since the US has made numerous technological advances in its military systems, and successfully demonstrated its resolve to carry out unorthodox warfare against the Taliban using these systems, Cohen argues that the risks of attacking Iraq and destroying Saddam Hussain’s regime are miniscule in comparison to the benefits that would flow from the elimination of his weapons of mass destruction. But is warfare simply about winning and losing battles?

No one doubts that the US can successfully defeat Iraq in battle, or that it lacks the resolve to do so. But is the US prepared to act unilaterally, as Cohen argues, using the “9/11” rules? Can we assemble a coalition of forces to take on Saddam this time? Even King Abdullah of Jordan, probably this country’s closest Arab ally, has cautioned the US against attacking any nation in the Middle East. Words of caution have been coming from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Such an attack is unlikely to even find much support in Europe.

Much of the world supported the US in its attack on Afghanistan because it saw the US as the victim of the attack on Sept 11. Many countries supported the US in the Gulf War, because Iraq had attacked and taken over Kuwait. They are unlikely to see the US rationale for taking on Saddam now, especially if it happens unilaterally, and without any proof being presented of his involvement in the Sept 11 attacks. Unilateral US action will impair our national interest, by creating diplomatic friction with our European and Arab allies. It may cause serious harm to our national security interests, if much of the Muslim and Arab world ends up seeing the US attack as evidence of its un-evenhandedness in dealing with the Middle East.

At the time that it was being waged, the Gulf War was supposedly being fought with precision weapons. As Cohen points out, much of the munition dropped on Iraq was comprised of dumb bombs. Civilian casualties were massive. The sanctions that came later have killed more than a million Iraqi civilians, according to a report prepared by former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark. In the eyes of the typical person living in the Arab and Muslim world, the US is ultimately responsible for these casualties.

It would be far more preferable for the US to work through the United Nations in resolving the threats posed by Saddam Hussain. All peaceful avenues must be explored before unleashing another war on the innocent people of Iraq.

Professor Hoodbhoy is one of Pakistan’s leading intellectuals, and his voice is often the lone voice of reason in a cacophony of chaotic voices. His essay (Dawn, December 10-11, 2001) is a tour de force, and will no doubt inspire much debate and dialogue throughout the world. I found much to agree with in this essay, but even more to disagree with. He argues that the US, in its zeal to bring justice to the terrorists, is not taking the time to understand the root causes of terrorism. Given its own history of supporting corrupt and tyrannical regimes throughout Latin America, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region, US actions belie its claim to being a “champion of democracy and human rights”. In fact, they lend credence to the words of MIT Professor Noam Chomsky, that the US is the world’s Number 1 “rogue state.”

Hoodbhoy, further argues that the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam was bigoted, extremist, and wrong, and caused much harm to Islam. Their extremist views have inspired much of the sectarian killing that has been going on in Pakistan for the past few years. Osama bin Laden’s views and policies—while much admired in the Muslim world because of their political underpinnings— have caused more suffering and aggravation to the Muslims than to the non-Muslims. His “fatwa” to kill Americans — whether civilian or military — outraged Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The terrorist actions of September 11—which Osama praised but for whom he did not acceptability — have to be condemned in the strongest possible terms, and their perpetrators brought to justice. I agree completely with these sentiments.

However, I don’t agree with Hoodbhoy’s implicit thesis—that Muslims should not aspire to create an Islamic state— and that they should instead aspire to become “secular humanists.” Hoodbhoy’s assertion that today’s conditions are very different from those when the first Islamic state was created in Arabia 1400 years ago is irrelevant. Until the First World War put an end to the Ottoman Empire, Muslims lived in a caliphate (ruled by a Caliph or Khalifa, successor to the Holy Prophet Muhammad PBUH) that was organized along the lines of an Islamic state. In this caliphate, religious and political authority were interwoven. The caliphate was living proof that an Islamic state could exist with large minority populations. As Professor Hoodbhoy himself argues, science and the arts flourished in the Islamic states that ruled variously from Baghdad (Iraq) and Cordoba (Spain).

Imam Ghazzali, whom he criticizes for imposing orthodoxy in Islamic thinking, created a grand synthesis in the writings of rational philosophers and the writings of Sufis. By so doing, he created flexibility and not rigidity in Islamic thinking. If he emphasized the role of “revelation over reason,” it was because he accepted the divine, infallible character of the former and the human, infallible character of the latter. I have learnt much from Ghazzali’s writings, especially from his short book on the Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship. This book brilliantly illuminates the basic principles of Islam by integrating the Quran and ‘ahadith’ (sayings of the Prophet).

Hoodbhoy, cites the examples of those who rejected ahadith to liberate themselves and pursue scientific advancement. Rejecting ‘ahadith’ that contradict the Quran is one thing, but rejecting ‘ahadith’ altogether is hardly a tenable course of action for a Muslim. Basic religious precepts, such as how and when to say your prayers, are defined through the ‘ahadith’. Only through a study of the life of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (May God’s Mercy and Salutations be upon him) can we understand the full purpose and intent of the divine revelations that constitute the Quran. The ‘ahadith’ are the only genuine way to understanding the Prophet’s life.

Professor Hoodbhoy regrets that the names of Muslim scientists do not fill up the bibliographies in today’s scientific journals. This shortcoming can hardly be attributed to the religion by which they live. It is the fault of the educational institutions from which they graduated; the fault of the system within which they work, which does not sufficiently incent them to publish; and ultimately it is their own fault.

People like Mustapha Kamal or Mohammad Ali Jinnah can hardly be considered icons of Muslim leadership in the 20th century. The former caused mass murder on a large scale in Turkey, and in his zeal to impose a secular view on that country, even outlawed any outward acceptance of Islamic symbols, such as the Arabic language or the wearing of head scarves by women. The latter created a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia without thinking through what implications it would have for the Muslims who would be left behind in India. Undivided India could easily have been a secular state for the Muslims of South Asia, who constituted a third of the population in 1947. Was it necessary to create Pakistan if it was going to be simply a Muslim state?

Hoodbhoy recommends secular humanism—a path of logic and reason— to Muslims as an alternative to creating an Islamic state. Unfortunately, secular humanism has much too often been the “mantra” of apostates like Ibn Waraq (the Iraqi native who has written a book called ‘Why I am not a Muslim’) and Salman Rushdie. Moreover, I am not convinced that it will solve any of the problems that bedevil the Muslim world today. Secular humanism underlies much Western political thinking, which can be as hypocritical and self-serving as any other system. This country, being its ultimate manifestation, has been responsible for the deaths of more than a million Iraqis since the Gulf War, more than half of them children. In large measure, the sufferings and deprivations of the Afghan people during the past 23 years have to be laid at the door of policy makers in the nation’s capital. Much evil has indeed been committed in the name of religion by the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, but even more evil been committed in the name of secular humanism.

The US offer of a probe by the FBI and Pakistan’s offer of collaboration with the Indian investigative team in Parliament attack incident, have both been rejected by India. In fact, India claims to have found all the clues and arrested all the suspects in this case which, according to India, prove Pakistan’s complicity. Since India has already debarred any third party from looking into the matter, it is hard to resist the feeling that all or most of the so-called investigation is cooked up. Its only purpose being to implicate Pakistan, which in turn would provide India the justification to attack Pakistan.

I was a former student of Officer’s Training School Mangla Dam. I am currently in London and would like to get in touch with my Training instructor of the time (1987-1988), Major Raja Imtiaz Ayoub. He could be of a higher rank by now. And also a fellow Pakistani Officer Cadet Adnan Arrif of Lahore, Gulberg Third. Any help will be highly appreciated.

The real Indian goal since the September 11 attack is to suppress the indigenous Kashmiri movement for self-determination, for which nearly 75,000 Kashmiri freedom fighters have already made the supreme sacrifice since 1989. While most of those involved are from Indian held Kashmir, they do get support from Kashmiris across the Line of Control.

Indian repression has been greatly stepped up since September, and the BJP government appears determined to pin the label of terrorism on the struggle, so that it can suppress it by recourse to extreme measures.

Pakistan has been pressing for the resumption of the dialogue that had been started at Agra, because that is the approach most suited to establishing an environment of peace and stability in South Asia.

But India apparently feels that it has an opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue on its own terms by exploiting the anti-terrorist wave in the world.

Recently, India’s ruling BJP Chief J. Krishnamurthy has warned publicly that Pakistan could be wiped out of the world map which is highly irresponsible, provocative and horrible statement. I don’t understand that why and how ruling party head of the so-called biggest democracy of the world could issue such a controversial statement when President Pervez Musharraf and his Government has remained calm and has shown great maturity and statesmanship amid torrent of accusations and threats from across the border?

Since day one, our Big Neighbour has not accepted the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a Sovereign, Independent and Modern State under the able, wise and dynamic leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his associates and is bent upon destroying and invading it, inline with its “MAHA BHARAT” expansionist ideology.

History is testimony to the fact that India invaded Junagarh, Manavadar and Hyderabad Deccan in the forties, annexed Kashmir in the fifties, ran over Goa in the sixties, captured Sikkam in the seventies, illegally occupied Siachen Glacier in the Eighties and has killed through its more than 700,000 troops, thousands of innocent Kashmiri civilians including women and children in the nineties to brutally crush their legitimate struggle for self-determination as guaranteed by UN and the process is still on.

What kind of democracy is this where the will of the people is crushed by bullets, guns and killings? What kind of tolerant democratic norms are practiced when you destroy Babri Masjid, Golden Temple and Christian Churches under State patronage and protection? If this is the kind of democracy that the Indians are trying to preach and implement, then I think Pakistan is better off without it.

It’s a great tragedy that with more than 70% of its total population living below poverty line, India is bent upon starting a meaningless war with Pakistan which would result in nothing but more poverty, chaos, destruction, death and miseries for the common people on both sides of the border.

It is high time that the International Community led by USA must take serious note of India’s ulterior motives and hegemonic designs and use its influence and power to snub it with an iron hand to ensure peace, stability and tranquillity in the world.

I have been reading A.H. Amin’s articles in the Defence Journal for quite some time and I must appreciate his courage in speaking out the truth without any bias of any kind whatsoever. Very few people in Indo-Pak Subcontinent have the intellectual capability to see the truth without falling into the trap of their respective national positions.

Specifically I was truly impressed by his analysis of the Indian War of Independence of 1857. It is amazing to see how many self-styled political analysts belittle the First War of Independence on the basis of hollow arguments of progress under British Raj. I totally agree that to assume that a fight for independence can be harmful to a nation is the stark evidence worst form of mental slavery. How can freedom be a step in wrong direction? Even though I have read a lot of Indian history (official of course), I was completely unaware of the brave people like Beni Madho of Shankarpur, Devi Baksh of Gonda and Gulab Singh of Biswah who chose to die free people rather than accept any offers of amnesty and restoration. So much of history has been doctored to inflate the role of Congress politicians in winning independence that we are downright insulting the memories of our heroes.

In any case these Congress politicians were just a bunch of lawyers chatting endlessly around countless round table conferences who were never considered more than a minor irritant by the British. The British ruled the country as long as they wished to and then left the country on their accord. If any single factor that was instrumental in British decision to quit was either the sight of their former troops fighting against them under the banner of Azad Hind Fauj or the naval mutiny in Bombay. That finally convinced the British that the party was over. Intelligent that they of course were, they managed to ‘grant’ India independence before Indians ‘snatch’ it.

Another issue where I whole heartedly agree with Mr. Amin is his total rubbishing of the theory of martial races. People win or lose wars depending on the capabilities of their leaders or the ideological fervours with which they fight. No human race is inherently martial or non-martial. So many examples are present in this regard in history that to propagate this theory itself is an insult to the intelligence of intended listeners.

In fact if one sifts through history one will find that Punjabi Muslims are the only Muslim community of subcontinent who has never ruled an independent kingdom. All other Muslim communities have ruled areas varying from small kingdoms to Pan-Indian empires at one time or another. Afghans ruled all of northern India before the Mughals and during the brief period of Sher Shah Suri. Sindh was an independent kingdom under its Amirs for centuries. Hindustani Muslims had Audh kingdom. Bengali Muslims have had their kingdom after the break-up of Mughal Empire. Deccani Muslims had Nizam Shahi of Hyderabad. Kannda Muslims had their moment of glory under Tipu Sultan. Never heard of a truly independent Punjabi Muslim state. It does not mean that Punjabi Muslims are any less martial than others. Probably their time has not come so far.

Even Indian army suffered from this myth and then learnt its lessons the hard way. Chinese were ridiculed as small bodied half starving race while Tamil rebels of Sri Lanka were termed lungi-clad Dravidians. Yet these are the only people who have given the Indian army a bloody nose. That is because they were fired by ideological zeal and led by capable leaders.

If only people of India and Pakistan free themselves from these colonial theories then can only a true progress be made in bilateral relations. Without that foolish military adventures will continue to be launched by ‘martial’ generals and they will keep on failing because of operational incompetence. Someday we might all perish in a nuclear holocaust and nobody will be left behind to claim martial race status.

I wonder if you could publish my following letter in your next esteemed publication.

I was most thrilled to read the article “The Last Flight From East Pakistan”, written by Brig (Retd) Sher Khan in your Feb/2001 issue. I simply enjoyed every word of the article for a number of reasons. Foremost, Brig. Sher Khan ever since his retirement has been writing letters quite regularly in various national dailies. I first met him in 1984/85 when he was Commandant of 503 Workshop at Qasim Army Aviation Base, Dhamial which I used to frequent in order to maintain my former employer’s only civilian helicopter in Pakistan at that time. Then he became my collegue, for a very short time, with the same NGO of international repute.

The article further took me back down the memory lane when Sher Khan mentions Col. (Retd) M. Zareef Bangash, a brave Pathan from Hangu, a pilot par excellence and an avid golfer. I was very fortunate to know Col. Zareef when, while still in uniform, he was selected by my employer to become one of their helicopter pilots.

Although I was never a military man but I was associated with Army Aviation in particular since I had to maintain our civilian helicopter at Qasim Base. I have had my good share with making good friends, some family friends, with some of the finest EME and Army Aviation officers. Brig. (Retd) H.U. Beg, Brig. (Retd) Humayun Malik, Brig. Arif Nazir, Lt. Col. (Retd) Omar Jalal, Lt. Col. Ahmed Saud are just a few of the officers who not only excelled in their profession but also commanded highest respect.

Col. Zareef had numerous qualities! Apart from being a good aviator he was a very religious and honest officer and a gentleman. I only wish that had he done his staff college he may have made it to, atleast, the rank of a Brigadier. It is my sincere hope, wish and humble prayers that may Col. Zareef excel in his career with Askari Aviation.