Pakistan in a maelstrom

Columnist MB NAQVI analyses the present crisis.

Geo-strategic situation in and around Pakistan has rapidly changed since September last year. That Pakistan joined the international coalition to fight terror seemed like a simple beginning on a new course that was in broad philosophical accord with its own ideas, though it involved a wrenching political cost. It comprised the sacrifices of all the gains that Pakistan diplomacy and security agencies had made during the quarter of a century since early 1970s. Nevertheless, Pakistan resolutely sided with the US all through the military campaign that destroyed the Taliban power in Afghanistan and that country was handed over to an anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance. There was also a domestic political price: the religious lobbies within the country were stunned by the U-turn that President Pervez Musharraf had had to make strongly disapproved. That there was no other option available to him was clear and also that the course adopted was a right one. It also seemed to be the only course that would serve the national interests in the given constraints of time, space and circumstance. But this sense of danger and loss felt by the pro-Taliban elements within the country constituted a big political price.

Additionally, to add to the misery and consternation of the religious lobbies was the necessary permission given to US forces to pursue Al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives within Pakistan. Geography’s part was largely responsible for this: the only direction and route that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda men could take in running for cover was to and in Pakistan. There was no other place where they could go for a variety of obvious reasons. That led relentlessly to the logic of the military campaign. Pakistan came under tremendous pressure from the US to hunt down and arrest fugitives from Afghanistan. Islamabad’s intelligence and other security agencies are still engaged in arresting such men and in point of simple political fact handing them over to the US, though legal decorum is being observed in many cases. There is no knowing how far will Islamabad have to go because the number of possible fugitives in Pakistan can be very large. Doubtless deployment of a sizeable force to plug the various holes in the highly porous Durand Line has to be made; Islamabad is doing the maximum it could. But 1400 miles of the border that in many places is absolutely inaccessible to any normal military force are sure to leave certain tracks uncovered because a man cannot be put at every yard or so on that long border. After all, these deployed men have to be relieved and fed; walking within a few kilometers of flat lands may be possible but not over long distances where motorised transport can only operate in a few areas. The inrush of defeated soldiers cannot be easily prevented. Thus the pressure from the US mounted that Pakistan should hunt them not only in all tribal areas in the NWFP but also in other parts of the country. Americans operatives, Special Forces and spooks must have joined the effort to nab the Al-Qaeda and leading Taliban figures wherever they might be suspected of hiding. The political price for Pakistanis, and particularly for President Musharraf, would indeed be high for this permission.

One circumstance is highly upsetting: Even as Pakistan sharply veered away from its old pro-Taliban stance, the Kashmir Jihad has continued to gain in momentum. That has occasioned truculence in India. Indian reactions have become somewhat uncharacteristically high-pitched, not to say arrogant. The Indians, in short, have threatened war on Pakistan on the ground that Pakistan is supporting what they call cross-border terrorism. Needless to say that Pakistan’s official stance has clearly distinguished between the freedom struggle of Kashmiris and terrorism. Whether or not Pakistan had any hand in the events such as those of October 1 attack on Srinagar Assembly and December 13 attack on Indian Parliament in New Delhi, the Indians hold Pakistan responsible. Indeed they say that they have enough evidence to go by; but they have not given such evidence as would be conclusive and credible to show that there were any Pakistani personnel or groups that had a hand in those events. The war fever has mounted as India has assembled largest ever forces along the international border as well as the LoC. In terms of official rhetoric in India, this obviously intimidating move is likely to result in their hot pursuit across the LoC in Azad Kashmir. Needless to say Pakistan has called such a possible action by India as equal to waging war on Pakistan. The Indian intent is seen as one of military action that would start a terrible conflagration. As one writes, the threat of war has not in fact receded because the massing of the troops and heavy equipment remains threatening and the Indian government is refusing to begin negotiations with this country. A war can start not only by intent but also by accident or through escalation of any particular incident whether by Kashmiri Jihadis or any other.

Two points need to be considered: what the foreign powers, especially US and UK, are doing because they are the leaders of the International Coalition against Terror. And secondly where does Pakistan stand vis-a-vis this evolving situation. Needless to say that the situation is fluid and pregnant with many possibilities. First, there is the question of a possible war itself. Would it be a conventional war? Should any shooting between India and Pakistan armies begin in earnest, nothing can stop it from starting an all out war between the two countries. In which case there is an insistent query to be made: would it have a nuclear dimension. While Pakistan’s readiness to wage a nuclear war has been proclaimed and is credible, it is perhaps true that left to themselves neither the Indian government nor Pakistan authorities would wish to use the nuclear weapons. This is a moot question. Despite conceding a conscious desire on both sides to avoid a nuclear conflagration, the question has to be asked: whether it can be avoided in the case of a war. All said and done, in modern warfare the quantum and quality of the military hardware matters. Underestimating the strength of the enemy would be foolish. The fighting qualities on both sides are nearly the same while the other side’s numbers and the quantum and quality of their armour and other equipment is superior to Pakistan’s. Thus in a purely conventional war, which this time may not end quickly, Indian advantage in numbers and quality and quantity of tanks, aircrafts and guns would begin to tell at some stage. What then? In terms of Pakistan’s proclaimed nuclear doctrine, it reserves the right to first nuclear strike if its national security comes under serious threat. This means that at some stage, on the assumption of the war being a fairly longish one, its chances of acquiring nuclear dimension should be rated as high. The question then is what would the Indians do?

Superficially, the Indian doctrine is that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. In terms of military commonsense, Pakistan’s nuclear strike will have to be preemptive and so massive as to knock out the second strike capability of India. Given India’s resources, numbers of nuclear warheads and the vast landmass that India is would enable it to deploy these weapons in many secret far off places that may not be easy for Pakistan to reach; not all such targets are likely to be known to Pakistani planners even if they have the wherewithal to hit all of them, which may not be the case. If India retains the second strike capability, then the first strike would become risky and may be foolish. India’s return strike would cause absolutely unacceptable damage no matter which targets they choose. It has to be assumed that both sides would use cities as their targets for maximum effect because of the limited number of warheads that both sides possess. This would suggest that Pakistan may have to think a hundred times before making a preemptive nuclear strike because of the utter uncertainty of what the Indians might then do with their Prithvis and even Agnis.

Does that mean that we can relax that there would be no nuclear exchange? It is not an automatic or easy conclusion. The mere fact that both sides possess nuclear weapons is a highly destabilising fact. The present crisis has made it abundantly clear. Which Pakistani General can be sure that the Indians, saint-like, would not be suspicious of Pakistani intentions and would sit stoically until Pakistan makes the first strike? The very notion is absurd. Both sides cannot but suspect each other’s intentions all the time. Given half a chance that they get away without a reply in kind, either side would make a preemptive strike. A war has to be fought in order to win. It is not a cricket match that is played for the fun of it. The deeper one thinks that should suspicions rise, as they generally do during wartime, there would be temptation, and indeed pressure, on the decision-makers on both sides to make the first strike and shorten the war. This might seem to be the shortest cut to victory and the defeat of the other side or avoid mounting losses from a conventional war. This would suggest that both sides may actually wish to be the first to strike. And a race to nuke first can be visualised. The possibilities are altogether scary. It is not simply a matter of assumption; the current situation suggests that that the very presence of these weapons —- which are anyhow weapons of offence against which there is no known defence —- cannot but be destabilising and suspicion raising. So long as they sit in the armouries of the two sides, the temptation and the possibilities of their use, preemptively, cannot be discounted.

Let us now turn to what the leaders of the international coalition are doing. It is obvious that the Americans are now well entrenched north of Persian Gulf. They are physically (militarily) present in Pakistan and notionally so in India. They have developed Afghanistan’s Bagram airport base and are using it as their own. Indeed the government of Afghanistan being an American creature and under its thumb, the US military will continue to have a free run of the place. The American forces have established bridgeheads in several Central Asian Republics: in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan they have bases and there are some arrangements in Kazakhastan while economic, political and diplomatic presence of America in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan makes American diplomacy very very effective in this whole region. In geo-strategic terms the American advance has been obviously at the expense of both Russia and China. They have been notionally pushed back into themselves; the American role in Central Asia looks like expanding while the Chinese and the Russians might have to struggle to retain effectiveness of their diplomatic presence in Central Asian Republics. Political influence in a country is a zero sum game. If the Americans gain others loss.

Thus the glittering prizes for the surplus American capital are strewn all over the place in Central Asia. There is about five trillion dollars worth of profits to be made from the hydrocarbons under the soil in this area. There are many other minerals to be exploited. But oil being the most important and strategic commodity much of the story in future would concern how it is exploited and through what route it is taken out and who benefits and who does not. As far as can be seen into the future, America is well placed to make the maximum profits, perhaps in half a dozen trillion dollars, from oil alone. Then if the American diplomacy runs true to type, it would advise the various republics —- many of which have traditional rivalries based on nationalism and ethnic stereotypes —- to modernise their armies to cope with the supposed ‘possibilities’. That may mean many good contracts for the armament industry in America. And so forth. America today does not depend on selling simple merchandise. It invests on a big scale in economies that are poised for growth. That is the name of the game. And this game has to be played on a growing scale. Central Asia answers many of the American needs in its unquenchable thirst for more markets for investments. Some call it the help globalisation and unipolarity are giving while others call it by the old fashioned terms of imperialism.

Afghanistan has also an economic and financial dimension. Apart from the fact that Afghanistan was one of the poorest and notably underdeveloped country, this current war has destroyed whatever was left of its infrastructure and economy and has added to the number of hurdles that the Afghans will have to overcome if they have to reconstruct their economy and society. Needless to say Afghanistan is firmly under the US tutelage and control, with friendly (international) troops guarding the government made in Bonn on an American order. About $ 15 billion are said to be required for the rebuilding of the economy and the infrastructure. Much of it, or even more, is notionally available; the donors conference was about to begin in Tokyo when this is being written. That means many contracts and some profits. Afghanistan has always been a country that was ethnically allied to Pakistan; indeed it may be said to be an extension of Pakistan’s Pushtoon belt, though alternatively the same factor became the threat to Pakistan in the past in the name of Pakhtoonistan. The question is who are the people who are expected to get the share of this pie? As things stand today, it looks as if Pakistanis would not be encouraged, though no one would actually disallow them. It does look that the cream would go to the American and British companies, while a good share might go to European companies. But for the second rate contracts, the Indian companies would be better placed than Pakistanis or even the Chinese. Afghanistan is likely to remain a sort of terra incognita for Pakistanis — in a political sense. All the old links are unlikely to be renewed in the old style. The new Afghan government is clearly more friendly to India than to Pakistan, despite Mr. Hamid Karzai’s earlier friendly noises. It is typical that he has not yet visited Pakistan which is his third home, the second being in America. If the present mood of the Indians and all the important members of the new Afghanistan government continues, Pakistanis have to be wary and watchful.

The wishes behind what the Americans and the British are doing in South Asia are to be considered and their trends for the future need to be studied. Even as the war is continuing in a desultory fashion in Afghanistan, the Anglo-American attention has veered sharply toward Kashmir as a pressure point and to the India-Pakistan military standoff over it. The British Prime Minister was in the region at this writing. No doubt, the Anglo-American purpose is obviously to urge restraint on India while Pakistan need not be urged for any kind of moderation. Pakistan is on its best political behaviour and is necessarily to be peace loving and moderate because war does not suit it. The Indians, however, show no sign of listening. What the British Prime Minister has recently said in India has caused alarm bells to go off in Pakistan. By now it is obvious that both America and Britain endorses the current Indian stance 100 per cent that Pakistan is responsible for Dec 13 attack on Indian Parliament and it sponsors terrorism. The Anglo-American demands on Pakistan are the same as that of India: stop all cross-border terrorism. They apparently ignore that there is such a thing as a freedom fight in Kashmir, though they do not mention any term like freedom fight in all their discourses. Mr. Tony Blair, the British Premier, has promised active support to India’s fight against terrorism, hopefully in a non-military fashion. And Britain has also supported India’s case for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. They — all three, India, Britain and USA — want Pakistan to stop doing whatever it may be doing in Kashmir by way of sustaining the Kashmiris fight for their Azadi. The design is clear. It is, therefore, not difficult to see what pressures are likely to be mounted on Pakistan in the coming weeks and months. For good measure, Blair has also ‘hoped’ that a civilian government would emerge here in October next  —- redolent of a reversion to an earlier western stance of shunning military dictatorship. What does it all amount to? In a few words, the US and UK are trying to force President Musharraf to do a similar U-turn on Kashmir as he did on Afghanistan. Now can Afghanistan and Kashmir be equated? It is in fact a moment of truth for Pakistan. Pakistan is, insofar as Kashmir issue is concerned, again isolated within the alliance to which it belongs: International Coalition fighting Terrorism under the leadership of US and UK. It is doubtful if there is any real concern for Pakistan except a temporary one of ensuring its cooperation on Afghan war’s tying up of loose ends. Iran is very friendly —- mostly in theory. It certainly has no immediate salience. India is of course in its most threatening mode. The US and UK, on issues of substance, stand four square behind India insofar as Kashmir is concerned. As noted, they want Pakistan to change its policy 180 degrees, if possible. Europeans and Japanese on this particular question and on the relationship with Pakistan itself are likely to go along with the US rather than oppose it, though left to themselves their attitude is more accommodating and helpful. The only exception is that of China. While asking India to be patient and remain restrained, it is actively helping Pakistan even with military supplies. The west as a whole is asking Pakistan to give up its Kashmir policy that it has pursued for 54 years. The decision cannot be easy. Probably in their magnanimity they would give more time to Pakistan and probably spin out the transition. But they are implacable in their demand. What of China?