Can the US prevent Armageddon in South Asia?

Columnist Ahmad Faruqui worries that the US may not be able to restrain the South Asian antagonists from starting a nuclear holocaust.

During the past week, Pakistan has mobilized its entire army of half a  million soldiers, and positioned anti-aircraft guns and missiles in its  major urban centres to ward off an Indian attack.  Its air force is carrying  out extensive patrols in the air space above Islamabad, to prevent any  pre-emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear assets.  India has deployed its  short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, cancelled all military  leaves and requisitioned various forms of civilian transport to move its  troops toward the border with Pakistan.   A dangerous game of chicken is  being played by these two neighbours who have fought three major wars and several minor wars since independence in 1947.

The triggering event was a terrorist attack on the Parliament Building in New Delhi on December 13.  India charges that Pakistan is behind the attack  and Pakistan alleges that India self-arranged the attack to place the blame  on Pakistan and settle old scores.  Both accusations are irrational.  What  would Pakistan hope to gain by carrying out a terrorist attack in the Indian  capital at a time when it is expecting several billion dollars in US  assistance for its cooperation in fighting the war on terrorism?  Why would  India risk global condemnation by carrying out a self-arranged attack?  More than likely, the attack was carried out by stateless groups that are  fighting for an independent Muslim Republic of Kashmir.  These groups are  concerned that Pakistan has abandoned them, just like it abandoned the  Taliban in October.   

Ironically, like the question of who murdered the Count prior to the start  of the Great War, this question has become irrelevant.  Both India and  Pakistan accuse the other of having carried it out, and seem to be getting  ready to fight an all-out war.  At some point, rhetoric and mobilization  develop a logic of their own. Events are moving much faster than  anticipated by any of the leading South Asian theorists.  More importantly,  they have been triggered by an incident far away from Kashmir.  The US faces  tough choices in dealing with the very volatile and unpredictable crisis in  South Asia.

It can take the low road to defusing the crisis or the high road to helping  establish a process that would deal with the underlying causes. The low  road involves intense telephone diplomacy.  Secretary of State Colin Powell  has been diligently working the phones since Christmas, urging both parties  to de-escalate and use diplomatic channels to resolving their dispute.  Given his considerable charm and charisma, the US may well succeed in  getting both countries to pull back from the brink.  However, the underlying  conflict between India and Pakistan would remain unresolved, and thus remain  susceptible to being “hijacked” by some isolated incident in the future. 

The low road represents the conventional wisdom in Washington, and is based  on the premise that no vital US interests are involved.  This premise needs  to be reconsidered for several reasons:    

* Both India and Pakistan are pivotal countries, whose success  or failure would have international ramifications.  One quarter of humanity  lives in these two countries, producing goods and services valued at $500  billion.  Both countries are located strategically near the oil fields and  energy resources of the Middle East and Central Asia, and share a long  border with China.  A major war between India and Pakistan would arguably  have a much bigger impact on world economic growth and political stability  than a full-fledged war in the Middle East.   

* A full-fledged military conflict between these two neighbours  has a substantial probability of progressing into a nuclear war.  Pakistan,  being the smaller of the two countries, has indicated that it will use  nuclear weapons if its survival is threatened in a conventional war.  This  doctrine, similar to the French doctrine during the Cold War against the  Soviet Union, recognizes the impossibility of prevailing against India.  Pakistan has a highly trained army and an air force that ranks among the  best in the world.  However, Pakistani forces are numerically much smaller  than India’s forces, and much of the Pakistani equipment is inferior to  India’s.  While pledging not to be the first country that will use nuclear weapons, India has stated that a Pakistani nuclear attack on New Delhi will  invite such massive Indian retaliation that “there will be no Pakistan,”  according to retired Indian Air Commodore Jasjit Singh.  In other words,  India believes that “asymmetrically assured destruction” will prevent  Pakistan’s first strike.  Pakistan believes that “deterrence rest on  ambiguity,” in the words of retired Lieutenant General Kamal Matinuddin.  Unfortunately, ambiguity is a two-edged knife that can cut both ways.  If  the deterrence card is not played skilfully, it can invite a pre-emptive  attack.     

* The destruction of the world’s second largest Muslim nation  will represent a major setback to global efforts to combat terrorism, and  strengthen the hands of the radical groups in other Muslim countries.   A  nuclear war with Pakistan will cause massive economic and environmental  damage to India, even as it brings about Pakistan’s destruction.  That  notwithstanding, the hawks in both countries are in the ascendant. In New  Delhi, they are talking about reneging on the Indus Basin Treaty that was  signed in the sixties, and represents the only successful case of  negotiations between the two countries.  If India were to shut off  Pakistan’s water supply, it would reduce major portions of the Indus Valley  to a wasteland.  In Islamabad, they are talking about teaching India a  lesson, and hitting it with everything they have got, oblivious to the  widespread destruction that will certainly rain upon Pakistan.  

* The two countries, while nominally speaking the same  language, seem unable to communicate with each other.  The Agra Summit  between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee failed in July  because neither side was able to develop even a modicum of trust with the  other.  Given the disparity in sizes between the two countries, with India  outnumbering Pakistan eight-to-one in population and four-to-one in military  strength, a bilateral solution is not possible.

*In the current crisis, neither side wants a war, but  suspects the other will start one.  Insecurity has historically triggered  wars between nations.  If war breaks out between India and Pakistan, both  sides are prepared to engage in a “fight to the finish” knowing fully well  that there can be no winners in such a conflict.   

Faced with such prospects, the US can no longer afford to take the low road  to South Asia.  The good news is that it is in a unique position to bring  the two parties to a negotiating table.  As Henry Kissinger noted recently,  the US is the globally pre-eminent power in the cultural, economic,  political and military spheres.  For the first time in its history, India is  allied with the US, which represents a significant shift in the non-aligned,  pro-Soviet position it had maintained during the Cold War.  India wants the  US to support its desire to have a permanent seat on the UN Security  Council.  The US is a major economic market for India, especially to its  rapidly growing high-tech sector.  Finally, India is keen to develop strong  military ties with the US.  Pakistan has changed its foreign policy toward  Afghanistan to accommodate US concerns and is making a major commitment to  stop all terrorist activities from being carried out on its soil.  It is  also keen to expand its economic ties with the US.  Thus, the US should be  able to exercise considerable leverage with both countries.

The US should insist that both countries commit to establishing a process  for carrying out a dialogue designed to resolve their underlying  differences.  The scope of this process should not be limited to Kashmir, as  Pakistan has demanded for a long time; but neither should the process ignore  Kashmir, as India has demanded for an equally long time.  The US, working  with other western countries, should provide both countries with a package  of political and economic incentives that is tied to the results of this  dialogue.  The package should include economic aid on concessional terms and  rescheduling of debt obligations.

Initially, the countries should be encouraged to create a de-militarized  zone around the LoC in Kashmir.  Pakistan should be asked to disarm all  militias on its side of the border that are suspected of operating across  the LoC. India should be asked to withdraw its paramilitary and military  forces from Jammu and Kashmir. An international peacekeeping force should  be deployed in Kashmir, and the people of Kashmir should be allowed to  decide their fate without outside interference.  Finally, both countries  should be encouraged to reduce military spending and increase spending on programmes of human and social development.   The leaders of both countries  have often stated that their common enemy is poverty.  They should be  encouraged to work jointly in making war on poverty, and working together to  promote their shared values, culture and history.

Will the US take the high road in South Asia?  Once the Soviets withdrew  from Afghanistan in 1989, it lost all interest in that country.  After  several years of civil war, Afghanistan became a fertile breeding ground for  terrorists.  It took a horrible series of terrorist acts on US soil before  the US changed its Afghan policy.  One hopes it won’t take an even more  horrible war in South Asia, triggered again by a terrorist act, to get the  US to change its “hands off” policy in South Asia.