Information age operations

Columnist Lt Col (Retd) ZAMAN MALIK discusses the changed face

of operators in the new information age.

We live in an age in which communications are not only faster than ever before, but also take in more complex issues of technology, security, and great rates of change. The information age, therefore, presents both challenges and opportunities across the board for modern operations. Information exploitation and information management are keys to successful operations. National and international capabilities will be increasingly affected in the new ‘networked’ world and threats need to be safeguarded against, as do acquisition procedures which emphasise systems over users and infrastructures.

The fall of Berlin wall and the end of cold war (not for Pakistan), were a result, among other factors, of the increasing ease with which information could be exchanged. Information has become an invisible Web to be used by the military, much of it woven by others and some woven by ourselves. Commanders and Operational Staffs, more than the communications-providing arms and services, therefore, need to understand the nature of information-handling in the battle space. Battle space is like a box that includes breadth, width, and height in which a commander positions himself and moves his forces over time. It is four-dimensional and is considered without regard to boundaries. The commander can now expand his thinking, as he has to dominate the enemy as well as protect his own forces. The commander certainly considers the centre of gravity, as he develops his battle space concept. Force - terrain - oriented Centres of Gravities make this fairly objective consideration.

The nature of information handling is now as important for every officer and junior officer to understand as it was important to understand the new technologies of the stirrup, gun powder, the telegraph, the railways, armour, steam or air power. And a useful start is with ‘Systems Architectures’, the framework into which systems and capabilities must fit. But a blind assumption that technology can solve battlespace management of information is as dangerous as a blind fear of technology. No information is ever complete, true and upto date. Most will have falsehoods which may be exacerbated by powerful information systems. Commander and staff will need a clear understanding of the risks and penalties of dependence on such systems. Even the US Department of Defence Computer Systems is being successfully penetrated. All informations do have their limitations. A particular issue to be careful about here will become acute in the world of Inter-net; it will not always be clear where information placed on server, actually comes from. Judgement on the validity of informations based on its provenance will not always be possible. Good information management will be needed to establish grades of validity.

The boundary between strategic communications and information systems is eroding. Information structures at strategic, operational and tactical levels must reflect the crossing of boundaries. However, as of now, when we talk about indications and warning information, we talk about two types of warnings. Strategic and Tactical. Tactical is a warning that you have been attacked, and strategic warning is a warning telling you that you are about to be attacked. These are the distinctions that are difficult to discern. Tomohawk or Cruise missiles are attack missiles which are fired from submarines against targets that may be in a brigade commander’s tactical area of responsibility. Information structures at strategic operational and tactical levels must reflect this crossing of boundaries.

To have indicators and warning intelligence, you have to have indicators. What constitute a good indicator? It must be something observable; you have to be able to see if it is going to be a valid indicator. And lastly, an indicator should occur sufficiently in advance of the event to enable you take some response. A bright light in the sky above is an excellent indicator of a nuclear burst, but it does not give you much time to do anything about it! The PM of India, A.B. Vajpayee has refused to allow others to believe in any kind of indicators that they mistakingly, might be expecting from India. With usual jugglery and acrobatics of words to fox and delude the west, he said the other day: “Although the sky is clear yet the lightning can be very much expected even from the clear blue sky.” Let us not forget that like Saddam he has collected a huge arsenal and delivery system, from his natural allies! In the prevailing scenario when the Sub-Continent, rather the whole world has been made to stand on the knife-edge by India, by its all out escalation against Pakistan, by land, sea, air space, with the well demonstrated nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, to be used instantaneously, without allowing any indicators to leak out, one is bound to think, here in Pakistan, about the following imponderables.

“Once a country seeks security through nuclear deterrence, for this to be effective, it must be credible. If the possession of nuclear weapons is to act as a deterrent then the possibility of its use must be real! An opponent will not be deterred if he believes that the deterrer will never use his nuclear weapons. For deterrence to hold, one has to be confident that one can inflict what is called ‘unacceptable damage’ on the adversary in a second strike. The question of whether one will be able to retain an adequate second-strike capacity after a devastating strike by the enemy (first strike), is deeply troubling one. There is also the uncertainty and doubt about whether one’s adversary will feel that the damage that can be inflicted upon it, is indeed unacceptable and therefore a deterring factor... Every country that goes in for nuclear weapons in the belief that deterrence will work, has to ask itself an unavoidable question. What if deterrence breaks down? In that case, a nuclear exchange or war has to be brought to an end as quickly as possible. That is to say, the capacity to fight a ‘limited nuclear war’ must be established. However, building such a capacity for nuclear war fighting by making ‘limited nuclear war’ more feasible itself undermines the efficacy of deterrence. This ‘what if’ question haunts and shadows all nuclear strategic thinking. It has no satisfactory answer. Since it is supposedly hard-headed lack of sentimentality that led to the nuclear weapon’s production and deployment, in the first place, the hard-headed unsentimental ‘what if’ question cannot be ignored or left unasked, yet it simply has no good answer. Moreover, the absence of an adequate answer here only highlights the deficiency of another kind of answer to another kind of question. What are nuclear weapons useful for? This is not answered by saying ‘deterrence’! We only know that deterrence has worked after the 2nd World War. The hair raising imponderables, notwithstanding, Pakistan will have to fight with its back towards the wall. It’s the question of our very existence or survival! Let no one be allowed, through one or the other hypocracy to render our capability null and void. We know how was India provided all sorts of assistance to prepare its nuclear capability. We know that in Pokhran US satellites always went blind be it 1974 or 1998, whereas in the case of Pakistan, a horrible example was made in 1977, and the said satellites delivered running commentary when we carried out experiments on 28 May 1998. Right now, there are, alongside the fear of unlimited war, between India and Pakistan, certain lurking apprehensions in the mind. First, the US may seek Kashmir to itself, as it is neither with India nor under Pakistan, but has international bearing which could be turned into a jumping ground for its adventure in the region, cutting off Pakistan and India from China, near Lop Noir, the Chinese nuclear site. Nepal’s Kingdom was finished soon after Chinese PM ended his visit to that country, about a year back. One can stretch one’s imaginations. Second, Russia will be made to offer mediation like it did in March 1966. Russia has good relations with India since 1949. Pakistan does want mediation, in the light of UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949. The principal party to the dispute is the people of the Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir. They must be treated as such in all parleys or negotiations. So, the shadow boxing is to pay the BJP? Pakistan wants nothing except what is needed to be done in a just and impartial manner, keeping in mind the sentiments of the people of J&K, on both sides of the LoC. Right now, we are considering about what we have been, in this article. That is important to keep oneself relevant!

While in PMA, the cadets should be taught about the different problems and different connotations of information war versus conventional war. In conventional war, we have land, sea, and air battle space, and we organise our military forces around this geography. You have a military force that fights on ground, one that goes through the water, and one that flies through the air. Information warfare, on the other hand, does not occupy a physical battle space. When we fight conventional war, we have identified our adversary/adversaries. But in information war, your enemy does not wear uniform; you don’t know who your enemy is. For conventional war you have time to mobilise, but with Cyber war, no mobilisation is required. No deployment is required. It simply happens at the press of a button.

Conventional warfare is against nation-state versus nation-state. We have (though much infractioned) some conventions. We have a whole series of diplomatic protocols. It is impossible to conduct in the information war because our enemy is not a nation state. It may be a commercial entity supporting the terrorists covertly, to achieve its own ends through them, in various ways.

In fact, it is intelligence collection and collation problem. One of the problems with rapid collection and understanding of information on logical attacks is the structure of the national infrastructure. What does that say in terms of defence? If offensive doctrine calls for pre-emptive attack before formal declaration of war, attack before the enemy could move forces to defend against the exertion of military force upon him, it is going to be a surprise attack, an electronic catastrophe. What does it mean? It means a systematic attack on our national infrastructures, so as to determine how would we deal with it. Telephone systems, digital net-works, air traffic control, rail, the national grid, and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) pipelines etc. Computer system Internet are penetrated comprehensively, before the beginning. Command posts should, therefore, acquire adequate capabilities to make use of the rich field of information placed at their disposal. We need a chain of satellites too. However, Information must be denied to the enemy, and all the under commands made properly informed about any breach of information security, by the Command Post. Staff officers must ensure the execution of Command’s policy; mere issuance of instructions is the least of their responsibilities. They must let the subordinates have a word of praise for those who deserve it, instead of projecting themselves as Socrates. Merit must be allowed to flourish; and this is one of the most important but most abused aspect of it!

Finally, this is an area where the grown ups must allow the young officers to do a lot of reading. Flexibility of mind and of attitude, the ability to see the connection between one sort of technology and another and to see the management opportunities offered by new technology is some times found most effectively in junior leaders. Old men must listen. The way forward is staff, soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and let them use the equipment. And if it works, to arrange to keep it, properly maintained, supported and upgraded.

Technology is no longer a passive repository for information. Current IT system can move information around automatically, changes it, highlights specific aspects, and presents the same groups of facts, statistics or implications in countless different ways without human involvement. The user whether he is a commander, a staff officer, or an administrator, sometime feels like the sorcerer’s apprentice in the face of all this. While command post’s capability can immeasurably be enhanced through the use of technologies, the risks and penalties must be taken into account. A credible and progressive information system is essential to have strategic indicators, so important for our deterrence to be useful and effective.