Relevance of Conventional Forces in a Nuclear Environment

Air Commodore (Retd) JAMAL HUSSAIN discusses why conventional forces remain important.

One of the attractive and compelling arguments propounded by those in favour of Pakistan matching the Indian explosion of its nuclear devices after 11 May 1998 was that under the safety of our own nuclear umbrella, we could reduce our conventional forces to a level that our fragile economy could afford. Given that we could not hope to continue to match India’s growing conventional forces without bankrupting our economy and also being convinced that the Indians were/are following this very strategy to eventually have Pakistan self-destruct under the crushing burden of maintaining a credible defence against a powerful and hostile neighbour (a repeat of the US strategy against USSR during the Cold War period), this was a very powerful argument. Pakistan took the momentous step and exploded its own nuclear devices on 28th May 1998, defying the threats, pleas and incentive offers of the rest of world. Over four years have elapsed since that fateful decision and although now we have our own nuclear umbrella, a reduction in conventional forces has not taken place, and in the prevailing hostile environment, there is little hope of any such action in the near future. Is an indigenous nuclear umbrella by itself sufficient to permit a unilateral reduction in conventional forces to a manageable level? What is the inter-action between conventional and nuclear forces to maintain a credible deterrence against a powerful and hostile neighbour? These are the questions this article will attempt to address. A brief analysis of the factors that led to our taking the fateful step of overtly demonstrating our nuclear capability despite overwhelming world opposition would be relevant.

That Pakistan had to match the Indian nuclear explosion of May 11 1998 with its own was inevitable. This inevitability was primarily due to the prevailing domestic environment within the country and the existing culture of hate and mistrust which existed/exists between the two unfortunate neighbours.

An overwhelming majority of the population, including the educated and learned section of the society in Pakistan, willed, taunted and eventually forced the government to join the nuclear club. Admittedly, there was a miniscule minority opposing the “tit for tat” response but the overpoweringly hawkish majority drowned their voices. To make matters worse, the Indians, perhaps in their ignorance or more likely, fearing that Pakistan may not respond to their own supposedly “stupid” act with something similar, started to hurl threats of annihilation of Pakistan now that they were a nuclear power and Pakistan was not. They dared Pakistan by challenging its theory of nuclear ambiguity, calling it a bluff. The common Indian citizen was made to believe that manufacturing nuclear weapons was an outstanding feat of scientific achievement. A backward and ignorant nation like Pakistan could not scale such magnificent heights and they were bluffing. These bellicose threats from India silenced even the handful of those opposed to overt display of our nuclear capability. The 28th May explosion of nuclear devices by Pakistan was thus inevitable. The nation proudly announced to its euphoric public that they are only the 7th in the comity of nations that have a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability. The Indians had laid similar claims after 11th May 1998. The wretched people of the sub-continent do not seem or want to realize that at least fifty or more nations have the ability to produce atomic weapons but they have consciously chosen not to, and for very sound reasons.

Between 11th May 1998 till 28th May 1998, a raging debate was going on in the entire nation, more so in the government controlled TV and Radio medias about how should Pakistan react to the Indian nuclear device explosions. Should we too respond in kind or should we take the moral high ground and earn the accolade and appreciation of the whole world by not emulating the Indian act. There was a school of thought, albeit a tiny minority, that argued that the world had already granted Pakistan the status of a de facto nuclear weapon state as in its opinion Pakistan did indeed possess nuclear weapons whose working efficacy had been proven through cold tests and computer simulations. By refraining from overt demonstration of our nuclear weapons capability, we could maintain our nuclear deterrence without inviting the wrath of the rest of the world. An overwhelming majority, however, were in favour conducting live tests to remove any shadow of doubt especially in the Indian minds about our nuclear weapons capability. Many of the arguments presented by the “hawks” were logical especially in view of the threats emanating from Mr. Advani, the Indian Home Minister, of how they will pulverize Pakistan into submission now that they have this “magic” weapon, which Pakistan did not have. One could also argue with some justification that a strategic nuclear balance between two hostile states does reduce the likelihood of a full-scale armed conflict between them. However, the inherent danger in such a doctrine is that it might tempt one side to covertly or otherwise start sabotaging vital interests of the other side in the hope that possession of nuclear devices would help prevent an all out military conflict.

Kargil was a result of such a miscalculation that brought the two nations very close to an all out war with its attendant danger of nuclear escalation. Pakistan appeared to have calculated that were the freedom fighters to occupy the Kargil heights, the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides would prevent India from escalating the conflict. While this assessment did hold true and an Indian response across the line of control or the international border did not materialise, Pakistan had failed to appreciate the international concern on the threat by the Indians to launch an all out conventional offensive against Pakistan that had all the ingredients of escalating into a nuclear exchange. That Pakistan was perceived as the aggressor as it had attempted to disturb the status quo militarily resulted in the application of unbelievable diplomatic, financial and moral pressure especially by USA, which eventually forced Pakistan to ask the freedom fighters to vacate the heights. A brilliant tactical victory by the freedom fighters was turned into a strategic defeat through the application of world pressure on Pakistan. The Indian strategic aim was achieved without it having to actually engage Pakistan in an armed conflict. The mere threat to do so was enough as the spectre of a nuclear war was totally unacceptable to the world. Although an armed conflict between the two declared nuclear powers was eventually averted, it was too close to call for comfort. It also made one thing very clear: even if Pakistan had the conventional superiority to defeat India militarily in a bid to resolve the Kashmir dispute, nuclearization of the region has closed this option. This is true for the Indians as well. Even with their present conventional superiority, they can ill-afford to militarily annex Pakistan’s part of Kashmir without running the risk of a nuclear holocaust in the sub-continent. For that matter even attempting to threaten use of conventional forces to make Pakistan change its stated policy of politically, morally and legally supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle in the Indian Held Kashmir in the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides is fraught with danger, as the Indians are realising in the present impasse.

The ongoing crisis in South Asia, which has caught the world’s attention, is also a result of a similar mindset, this time by India. The events of 11th September emboldened India to think that it could repeat the Kargil strategy to force the world to once again put unbearable pressure on Pakistan to abandon what India claims conduct of proxy war by Pakistan through its alleged conduct of cross-border terrorism in the Indian Held Kashmir. Whether the attack on the Indian parliament was stage-managed drama by India to malign Pakistan or it was an attack by the militants with our without the support and connivance of the Government of Pakistan, is a moot point. The Indians used this incident to hold Pakistan squarely responsible. The entire Indian armed forces were mobilized and placed on the border in an extremely threatening posture. Ultimatums of sorts were given to Pakistan among them, complete cessation of any support to the Kashmiri freedom fighters who were allegedly operating from the part of Kashmir not under Indian occupation, failing which India was fully geared up to launch a conventional offensive against Pakistan. Whether the western world, particularly USA held Pakistan responsible for the attack on Indian parliament or not was not really material. For the west, especially USA, the Indian stance suited their current strategy in their war against what they termed as Islamic militants and they used this pretext to force Pakistan to take stronger actions against the religious extremists. Pakistan has complied, as it is in line with its own security concern as well, and USA’s objectives by and large have been met. India, however, is still unconvinced that Pakistan had reversed its policy of supporting the Kashmiri militants. It refuses to de-escalate and the two opposing armies are continuing to face each other eyeball to eyeball. A conventional war that could spiral out of control to a nuclear exchange still remains a nightmarish reality for the rest of the world. The Indians are maintaining their aggressive posturing hoping that USA would put further pressure on Pakistan in a manner similar to the way they had done during the Kargil conflict. What they do not seem to realize that unlike 1999 when Pakistan was practically isolated and was seen as the aggressor, in the post-9/11 scenario, Pakistan is a key ally of USA in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Also, since Pakistan is being viewed as the one making all possible peace efforts to defuse the situation and has taken major steps to allay USA’s fear about supporting the militants, the pressure to back down is now on India. Having taken such an extremely aggressive stand of full mobilization, the Indian Government finds itself in a dilemma: how do they justify to their public de-escalation when most of their demands have not been met and Pakistan has outrightly rejected many of their ultimatums. That eventually India will have to back off appears imminent. Although its actions have apparently forced Pakistan to review its military support to the Kashmiri separatist movement, the primary objective of making Pakistan abandon its policy of supporting a plebiscite in Kashmir has not been achieved. To the contrary, much to the consternation of the Indians, Kashmir issue has been internationalised and India is coming under increasing pressure to resolve the issue amicably to avoid frequent showdowns with Pakistan. Similar to the Pakistan’s experience in Kargil, India is also learning the bitter lesson that in the nuclear balance that exists between India and Pakistan, the threat of use of conventional forces to resolve disputes can and will backfire.    

Nuclear deterrence has worked in the past and can work in the future provided one does not assume that the mere possession of these weapons gives one the freedom to hurt the core interests of its adversary, without risking a military response.

Now that both the antagonists have publicly confirmed the possession of nuclear weapons, they have to ensure development of a fail safe Command and Control System that would prevent accidental/inadvertent firing, while at the same time remaining responsive to the threat. A heavy investment is required and India and Pakistan are committed to achieve these goals. This factor along with the production and development of delivery means of the nuclear devices has added a considerable sum to the already burgeoning defence expenditure of the two impoverished nations, without any reduction in their conventional armed forces budget, which in the case of India has witnessed a substantial rise since its nuclear debut. In Pakistan, it remained frozen to the pre-1998 level till the year 2002, and in the current budget it has witnessed a rise. The predictions of some of the experts who were of the opinion that possession of the nuclear weapons would permit Pakistan to cut down on its conventional armed forces have not been realised. The mere availability of nuclear deterrence is unlikely to result in any reduction in conventional armed forces. Reduction of conventional forces is possible but for that other factors would have to come to play. A reduction in threat through peaceful resolution of the core issue; a change in the Indian strategy not to up the ante by continuous increase in its conventional capability; or a unilateral decision by Pakistan not to engage in an arms race with India and instead concentrate on resolution of its core disputes through diplomatic means only — these are some of the factors that individually or in conjunction with one another may permit a reduction of conventional forces at least by Pakistan.

In the final analysis, only a threat reduction in the region can result in lowering of conventional defence forces in South Asia. Conventional armed forces and nuclear weapons work in tandem to make total deterrence credible. Nuclear deterrence without a credible conventional deterrence when serious differences continue to exist will result in a very low nuclear threshold that in turn would make the situation extremely unstable. Threatening to use nuclear weapons even for minor infringements by the enemy is an impractical doctrine to implement. It just would not work.