Political Economy of Narcotics — An Overview

Columnist Hassan Bashir examines the ramifications of narcotics on the economy.

Introduction

The Problem Defined

In recent years, the world has watched narcotics cropping, trade and consumption turn into an international crisis of unprecedented gravity. The abuse and control of illicit narcotics have come to pervade major powers relations with the Third World. The issue is a constant source of conflict and mutual recrimination between North and South. Traditionally the main drug-producing countries were poor and essentially agricultural whereas the main consumer markets were the industrialized and rich states. This distinction, however, is also undergoing a change as we shall see later. The narcotics trade; generates a transfer of billions of dollars from North to South annually, and has attained an economic and political foothold in some Third World countries. The consuming and producing countries blame each other for the exponentially growing crisis and advocate respectively the supply-side and demand side solutions. Proposed plans for controlling drug cultivation and production often face nationalist resentment. Moreover, political elites in some Third World countries see anti-narcotics campaigns as imposing severe economic and social costs and also as creating new and formidable political challenges.

The cocaine traffic in the Western Hemisphere and heroin trade in some Asian states, constitute a particularly severe manifestation of the North-South conflict over drugs. The consumer states especially the US expend considerable diplomatic effort on pressing Pakistan, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. The major countries reducing heroin and cocaine — to curb illicit narcotics cultivation and refining and thus trafficking into the US. The consumer states provide these producing countries with funding, technical assistance and personnel for narcotics control programmes, such arrangements bear heavy costs on these countries. Moreover, the issue has been linked to foreign aid. Countries that do not take effective measures to control illicit drug production trafficking and money laundering can lose certain specified economic and military assistance and trade preferences such as sugar quotas.

Supply-side moves, however, have been of little or no use in stemming the flow of drugs, into the main consumer markets of the same. These governments lack the resources to counter the traffic, there is in fact no compatibility between the resources available to drug traffickers and the resources available to drug combatants. Perhaps, even more important than this is that governments as well as important constituencies in the main producing countries do not give the war against narcotics their unconditional support, even though, this is true that drug trafficking in many respects adversely affects the source countries — rising number of drugs addicts, rampant corruption, escalating levels of violence, declining moral standards and above all a deteriorating national image, being few of the most obvious consequences. The reasons for this reticence are complex and are discussed in the coming chapters, however, several points deserve discussion at the outset.

First, anti-narcotics moves entail serious economic and political costs. Over the years, narcotics business has flourished with an amazing speed. In fact it can now duly be considered an industry, though of course illicit in nature.

The huge sums of narco-money are laundered through untraceable systems and invested in various sectors of national economic activity. Evidence suggests that in most drug producing countries, governments though theoretically dedicated to the war against drugs, do not discourage the flow of narco-money into the national economy. Any crackdown on narcotics industry, therefore, can seriously shrink the producer country’s foreign exchange reserves and also give rise to the unemployment figures to an unprecedented degree resultantly causing widespread discontent in the masses.

Second, the narcotics industry as a whole has accumulated significant political clout. Drug traffickers play the role of power brokers and are a major source of funding for political campaigns. Traffickers also have penetrated and corrupted nearly every important national institution.

Third, the war on narcotics is not especially popular in the growing regions, in fact it is perceived as a programme imposed on these regions by the consumer states and especially by the United States. Measures such as extradition, the spraying of illicit crops, armed operations attack against drug laboratories and economic sanctions against narcotics exporting countries, have provoked considerable anti-consumer sentiment. Furthermore, most leaders in producing countries see the supply-side approach to drug control as fundamentally flawed. In their view, demand not supply, drives the international drug traffic.

The problems of narcotics control, therefore, stem largely from the power of entrenched narcotics interests. However, such problems are also attributable to other factors like, unstable political structures, tensions between civilian and military authorities and the absence of strong public support. The governments of Pakistan, Colombia, Peru and most other producing states have never exercised full control over their national territories. Vast sections of these countries have always been a political no-man’s land. In these remote areas, traffickers establish their plantations, laboratories, air strips and storage facilities etc.

Public opinion imposes an additional constraint on drug control programmes. Top national leaders affirm their commitment to the war against drugs, but facts show that drug trafficking and drug abuse rank at the bottom of concerns of producer states publics, i.e. well below problems such as inflation, unemployment, crime and terrorism etc. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief in the public that the drug trade is beneficial for the economy, even if it is harmful in other respects.

The attitude of military establishments, also constitute an obstacle to narcotics control efforts. Corruption, strategic considerations, ideology, and institutional self-interest all affect the military’s posture vis-a-vis the war against drugs. Military factions in Colombia and Pakistan, for example, have been linked to cocaine and heroin traffickers. Moreover, the military, for its own institutional reasons, seeks to keep the police as ill-armed and as immobile as possible. In other words military opposition has prevented the drug enforcing agencies and civilian leaders in producing countries, from raising an effective drug-fighting force.

To sum up, many factors account for the narcotics producing governments difficulty in taking decisive action against the illicit drug trade. Crackdowns can cause serious repercussions in these states, where prices for licit exports have collapsed, and majority of population is unemployed or underemployed. Anti-drug policies can generate massive popular discontent and add to government political troubles. Also, that governments do not possess a popular mandate for carrying out a major anti-drug initiative. Furthermore, the drug issue clearly constitutes a source of conflict in civilian-military relations.

Due to the wide range of issues related to narcotics production and trafficking, it became almost impossible to take into account and analyze every facet of the problem within the confines as exercised in this study. The theme and scope of this study, therefore, has been limited to making a comparative analysis of narcotics menace as witnessed in Latin America and as emerging in Pakistan. Considered thoroughly are the dynamics of growth and control of narco-problem in both the regions.

Methodology

The methodological tools employed during the course of this study have been the primary as well as secondary sources of information. A simple deductive-interpretative method has been used to substantiate the arguments. The collection of data has been in the sphere of objective indicators like policy decisions by governments, various government reports on narcotics issue, surveys by law enforcing agencies and other organizations working on narcotics. Other than these, published works of various scholars who have analyzed different dimensions of the narcotics problem, have also been taken into account. Based on these objective criteria are the interpretations and deductions about these markers. This exercise has been organized in a manner to include the theoretical conceptualizations of capitalism as a mode of economic activity, and the place for the illegal business of narcotics in this broader theoretical framework.

Organization of the study

First chapter of the study gives an overview of the political economy of narcotics. Discussing briefly the working of the capitalist economy and the role of narcotics business in this framework. Also taken into account are the political forces which have helped in the emerging of drug trade as one of the most profitable illegal businesses in the history of the world.

Second and third chapters discuss in detail the dynamics of growth and control of the Latin American cocaine industry. Taken into account are the geography of cultivation, trafficking trends and politico-economic effects of the cocaine trade on these countries. The third chapter on dynamics of control views the drug law enforcement scenario, concentrating on role of the public opinion, governments and military.

Fourth and fifth chapters take into account the dynamics of growth and control of Pakistani heroin industry. Concentrating on the genesis of the drug problem in the country and whatever measures have been adopted to check the same.

Sixth chapter presents a comparison between Pakistan and select Latin American countries of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The conditions prevailing in all these drug producing states are compared and deductions have been made on their bases.

Chapter 1

Political Economy of Narcotics — An Overview

The cultivation and production of different narcotics is perhaps as ancient as the mankind itself. Ancient scriptures and other evidence confirms the use of narcotics as a centuries old tradition in various civilizations. However, the popularity and problems associated with drug use, are peculiar to the post industrial society. The drug phenomenon as it exists today shares its origins with other modern phenomenon, such as the ecological crisis.

Even though use of opium, coca and alcohol, is old and must certainly have caused problems for humanity for time immemorial. But the fact is that the use of these and their psychoactive after effects, did not spread to the masses to the extent that they do today. In the modern society there has been a kind of “massification” of drugs. Legal or illegal, they are available to all strata of people as commodities; at all hours of commerce, provided the customers can pay. This situation is new since the advent of capitalism.

The very essence of capitalism is that it tends to earn profit through surplus value, created by wage labourers in the process of producing commodities. In other words, under capitalism profit is created by paying the workers less than the total value that they produce. The difference between these two constitutes the surplus value. However, it remains only a potential profit and not an actual one. In order to realize a profit, the capitalist has to sell the commodities produced by labourers; to the consumers. Hence, establishing that in a capitalist system what is produced must be consumed before a profit can be realized. In other words, without consumption there is no profit. Therefore, consumption becomes a necessary link, in the cycle of capital formation and reproduction i.e. the basis; for the creation of surplus value and then its conversion into money, or realized profit.

Moreover, as under capitalism things are created not for their utility, but to be sold in order to realize the profit in shape of money; the production is potent with expansion. In other words when commodities are produced for the purpose of satisfying certain specific needs; the fulfilment of this purpose tends to put a limit on the level of production. However, if the same commodities, as in the capitalist system; are weighed for their exchange value in the course of which profits are realized; money making becomes an end in itself and the process of accumulating profit tends to proceed without bounds.

Furthermore, under these circumstances, the production should be kept up unstopped, until it meets up with its inherent contradictions like over-supply of goods exceeding the existing level of demand, which checks the flow of production. Past experiences in world economy show that over production, caused periodic recessions and depressions, which consequentially caused setbacks in profit making.

In order to counter this inherent tendency of production in a capitalist system, capitalists seek to expand their market to keep up with the production and in this quest they broaden the sphere of their economic activity on a systemic scale. In the pursuance of this purpose capitalist states in the post have followed and initiated policies like colonialism.

The expansion of the market, consequentially, results in increased consumption of commodities which as noted earlier works as the very basis of capital formation and reproduction.

To sum up capitalism, it is a system which focuses on earning profit through monetizing the surplus value of commodities. In doing so the capitalists increase their production and create markets in which the production gets consumed, giving them profits. This economic logic applies precisely to the reduction of narcotics under capitalism. However, the illicit nature of the commodity here creates certain exceptions, which are taken into account in the following discussion.

One important point to consider here would be that it is not simply the use of narcotics as a means of profit-making which encourages its production. Instead, it is the involvement of narcotics in the profit-making process under the capitalist mode of production which promotes their use in an increased way. In other words the production of drugs created out of the exigency of profit making, tends to push up the consumption level.

The medical profession has championed the use of these to deal with various behavioural manifestations, ranging from mild problems of living to severe psychoses. Moreover, in the process, the pharmaceutical industry has earned great profits and also helped create a whole generation of pill takers hooked on drug habits.

Another force which creates or has the potential to create a community of drug addicts as well as a realized version of the same is the role of medical profession in ousting the use of certain drugs from the arena of legitimacy. Where it may sound as a very right or even a moral one, the initiative has an inherent irony, that banning a drug does not necessarily make it go away, instead it may on the other hand increase its popularity by making it move alluring with the attached sensational publicity to that drug. In this context, the mass media also plays an important role by increasing campaigns on warning about drug dangers. This done in the name of health and morality where serves the purpose also links illicit drugs with the life in the fast lane and glamorize them. Hence, increasing the vulnerability of the populace towards drug addiction.

In sum, therefore, it can be said that the very working of the medical industrial complex in a capitalist framework facilitates the increased use of drugs. The forces which would have been considered sterile in a pre-capitalist society become instrumental in vice versa. However, modern drugs scenario also needs to be analyzed in its political context.

Drugs and politics, share a very long partnership. As referred to earlier the advent of capitalism initiated the need to find colonies for greater markets and resource bases in order to increase the wealth of nations. In achieving these ends, drugs were often used as the means. For example the British waged two wars in mid-19th century to force opium into China, which had imposed a ban on the drug. The larger issue behind these wars was opening up of China for commercial purposes, but the immediate cause of war was opium. Furthermore, in making these wars successful the British government also worked in close connection with the smugglers of the forbidden substance. Two conclusions can be derived from the above related incidents. One, the emergence of drug-politics and two accomplicity of a government with members of organized crime. However, this work pattern by any government and especially a colonial power was not so out of character in the colonial times and practically almost all colonial powers employed such methods. The larger aim of such methods was always opening up of new markets for the mother countries products and in a capitalist system any means which led to this aim were justified. Moreover, drugs themselves were a good source of revenue for the colonial power, therefore, they in fact encouraged the drug trade in pursuit of profit. The effects of such policies of production and consumption of drugs should be fairly visible.

The association between drug trafficking and national politics took a truly bizarre turn with the start of post-World War II era, when a threat was presumed to the capitalist system. The major characteristic of the post-World War II era was division of world into two diagonally apart blocs, which represented anti each other political and economic systems. Champions of the two blocs, the United States and the former USSR adopted different policies to protect their politico-economic systems against rising  challenges posed by each other; in peripheral areas of the world.

In turning back these challenges both the super powers, the US government as well as the political regimes in the former USSR, more than once turned for help to organized criminals and dictators, who enriched themselves through illegal means, drug trafficking inclusive. In other words as a return for the help provided by these counter-insurgent allies in holding down the rebellion at the edges of the empire against rising challenges, the governments of major powers have in the name of national security, tolerated, protected and even aided illegal drug trafficking activities.

This situation reveals an inherent paradox in anti-narcotics policies of world’s major powers, especially that of the US, which spends untold millions of dollars every year to halt the flow of illicit drugs into its borders and also to shut their production in the source countries. Moreover, it was the United States which for the first time declared drugs like Marijuana, Cocaine and Heroin etc illegal for all practical purposes, in the US in 1914. The US Government did so in order to stop the increasing drug abuse in America. The argument of the government was that an increased addict population was a threat to the national security of the United States.

The passing of law against narcotics use and trade did not stop the two; instead it took the drugs to the underworld where they opened doors for the elements of organized crime to start trafficking in this outlawed commodity, and feed the growing habit in the United States. Moreover, the banning of drugs increased their price to an unprecedented degree hence making the whole business too lucrative for any criminal organization to resist.

The governments which declared drugs and drugs trafficking illegal in the name of national security have helped the same in developing into most profitable criminal activity in the history of the world, and that too has been done for national security concerns. Furthermore, in a broader sense, banning of narcotics, tolerance towards narcotics trade and flourishing of the illicit narcotics industry; all have occurred for the cause of the capitalist world. That United States banned the drugs because it feared an unsustainable addict population. That the same tolerated the activities of organized criminals involved in narcotics trade in order to the capitalist economic order of the world. And that illicit narcotics trade flourished in order to meet the very essence of capitalism i.e. higher profits through greater consumption and increased production of goods.

Chapter 2

Latin American Cocaine Trade: The Dynamics of Control

The preceding discussion shows, that breaking the power of narcotics dealers and lobbies in Latin American countries will be extremely difficult. Serious structural barriers impede drug law enforcement in these countries, which include weak central governments, the lack of strong public support for narcotics control and divisions within governments over anti-drug policy.

To curb the crisis many industrialized states, which are also the largest consumer markets for drugs; support a number of supply side programmes in cocaine producing countries. Funding for these programmes, by United States alone has been upto $ 50 to $ 60 million a year. However, when compared to the earnings of the cocaine dealers which are between $ 5 to $ 6 billion per year; the funds allocated to anti-drug activities seem very meagre and one may conclude from this vast difference of figures that infusion of anti-drug aid, might not be the answer to the problem. The following discussion focuses at the narcotics control problem and strategies as posed and applied in narcotics producing Latin American nations. The discussion largely takes into account the US efforts to check the drug trade into her borders. US is the largest consumer market for drugs especially cocaine and has spent the most on anti-drug efforts.

The Problems in Effective Drug Control

Narcotics producing Latin American nations are poorly equipped politically and administratively to control cocaine trafficking across their borders. These governments often exercise little or no effective control over territories where drug production flourishes. Such areas are remote from metropolitan centres, relatively inaccessible, characterized by mountainous or jungle terrain, and patrolled by guerrillas or other hostile groups. Vast regions of northern Bolivia, eastern and southeastern Peru, and southern Colombia are in effect a no-man’s land where government forces vie for political control with drug traffickers and anti-government guerrillas.

In these existing conditions, the cocaine industry represents a force for colonization, bringing a human presence, road penetration networks, airstrips, satellite industries and some licit agriculture (mainly subsistence farming) to regions that previously were virtually uninhabited. However, cocaine industry tends to weaken governments’ already weak hold on their territories.

The other side of the territorial problem is official corruption. Bribery it can be argued, has long been the cement of political and social interaction in much of Latin America. However, drug traffickers, especially cocaine traffickers, capitalize on this tradition to transform the existing power structure, to create networks of compliant officials at national department and local levels. As already discussed these networks vitiate the effectiveness of criminal justice systems. In Bolivia during 1986, for example, Chapare traffickers reportedly were paying the police $ 20,000 to $ 25,000 for a 72 hour window of impunity for loading coca paste into air planes or for moving major shipments by land or by river. In Colombia, Medellin’s famous Olaya Pemana International Airport, located in the centre of the city, was for several months in 1986 the scene of a major cocaine smuggling operation that apparently was carried out with the full knowledge of police commando unit on permanent guard at the airport. As noted previously the Colombian mafia’s network of informants enables its Chief Executives to escape police dragnets and live a fairly comfortable existence in major cities such as Medellin and Cali. On the rare occasion when traffickers are arrested, they usually can bribe their way out of jail or right at the spot. Law enforcement in Latin American countries can hence be considered to work simply as a way to share in the proceeds of the drug trade. The police takes bribes for not making arrests and seizures. When the police do make successful crackdowns, the confiscated drugs are often resold on the illicit market.

Corruption has devastating effects on drug law enforcement in Latin America. Unfortunately, the disease has no cure. In the Andean countries, the cocaine industry represents one of the few important sources of wealth. At the same instance, poverty in these countries is rampant, economic opportunities are circumscribed and salaries of public servants often barely exceed the subsistence level. Under such conditions cocaine dealers find it easy to co-opt parts of the state apparatus. A survey of the Medellin Metropolitan Police Department says:

“Only corruption can explain how a second lieutenant earning 35,000 pesos a month can make a million-peso deposit in his account and live in 18-million peso apartment”.

Hence, for a vast group of underpaid policemen, judges and government officials in Colombia and elsewhere in the Andean world, the price of honesty may seem excessively high.

Public Opinion

The success of any drug control programme in any society, requires among other things, a high degree of political consensus. The top leadership in drug producing nations lacks this will. However, the same is not reflected at the grass root levels. There is not yet an awakened public consensus against drugs in the Andean countries. According to various US surveys drug trafficking ranks near the bottom of public concerns in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The drug trade is outranked by problems such as unemployment; poverty; terrorism; and the lack of housing; education and health care. In short Andean publics do not view the drug problem as a survival issue.

Moreover, the cocaine industry is not usually a prime target of politicians seeking election to public office. The candidates, it seems evidently, do not presume the subject to be of concern to the voters or may be they think that raising the drug may make them lose their votes instead of gaining. In addition, the prevailing attitude towards drug control is characterized by ambivalence, pessimism and hostility. There is a widely held perception in Latin American countries that the drug traffic is good for the economy even if it is harmful in other respects. Top leaders and officials appear to share this perception. For example, Bolivia’s president Victor Paz Estenssoro remarked in 1986, ‘cocaine has gained an importance in our economy in direct response to the shrinking of the formal economy’.

Estenssoro and other leaders would be well aware of the destabilizing effects of drug trafficking on government institutions, on public morals, and on their countries international relations. Yet they seem as afraid of the narcotics control as they are of the narcotics industry and the mafia itself. The debt crisis, economic stagnation and rampant unemployment that haunt most countries in the region reinforce this vision. Indeed, if the cocaine industry disappears from the scene tomorrow the results will be catastrophic, the evaporation of hard currency reserves massive unemployment, an increase in crime and subversion in rural areas and a flood of new migrants to cities; are few to be mentioned. Such a situation could only play into the hands of extremist groups and may cause the seizure of power by the military.

Other than these obstacles in the way to effective narcotics control in Latin America, a major one still needs to be discussed. The Latin Americans resent US interference in their affairs. As discussed previously. Narcotics lobbies consistently equate drug control with a loss of national sovereignty. The populace and intellectuals of drug producing nations often question both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of Washington’s supply-side approaches to drug control.

In sum, anti-drug policies in the drug producing countries do not enjoy wide popular or official support. Latin American public see drug control programmes as a low national priority. Governments likewise are inclined to feel that the war against drugs interferes with more pressing priorities, for example, coping with unemployment and poverty, and servicing foreign debt. Moreover, Latin Americans from top government officials to down think that successful crackdown on drugs will hurt the economy.

Finally, there is a tendency to view drugs as essentially a consumer side problem and the solution presented by most Latin Americans is that consumer countries should reduce their intake of cocaine and other harmful drugs.

The Role of Latin American Governments

Most Latin American governments find themselves in an awkward situation in the war against narcotics. At one place cocaine trade is an important source for injecting needed dollars into Andean economies; and gives employment to a vast section of their populace. Therefore, any anti-narcotics activity calls for a massive opposition from those who make their living from the industry. Moreover, waging and investing in the wars against narcotics comes into direct conflict with other priorities e.g. coping with inflation and unemployment, promoting economic growth and combating crime and subversion.

At the same point, Latin American governments are under some domestic and international pressure to control drug trafficking. The public consensus on drugs, as discussed earlier, is not very highly developed, but there is some concern, especially over increased consumption of coca products among young people. Moreover, these governments face the threat of reprisals by the US for not taking strong action.

These paradoxical tendencies condition the ways that governments approach narcotics control. There have been several distinct approaches. First, governments set up elaborate bureaucratic structures for fighting the drugs trafficking. Second, they sought to maximize the inflow of international narcotics related assistance. Third, they have tried to refocus drug control strategy, stressing interdiction over eradication. However, continuing controversy over narcotics policy within the bureaucracy and within the society at large has immobilized governments in important ways. They cannot implement enforcement measures that could materially advance the cause of drug control. Significant measures apparently on hold include the use of herbicides to eradicate coca and the extradition of leading cocaine traffickers to the United States.

US Pressures for Coca Eradication

The United States exerts the strongest pressures on Latin American governments over coca eradication. US legislation makes aid to Peru and Bolivia contingent on those countries’ progress towards eradication, as a relatively cheaper solution to her own drug problem, the officials believe it is easier to locate and destroy crops than to locate and destroy laboratories. However, eradicating coca in the field will pose a great problem for Latin American governments, in the shape of protests by coca growers, the number of these farmers goes into tens of thousands. Other than this it is believed by the governments of most coca growing countries that if the crop is totally eradicated the anti-government guerrilla groups will become more powerful and effective. This will be so because the unemployed of the drug industry will share their anti-government feelings with the guerrillas. This situation on the whole will result in serious political and social consequences. Due to these reasons most drug producing countries have kept the eradication of coca programmes at a standstill. At this point the last hope for winning the war against cocaine in Latin America is the large-scale application of herbicides against coca plants. However, even this faces a major challenge by the governments and in fact even more by the environmentalists. Application of large scale herbicides will damage the jungle and might also pose serious consequences for human beings and the wildlife. Moreover, companies that manufacture herbicides are also very cautious on the issue these companies are almost certainly afraid of lawsuits stemming from improper use of their chemicals. One especially interesting case in this regard was in Peru where Eli Lilly a manufacturing company, refused to supply tebuthiuron (trade name spike), for coca eradication programmes. A company representative gave the press statement that improper use of the chemical can cause irreversible damage to flora and fauna and even affect human beings if it is not applied with extreme caution. The Peruvian press reprinted certain sections of the brochure which was distributed with the chemical. It stated that the compound could destroy the roots of trees, shrubs and other vegetables and cause vomiting and pulmonary and heart damages in humans. This incident gave rise to a debate inside US where the state’s stand was that spike was less toxic than aspirin, micotive and nitrate fertilizers. Whereas, the environmentalists equalled the compounds spray with unleashing of an atomic bomb in the region. They further argued that drug producing nations are basically agrarian societies which depend on earth for subsistence and if the agricultural base is destroyed, one should not hope to have a promotion in economic development through harvests of legal products. Another problem in this context was raised by the Peruvian agriculturists and environmentalists; that the heavy rainfall in Upper Huallaga would wash the chemicals from the leaves even before it would have killed the plant. Moreover, the chemical would, along the rainwater mix into streams and canals, hence causing serious damage to the licit  crops and other plant life.

Keeping these considerations in mind the anti-spraying lobby seems at this point to have the upper hand. Other spraying, manual eradication of coca crops is almost impossible because of the geographical remoteness of coca-growing areas and as noted earlier because of the presence of anti-government guerrillas in these regions. The US officials and experts, themselves are not very hopeful but the success of their efforts for eradication. As one US official reportedly said that “the programme was troubled from the very beginning. It was all highly improvised, we had minimal resources and no scientific support”. The US chemical manufacturers are also not willing to extend their support and demand indemnification against lawsuits if the State Department decides to use their product for coca radication programmes.

Extradition Treaty

The US-drug producing nations treaty on extradition is far an important tool of drug enforcement. According to the US State Department the purpose of this treaty is to show that there is no safe haven for traffickers in their native countries, who violate US drug laws. The treaty has essentially been an important tool of drug control between US and Colombia. After the assassination of Laa Bovilla, the Justice Minister, in April 1984, the Colombian government cooperated upto a point in implementing the treaty. By June 1987 when the same ceased to be operative, the US had submitted some 140 requests for drug trafficking and related offences; 24 of these requests were approved and 16 persons have actually been extradited.

The rationale and the need for the extradition treaty stemmed from the pourous system of criminal justice in the drug producing nations. These systems convict only a small percentage of those tried for narcotics related offences and usually those who are convicted are small fry. The drug mafia’s use of bribes, threats and violence, as discussed previously, neutralizes many judges. Judges are often poorly trained or incompetent, and the judicial system is overloaded. Due to these reasons most experts strongly favour extradition as a counterweight to the weak judicial system of drug producing nations.

Yet many people see extradition as an example of colonial justice and a renunciation of sovereignty. Opposition to the treaty in fact has been widespread and at times even violent. The narcotics lobby has mounted an intense propaganda campaign against extradition and may well have resorted to stronger measures. However, the greatest hurdle in the way of extradition stays to be the nationalist sentiment in the populace. Moreover, the same sentiment exists in the law making personnel of these countries. For example, in Colombia sharing of this sentiment in the people and the Congress ran overwhelmingly against the treaty. And in June 1987 the extradition treaty finally collapsed in Colombia by the order of the Supreme Court. No doubt death threats from drug trafficker’s influenced the court’s decision, but public opinion was also in this favour.

The Military’s Role in Drug Control

The Latin American militaries do not exactly have a major anti-narcotics mission. However, they occasionally provide logistical support, such as helicopters and pilots, for anti-narcotics operations controlled and executed by anti-drug units of national police. Historically, the military has not ventured for a major role in the war against drugs, instead it has always viewed the same as a threat to its corporate interests.

Furthermore, there have in fact been episodes of collaboration between the military and the narco traffickers throughout the Andean world. The linkages may derive from corruption, from strategic considerations or even from shared political and ideological values. Also the inherent nationalism of the Armed Forces has been a barrier to increased international cooperation against narcotics.

Finally there is a rivalry and a historical animosity between the military and the national police in the Adean countries. Military establishments seek effective control over the legitimate use of force in their societies, for this reason, they have resisted efforts by the national police to develop an independent drug-fighting capability.

Latin American military establishments generally see themselves as guardians of the nation. Also, they seek to monopolize the legitimate use of force within their territories. Both attitudes have posed a problem for narcotics control efforts in Latin America. For example, the Peruvian military, has been openly hostile to transitional collaboration against drug trafficking. This has been partly so because Peru traditionally has had bad relations with its neighbours and in part because the military’s rival, the national police, has played a leading role in such collaboration. Almost in all drug producing Latin American countries, the military has been suspicious of US narcotics assistance programmes to the extent that they add to the overall capabilities of the police. Efforts by the US to increase significantly its aid to the anti-drug police could run afoul of the military and conceivably even evoke to destabilize civilian governments. In these countries, the military’s instinct has always been to keep the police in check, and it has acted accordingly.

The above facts relay clearly that drugs have emerged as a significant problem in civil-military relations in Latin American nations. The military sees anti-drug strategies as a tool of civilian politics. On the other hand the chance cannot be ruled out that civilian leaders in these countries, may be tempted to build up the power of the police as a counterweight to the Armed Forces and may see drug fighting as a convenient excuse for doing so.

Hence, in the current circumstances an effective anti-narcotics strike force without antagonizing the military is not possible, or for that matter one can say that if it is possible even then the chances are not particularly good. The problem can perhaps be diluted by providing both the military and the police with hi-tech weapons in amounts that does not disturb the existing force ratios. However, for such a solution to work, the military will have to sacrifice its sheer monopoly over the significant tools of legitimate violence. Another option in this context can be the creation of an effective anti-narcotics unit inside the Armed Forces, however, regarding military’s present stance, of counting narcotics fighting out of its main objectives, such an idea might not be favoured by the military. In sum, therefore, the dilemma is not an easy one to be resolved.

Spending on Drug Control

Latin American governments see the war on drugs as a drain on scarce resources and as under funded by the international community. They refer to the awesome economic and military power of the cocaine barons and the relatively low levels of international support as reasons for their failure to control the drug traffic. In addition, governments in varying measures perceive narcotics control as imposing economic and social side effects, principally in the form of lost income and jobs. The rich drug consuming countries, in their view, should compensate for their losses with major new infusions of money and development assistance. However, these arguments by the Latin American governments can be called an excuse of not having the true will to fight drugs. But to an extent their argument is valid as well because the fight between the governments and their opponents is grossly unequal. The traffickers are by far more equipped in every sense than the governments. But leaving aside these discussions of anti and pro drug lobbies, one can clearly interpret the only message being relayed by the Andean governments i.e. that International Drug Trafficking Organizations are extremely powerful, and that the producer countries do not possess the means to fight them and nothing short of a massive infusion of international aid can alter the situation. Finally, a constant feature of Latin American and Int’l anti-narcotics agencies negotiations, has been the demand for compensating the socio-economic losses that these governments bear as a result of successful crackdown on drugs industry. What is important here is that the argument is not limited to compensate for eradicated coca cultivation but that they want a compensation in the form of foreign exchange which earlier used to come from cocaine earnings.

Given the cocaine industry’s strong economic and political foothold in drug producing nations, such desires for compensation are understandable, but at the same time they are highly unrealistic. The international anti-narcotics agencies do not think any point of compensating an activity which should not have been there in the first place and is highly inhuman, immoral and illegal. This stance by the agencies may make Latin Americans, losers in the compensation game. But in the absence of safety-net programmes for coca farmers and others whose survival is tied to the cocaine industry, countries which produce drugs will continue to have little interest in the success of drug control programmes. After all why should they themselves welcome a political economic and social chaos in their respective countries.

Chapter 3

Pakistan Heroin Trade: The Dynamics of Growth

Geography of Cultivation

Heroin is derived from the opium gum, harvested from the poppy plant. The cultivation of poppy in the Indian sub-continent is centuries old. It is believed that the plant was brought by armies of Alexander the great into the region. But even otherwise narcotics are rooted deep in the history of the sub-continent and especially the Indus valley region. The ancient Hindu scriptures — the Vedas, also describe the ritual use of ‘soma’, a narcotic drink.

Today, opium poppies are grown and harvested in Burma, Thailand and Laos, the three are also called the Southeast Asian Golden Triangle. And in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan also known as the Southwest Asian Golden Crescent. Other than these Asian countries the plant is also found in Mexico. 

In Pakistan, the poppy plant is found in abundance in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Potohar region of the Punjab province. However, the concentration of poppy growth is in the Tribal areas of NWFP where the government has the least interference because of the areas’ being recognized as a political non-man’s land. These are remote mountain areas and ideal for Opium poppy cultivation.

From Opium to Heroin                

Opium (papaner somiferum) grows in a variety of climates, preferring cool temperatures and strong sunlight during its growing season. The plant grows about one metre high and after three months of plantation it produces a bright red flower. The petals drop to the ground exposing a green seed pod about the size and shape of an egg. The bulb produces a milky white gum. Farmers collect the opium latex by making a series of shallow, parallel incisions across the bulbs’ surface with a special curved knife. As the white sap seeps out of the incisions and congeals on the bulb’s surface, it changes to a brownish black. The farmer collects the opium by scraping it off the bulb with a flat, blunt knife, sometimes returning for a second or third tapping.

In further refining steps, the opium collected by the farmers is turned into a more potent extract. This requires a strict and accurate level of standardization and quality   control. The chemist starts with heating the water and adds raw opium to it until it dissolves. Then the organic waste is precipitated out of the solution by adding ordinary time to it. The residue is, morphine, suspended in the chalky white water. Once this is achieved, there is a second round of heating, this time concentrated ammonia is added to the residue solution, causing the morphine to solidify and drop to the bottom. The liquid is then filtered through flannel leaving chunky white kernals of morphine on the cloth. Once dried and packed for shipment, the morphine usually weighs about the tenth of the weight of the raw opium from which it was extracted.

After the achievement of morphine, there follows a five step process in which morphine molecules are chemically bound with acetic acid and refined into heroin. This is a more sophisticated operation requiring heating, filtering and crystallization. The compound at the end of the process is a fluffy white powder, 80-90% pure known as No. 4 heroin.

Heroin is most typically consumed by whaling or smoking. The most common way is that of “chasing the dragon i.e. heating the heroin over a piece of tin foil from a cigarette package and aspirating the fumes. Other methods are taking the drug intravenously, through injections; this is highly dangerous because intravenous forms of use are associated with AIDS and Hepatitis. Heroin is a particularly dangerous drug because of the ease with which a user can over dose. A lethal dose of heroin is only 10 to 15 times a normal one.

En route to the market

As discussed earlier Pakistan is a major producer of opium as well as a processor of opium into heroin. Moreover, much of the opium grown in the neighbouring country, Afghanistan, is also processed into heroin, in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Other than this drug growing and producing capability, Pakistan also serves as an important transit country for drug shipments; destined for international drug markets.

The long coastal belt and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan, make Pakistan’s geographical position an ideal one for drug trafficking to the great consumer markets of the west. Annually, almost 200 tons of heroin is smuggled through various sea and land routes to different destinations all over the world.

Oldest and the most frequent of the routes used by traffickers for shipping narcotics, has been through the port of Karachi and the surrounding coastal area. These are ideal places for shipping big consignments to Africa, Europe and the United States. Vessels carrying drug loads, normally leave Karachi port for Yemen and Southern Europe, through the Red Sea, or they follow the African route which goes via Somalia and Ethiopia to Kenya and onwards.

In recent years the Makran coast has also become popular for the purpose. Drug consignments are loaded on small launches and are carried from coastal areas to the high seas, where they are transferred to ships. In fact the long and virtually unguarded coast line is regarded as the safest route to be adopted, by the traffickers.

For the consignments destined towards Central Europe, the Balkan land route, is considered to be the most feasible. This route goes from Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, leading to former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. From Turkey routes lead to Western Europe as well. Moreover, the disintegration of Soviet Union and the emergence of new Central Asian States bordering Afghanistan, and Iran, have opened up new and safer land routes for traffickers to ship heroin to Europe. For example, drugs can now be carried through Afghanistan, passing Ukraine and Russia to move onwards.

However, the long and rugged routes of Balochistan, are the most favoured by the traffickers, for moving drug consignments to the launching points of their international destinations. This is so because first of all it is almost impossible for the law enforcement agencies to intercept the traffickers’ convoys, due to the difficult terrain of the region and the highly concealed mountainous routes. Second, that the law enforcement agencies have very limited means to fight their opponents, who have now built up their private armies, comprising mainly of the Afghan war veterans and refugees. Also through their phenomenal drug earnings the drug barons have equipped these small armies in the best possible manner and they have a communication network and fire power which can be well compared to any modern sophisticated fighting squad. In fact, Balochistan has almost become a place where narcotics dealers no more need to work in a clandestine way.

This emergence of Balochistan and the Makran coast as a safe haven for drug smugglers attributes to the Afghan war and the situation in Iran in the early 80’s. The two made the region economically vulnerable to smuggling. According to a CIA report at the height of Iran-Iraq war, when Iran faced an acute wheat shortage, Khomeini government tacitly arranged for the smuggling of wheat from Pakistan. It is suspected with substantial evidence that under cover of wheat huge consignments of drugs found their way to Iran and from there to other parts of the world. Drug trafficking routes in Balochistan lead to the coasts of Jiwani, Pasni, Gwadar and Ormara, which then work as outlets to the international waters, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Other than these land and sea routes, used for the drug trade, the traffickers have invented novel means of smuggling drugs into the consumer markets of the United States and Western Europe. These include, trafficking by relying on the international postal system. In July 1983 e.g, US customs officials at JFK Airport seized one kilogram of heroin concealed in rolled newspapers destined for Pakistan nationals residing in New York. Similarly, two other packages each containing half kilograms of heroin were destined for Berkley, California. Rolled newspapers and magazines can conceal upto one kilogram of heroin and are generally sealed in plastic. Drugs are also sent through the mail concealed in shipments of textiles, clothing and other durable goods.

The Drug Economy

Pakistan today is one of the largest heroin exporter of the world, with an annual export of upto 200 tons. The trade generates billions of dollars for the drug barons, who administer and run hundreds of illegal heroin factories in the country. These drug lords, with the help of narco-money have developed strong connections in the administration, law enforcing agencies, military and the political elite of the country. Drug money today has seeped into every sphere of life in Pakistan. Many of the barons have turned towards politics or are major financers of the political campaigns. Massive returns have lured a large number of businessmen, traders, professionals and even house wives into the lucrative drug trade. Pakistani airlines and sea vessels are becoming known as drug carriers. Expansion of the drug trade at such a wide scale has had profound effects on the country’s economy.

First of all, the drug trade has brought unprecedented prosperity to the opium poppy growers. As discussed earlier, the plant is the only cash crop of the regions where it is grown. Plus the trafficking organizations provide the growers with as much facilities as possible. This keeps the incentive of growing poppy; fresh in the farms, and the heroin industry supplied with raw material. Moreover, agents of the drug mafia offer locals who own herds of camels, boats and pick-ups, huge amount for their services. For example, the camel herders are asked to deliver consignments to the coast, where launches and boats wait to be loaded. These people are paid 10,000 to 20,000 rupees per trip and assured full support in case they are arrested. Amount paid by the drug mafia to these locals for their services equals their earnings in months otherwise.

Hence, at a very low level the drug industry works as an efficient and concerned employer, bringing prosperity and job security to its employees. However, as witnessed in the Latin American case the amounts spent on those hanging to the lower rungs of mafia are the smallest part of the total earnings of those in the upper echelons. Moreover, any short-term benefits of the drug trade are totally meaningless, when compared to its long-term negative effects.

The narco-money earned by the barons, forms a major part of Pakistan’s economy, particularly in the informal sectors. Many of the country’s industrialists and businessmen are suspected to have made their fortunes, through narcotics trade. Within last ten years, a new trade of industrialists, contractors and businessmen, who were totally obscure ten years ago, have come to dominate the investment scene. Although, the source of these new entrepreneurs’ wealth may not always be substantiated, but it is common knowledge that narcotics has had a major role in their sudden rise to the top from almost nowhere. Most of those who have benefited from the drug trade, have gone into diverse fields of business, where they have established themselves as respectable citizens.

Pakistan is believed to earn around $8 to $10 billion from the overall global drug trade. This makes narcotics revenue far higher than the country’s annual budget and almost one fourth of the annual GDP of $40 billion. However, as noted earlier, only a fraction of drug money comes back to the country. According to one estimate only five percent of the revenue is channelized through different means into the economy. The narcotics revenue is largely invested in sectors such as real estate, construction and to some extent transport. Real estate is the most risk-free and lucrative investment as the money invested cannot be traced easily. Moreover, the booms in real estate prices in metropolitan centres of the country well justified the enormous bank accounts and high living standards of those involved in the drug trade. Many Economists believe that the construction industry has also absorbed a substantial amount of this money. Other major investments have been in the private transport sector.

In the last decade, it seems that drug money has created its own protected sectors. The narcotics underworld provides not only funds but also protection to the people involved in the business. However, the greater part of the drug money goes into extravagant lifestyles of the drug dealers, which in turn makes room for inflation. Even though the narcotics revenue coming back to Pakistan is very small as compared to the actual size of the drug trade of the country, but still it has shown serious negative effects on the national economy. To list few of these, the foreign earnings from narco-trafficking usually translate into an overvaluing of Rupee of 25-30%. This makes it very hard for legitimate exporters to recover their costs.

This increasing foothold of the mafia in country’s politics, and the creation of a shadow economy by huge sums of narcomoney, flowing into the country has made both the political and the economic scenario of Pakistan an unstable one. Such a situation works as a deterrent for foreign investors, who are or otherwise would have been interested in making investments in the country.

The very fact that drug traffickers do not pay taxes for their huge earnings, practically strips the government from any revenues to be earned from the profitable drug trade. Instead, the same brings an ill-reputation and the role of the Government of Pakistan under severe criticism of international agencies and great powers, who are also the largest consumer markets for drugs and are worst affected by the drug trade.

As discussed earlier, some drug money does contribute to economic growth and bring prosperity to limited pockets of the society. But this happens in a very unbalanced fashion, making the relation between drug money and economic growth a highly unclear one. In other words, the expenditure of drug money in the overall economic activity of Pakistan is in sectors other than those counted as core economic activities. For example, as stated earlier, drug traffickers invest normally in real estate, construction and transport sectors, such expenditures short change core economic activities like mining and manufacturing etc. However, whatever expenditure of drug money is made, creates numerous economic linkages of multiplier effects, that stimulate the economy to an extent. But this cannot exactly be counted as a positive impact of the drug trade on national economy, because it strengthens the roots and support for the drug mafia, which has already become very powerful in the country. Hence, making it almost impossible for law enforcement agencies to do their job. Moreover, as seen in the Latin American case. If the heroin industry gets as powerful, the shutting down or successful crackdowns would create an economic and political chaos.

Here the question can be raised, that if the heroin industry is contributing positively, to the otherwise weak economy of Pakistan, why in the first place should it be shut down? The question is in fact often asked by the not fully awarded public and is often believed by certain political leaders of the country. Statistics show that eversince Pakistanis have effectively become involved in the international drug trade the domestic consumer market for heroin and other opiates has expanded as well e.g. since 1981 when the first ever case of heroin addiction was reported in Pakistan till today, the figures for people addicted to one or other forms of narcotics has reached a staggering 2.1 million. According to a PNCB survey almost one out of every 19 males in Pakistan uses drugs. These conditions raise serious concerns regarding the societal fabric of the country. Moreover, with an increase in the spread of drugs in society, the drug related crimes are on an increase as well. Even though these fall in the category of petty crimes such as theft, shop lifting etc. but they reflect on the building law abusing behaviour of the populace.

Hence, if the drug industry is allowed to flourish it will emerge as a serious threat to existing values, family fabrics, law enforcement and Pakistan’s relations with the developed world as well, due to international nature of the drug trade. Such a state of affairs would in turn pose a serious threat to the country’s national security. In simple words, therefore, one can say that any short-term advantages of the drug trade are washed away with serious long-term implications.

Moreover, facts show that, drug trafficking has negatively affected different development programmes being run in Pakistan. This has mainly  been so because the drug industry has stacked cards against the enterprises set up as an alternative to itself. For example, in the Gadoon Amazai, production factors have been distorted. Labour wages for those involved in poppy growing are four to five times more than what has been offered as an alternative, hence, the whole project, has become uncompetitive. Moreover, the drug industry has strengthened the merchants who are the intermediate links in the market now are opposing and creating hurdles in the way of more equitable development in the rural areas, where poppy is grown.

Money Laundering

The money earned from narcotics trade is laundered by passing through a number of intermediate agencies, including trading houses and International Banks. The whole process is spread over several countries. Once through a complete process the narco-money becomes almost untraceable.

A routine money laundering process follows a typical pattern, spread over at least four trading houses and banks. First of all, as soon as the narcotics leave the Pakistani border, messages are conveyed to the concerned people at the destination of the consignment, who when actually get in possession of the drug load, make payments, which normally go into millions of dollars. These people, at the receiving end make transfers of the required sum from a parent account to the bank accounts in different countries. These huge sums are then invested and reinvested repeatedly in commodities or stocks and shares. Shiploads of commodities such as wheat and bullion are bought and sold on the high seas and in various countries. Investments and reinvestments are also made in the chip stocks, shares and other safe securities.

After passing through numerous cycles of investments, money finds its way back to where it was actually originated. This time it is in the form of various company accounts. These companies then transfer the money to the parent account.

The next step in the process is to actually transport the money, or a part of it, to Pakistan. Normally it is in shape of gold, dollars, and coins on other costly commodities, those destinations are specific areas along Pakistan’s western coast. Apart from these, money from the receiving end reaches Pakistan, through the personal remittances and personal allowances of over- seas Pakistanis. The papers of Pakistanis, particularly blue collar labourers, in foreign countries are especially useful for this. In return for his operation, each remitter gets a small percentage for the service.

Finally, once the money reaches the home country i.e. Pakistan, it becomes visible in the form of various ventures e.g. jewellery shops, car showrooms and real estate agencies etc.

Heroin traffickers and the political system

Other than the serious implications for national economy, as discussed in the preceding pages of this chapter, what asks for a more alarming attention regarding the illicit heroin trade is the creeping of this problem into Pakistan’s political scenario.

In the last decade, those involved in heroin trafficking have reaped enormous profits. Looking at the illicit nature of this business it comes as obvious to anyone, that the traffickers would do anything to buy security for themselves and stay away from arrest and prosecution by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, most drug barons spend large sums of their drug money on corrupting the vital state departments like police, judiciary, the political parties, media and even the military. Drug barons have allegedly been reported to have strong connections with influentials of all these state departments. Pakistani experts on narcotics believe that narcotics money now fuels the political system, supporting party organizations and mandatory campaigns. Narcomoney buys protection for the drug mafia at the highest political levels in the country. Moreover, in 1991 changes in the Government of Pakistan’s (GOP) foreign exchange regime, have made it possible for the drug barons to transfer narcodollars, otherwise deposited in foreign banks and financial institutions, to Pakistan and launder these as well as legitimize themselves by buying into banks and industrial conglomerates.

The contacts of drug barons have been known right from the time when the drug trade became of any significance in context of Pakistan i.e. the early years of Dictator General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. At the time Pakistan had a front-line state status with the US as well, due to the Soviet-Afghan war. The United States giving its communism containment policy a preference over the narcotics control issue was giving massive aid and military supplies to Pakistan, in order to help Afghan resistance forces. It is suspected that the military ruler of Pakistan was deliberately overlooking the growing drug trade or might himself have been involved in the business. So much so that by the middle of 1983, Zia’s 4th year in power, US narcotics control officials reported that between 85 and 90 percent of the Heroin reaching the East Coast of the United States and the countries of Western Europe was coming from Pakistan. It becomes very interesting here to note that while Zia’s military government hanged thousands of people, as Amnesty International puts it, without even prosecution through trials, the heroin mafia could manage to stay untouched and protected. Moreover, top officials in the Zia regime and people otherwise close enough to the military ruler have been known to have strong links with traffickers as well as being involved in the narcotics trafficking themselves. The point that Pakistan achieved the status of largest exporter of heroin during his regime and that no worthwhile actions against heroin traffickers, during the same, reflect on the nature of mafia intervention into the political system of Pakistan.

The first serious efforts to control the heroin trafficking in Pakistan were made by Mohammad Khan Junejo’s elected government, in 1985. However, Junejo’s government did not enjoy absolute powers and in fact was only a civilian buffer created by General Zia-ul-Haq to give a cover of legitimacy to his military rule. Hence, no significant achievement could be had during the so-called elected representative government, and the drug problem continued to escalate to unprecedented heights.

Evidence suggests that most members of the Pakistan mafia are either politicians themselves or are associated closely to the national leaders and influential politicians. In the wake of such circumstances, local and international drug enforcement agencies seem to be fighting a losing war, they have failed to collect or use evidence to convict the top barons. Whereas on the other hand the political power of the barons is increasing unimaginably.

The power and money of the drug barons has infiltrated into almost every sphere of political activity in Pakistan. As noted, the barons invest heavily in political campaigns or themselves stand for the political office. They corrupt the law enforcement agencies and have also developed small, sophisticated and dangerously armed armies of their own. Such a situation has made them quite out of reach of the anti-narcotics forces. Moreover, the creeping of these people into the parliament of the country, resulted in acute lack of will by the government to launch effective operations against narcotics trafficking.

If the situation prevails and the whole matter is continually neglected, it would not be wrong to suspect that democracy and the democratic institutions, which are already in a very fragile and nascent state, may collapse totally or otherwise come under direct control of the drug mafia.

The infusion of narcotics and especially heroin, might not have essentially changed the way in which the Pakistan underworld worked. The organized criminals and law offenders have always kept familial or symbiotic connections with the political elites. The under world works through a long-established patron-client system that trades protections for contributions. The introduction of narcotics, however, has changed the magnitude of the underworld operations, increasing the criminals resources to unprecedented heights and enabling them to, corrupt vast sections of law enforcing agencies, and political elites. Also they can now invest heavily in the world of finance and trade. In other words Heroin trafficking has made the whole under world a far more lucrative business to join, than it could ever be. The resources provided by drug trafficking, have made the criminals far more superior to their anti-counterparts, hence making them more secure, and also reflecting on the point that even if serious efforts to check the trade are made it would not at all be an easy task. This argument can be substantiated with the fact that even though the last three governments of Pakistan have kept narcotics on top of their priority lists but the drug trade and the number of domestic addicts are on an increase. Moreover, Pakistan is now globally considered a drugs producing and exporting country and is seen with disrespect as well as considered a violator of human rights. The international community is constantly increasing the pressures on the Government of Pakistan to check and eliminate its drug trade. If the government has to regain its lost integrity it should not just stay theoretically dedicated to the task of narcotics elimination but show a political will to fight drug trafficking.

Chapter 4

Pakistan Heroin Trade: The Dynamics of Control

The previous chapter discusses the enormous growth of narcotics trafficking in Pakistan. The drug mafia has penetrated deep into the country’s political and economic system, and with its enormous resources has corrupted the vital state departments to buy security and protection for itself. The drug barons have created heavily armed fighting units for shipping their consignments safely to their destinations. Over  the last decade the domestic consumption of narcotics, especially heroin, has increased many times. Moreover, the drug related crime and the size of the underworld operations have increased to the limits, unknown at any time in Pakistan’s history.

This chapter focuses at the problems and achievements in effective drug control taking into account and analyzing roles of the government, media, public opinion, non-governmental organizations and different law enforcement agencies.

Problems in effective Drug Control

A thorough study of the rise of narcotics industry of Pakistan, reveals its deep connection with the Soviet-Afghan war and the Iranian revolution. As noted earlier Pakistan came on the international drug scene in early 1980s. At the same time the war in Afghanistan was on and Pakistan was supporting the Afghan resistance groups, fighting against the Soviets, with the help of United States. It is believed that the resistance groups and also the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, used drug money to finance the war, besides the American support. Moreover, organized cultivation of poppy, processing of it into heroin and trafficking, coincide with the years, when Afghan Mujahideen were allowed to cross the border into Pakistan as refugees. The Newsline magazine reports that

“... the CIA and the ISI patronized the tribes living in the Pushto speaking Balochistan belt bordering Afghanistan to keep the Mujahideen’s supply line secure ... tribals and Afghan commanders in the border belt are becoming increasingly independent and resorting to ... providing protection for drug traffickers.”

Moreover, evidence suggests that heroin manufacturers of NWFP and FATA, with the help of their counterparts in the Pushto belt of Balochistan shifted their industry to north-east Balochistan en route to the international market through Makran.

The alleged association of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq with drug dealers further supports this argument, as the General was deeply concerned with the Afghan war and in fact termed it as ‘Jihad.’ After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, there prevails a state of acute lawlessness in the country. With connections and routes already established during the war years, most or all of the Afghan poppy crop comes to Pakistan for processing into heroin and other opium derivatives. Furthermore, the disintegration of Soviet Unions into Central Independent states has facilitated and opened up new, safer land routes for drug trafficking. The Afghan war veterans have joined private armies of narcotics dealers in Pakistan, making them stronger in terms of fighting the law enforcing agencies.

Revolution in Iran is the second most important event, which has a lot to do with Pakistan’s rise to the status of largest heroin exporter in the world. Before the revolution Iran had an addict population of over one million, however, once the Islamic government took charge, it implemented serious actions against those related to the drug abuse and trafficking, and almost virtually shut down the market for narcotics in the country. This directed the flow of narcotics, which were previously being shipped to Iran, towards Pakistan and resulted in a rapid growth of drug addiction in the country, and institutional development of the Pakistani drug mafia.

With political instability in Afghanistan and difficult entry of narcotics into Iran, the focus of the narcotics trafficking organizations is on Pakistan. This has resulted in an enormous build up of strength, power and organization of the mafia and it can now compete and be successful in fighting all the control measures adopted by anti-narcotics forces. With mafia chiefs deeply connected to the country’s political elite, it has also become very difficult for the government to develop a sincere will for fighting the drug abuse.

Moreover, the investment of huge amounts of narcotics money into different sectors of the national economy has resulted in a chain of multiplier effects. If a successful crackdown on narcotics industry is made, the economy will get devoid of a large share of investment and Pakistan may come under severe economic chaos. Therefore, any plans for the eradication of narcotics industry should provide, if not equal then strong substitutes for dependants of the drug industry at any stage of the process. In this context a number of local and international agencies are working on development projects in the narcotics growing and producing areas. However, the success of these, is not very visible when compared to the parallel growth of narcotics trafficking. It has been reported that execution of development projects by the foreign aid agencies is half-hearted and perfunctory, and has been extremely slow, when compared to the working of the same in other narcotics-producing countries of the world e.g. Thailand. But this is just one side of the story, the foreign agencies argument in this respect is that the development works are slow because of institutional hazards in Pakistan. The foreign aid officials have reportedly complained that the reason why their projects are taking so long is because they are in the hands of the provincial governments. As noted earlier the provincial governments of the poppy growing provinces are heavily penetrated by the drug barons, therefore, there stands a very valid chance that most narcotics control projects stay ineffective or are hurdled by the local governments.

Pakistan is one of the three poppy growing countries in the region known as the Southwest Asian Golden Crescent. The region has an abundant plantation of the opium poppy and processing of it into heroin. The Government of Pakistan and the international drug enforcing agencies especially the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) are trying to control this in Pakistan. However, most poppy growing areas in the country come under the tribal belt where the government has not got a full control and most of these are considered autonomous. Therefore, even if the anti-narcotics strategies become effective and poppy cultivation in Pakistan controlled, the trafficking and production of narcotics will not be hampered. Because the supply line for the narcotics industry will shift across the border in Afghanistan. As discussed earlier in this chapter the political instability in Afghanistan makes it impossible for Washington to pressurize Kabul on the issue and local and international drug enforcing agencies to gain any positive results regarding the control of poppy cultivation. In fact, instead of having any success in controlling the drug menace, it has been reported that most of the international aid to Afghanistan for developing the agricultural infrastructure for the purpose of providing substitute crops for poppy, had been used to improve the yield of the latter! 

From these facts one can see that there is a “balloon effect” working in the Golden Crescent. that, even if the production of poppy is controlled in one country, the raw material for heroin industry will come from the second in the region, and the drug trafficking will continue as ever. This situation suggests that if narcotics are to be checked in Pakistan they should be checked in the whole Golden Crescent. This, however, is not possible at the moment because of Pakistan government’s incomplete access to home poppy growing areas, the deep links of these areas with Afghanistan, the political instability in Afghanistan and Washington’s  inacess to both Kabul and Tehran. The same facts suggest that a successful crackdown on drugs industry requires demand side solutions as well. Narcotics are popular, even with all the risks and anti-public opinion involved, only because of the reason that they are a readily accepted and well paid commodity in the world market. To check the narcotics trafficking, US and other developed countries of the world need to break the demand for narcotics in their countries.

Other than these systemic and large scale factors there are societal causes as well, which are producing hurdles in the way of effective drug enforcement. For example, there can be seen an overall collapse of ethnic standards throughout the Pakistani society and institutions. According to the September 1992 CIA report, Pakistan is at a stage of development wherein corruption is simply the norm. The influentials in any field of life, in the country, use the law in their favour and are in most cases out of its reach. The law stands effective only in the case of poor. Minor things like telephone connections cannot be had without bribing the concerned officials. The situation has in fact degraded to the extent that one has to give a bribe, in order to get his child into a decent school.

Hence, an overall view of Pakistani society presents a world of petty corruption where whole functional segments of social order are eroded almost beyond recovery. In such circumstances, it becomes very easy for the drug barons to place their own people into important places, particularly when they have the help of the country’s political elite. The same situation also makes it very difficult to survive, for whatever little number of honest individuals left in the society. Moreover, the ties of blood and kinship are the key relationships in Pakistani society. Anyone who is in an influential service under the pressures of family and kinfolk, tries or is compelled to make the most out of it.

In such existing conditions, people and events become of a dual nature, one what they seem on the face value and second what they actually are. Hence, the validity of both becomes highly questionable. In the context of narcotics, the available information on the issue, role of anti-narcotics state agencies, the police and claims of non-involvement in the business in any way by concerned influentials, all need to be questioned and thoroughly researched before acceptance. Moreover, certain incidents and information have assured narcotics experts that what is reported about drug busts and arrests is only half the real story. For example the reported break-up of a drug ring involving senior police and PNCB officials in Punjab in mid-1991, was actually the result of a bitter struggle inside the police over drug payoffs.

Such complicity of the society and state machinery in drug trade makes it a difficult task, beyond imagination, to control the drug menace. There have been very few positive results in this context in the past, the following parts of this chapter take into account and analyze the efforts and achievements in drug control by different anti-narcotics forces.

Role of the government

The Government of Pakistan has got a mixed record on narcotics enforcement. Considering the annual yield of heroin exported out of the country, the amount of narcotics seizures by different law enforcing agencies, is very little. At present there are over ten such agencies working in the country (names and amount of narcotics seizures by each in 1992 is given in table 1). However, as discussed earlier, the working of these agencies is not adequate and requires a more sincere will to fight narcotics. In the wake of current US pressure to move narcotics on top of Government of Pakistan’s (GOP) priority list, and the serious attitude of last four governments there are chances of a betterment in the performance of these agencies.

TABLE 1

Heroin seizures, by each Agency

(PNCB data for 1990)

________________________________

Agency                         Heroin (Kg.)

________________________________

Coastal Guards                            0.0

Customs                                   703.2

Excise                                      554.4

Frontier Constabulary            1,750.9

Levies                                     100.0

PNCB                                    921.0

Police                                   2,314.1

Pak Rangers                              62.0

Railways Police                         44.6

________________________________

Source: Pakistan Narcotics Control Board.

Other than interdicting the processed heroin during shipment the GOP has declared a ban on poppy cultivation in the country. Every spring the government launches its mandatory campaign to destroy the standing poppy crop in the NWFP, where virtually, all of the Pakistani poppy plantation is done. Results of these campaigns have been positive in few areas. The government claims to have reduced the all time high 80,000 acres under poppy cultivation in 1978 to 12,000 acres in 1992. This statement also coincides with the reduction in heroin production during the same years i.e. from 800 tons to 200 tons. These figures reflect that the government has been successful in implementing its narcotics control strategy. But the facts when explored in detail deny this achievement. Even though the figures of reduction in poppy crop and heroin manufacturing are true but this decrease has more to do with the price of narcotics in the market than with the government actions. The price of heroin in the same years had sunk from 3000 rupees per kilo to 500 rupees for the same quantity. The drastic fall in price reflects on the over abundance of opium coming for processing into heroin. This excessive supply may have resulted because of massive poppy growth in Afghanistan. In fact it is suspected that Afghanistan poppy cultivation has given Pakistan a more specialized role in the industry, that of processing poppy into heroin. This situation washes away the governments claims of decreased poppy cultivation in country as in actuality the whole problem stays where it previously was.

Other than efforts for eradicating poppy cultivation, the GOP formed a committee in 1991 to introduce extensive reforms in policy, administration and legislation as well as the allocation of sufficient funds to narcotics control efforts. The committee devised certain laws which can be very effective in controlling the narcotics production and trafficking. These include suggestions of bringing the local law in conformity with the 1988 UN convention on narcotics. However, till now nothing significant has been achieved in this respect because of many institutional hazards and pressing demands on country’s limited resources. Moreover, the main focus of Pakistani drug enforcement agencies is on narcotics seizures rather than being on the arrest and prosecution of major drug barons. These agencies lack institutional initiative, resources to follow up on seizures with case preparation, and co-ordination among each other. Political interference in the working of these agencies and the judiciary is yet another hurdle in enhancing the commitment of narcotics investigators. Furthermore, as stated earlier, illicit money and influence of drug barons has infiltrated deep into these agencies and hampers their working.

Pakistan is a party to the three UN conventions on narcotics, and also gets narcotics related assistance from the US under the terms of bilateral letters of agreement which are subject to annual renewal. Pakistan is also a signatory to the extradition treaty with US and is liable to transfer its nationals to US accused of drug related crimes in the US.

These actions by the GOP suggest that it is trying to help and participate in every possible manner, in the global war against narcotics. But that narco trafficking is on an increase suggests that the government is only theoretically  dedicated to the task and lacks political will to enforce the initiatives listed before. This lack of political will can be attributed to a number of reasons, first, the existing political structure of Pakistan does not give any security or assurance to the government that it will complete its term. The 8th amendment in the constitution has given the powers to the President, of dissolving the national assembly, at any moment. This resulted in the fall of three elected representative governments in the country, within five years, which is otherwise the normal time of service for one single government. If the political situation stays stable one can hope for some betterment in the GOP’s narcotics control efforts.

Second reason, is the funding of political parties by drug barons and the presence of these people in the parliament of the country. One can obviously not expect these barons to work against themselves.

Finally, governments lack of control in the poppy growing areas and country’s porous border with Afghanistan where the situation stays to be warlike, can be termed as factors in hampering the government’s efforts, in controlling narcotics effectively.

US Pressures for eradication of Poppy crop and extradition of traffickers

United States Government (USG)  is the most concerned for checking narcotics production and trafficking in Pakistan. This is so because the US is world’s largest narcotics consuming market with a total addict population of around 6 million. Most of the drug consignments moving out of Pakistan’s borders are destined towards the United States. To stop this massive production and movement of narcotics the USG, through diplomatic initiative, anti-narcotics assistance programmes and law enforcement activities, has been trying to increase the willingness of the GOP to devote energy and resources to combat the menace. The USG over the years has increased pressure on the GOP for making anti-narcotics law enforcement more effective and also has been urging the GOP to bring its law in conformity with 1988 UN convention. The USG also demands the latter to increase the areas where opium poppy ban is enforced. Moreover, the USG is supporting a number of drug related development programmes in poppy growing areas and in collaboration with the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Integrated Drug Demand Reduction Programme, the same is trying to increase the awareness in general public about serious after effects of narcotics production and trafficking. In this context the USG is interested in developing a strong anti-drugs constituency in Pakistan.

In context of the development programmes the USG supported projects in the opium poppy growing areas of the NWFP, focusing on roads and the development of other vital infrastructure. The programmes aim at gradual expansion of the poppy ban, destruction of heroin laboratories, giving greater access to GOP political authorities and law enforcement agencies and increased economic viability of substitute crops. It is generally believed by the governments of both the countries that with vital infrastructure like roads, education and communication etc. the poppy growers will have a number of options to follow. Plus the same will give the GOP an upperhand in asking for poppy eradication in the region.

To ensure the correct implication of its narcotics control strategies the USG has inserted certain “poppy clauses” into its aid programme for the control of narcotics production. These clauses state that project disbursements will stop, if it is found that poppy is being grown in any area where a USG supported project is growing underway. The aid will resume only if the poppy crop is totally eradicated from the area.

The GOP has till now extended full co-operation to its counterpart in the US. However, partly due to its own weaknesses and partly due to an inherent paradox in the US policy nothing much has changed on the control scene. The US, even though has always taken the narcotics issue as a vital factor for her national security. But during the early years of Zia’s regime it constantly overlooked the rise of drug mafia in the country (see the beginning of this chapter) and the alleged involvement of President Zia in narcotics related matters. Now that the Soviet-Afghan war is over, and the mafia has become a vital component of country’s political and economic system, countering the narco problem in Pakistan has become almost an impossible task.

Moreover, many GOP officials blame different US anti-narcotics agencies especially the US DEA for not extending full support in successfully prosecuting the main narco barons of the country. For example in the case of Haji Iqbal Baig, who was released on October 2nd 1989 due to insufficient evidence, many senior government officials complained privately to the journalists that US and other western narcotics agencies let them down in providing access to crucial evidence. Moreover, it is argued that had the US arranged Baig’s arrest outside Pakistan, it would not have been so easy for him to have bailed himself out. Also there was evidence against the accused during Zia years but the US DEA never secured his assets then. Had that been done there are chances of unravelling the principal thread in a long drug connection. Moreover, as in the Norwegian connection where the arrested was given the status of state witness on request, and the Norwegian officials got a lead to more important figures in the drug syndicate, the US could have also followed the same design. Had the DEA secured an arrest at a place and time where powerful political figures in the Pakistan government with alleged links to the accused would not be in a position to protect the target of investigation, much positive could be had in Haji Baig’s case.

The above facts, in other words say that the US has shown a conflicting political agenda and did not want to press matters beyond a certain point in order to avoid compromise associations of a particular strategic nature. And it comes without saying that forceful crackdowns on drug industry in the early years of its formation, would not have resulted in a drug milieu as it exists today where the US and Pakistan both have got little chances of controlling the drug menace upto a satisfactory level.

Public Opinion

The role of public opinion is crucial in the success of any strategy to control the drug abuse. As discussed earlier in this chapter the state of Pakistani society is such where petty crime is abundant and people go for short-term monetary benefits rather than keeping an eye on the long-term consequences of anything. The struggle for money and elevated social status do not make them realize their complicity in the drug trade. Instead there are stereo type justifications with almost everyone in the society. For example, most people lead a case of Alcohol versus Heroin. It is argued that as they are tolerating the western narcotic the west should also tolerate their product, it simply is a tit for tat business. However, in the making of this argument most forget the rise in domestic consumption of heroin. In a short period of 13 years Pakistan’s drug addict population has gone from a virtual zero to around 2 million and is still rising. The same on the other hand, shows the lack of integration in the populace and absence of the idea of nationhood, which espouses the concept of a common destiny for all members of a community. People often fail to realize that if the drug mafia completely encroaches country’s political and economic stage, they will be the worst affectees of the situation.

Moreover, one finds a popular anti-US sentiment in the populace. As most drug control programmes are US sponsored it is believed that the whole business is a US strategy for enforcing its imperialist designs on Pakistan. This is often substantiated with the US operation in Panama. The situation generates a hatred and insecurity in the populace and as an immediate shield, to this feared US intervention policy, many believe that supply of heroin to US should continue or even be increased.

In these circumstances the government’s efforts for controlling narcotics go half lost even at the time they are launched. Moreover, in the quasi independent areas of NWFP where most of the poppy is cultivated, the plant is the only source of revenue for the farmers. Every year when the government officials try to bring the poppy ban in effect, violent clashes take place, in one such incident two enforcement officers lost their lives in an armed clash in 1986. The incident gave rise to the hatred already prevailing in the grower community and in general public as well, against the law enforcing agencies. The fact that the whole operation was US sponsored further aggravated the situation.

The famous Gadoon Amazai project also depicts on the reason as to why alternatives to poppy growing are not very successful. Most alternative strategies involve industrial projects which are not labour intensive, whereas poppy growing or farming in general is a labour intensive work. Hence, even if an alternative is provided not many can benefit. On the other hand the standing poppy crop is destroyed on the grounds that development has reached the place. This situation further strengthens the desire to grow poppy, among the farmers. Moreover, the drug mafia presents a very lucrative package to the growers, which cannot be compared to anything offered by the alternative governmental options.

Other than these facts, poppy growing is also used as a bargaining lever by the growers. Most farmers in poppy growing areas have reportedly blackmailed the government officials with threats of growing poppy, if they are not provided with basic facilities. Moreover, the temptation of receiving development funds and the acceptance of political demands is also encouraging poppy cultivation in new areas. The situation till now and results of anti-narcotics policies in growing areas show that farmers do not intend to let this bargaining lever got out of their hands. If the government wants to secure any positive results it will have to increase awareness through education and media in order to first buildup a strong anti-narcotics public opinion which is acutely missing in these areas, in specific and in the whole society, in general.

Role of the NGOs

At present there are a number of local and international non-governmental organizations working for development and control of drug abuse in Pakistan. Keeping in mind the corrupt nature of Pakistani society and government more and more aid donors for development and narcotics control have come to believe that NGOs can prove to be far more effective than government law enforcing agencies, in controlling the drug menace.

Over the years NGOs have devised ways in which to slowly but surely create public awareness against narcotics and other alike social evils, in the populace. NGOs are also more effective in the sense that they focus their attention on the problems of a community at the grass root level. In other words NGOs go more for the people and less for the institutions. Moreover, with flexible structures they are instrumental in collecting first hand information to illuminate situations which require specialized consideration and urgent interventions. In simple terms, it can be said that NGOs have an edge over GOs because they can be more innovative, in fighting drug abuse.

In Pakistan there are at present more than 50 NGOs working against drug abuse. These organizations basically are interested in the following areas:

- Treatment (Detoxification of addicts).

- Rehabilitation of addicts in society and job placements.

- Education of parents to protect the children from the abuse of narcotic drugs.

- Involvement of community for intervention against narcotics availability and prevention of their use.

- Assistance to law enforcement agencies in the control of narcotics distribution and interdiction of trafficking.

- Creation of awareness against narcotics through meetings, publications and distribution of literatures, posters, stickers and leaflets.

The modus operandi of NGOs, reflects a very wise approach of curbing the drug demon at its root. Moreover, NGOs seem to make up for the most vital part missing in the dynamics of control of drug abuse in the Pakistani society and that is building up of a considerable anti-narcotics constituency in the populace. If successful in this task they might well be able to produce an advocate for narcotics eradication in the society, which will be effective in making the government and political elites change their priorities. Moreover, the working of NGOs seems to be more focused at demand reduction i.e. it involves education about drug abuse at all levels. This method of controlling the drug menace can be much more effective than the supply reduction techniques which aims at keeping drugs away from reaching the addict population. It comes as obvious to the thinking that with no demand, less and less drugs will be produced.

However, even though NGOs are on a right track for controlling drug abuse but keeping in mind their limited funds, limited number, small area of operation and size of the drug problem in Pakistan, little positive can be hoped for in this context. NGOs may be successful in creating small drug free zones within the cities and specific rural settings, but at the moment to expect the same effects for the whole society, will be nothing more than wishful thinking. If the governments and international donor agencies elevate the status of these organizations and help them in becoming operational at a broader level, much positive results can be expected to have in controlling the narcotics consumption as well as production.

Net Assessment

The episodes recounted in the preceding pages reflect on the dynamics of control of drug abuse in Pakistan. There does not seem to be any prospect of sudden or major change in Pakistan’s narcotics profile. The country lacks both a political will to fight the drug menace and a strong anti-narcotics public opinion. Various control programmes are in action in the country with local and foreign assistance, but the fact that too many powerful interests are benefiting directly or indirectly from narcotics, has undermined the chances of positive achievements by these programmes. Moreover, the country needs to develop more programmes aimed at demand reduction. This can be done by mobilizing the NGOs at a much broader level.

The United States which has a strong interest in curbing the Pakistani heroin industry, has lost her influence and credibility which it gained during the Afghan war years by backing the then government. Today, if the US wants to clear the Pakistani drug mafia it will have to rebuild strong ties with the country’s political elite and populace as well. This can be done by reassessing the vital bones of contention between the two states. These include the nuclear issue and the Kashmir problem. The US should reevaluate its stand of asking Pakistan to sign the NPT regardless of India’s doing the same. Other conditions, as imposed by the ‘Presslers’ Amendment’ should be reviewed as well. In short, US needs to build up a renewed sense of common strategic purposes with Pakistan which include narcotics alongside, other important concerns like stabilizing the political situation in Afghanistan and the strengthening of moderate political and social alternatives in the Islamic world, etc.

Chapter 5

Latin America and Pakistan: A Comparison

Study of growth and control patterns of the illicit narcotics industry in Pakistan and Latin America reveals a striking resemblance between the two experiences. The geography of cultivation of coca and poppy plants, the underdeveloped and autonomous nature of these areas, work patterns of the drug mafia in both Latin America and Pakistan, the economic impact of narcotics trade, the existing social conditions of the concerned countries and the responses of their governments — all share almost the same dialectics.

However, Latin American experience stays by far an advanced case of narcotics abuse in every sense, when compared to Pakistan. The Latin American mafia, over the years, has almost got itself recognized by creating a pro-narcotics lobby in the populace. Pakistan seems to be following rapidly in the Latin American footsteps but the situation still cannot be called as adverse as in Colombia, Bolivia or Peru.

This chapter discusses the similarities and differences in both experiences.

Similarities

Both, coca and poppy plants, are grown in remote regions where climatic conditions are not suitable for other crops to flourish. Also both the plants do not require a great deal of care, as in the case of other typical licit crops. These areas are underdeveloped and their inhabitants are cut off from metropolitan cities in their respective countries. There are no or little communication links available to these people. Historically, these areas are either a political no-man’s-land or enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from their governments.

In such circumstances the drugs industry has acted as a colonial force, introducing vital components of a modern civilization in these areas. These include, communication networks, satellite industries and some limit agriculture etc. But most of all, narcotics industry has become the only source of welfare to the people of narcotics growing regions. It pays them more than they can earn from any other source, it saves them the need to go to the market to sell their product, it compensates their losses and provides them with a chance of earning a living. In short, narcotics industry is the only concerned employer in narcotics growing areas, which are otherwise seriously neglected by their local governments.

Both coca and poppy growing areas extend to their alikes in the neighbouring countries and because of their autonomous nature, provide traffickers an easy movement across borders. Moreover, same creates a standby facility if in case the narcotics crop is adversely effected in one country by unfavourable climatic conditions or crop eradication attempts by law enforcing agencies. The geographical conformity has also resulted in a specialized division of labour. For example, in the Latin American case Colombia is practically only a processor of coca-into cocaine whereas Peru and Bolivia concentrate more on coca growing. Similarly, it is suspected that decreased poppy cultivation in Pakistan may be because there is abundance of the quality poppy growing areas in Afghanistan. Hence, in short, the political geography of narcotics growing regions has facilitated the narcotics industry, in both Latin America and in the Southwest Asian, Golden Crescent, in becoming more systematic.

The societal conditions in the narcotics producing countries of Latin America and Pakistan are also quite identical. All are post-colonial, under developed states, where the populace lacks integration. Moreover, due to low living standards because of being under- developed, petty corruption is a norm. The populace looks more towards the short-term monetary benefits and less attention goes to the long-term implications of most social phenomenon. Furthermore there is acute deficiency of strong public opinion against narcotics in the peoples of Latin America and Pakistan. Instead, in fact there is a pro-narcotics exporting lobby present in both the regions. In case of Latin American countries especially Colombia this constitutes a sizeable proportion of the population. Whereas in case of Pakistan the same is just emerging.

The pro-narcotics lobby is present and growing too, because of the presence of an anti-US sentiment in the masses. In case of Latin American countries this sentiment may have emerged because of North American domination throughout in history and also due to the nationalist feeling which sees US assistance for narcotics control as a direct intervention in those nation’s sovereign matters. In case of Pakistan, on the other hand, anti-US feelings in the populace seem to have developed from the past experiences like the 1965 and 1971 wars in which the US backed out of supporting the country. Moreover, the strong influence of religion in the country makes the populace think of the developed west in general as non-believers. Moreover, conditions like ‘Pressler’s Amendment’ make the people feel that US supports India more than Pakistan, the two being traditional rivals.

In short, therefore, the US moves to control narcotics are viewed by both the regions as attempts of imposing US imperialist designs on the latter.

Huge drug trade revenues in both the regions have increased the magnitude of underworld operations. These revenues have created black economies in drug producing countries which are almost equal or even larger in size than the national economy. Even though very small proportions of narco money is spent in the home countries but even that small amount is huge enough. The narco money is expended in certain typical areas of the overall economic activity. For example cattle ranches, real estate and transport etc. This pattern of investment has a dual effect, first that it creates multiplier effects which increases the number of those indirectly dependent on narcotics industry. Second, that it does not contribute in any sense to the vital economic activity for development of the country, for example activities like mining and heavy industry.

In other words narcotics industry in both the regions, does not act as any motor for economic development and whatever little economic prosperity is brought about by narcotics revenue is in a very unbalanced fashion.

On the other hand narcotics money has made the Latin American and Pakistani drug mafia, very strong. Drug barons in both the regions are few of the richest men in the world. With such economic resources at their disposal and the fore described societal conditions in Latin America and Pakistan, drug barons have penetrated deep into the economic and political milieus of their respective countries.

Drug barons in both regions spend large sums to back the political parties in their election campaigns and at various instances these barons have themselves stood for political offices. Financing of political parties enables these barons to extend pressing demands to the political regime working in their governments, the same gives them a chance of influencing narcotics related law enforcement. On the other hand the political elites who have taken the funding from the drug barons keep a rather compromising attitude in the fear of blackmailing.

Heavy encroachment of drug mafia on producing nations economic and political scenarios has created the belief in the national leaders minds that a successful crackdown on drugs industry will result in a state of total economic, political and social chaos. Moreover, in both Latin America and Pakistan due to being underdeveloped, there are other important concerns for the governments to deal with. For example, unemployment or under employment, poverty and lack of welfare systems. In the wake of such circumstances, it is a common belief with the governments and the populace as well that fighting drug abuse is not as vital as other issues for national security.

The neglect of fighting drug abuse in Latin American countries and Pakistan and the prevailing social discontent, has resulted in a sharp increase of domestic consumer markets in these countries. With this the drug barons and the mafia have become even more entrenched in their respective social set ups, consequentially giving rise to drug related petty crime and corruption. The societies of drug producing countries being more vulnerable to corruption has enabled the mafia to infiltrate deep into the state machinery. The Latin American and Pakistani drug barons have placed their men at sensitive positions in vital state departments like police, judiciary, foreign affairs and even defence ministers. This has resulted in the build up of a strategic intelligence capability for the drug mafia, with which they can keep a check on their anti-counter parts’ strategies.

With their huge drug trade revenues drug lords have acquired extremely sophisticated weaponry, far advanced in nature to what is available with the law enforcing agencies. Similarly, Pakistani drug barons have employed the Afghan war veterans and have virtually created private armies of their own. Other than this the drug mafia in both the regions makes an open display of arms, in order to deter the anti-narcotics demands.

The dynamics of control of narcotics, in Latin America and Pakistan also share a common unfolding of events. In both the regions states are characterized by weak central governments, which lack the strength to launch an effective war on drug mafia to curb the drug menace. Governments at several instances have either been an accomplice to the drug trade or have been known to ignore the illegal activities of the mafia. The cases of General Luis Garcia Meza’s regime in Bolivia and President Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in Pakistan can be quoted in this context. Moreover, the lack of resources has often hampered of any anti-narcotics efforts by these states. On the outset governments seem to be dedicated for fighting the drug abuse, however, on a closer analysis one finds an acute shortage of political will to serve this cause.

United States is the worst affected of Latin American and Pakistan narcotics trafficking. Therefore, it funds a majority of anti-narcotics projects in the two regions. Most of these projects are identical in nature in both Latin America and Pakistan. These projects include, crop substitution programmes, development in narcotics growing areas, technical assistance to local law enforcing agencies, and funding of the non-governmental organizations, which are dedicated to fighting drug abuse. Moreover, through diplomatic efforts US tries to compel these states to eradicate coca and poppy plantations and also extradite leading narcotics criminals for prosecution and trial in the US.

However, US efforts in curbing the drug menace possess an inherent paradox. It seems that the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has often got into a marriage of convenience with underworld organizations to advance Washington’s political agenda abroad. For example, during the Soviet-Afghan war years Washington strengthened the border tribes of Afghanistan in order to create a strong Afghan resistance against the Soviets. These tribes which were historically known to have smuggling as their major occupation, today are the centres of activity for narcotics trafficking and production. In the Latin American context it is often argued by analysts that without the CIA complicity General Luis Garcia Meza would not have been able to come into power. The General was later accused by the CIA to have been grossly involved in narcotics trafficking.

Hence, in both cases that is, Latin America and Pakistan, CIA and other vital United States government agencies, have been factors in the development of narcotics trade. The same can be accounted for as a reason in compromising the arrest, prosecution and extradition of few of the most infamous drug lords, in the two regions, the case of Haji Iqbal Baig being an example. Moreover, the US seems to be dealing with the problem of her domestic narcotics consumption market, by applying supply-side strategies i.e. in other words the US is attempting to solve, what is largely a domestic problem at its foreign source.

In a nutshell, therefore, it can be concluded that in both Latin America and Pakistan, a number of drug enforcement policies are underway but to the lack of anti-narcotics constituency in the populace and strong governmental initiative and the presence of anti-US sentiment, fear of US imperialism along with immense resources of drug mafia, nothing positive seems to be in the course of narcotics control. Instead, it can be said that the way circumstances are moving in favour of the drug lords, whatever control scenario present in drug producing states may well be reversed.

Differences in the Pakistan and Latin America Experience

The preceding discussion reveals that dynamics of narcotics trafficking and production in Latin America and Pakistan are moving in a symmetry. However, the cases are not exactly identical. In its existence the Latin American mafia it is far more advanced and recognized than their Pakistani counterparts.

As noted earlier the Latin American drug mafia has evolved a certain political, economic and social philosophy, over the years. The drug lords refer to themselves as success stories in a capitalist world and also claim that war against them, by the US is a tactic of extending US imperialism in the underdeveloped states. The lords also accuse their local governments of being US cronies, as they are assisting the US in her motives.

Moveover, the Latin American drug barons have spent heavily on public service works. These works are normally done in areas out of reach of the local governments. Hence the drug barons have created a soft corner in the hearts of the populace for the drug mafia. The creation of this pro-coca lobby in their respective states have given the Latin American mafia an advocate for their illegal activities.

In the economic sense the cocaine industry has completely overshadowed the national economy in Latin America. The case of Medallin can be quoted in this context where an almost virtual collapse of the textile sector was supported and filled for by the narcotics industry. Such a deep penetration into country’s national economy, has made the governments in Latin American narcotics producing states, review and fear the total and complete eradication of the narcotics industry. In fact the governments, through their various actions, seem to recognize the presence of mafia, in a context which is not criminal.

These circumstances are peculiar to the cocaine industry when it is compared with its counterpart in Pakistan. The Pakistani mafia by and large, is still a highly evolved case of organized crime. Moreover, the sharp increase in domestic narcotics consuming population is raising serious concerns with the Pakistani analysts, intellectuals and even government. The situation, where cannot be called exactly hopeful can also be not termed as hopeless as in Latin America. Increasing role of the NGOs in Pakistani development can also be called a positive step towards narcotics control in the country.