The Future of Minewarfare

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI examines the future of this deadly form of warfare.

Mines are clearly an obnoxious stuff and perhaps unchivalrous weapons to be used in warfare. They have only a limited tactical/strategically value in war but the armies of the world use them all the same to trade manpower and close gaps in defensive infrastructure. It is surely ‘not cricket’ to use them, especially the anti-personnel landmines (APLs) which have a societal import. Most of such mines are left unlifted after the war — and then they play havoc with the civilian population and the cattles in the abandoned areas. And it is only when the damage has actually occurred that it is known for certain that there are mines in the area. Some of the most heavily infested areas of such nefarious gadgets may be found in Afghanistan, Cambodia — and even Egypt, where mines laid are as old as the Second World War.

Mine clearance is a pyretic process and according to ICRC each year worldwide some 100,000 mines are lifted/removed, but at the same time 2 billion more are planted in their place which makes the calculus of mines oblique and unmanageable. The APLs cost no more than $3 to $30 each, but the clearance operation of each of these venomous stuff may cost 50 times as much.

Cleansing the world’s 120 million active mines could cost upto $33 billion. And at current rate of progress, it would take good 1,100 years to clear the entire world of mines — and then only if not a single new mine were laid. But another 120 million mines are waiting in stockpiles all over the world for relaying. And for the predicament of the mine clearance staffs, one mine clearance expert is killed and two are injured or maimed for every 5,000 mines cleared. All this makes a terrible calculus.

These active i.e. 120 million mines are found in 70 countries at the rate of one for every 16 children or 48 human beings on the planet. IN a more mathematical equation this may be summarized as:

Mines = Death + Suffering + Mutilation: 800 people killed and 1,200 maimed every single month — one victim every 20 minutes. This is horrific. Isn’t it so?

The present concentration of this predicament besides the three countries mentioned earlier on is in Angola, Bosnia, Iraq, Croatia, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam — and many others. The APLs have a special terror for the civilian innocent people / targets and these bar their access to them to their farmland (Afghanistan is one case in point), irrigation channels, power plants, roads and other infrastructure. Millions of such unfortunate people have to choose between: farming in dire fear, even going hungry, or leaving their homes. “Targeting civilians in this way is a violation of the international humanitarian law.”

Mines, therefore, and especially the APLs have been a subject of much condemnation worldwide and this stigmatization had ultimately resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and their Destruction which is commonly known as the Ottawa Convention of 1997. There are, as of now, 142 signatories of this convention (Pakistan being one of those), but only 122 have actually ratified the Convention.

I happened to attend a South Asian seminar on the banning of landmines especially the APLs in Manila just prior to the Ottawa Convention and was surprised to see that most of the delegates confirmed that the mines had a little tactical use but everyone did not agree with the idea of total banning of mines and some countries like China and India liked the idea of trading mines for manpower. So the paradox was never really resolved at Manila any way. The efforts of ICRC — Geneva, however, must be appreciated who went on propagating this humanitarian cause by arranging such seminars all over the world.

And about the Ottawa Convention, the notable absences from this are China, Russia and USA ironically who are perhaps the biggest users of these artifacts. “China has shown little interest in complying with the terms of the convention and it is not known what programmes it is looking into... Russia has made vague statements supporting the convention, but has also demonstrated a real attachment to traditional anti-personnel landmines for defending static positions in Chechnya...Though there are scant details of programmes in development, it is believed that the Russian State Research and Development Engineer Institute and the Science Research Machinery Building Institute are studying ways to modify current designs to make them compliant...This could include putting an operator into the loop or automatic self-deactivation after a set time...”

Under the Clinton Administration, the USA made a firm commitment to at least try to become a signatory to the convention by 2006, though this came with some reservation with regard to the mixed minefields across South Korea.

The current policy cum doctrine of the USA is well summed up by Major Mike Halbig of the US Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, ...The Bush Administration is currently reviewing the US landmines policy...We will address both military requirements and humanitarian concerns in conducting the review. No final decision regarding funding and so forth for landmines alternatives will be made until the review is complete....”

In the meantime US studies include a three-track programme and a range of alternatives to replace traditional landmines for a range of tactical functions. These are:

• Research into systems to replace the mixed landmine fields in South Korea. The US went some way to ease objections to continued use of landmines by only deploying self-destructing APLs — or self-deactivating landmines with a present lifetime.

• A long term and more technologically advanced alternatives by the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to be launched.

• A third option was added in 1999 “to explore combining existing and new technologies and operational and tactical doctrine to provide equivalent capabilities to non-self-destructing APLs, mixes anti-tank and APLs system and anti-tank mines with anti-handling devices. This study was contracted out to the National Academy of Sciences.”

The National Research Council (NRC) has since produced “Alternative Technologies to Replace Landmines” Report. The suggested alternatives revolve around four main concepts:

• Adding an operator into the discriminate sensors between non-combatants, and friend and foe.

• Introducing cheap advanced sensors leading towards a net worked battle space.

• Improving anti-tank mine capability and,

• Installing self-deactivation or self-destruct devices.

“....Developing landmine alternatives, however, is not solely seen as a like for like transfer. The alternatives must be at least as effective and the NRC found that the alternative technologies, that do not look like traditional landmines but fulfil a similar function can actually be far more effective than current system.”

Presently and in the traditional mode the landmines have the main functions of being used as protective, tactical and nuisance landmines respectively. And clearly any new type or variant of mines must fulfil these requirements. And sometimes “APLs may be used to protect the bigger and more easily located anti-tank mines from dismounted troops.”

Some of the more important programmes under US consideration are the Non-Self Destructing —A (NSD-A) system and the Remote Area Denial Artillery Munitions (RADAM). The first system i.e. NSD-A is direct way of working around the constraints of the convention. It has been developed by Alliant Techsystems and Textron Systems. It targets dismounted troops and consists of hand-emplaced landmines with built-in sensors that detect    intrusion into the field and send a signal back to the operator who decides whether or not to activate the field. This system can be further enhanced with the conceptual Hand-Emplaced Sensors Field (HESF), which may be introduced before 2006.

HESF would provide early warning and make use of everything from acoustic, laser and infrared ‘trip wires’ to biological seismic or video sensors to alert the operator to intruders. It could also be used to cue indirect fire and support weapons pre-registered to the target area. As these operations involve continuous monitoring and maintenance, these systems may prove terribly time consuming for troops holding the defences in South Korea.

There is also a proposal for the installation of a ‘battle override switch’ that would switch the minefield to automatic, effectively making it revert to ‘victim’-activated status. This will probably break the Ottawa Convention, and is highly contentious.

It is interesting that the conventional role of mines being what it is, a number of non-lethal studies — probably under the influence of humanitarian considerations are under consideration. Such technologies generally pertain to riot control; peace keeping roles and anti-tank protection and may provide the armed forces with a greater range of responses.

“These systems include adaptation of existing weapons, like the Claymore’s evolution into the rubber ball firing Modular Crowd Control Munition role...The French Army deploys a similar system, the hand emplaced Lacroix Defence Sphinx-Mader, but with a scaleable response. This can emit a warning tone, fire smoke and warning rounds as well as more dangerous fragmentation rounds.”

And then there are other systems including mine-like devices which release tranquillizing, psychotropic or debilitating, but ultimately harmless, chemicals when trodden or activated by remote control. Japan, the USA and other Western countries are studying obscurants and advanced entangling devices. Although these systems add a capability to armed forces they are not seen as a replacement for APLs in a battlefield setting. More aggressive non-lethal systems could fulfil these roles for incapacitation.

American firms Taserton and Primex Aerospace are testing air delivered or hand-emplaced Taser Area Denial Device. This launches miniature barbed darts in a variety of directions out to between 15 feet to 30 feet. When the darts hit, 50000 V of electricity are flashed into the victims, incapacitating them by causing violent muscle spasms.

In the area denial role even the directed — energy weapons (of the SDI Technologies fame) are also being investigated, though they will likely face tremendous legal opposition and will not be available for quite some time. Microwave devices are particularly favoured because they can be tuned to have ‘progressive penalty’.

According to a defence scientist “this means that a fairly simple microwave device could be placed in an area to be denied to the enemy and at a range of say 100 meters. Intruders would experience discomfort as their skin is heated by microwaves. If they continue into the field and get closer to the device, they get progressively hotter as fever sets in until the especially foolhardy are cooked to death.” The system can induce artificial fever at 107 deg F.

Dr. Nick Lewer of the Bradford University’ s Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project has drawn attention to the electromagnetic-beam weapon — the Vehicle — Mounted Active Denial System (VMADS) which was unveiled by Raytheon at the US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate in March 2001. VMADS can cause burning sensation but no visible marks at upto 700 meters.

The US Army and Air Force is believed to be developing some ‘sonic’ weapons that bombard the victims with agitating sound waves. Like the microwave system these can have a discomforting and even lethal effect and could also work against vehicles.

And there is a rather innovative pure Anti-Tank Self-Healing Minefield, which is being studied by DARPA in a number of variants.

According to DARPA “...Self- Healing Minefield is an intelligent, dynamic obstacle that responds to an enemy breaching attempts by physically reorganizing itself.” Here each mine is networked to the surrounding mines and, once scattered, the mines automatically organize themselves into a set pattern, with propulsion designs ranging from pyrotechnic thrusters to ‘hopping’ devices.”

When a mine disappears from the network either through destruction of a target or by deactivation by a breaching force, neighbouring mines move to fill the gap, so an open breach cannot be maintained. This in fact necessitates the breaching force either carrying out a much slower, sustained assault to exhaust the field of mines, or retreating into areas that have been reminded by the field itself. All this appears to be highly futuristic.

DARPA has another rather exotic contraption in production which may be available after 2006. This is known as Raptor. Raptor, however, would need a very considerable amount of resources for its field production. It is based on an advanced over-watch sensor that can be deployed deep into a battlefield to recognize large combat formations and detect, track and classify individual vehicles. Raptor would need constant upgradation as the sensor technologies become available.

So here we have some alternatives for the mines. But are the mines really so indispensable for the future battlefield? There is a school of thought that says that the removal of APLs from the battlefield is no real loss to the modern armed forces. A spokesman for the British Army’s School of Infantry at Warminster said,  “The withdrawal of victim-activated APLs from service has fundamentally made very little difference to infantry training or tactics.”

And here is an opinion contained in a report of the Canadian Department of National Defence on APLs “...Accepted procedures dictate that employed correctly, APLs were to always be under visual observation and covered by direct-fire weapons, which could give early warning.

The report continues with a West Point study, which says, “APLs did not have the operational effect of completely stopping a missile.” They may have an immediate tactical effect. Mines in fact have never deterred a determined assaulting troops in battle.

To quote from the Gulf War 1991, the vast mixed APLs and anti-tank mines that Iraq laid to defend against the allied ground attack hardly broke the stride of the assaulting forces. This may, however, have been a special circumstance due to allies total air superiority and their ability to survey the minefields and denying the Iraqis to maintain those. The use of the British Army’s Giant Viper, among other systems, rapidly cleared wide lanes with little effort.

Finally “the advent of highly advanced sensors and weapons, however, will no doubt have the greatest tactical effects far beyond the advantages provided by traditional landmines... A truly network battle and an accurate picture of enemy formations will radically change the way that battles are fought and traditional ALPs will become relics of the past for all but the poorest and most deeply embattled states... It is an irony then that these are the very countries that are most likely to find themselves involved in a conflict where landmines are deployed and that arms control initiatives like the Ottawa convention were set up to protect in the first place....”