Suicide Attacks: An Overview/Analysis

BOOK REVIEW

Suicide Attacks: An Overview/Analysis

Published with permission obtained from Ma’ariv

Columnist BOAZ GANOR Executive Director ICT, Israel wrote this for the MA’ARIV.

Foreword

Over the past decade, several countries all over the world have been forced to contend with the phenomenon of suicide attacks. Radical activists from such diverse countries as Turkey, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, as well as Palestinians have elected to use suicide as a weapon in attacks aimed at various targets both civilian and military where large crowds tend to gather.

Suicide attacks constitute an additional stage in the escalation of terrorist activity, with the clear intention of causing the maximum number of casualties and damage even more importantly of striking a blow to public morale.

What is a suicide attack?

A suicide attack is an “operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator”. The suicide attacker is fully aware that if he does not kill himself/herself, the planned attack will not be implemented. The attack is carried out by activating explosives worn or carried by the attacker in the form of a portable explosive charge, or planted in a vehicle he is driving.

It is important to correctly define a suicide attack, for there are different types of attacks, which may be mistakenly considered as belonging to this special category:

On many occasions, the attacker sets out with the knowledge that there is a good chance of being killed in the course of an attack (for example in trying to force a bus over a cliff). In spite of the imminent danger to the attackers life, as long as there is a possibility of the attack being carried out without him being forced to kill himself during the course of it, this should not be “considered to be ‘a suicide attack.”
Sometimes the attacker makes concrete preparations for the possibility of death as a result of the attack (preparing a will, carrying out purification ceremonies, etc.). However, these attackers in themselves do not turn the attack into a suicide attack.
In some attacks, the attackers are equipped with arms or explosives for blowing themselves up should the attack go wrong, (For example if the attack fails, or security forces break into a building where terrorists are holding hostages). The existence of such arms or explosives and even the decision to use them does not constitute adequate grounds for the attack to be defined as a suicide attack.

As mentioned above, in a true suicide attack, the attacker knows fully well that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process.

What are the benefits of the suicide attack for the attacker’s organization?

Suicide attacks are attractive to many organizations, as they offer them a variety of advantages:

Suicide attacks result in many casualties and cause extensive damage.
Suicide attacks attract wide media coverage. A suicide attack is a newsworthy event for the media as it indicates a display of great determination and inclination for self-sacrifice on the part of the attacker.

Although a suicide attack is a very primitive and simple attack, the use of suicide tactics guarantees that the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location. This guarantees the maximum number of casualties (in contrast to the use of technical means such as a time bomb or even a remote controlled explosive charge). In this regard the suicide bomber is no more than a sophisticated bomb carrier that brings the explosive device to the right location and detonates it at the right time.

In a suicide attack, as soon as the terrorist has set off on his mission his success is virtually guaranteed. It is extremely difficult to counter suicide attacks once the terrorist is on his way to the target; even if the security forces do succeed in stopping him before he reaches the intended target, he can still activate the charge and cause damage. (Thus the need for accurate intelligence concerning the plans of the attacker’s organizations is crucial).

Planning and executing the escape route after the attack has occurred is usually one of the most complicated and problematic stages of any attacker attack. Suicide attacks require no escape plan. Since the perpetrator is killed during the course of the suicide attack, there is no fear of him being caught afterwards, being interrogated by the security forces and passing on information liable to endanger other activists. What are the benefits for the perpetrator of the suicide attack? Suicide attacks are considered attractive by groups of religious and nationalistic fanatics who regard them as a kind of “Holy War” and a divine command. The phenomenon has seen a growing popularity especially among Islamist fundamentalist groups. Here we will focus on the Hamas, an organization that has carried out a number of suicide attacks against Israeli buses, markets and other civilian targets.

For Hamas, the perpetrator of the suicide attack is not considered either by himself or by other activists to have committed suicide. He is rather perceived to be a “shaheed” a martyr who fell in the process of fulfilling a religious command, the “Jihad” or “Holy War.” (Thus his act is called in Arabic Istishhad).

Suicide attacks may provide the Shaheed and his families with substantial rewards:

The majority of the Shaheed come from a low social status background. The Shaheed improves his social status after their death as well as that of his families.
The family of the Shaheed is showered with honour and praise, and receives financial rewards for the attack (usually some thousands of dollars).
In addition to the religious mission and the family rewards, the Shaheed also receives some personal benefits (according to his belief), including:
Eternal life in paradise,
The permission to see the face of Allah,
And the loving kindness of 72 young virgins who will serve him in heaven.
The Shaheed also earns a privilege to promise a life in heaven to 70 of his relatives.The will of Hisham Ismail Abd-El Rahman Hamed (a suicide attacker who blew himself up in November 1994 at Nezarim, killing 3 IDF officers and wounding 2 Israelis and 4 Palestinians), reflects the state of mind of the Shaheed at the time of the attack. He wrote: Dear family and friends! I write this will with tears in my eyes and sadness in my heart. I want to tell you that I am leaving and ask for your forgiveness because I decided to see Allah’ today and this meeting is by all means more important than staying alive on this earth...

Another suicide attacker — Salah Abed El Hamid Shaker, who blew himself up with another Shaheed at Beit Lid in January ’95, killing 18 Israelis and wounding 36, wrote in his will: I am going to take revenge upon the sons of the monkeys and the pigs the Zionists infidels and the enemies of humanity. I am going to meet my holy brother Hisham Hamed and my distinguished teacher, Hani El Abed and all other Shaheeds and saints in paradise. Please forgive me’

All of these factors constitute a substantial incentive for fundamentalist believers to adopt suicide attack tactics. When there are religious, nationalistic, economic, social, and personal rewards for this kind of action, it is no wonder that Hamas and Islamic Jihad find no difficulty in recruiting volunteers for such missions.

Who is the Shaheed?

Again, focusing on suicide attacks carried out by Hamas against Israeli targets, we can see a number common characteristic of the Shaheed, which serve as a basic profile of the suicide bomber. These include:

Young usually from 18 to 27 years of age,
Usually not married, unemployed and from a poor family.
Usually the Shaheed completed high school,
Most were devoted students in the Islamic education centres in Gaza and in the West Bank directed and financed by Hamas. Some of the Shaheeds arrested by Israel in the past have expressed the desire to avenge the death or injury of a relative or a close friend at the hands of Israel.

The reason for committing a suicide attack for most of the Shaheeds is, therefore, first and foremost religious fanaticism combined with nationalist extremism, and a wish for revenge, but not personal despair.

Usually a Shaheed does not volunteer for his missions. The Shaheed may be selected by his Islamic religious teacher at the mosques and Islamic education centres in Gaza and the West Bank. Usually the most devoted students are selected after a close examination by the teachers and over a long time of acquaintance. Sometimes the Shaheed is picked by the planner or the initiator of the attack on the basis of previous acquaintance.

After the potential Shaheed is selected, he usually participates in long training sessions in order to test his attitudes and performance under pressure and in life-threatening situations. Only the trainees who are both willing and cool-headed are permitted to move on to the next stage.

Subsequently the Shaheed usually “disappears” from his home without farewell, while he begins several days of intensive training in order to understand all operational aspects of his mission and learn how to deal with the explosive device. At this time the Shaheed also undergoes a process of physical and mental purification.

Some of the terrorists who were trained to be Shaheeds testified that at this stage they were taken to a graveyard and told to lie down inside one of the graves for several hours in order to overcome the fear of death.

On the last day before the attack the Shaheed is well trained, brain washed, and willing and able to execute the suicide attack. At his point he writes a will, in which he asks his family not to mourn him, because he did not die but rather was transformed to another life in which he will be with Allah. Also, he records a propaganda video cassette in which he is disguised (usually by wearing an IDF uniform or typical Israeli clothes and shaving his beard), he says a special prayer, and together with his collaborators he drives to the target area.

The Shaheed usually transports the explosive in a vehicle, sometimes even by bicycle or cart. Alternately the device is hidden in a bag or in a military vest under a coat.

Standard explosives run to about 3-15 kilograms of TNT or homemade explosives. In order to increase the damage small chunks of iron or a large quantity of nails are often packed around the explosives. The detonator is of a very simple design which allows the perpetrator to activate the explosives at the proper time even when under pressure.

Can suicide attacks be prevented?

The subject uses suicide attacks to instill a feeling of helplessness in the population, the notion that they have no way of protecting themselves against such attacks. These feelings strike a blow to public morale, creating fear and panic.

Any country faced with a struggle against this type of attacks must do its utmost to protect the population, and to provide them with a feeling that “things can and will be done” against suicide attacks in order to decrease the damage to the public morale.

A state faced with suicide attacks must prevent these attacks through intelligence, operational measures, and protective measures. To these steps must be added psychological measures. Intelligence is the first link in the chain of preventing any terror attack, but is of the utmost importance in thwarting suicide attacks before they are put into practice. The incidence of suicide attacks in Israel in the nineties reflects a decrease in Israeli intelligence capability against the attacker’s organizations.

Operational Counter measures

Since direct action against the Shaheed himself is usually a complicated operation, operational efforts should be diverted towards the application of pressure on those elements involved in the overall planning and implementation of these attacks.

Surrounding the Shaheed are several circles of activists, who are aware in advance of the plan to execute a suicide attack:

The first circle is the family. In many cases they notice a change in the behaviour of the shaheed. In some cases the shaheed has a brother or a father serving in the security services and this relative could report to their commanders and prevent the attack.
The second circle includes activists who initiate the attack, recruit the terrorist, train him, and devise the explosive device, gather operational intelligence on the target, and guide the Shaheed on his mission.
The third circle is comprised of the associates, who give logistical assistance to the Shaheed and the operational team, and drive the Shaheed to the target.
And the last circle is the supporters who approve these kinds of attacks and create an atmosphere, which makes it possible for the Shaheed and his team to operate freely among them. The operational measures must focus simultaneously on all of these circles of activist.

Security Measures

Intelligence and operational measures alone are not sufficient. New security methods should be adopted, and action should be taken in order to prevent the Shaheed from reaching his target or getting inside the target.

Even a Shaheed may be deterred, or at least his plans may be obstructed. Increased protective measures and the exposure of the Shaheed before he has the opportunity to carry out the attack at the planned target may reduce the amount of damage caused by the Shaheed and perhaps even prevent the attack.

The security measures are the last link in the chain of thwarting terror attacks. But in the absence of sufficient intelligence or where the operational capability against the terrorists is limited, the importance of this last link in the chain becomes exceedingly high.

Psychological Measures

Another important facet of fighting suicide attacks, as mentioned before, is countering the moral damage of these attacks. Of foremost importance is the task of supporting and strengthening the civilian population in dealing with suicide attacks. It should be borne in mind that the main victims of terrorism in general and suicide attacks in particular are civilians, and it is they who are on the front line in the fight against such attacks.

States faced with suicide attacks must do whatever can be done to strengthen the spirit of the people and their feeling of security, and thus convey the message to the attacks that these attacks do not serve their goals. In this regard there must be cooperation between the administration, the media, decision makers and politicians, security personnel and other sectors, which can work together to lessen the psychological damage of the suicide attacks by means of propaganda and education.

Summary

Suicide attacks are the latest “fashion” in such unconventional attacks in the Middle East and other countries worldwide. However, just as in the past waves of terrorism waxed and waned, so too this wave of violence will eventually die out.

In contending with the phenomenon of suicide terrorism we should bear in mind that the suicide attack is not an act of a lone lunatic or unbalanced person who decides to attack as an act of revenge. Rather it is a well-planned terror attack, which demands extensive preparations and the involvement of a number of activists and leaders.

Therefore, countering this wave of attacks requires a combination of effective intelligence, operational activity, security and psychological measures combined with international cooperation in the fight against the organizations responsible for such attacks.