By Thomas R. Mockaitis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. 165 pp.

The British Army has participated in many “small wars”, and as a result has developed a degree of proficiency in counter-insurgency operations that is arguably lacking in the US Army, most notably during the Vietnam conflict.
Author Thomas R. Mockaitis, assistant professor of history at DePaul University in Chicago, first wrote about the uniquely British approach to internal was in British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960. This current volume continues that study by chronicling and dissecting for “post-imperial” campaigns — the Indonesian “confrontation”, South Arabia (Aden/Yemen), the Dhofar campaign in Oman, and Northern Ireland — which have taken place (or are still in progress) since 1960.
The first chapter describes the evolution of British defence policy and strategy after World War II. The economic decline, domestic concerns, and rising nationalism of those years made Britain realize its far-flung empire in Africa and Asia was no longer tenable. The British had considerable experience — both successful and unsuccessful — in “imperial policing,” but in this later period they had to refine their methods and expand their traditional “hearts-and-minds” campaign.
In each of the books four case studies, the campaign is narrated and British tactics and techniques described and assessed. The “confrontation” was a hybrid conflict, combining counter-insurgency with conventional military operations, and in Oman, British officers planned and conducted a British-style campaign. Both of these campaigns were successful. In South Arabia and Northern Ireland, the insurgency took place in both urban and rural environments. The former campaign was “an unequivocal defeat, “while the latter has continued with increasing ferocity since the introduction of regular troops into the fray in 1969. Other factors affecting the outcome of a counter-insurgency campaign include the availability of high technology and weapons, and the intensity of media coverage and its effect on public opinion.
In each of the book’s four campaign studies, the British took the sound principles developed during their colonial wars and adapted them to the changing circumstances of the post-colonial era. Three broad policy principles — use of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and tactical flexibility — highlight British counter-insurgency campaigns. This interesting and thought-provoking study of a timely topic is well worth reading.