Missile Envy & Nuclear India - Pakistan 2002

Eas Bokhari talks about the missile race in the South Asian Sub-continent.

Missile envy seems to have persisted in South Asia and has showed its ugly face eclectically. Just this week, there has been two launches of Pakistan SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile) ‘Shaheen’ and India has launched its air defence missile ‘Akash’, meaning sky in Hindi.
A little probing by an initiated reader will indicate that with India having general ascendancy in advanced and state of the art technology, India can be proactive in this business of missile fabrication and launch. Pakistan perforce must admit that its actions are reactive in nature. Again, when both these countries who have worked on derived and ‘reverse engineered’ ballistic missiles call their hardware as totally ‘indigenous’, I would not like to comment on this, and probably this claim is true to the extent that the names of these monsters are surely indigenous.
The Indians seem to be more explicit and they have invariably placed the potentials of their hardware in open press (and surely ‘Akash’ is strictly speaking not a ballistic missile), but the Pakistani have been somewhat cryptic. May be this stance on the part of Pakistani press is intentionally opaque.
As a free writer, and who has no access whatsoever to official documents or presentations on missile, I can best make the use of open press in assessing the potential of the newly launched Shaheen-I (and Shaheen-III, possibly.)
Surprisingly, and for the benefit of the readers on the arcane subject of missiles, which can be quite thrilling, most of this material presented is based on the writings of Dr Rodney W Jones who is an authority on WMD in South East Asia, and on the work of yet another glittering name in this business, Dr Anthony H. Cordesman who holds Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy Washington DC.
Yet another authoritative source in this matter is a recent presentation ‘Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defence in Asia ‘by Michael D. Swaine and Loren H Runyon (NBR Analysis, June 2002, The National Bureau of Asian Research Volume 13 No 3.)
The following passage about the ‘Shaheen Series’ appears to be pertinent in the analysis of Swaine and Runyon:
“.... The ‘Shaheen-I’ is a single stage, solid fueled SRBM. It was first test flown in April 1999. Analysts believe this missile may be related to the Chinese M-9, though there is a great deal of debate over this issue ...... The ‘Shaheen-II, believed to have been displayed on Annual Pakistan Day parade in March 2000 is a much longer range, road mobile two-stage, solid fueled, with a range of 2000-2500 Km (Kilometers) and a pay load of 1,000 Kg (Kilogrammes) ...... It would be able to strike any target in India...”
Here is another interesting note provided by the above authors. “There is considerable confusion surrounding the Pakistani missile projects developed with Chinese assistance. In addition to transferring complete missiles, the Chinese also set up a turnkey missile production plant in Pakistan. It is uncertain whether the Pakistanis have used the plant to produce copies of the M-IIs, Hatf-3, or more advanced missiles like the ‘Shaheen’ series. Because the characterists of the ‘Hatf-3’ and ‘Shaheen-I’ are unclear, it is not certain on which Chinese missile they are based. There are suspicions that the M-II, M-9 and M-18, or at least their technologies are involved in the ‘Shaheen’ missiles are exact Chinese M-Series replicas, licenced out to Pakistan, or also have some indigenously designed aspects. It may be that they are both imported and licenced versions...”
Unfortunately, our press has provided different and ambiguous performance of the ‘Shaheen-I’, and one of the Urdu papers ‘Pakistan’, Lahore has said in its issue of 03 October, that it can carry a 500 tonne warhead. (This surely can be confusing and may be for political consumption at the best.)
Analysts are however, agreed that the Chinese SRBMs i.e. DF-15 (US name CSS-6) otherwise called M-9, and the DF-II US Name CSS-7 and also called M-II were exclusively for export.
Apparently, M-II system was sold to China and may have certain sanctions imposed by US, therefore, the best guess could be the M-9 in this case. The potentials of this Chinese SRBM are as below:
According to the best sources there are about 160+ or so of these deployed in China. The missile has a range of 600 Km and a conventional warhead of 300 Kg. A mobile launch arrangement in the form of a TEL (mobile) exists for this missile. It is nuclear capable. Of course, it is solid fueled and is in Chinese service since 1995. The M-II is also in service in China since 1995.
Launch from the Mobile TEL takes about 30 minutes. It has a strap down inertial guidance, perhaps the best system of missile guidance currently available worldwide, with on board computer with terminal velocity correction. May be GPS guidance is also available. Four of these were fired in Taiwan Crisis in 1995. Three landed in the general target area, and one crashed prematurely. Four more were fired in Taiwan Crisis in 1996. These landed in general target area..... The book CEP of these is 300 Meters.
I suppose own is a very creditable missile performance and may further improve with improvement in technology, guidance and precision location like the GPS.
Finally, ballistic missiles have a considerable political clout and indicate national technological virility. A comparison of the known ballistic systems of India and Pakistan as existing before the present week, i.e. ending 12 October 2002 is indicated in the inset.

Nuclear-Capable Ballistic and Cruise Missiles - India and Pakistan, 2001

Missile Type Range Inventory Status Configuration Payload Supplier/ (Km) (Kg) Tech Source
India
Prithvi-1 (Army) 150 75 Deployed 1-Stg. Liquid mob 800 Russia/SA-2
Prithvi-1 (Navy) 150 ? Deployed 1-Stg. Liquid mob ? Russia/SA-2
Prithvi-2 (Army) 250 25 on order 1-Stg. Liquid mob 500 Russia/SA-2
Prithvi-3 (Air Force) 350 0 R&D 1-Stg. Liquid mob ? Russia/SA-2

Agni-1 1.200-1.500 ? Tested 2- Stg solid liquid 1000 US/Fr/Ger/Russia
Agni-2 2.500 6? Prototypes 2- Stg solid liquid 1000 US/Fr/Ger/Russia
Agni-3 3.000-4.500 ? R&D Testing 3- Stg 2 solid with 500 US/Fr/Ger/Russia
liquid 3rd Stg.

PJ-10. Yakhont/Brahmos 300 ? Tested Ramjet Cruise ? Joint-Russia/India
Lakshya 600 ? Development Cruise 450 Russia
Sagarika/Dhanush 250-300 N/A R&D Purchase? Naval Ballistic/cruise 450 Russia/SS-Xn-27?
Surya 12.000 N/A SLV conversion Multi-Stg. Liquid 500-750 ?

Pakistan
Hatf-2 280-300 30-50 Product/Storage 1-stg. Solid. Mob 500 PRC/M-11
Hatf-3 600 ? Production ? 1-stg. Solid. Mob 500 PRC/M-9
Hatf-4/Shahenn-1 750 ? Production ? 1-stg. Solid. Mob 500 PRC/M-9
Shaheen-2 800-1.200 ? R&D testing 2-Stag. Solid 400-500 PRC/M-18/dF-11?
Hatf-5/Ghauri-1 1.350-1.500 12 R&D Testing 1-stg. Liquid 500-700 dPRK/No-dong-1
Hatf-6/Ghauri-2 2.000-2.300 ? R&D testing 2-Stg. Liquid Star 700-1,000 dPRK/Taepo-dong-1
Ghauri=-3 (Abdali?) 3.000 ? R&D 2-Stg Liquid. Star 1000 dPRK/Taepo-dong-2

It is not easy to quantify and say with perfect conviction as to what is the calculus of nuclear tipped weapons with India and Pakistan. It is in fact a subject by itself and needs a separate treatment. Suffice it to say that both the countries possess these weapons and the most probable figure as available in the open press is 60 India and 20 Pakistan. This in fact is the proportion of the India Pakistan defence forces in general i.e. around 3 to 1 proportion.
This figure is worked out by writers on this dubious issue after finding out the quantity of fissionable material with India and Pakistan i.e. Plutonium in case of India and Uranium in case of Pakistan., and dividing the material by six and fifteen respectively. Some writers suggest a figure of ten in case of India. It is important to know that the Indians get on to their nuclear device via plutonium - and Pakistan adopts the uranium way.
According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2002 Construction at Kalpakkam of a new facility to produce plutonium is scheduled to begin soon. “This should boost the production of plutonium in India and nuclear devices too”.
The Indian National Security Council - established in April 1999 has set up a command and control system (like Pakistan). A widely publicised draft document on the Indian nuclear doctrine prepared by the 27 member National Security Advisory Board called for the creation of a “credible minimum deterrent “to be based” on a triad of aircraft, mobile and land-based missiles, and sea based assets.” These assets as are known in the open press and are as below:

Type/Description Range (Km) Pay Load (Kg) Notes

Aircraft
Mig-27 Flogger 800 4000 At Indian Air Base (Bahudur)
North of New Delhi.

Jaguar IS/IB
(Shamsher) 1600 4775 At Ambala Air Base.

Missiles

Prithvi 1 150 1,000 Deployed, may have a Nuclear role

Agni 1 1,500 1,000 Tested, Status not known.

Agni 11 2,000 1,000 Test fired January 2001 Deployment
expected Soon; a 700-Km range Version test launched 25 January

“While the Army and the Air Force fine-tune respective nuclear strategies, the Indian government has been considering a proposal to create a strategic nuclear force.................. The proposal followed a Group of Ministers report that recommend the creation of a chief of defence, who would act as military advisor to the prime minister on the management and control of nuclear weapons and strategic forces......”
During the year 2001- a year that ended in heightened tensions with Pakistan, Indian government’s officials reaffirmed India’s commitments to a nuclear no-first use policy.
The Indian Defence Ministry released a report detailing its plans to modernize its forces on 31 May 2001. This report also assessed security concerns. Not surprised singly, Pakistan’s support (perceived) of terrorist groups topped the list on December 13, both India and Pakistan mobilized their Armed Forces, India has reportedly positioned ‘Prithvi missiles’ near Pakistani border.
India — a number of aircraft types that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, but considering their range payload and speed, the most likely to be used are the MiG-27 and the Jaguar.
The MiG-27 Flogger is a nuclear capable Soviet aircraft with British Royal Air Force (1975-1985) and with the French Air Force (1974-1985). 91 such aircraft have been assembled at HAL. Indian and Ambala are part of Western Air Command, which is located at Palam. The aircraft are located there.
Some other Indian air assets like Su-30 K and Mirage 2000 H could be equipped to deliver nuclear bombs but are more likely to be used for air defence missions. In December 2000, India has signed a $ 3 Billion contract with Russia for licence production of 140 Su-30MK 1. Indigenous Su-30MKL will “enable the Air Force to finalise its vision 2020 long-term perspective planning..” The first Su-30MKL is scheduled to roll out in 2004. India may also lease a small number of Russian Tu22 Backfire bombers, and France has offered India to supply its new Rafale aircraft.
Of the two version of ‘Prithvi-I’ is assessed by CIA as having a nuclear role. The two stage ‘Agni’ IRBM has been tested to a range of 1500 Km but its status remains nuclear. Its first stage uses solid propellant taken from an SLV (Satellite Launch’ Vehicle) - on the US ‘Scout’ missile and the liquid fueled second stage is a shortened version of ‘Prithvi’. Agni-II with a range of some 2000 Km might well be nuclear capable. It has a time of flight of some II minutes. They say its CEP is only 100 meters, which appears very good accuracy, and the missile is likely to be inducted in the Army by 2001-2002.
A few words about the naval triad. India is currently working on at least two naval systems- the ‘Sagrika’ (Oceanic) and ‘Dhanush’ (Bow) - which may be equipped in future to carry nuclear weapons. ‘Sagrika’ is perhaps a SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) and may not be developed before 2100, ‘Dhanush’ is the naval version of the ‘Prithvi’.
ATV (Advanced Technology Vessel) a nuclear powered submarine project has been underway since 1985 when India leased the Soviet K class cruise missile submarine (Indian INS ‘Chakra’) from 1988-1991. A launch date of this project may well be around 2007.
In an attempt to jump-start this rather delayed project Vice Admiral RN Ganesh who commanded the ‘Chakra’ - was appointed director general of the ATV project in 2000.
Pakistan per force had to become a nuclear power to restore strategic balance in South Asia and to make up for its conventional shortages of forces vis-a-vis India. This reluctant nuclearisation is therefore, reactive and not proactive. As it is, there is a certain amount of opaqueness about the Pakistani nuclear programme and this short presentation is based on published material abroad. I am not going to discuss the security issue of the assets as this has been discussed almost threadbare some times back and President Musharraf made this historic remark during interview with Larry King of CNN on 22 October 2001 when he said “.. There is no question of (Pakistan’s nuclear assets) falling into the hands of any fundamentalists.” I shall only try to put before the readers a glimpse of the nuclear infrastructure and the assets.
During the last 25 years or so, Pakistan has developed an extensive nuclear weapons complex. “Before its nuclear tests in May 1998, successive Pakistani governments tried to hide many aspects of its nuclear weapons programme while simultaneously revealing enough to convince India and the rest of the world that it had workable nuclear weapons.”
Consequently, the public is only aware of the basic fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state and has little information about the complex of nuclear weapons making facilities.
Typically, these activities include research, development and testing of nuclear weapons; the production of plutonium and highly enriched Uranium (HEU), the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and facilities for mating nuclear weapons to delivery systems, including aircraft and ballistic missiles. Nuclear weapons complex are composed of a myriad of facilities and are linked together to function as a unit through transport of materials and manufactured items, personnel and communication system. A central competent leadership is critical for control over nuclear weapons themselves.
Pakistan has the capability to produce both plutonium (Pu) and HEU fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Its main uranium, enrichment facilities are at the AQ Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta. Pakistan also has another, newer, enrichment facility near Wah, “which the US Government calls the Gadwal uranium enrichment plant,” Pakistan may have other production, scale facilities. Pakistan has also operated smaller enrichment facilities, including the Sihala and Golra ultracentrifuge plants. Most of these facilities would be expected to have HEU and low enriched uranium stocks.
As far as plutonium is concerned Pakistan can make weapon grade Pu through the operation of the Khushab reactor which is estimated to generate about 50 Megawatt of power, large enough to produce Pu for a few nuclear weapons per year.
Separation of plutonium is reported to occur at New Labs at Rawalpindi (near Islamabad.) This plant which is next to PINSTECH is large enough to handle all the irradiated fuel from the Khushab reactor. Storage arrangements and vaults for the separated Pu cannot be found out and confirmed.
At the end of 1999, the Institute for Science and International Security assesses that Pakistan possessed 585 to 800 Kg of weapon grade HEU, and 1.7 to 13 Kg of separated plutonium. These quantities are considered sufficient for 30 to 50 nuclear bombs or warheads.
Pakistan maintains facilities to produce metallic fissile material and to shape the metal into nuclear weapons components. Such facilities would have fissile material in liquid, powder and solid forms.
Other facilities produce the non-nuclear components and at least partially assemble the nuclear weapons. It is thought that some of these are perhaps near Wah. It is unknown whether all the available fissile material has been converted to nuclear weapons, perhaps not.
“One would expect that relatively large quantities of HEU are not in the form of partially assembled nuclear weapons and would be in the process in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. This amount translated into nuclear weapon equivalent must be subtracted from the estimate of 30 to 50 nuclear weapons....”
It is widely reported that Pakistan has not deployed its nuclear weapons. What that means exactly is not quite clear from the existing literature... For example the definition of deployment is that the weapons have been transferred to military units for storage and rapid mating with delivery systems at military bases deployment areas. “The situation in Pakistan may be murky and may in fact best be described as partial deployment...”
Pakistan has several nuclear weapons storage facilities in and near the military bases in tunnels mines.
By and large the Pakistan nuclear weapons are implosion type design and are stored with their fissile core separated from the non-nuclear components. This arrangement may reflect safety limitations as compared with South African weapons where the front and the back sections were stored separately.
“The simplest interpretation of the available information is that the fissile core and the rest of the device are stored separately in vaults. However, it is also possible that the weapon minus the fissile core is mounted on the delivery vehicle, and the fissile core is stored separately.... This arrangement would potentially allow more rapid deployment of the nuclear arsenal in time of crisis with India.”
Pakistan nuclear weapons are not thought to be “one-point-safe” with permissive action links (PALs) as defined by the United States. Again the necessary coded switch devices for the Pakistani delivery system that would impede unauthorized person for carrying out strikes cannot be found in contemporary open press.

Table 1. Nuclear-Capable Strike and Reconnaissance Aircraft India and Pakistan - 2000

Aircraft Type Operating Radius Inventory Supplier
(Km unrefueled)
India
Modern Su-30 MK 1,200 40 Russia
Mirage 2000H/TH 1,475 35 France/UK
Jaguar S(I) 900 88 France/UK
Mig-29 (Fulcrum) 630 64 Russia
Vintage
MiG-21 MF/PFMA 250 69 Russia
MiG-23 BN/UM 350 53 Russia
MiG-27 (Flogger) 390 147 Russia
Strategic (Long-Ranger)
Tu-142 (Bear F) ASW 6,200 8 Russia
Ilyushin-38 (merit recon) 3,600 5 Russia
Tu-22M (Backfire) 4,430 4 Russia

Total 513

Pakistan
Modern
F-16 A/B 850 25 US
Vintage
Mirage IIIEP 500 16 France
Mirage 5 500 52 France

Total 93

As I have said earlier on, Pakistan appears to emphasize the need to keep its storage locations secret for obvious reasons.
In USA and Russia nuclear storage is particularly distinctive because of extensive security arrangements such as fences, towers, guards and bunkers which are visible in overhead surveillance.
Of sure, Pakistan has a range of facilities for testing and development of nuclear weapons. Little is known of the transportation arrangements for sensitive nuclear items in Pakistan. The type of transport containers or vehicles, or the extent of armed escort is unknown. Pakistan’s transportation vehicles are unlikely to be of the calibre of the Department of Energy’s (USA) safe-secure transport system.
Finally, for obvious reasons, the Pakistan military controls the nuclear weapons themselves and has instituted a range of measures to tighten controls over the nuclear weapons complex. Military is perhaps least corrupt, and most professional part of Pakistani society.
Indo-Pakistan nuclearisation is an extremely emotive topic and I do not want to stick my neck out except where the topic has been covered in the open press.
All the same some of the more pertinent conclusions of this frenzy are covered in the paragraphs that follow:

* In testing nuclear weapons as de facto nuclear weapon states in May 1998, India and Pakistan both espoused nuclear restraint. Their senior officials soon embraced the language of “minimum credible detererence.” India declared a “no-first-use” nuclear posture soon after the tests. Pakistan declined to rule out first-use options for reasons explained below.

* India’s official statements did not identify nuclear adversaries, leaving open which national arsenals or threats it would use as reference points to define its own nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear force size. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to US President Clinton, however, alluded to China as a neighbouring nuclear threat. China and Pakistan are India’s known rivals and probably Indian nuclear weapon planners’ main reference points.

* Pakistani nuclear declaratory statements are clear that India is regarded as its sole nuclear adversary and thus the focus of its nuclear deterrent.

* Although the term “minimum” rapidly became a fixture of the public nuclear discourse in South Asia, neither India nor Pakistan officially clarified what the term “minimum” means, leaving this open to speculation. Does “minimum” imply the sufficiency of small numbers of nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons held in reserve? Low readiness or alert rates of a nuclear force? Renunciation of nuclear war fighting? Mainly counter-value targeting? Or does the term “minimum” merely make a virtue of today’s facts of life in the subcontinent-limited resources, scarce weapons material, unproved delivery systems, and still undeveloped technical military capabilities?

* Neither India nor Pakistan overtly deployed nuclear forces after the 1998 tests, nor was known to have done so by October 2001, when this assessment was prepared. By not deployed, we mean neither state was believed to have mated nuclear weapons with delivery systems on standby status, ready for immediate alert or use upon central command.

* Judging potential nuclear arsenal size even for a non-deployed force is feasible if enough is known about fissile material production. India’s and Pakistan’s “dedicated weapon facilities” continue to produce fissile material. Their outputs can be thought of as “nuclear weapon equivalents” (NWEs). Although the actual number of operational weapons in either’s arsenal is not known, analysis suggests that India has, and probably will retain, a significant lead over Pakistan. We estimate India had over 100 NWEs from its dedicated facilities by 2000-at least twice and perhaps three times as many as Pakistan. India’s NWEs from dedicated facilities are far fewer than China’s estimated arsenal of about 450 weapons. By appropriating fissile material from its un-safeguarded civilian power reactors, however, India could reach a potential of several hundred NWEs, exceeding estimates of China’s operational nuclear stockpile.

* The risk of nuclear war in South Asia is significant and not to be taken lightly. The potential for nuclear crisis instability is inherent in the conventional military imbalance between Pakistan and India. India’s steadily growing conventional military superiority over Pakistan, coupled with Pakistan’s geographic vulnerabilities to preemptive conventional air strikes and rapid invasion, and the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear forces are smaller, means that Pakistan could be driven to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict with India. Pakistan’s nuclear posture preserves a nuclear first-use option by default and therefore, reflects these military and geographic asymmetries.

* For bilateral deterrence, India and Pakistan both have nuclear-capable aircraft that could be put on alert and used for nuclear delivery on short notice. Both have acquired ballistic missile delivery systems, although the combat readiness of the missiles is not altogether clear. India’s missile development programme aims to develop an intermediate range ballistic missile capable of reaching Chinese cities, but a ready force of such missiles does not now exist. If forced to improvise, India has a few long-range aircraft that could be used to reach China’s interior with nuclear payloads. India’s tactical strike aircraft could also be used, but only on a one-way flight profile.

* While Pakistan has no officially stated strategic or tactical nuclear doctrines, technical considerations and writings by experts suggest that its core nuclear strategy is to hold Indian cities hostage by counter-value targeting, against a conventional Indian invasion or preemptive air attack that could threaten Pakistan’s defences with collapse.
* India has declined to elaborate nuclear policy and doctrine beyond a second-strike retaliatory posture, evidently on the grounds that its capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons should deter nuclear attack absolutely. But India’s officially convened National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) recommended that India rely on a posture of credible minimum deterrence. The term credible is a much more demanding criterion than “minimum deterrence” might imply by itself. The NSAB recommended India procure a triad of air, ground and sea-based nuclear delivery systems along with robust command and control and space assets to ensure the survivability of retaliatory forces and a capability for a rapid response after any imaginable nuclear first strike. It also recommended that India achieve the capacity for proactive conventional military response to nuclear threats. These recommendations stopped short only of a nuclear war fighting capability, strategic missile defence, and extended deterrence.

* While the Indian government declined to treat these Advisory Board recommendations as official policy, and experts acknowledged that they would be very costly to implement, the actual profile of Indian defence research and development and military technology acquisition closely parallels the Advisory Board’s recommendations. This implies that India probably will follow the main recommendations in defining requirements and building nuclear forces, but do so gradually within its limited resources. Over time, this could lead to an expansive nuclear strategy and force structure, with a capacity to respond in a graduated or massive fashion to potential nuclear threats from all directions.

* If India’s nuclear strategy and forces evolve along these ambitious lines, they would not constitute a “minimum deterrence” posture, as that term is generally understood.

* While it is unlikely that Pakistan could achieve or maintain nuclear parity with India, Pakistan probably will enlarge and diversify its nuclear inventory to make its own forces survivable, as prerequisites for confidence in a secure second-strike capability against India. This also implies that Pakistan will pursue a strategy and acquisitions in the near term that exceed what outsiders might believe is sufficient, based on a commonsense understanding of “minimum deterrence.” Outsiders tend to perceive India as a status quo power, but this is not the prevailing view in Pakistan.

* Indian and Pakistani officials profess that they expect to avoid nuclear arms racing. Once the facts are examined, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they have been in an arms race that will continue, albeit with continued conditions of asymmetry and at a pace that is limited by resource constraints.

* On nuclear command and control systems, Pakistan and India followed different paths after declaring themselves nuclear weapon states in May 1998. In 1999, Pakistan set up a national command authority for decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons, together with a joint-service command and control hierarchy for military planning, management, custody, development, and control of nuclear weapons, making this known in early 2000. While Pakistan thus served notice that it is militarily prepared to execute nuclear missions, the prevailing evidence is that its nuclear weapons and delivery systems still are not deployed in the field or ready for prompt use.

* India evidently left the articulation of a formal nuclear command and control system in abeyance after May 1998. Ultimate authority on decisions to use nuclear weapons probably resides with the Prime Minister in cabinet. Custody of nuclear weapons apparently stayed with the Department of Atomic Energy, under the nuclear scientific establishment that developed the weapons. Control was not transferred to the Indian military services. Nuclear-capable aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, such as the Prithvi, are in service with the Indian Air Force and Army. India’s longer-range nuclear-capable missiles such as the Agni, however, are still in the research and development process under the Defence Research and Development Organisation, are believed not to be in serial production, and secure deployment in silos or on rail-mobile launchers-concepts that have been discussed-probably is years away.

* India has had active programmes in air defence and has been acquiring high altitude Russian SAM systems that may have some tactical anti-ballistic missile capability. Pakistan has a less robust high-altitude air defence programme but is seeking new capabilities in this area as well.

* Kargil was the first unambiguous case of crisis management between India and Pakistan as nuclear-armed rivals. It sobered Indian nuclear experts who had assumed India’s “minimum nuclear deterrent” would contain Pakistan absolutely. Kargil indicated to the outside world that there is a high risk of nuclear conflict in the subcontinent. The experience may have strengthened Pakistani advocates of the view that the nuclear deterrent is an instrument only of the last resort. Kargil clarified an Indian view that nuclear deterrence does not preclude conventional conflict.