On and about a national government

Columnist M B NAQVI writes about national consensus.

There are several noble sounding proposals of a national government being sold in the name of national reconciliation. It all sounds high minded and unselfish. Two politicians are out in front of this campaign: Millat Party chief, Farooq Leghari and the Chief of PPP Parliamentarians Makhdoom Amin Fahim. As for its practical particulars, it is going to ignore the issues that divide and seeks to unite all the main parties in the Parliament by giving them representation in the much desired government-to-be.
It is being earnestly argued that the nation is faced with a critical situation. National unity is supposed to be the need of the hour, as continued differences and partisan struggles will cause unspecified but terrible harm to the nation. But if PML (QA), National Alliance, PPPP, MMA, MQM etc agree to serve on the proposed national government —- necessarily without raising any partisan demands that may not be acceptable to any of these parties or, more to the point, to the President —- something good or great will happen. What this will be is not explained. But it can be found out by examining the controversial demands that can prevent the formation of national government. But of that presently.
Let’s first look at the peculiarities of the pre-government-making situation in the National Assembly that has come into being as a result of the announced poll results. The latter presents a fragmented House in the sense that no single party has a majority to be able to form a government. The PML(QA) has 77 seats, PPPP with 63 seats, MMA with 51 seats, NA has 13, MQM 14, PML(F) 4 and several tiny parties. Now, the state of feeling between PML of all description and PPPP has never been good; their working together in a possible theoretical government, with some outside support that is always available to a government once formed, is not on the cards.
MMA is radically opposed to all Presidential policies and dealing with it can occasion a risk. No one knows how will Gen. Pervez Musharraf treat it in the light of the alarms that have gone off in the west over the rise of MMA as an important parliamentary actor. There is, however, much temperamental and historical compatibility between all PMLs and MMA; the two, with smaller friends, can arithmetically form a government. But there is the current difficulty: MMA has campaigned on an anti-American plank and the military regime is bound hand and foot to the American chariot. MMA demands that the President should get himself elected, have his Constitutional amendments approved from Parliament in accordance with the standard methodology —- while obtaining the de rigeur indemnification of the Oct 12, 1999 coup d’etat. PMLs and Musharraf lovers want such issues to be assumed as having been disposed of on April 26 and August 21 last; their very mention, or of the American policy, is embarrassing to them. Well, the MMA can scarcely fail to raise them. Thus PMLs alliance with MMA is out —- unless MMA can be talked out of its basic stance —- which may not be impossible.
While do gooder-seeming Leghari and Amin Fahim may earnestly plead the case of a national government —- with a view to either gentleman making himself the PM —- its chances of coming into being are slim. Let’s take just one issue of foreign policy; the ties with the US that now obtain. What view of it can a national government have that will contain PML(QA) and National Alliance, on the one hand, and MMA and PPPP, on the other. Such a national government can accept General Musharraf’s existing policies only under extreme coercion and governments do not work under such coercion. Can the President, who has the power to dismiss the lot, allow a government to talk about throwing the Americans (soldiers) out of Pakistan? No way.
Take another issue, the gut issue for Gen. Musharraf, about Constitutional Amendments including the setting up of a National Security Council and Article 58(2)(b) as parts of the Constitution. Many in the MMA and PPPP are sure to regard Gen. Musharraf’s actions —- the April 26 Referendum, August 21 Constitutional Amendments, particularly the provisions about dismissing the NA and governments and NSC formation —- illegal and void. The moment such people or parties enter the government they endanger the survival of the new system. Gen. Musharraf will feel obliged to send the whole elected system home, using his Article 58(2)(b) powers.
True, Gen. Musharraf will see as to what that will do to Pakistan’s image and its relations with the west as a whole. He might be able to obtain an understanding of sorts from the US; the latter needs Pakistan too badly to withhold it or so it seems. But EU, Australia, Canada, Japan and others have no such motivation. Most of them are Pakistan’s donors. Musharraf government cannot go against the wishes of the west as a whole; the pre-eminence of the US over them means that Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre for courting MMA is small.
General Musharraf has also to worry about his rear as much as his flanks. His rear is armed forces. There should be a limit to what they will settle down to accept. Musharraf, objectively speaking, is the first military ruler who is in fact a delegate from a college of senior Army generals, which can be called the High Command, a term with obvious political overtones. His regime is not a Martial Law, enforced by all armed forces under the Army Act, which has to be ordered by competent authority: the President. October 12, 1999 coup was one by senior generals who chose Gen. Musharraf, the senior most general, to head the regime. Insofar as the senior Army generals are serious about keeping the government under their surveillance —- to be changed or taken over, when they so conclude —- it is a moment of Crisis.
A new National Assembly has been elected. Many in it nurture rebellious sentiments. It is also badly split, as perhaps some of the generals initially preferred. What if it rejects their supremacy? It is also a moment of truth for the Army High Command, as it is for Gen. Musharraf. What if no government can be formed, or, if formed, it may not work beyond a few months. Even the possible formation of a government may require an effort by intelligence agencies, though without any guarantee of success.
Outsiders have no way of knowing how the generals read the situation. One can assume one of their major interests: they would like their American connection to remain intact. If this assessment is correct, they will see everything through this prism. If the civilians can deal with the Americans better —- as the Americans may have suggested —- the new ‘sustainable democracy’ was thus ordered. But now even the Yanks will be ready to rethink their love of democracy, if it delivers MMA. From their viewpoint this electoral exercise may not have provided positive results. So, nobody need be surprised if this set of Assemblies turn out to have a short life.
Well, no one need run away with the notion that most of the trouble is due to the rise of the MMA —- largely a creation of the powers that be. Only the unintended effect is unwelcome; MMA, under its own momentum is going to go too far out of the desired red line. But powers that be know its constituents rather well, having worked with them for long. Over time, they can turn the MMA constituents around their fingers. If it is more convenient to make do with this set of Assemblies, the High Command will ensure that a national government comes into being at the centre and suitable combinations of analogous governments in the provinces will take over. But can they last long.
The task before generals —- one general at the top cannot alone do it adequately —- is to manage the unruly politicians, many of whom want to end Army’s political role altogether, while staying in line with basic thinking of the Americans in foreign policy, keeping up a controlled degree of confrontation with India and stay the straight and narrow economic course required by IMF. This is an old formula. But with the passage of time it is becoming ever harder to work it through fractious civilians. Maybe the Army may soon begin feeling that it has to shoulder the responsibility of running the government itself.
The new National Assembly cannot but be unaware of this trend of thought. May be Leghari, Amin Fahim and other advocates of a national government have this in mind. The danger to the new NA is clear and present. It is up to the parties to decide what is preferable: a big effort to send the Army to its barracks or to compromise and temporise in or through a national government —- which in any case will be no great shakes.