Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy in South Asia

Air Commodore (Retd) JAMAL HUSSAIN gives a detailed exposition of nuclear forces in the region.

Impact of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
The development and deployment of nuclear weapons in the Indian Sub-Continent both by India and Pakistan has brought about fundamental changes in the concept of use of force for the conduct of war or maintenance of peace in the region. India and Pakistan are undergoing a process that the two super powers went through during the Cold War period. There are similarities and differences in the equation confronted by USA and USSR between 1950 to 1990 that led to their respective nuclear doctrines and that being faced by India and Pakistan after 1998. Nuclear deterrence between the two super powers after W W-II till the break up of USSR has been credited with prevention of any conflict of the nature or magnitude of the two great wars of the 20th century, although it failed to prevent violent regional conflicts between non-nuclear states where in many instances the two super powers were deeply involved by actively supporting one against the other. Korean War, Vietnam War and to a large extent the Arab-Israel wars are prime examples. On the other hand, the nuclear policies followed by the USA and USSR led to a mind-boggling proliferation of nuclear weapons by both the antagonists. While USA, with its more robust economy was able to sustain the heavy financial burden, USSR’s economy and with it USSR itself collapsed in the 1990s as the defence expenditure in which the nuclear aspect had a healthy share was too heavy for its economy to sustain.
The nuclear arms race during the cold war period was conducted in uncharted waters where there were no precedents to refer to for guidance. Both India and Pakistan are fortunate in this respect as the experiences of USA and USSR in this field are available. For peace, stability and progress in South Asia, the nuclear capability attained at a huge cost by both the countries must function as weapons of conflict avoidance, rather than of mass destruction.

Are Nuclear Weapons Merely Very Powerful Bombs
To be able to comprehend the elements of a nuclear strategy, the nature of nuclear weapons has to be understood. Are they merely very powerful bombs? According to Andre’ Beaufre, “the nuclear weapons, allied to modern means of delivery, is not, as it has sometimes been termed, a weapon similar to the rest, merely more powerful”1. He further argues that its power alone puts it in a category different from anything known hitherto: a 20 kilo ton nuclear bomb produces an explosion equivalent to four million field guns while a single one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb’s explosive power equals two hundred million field guns. The effect of the explosion is augmented by the fall-out; and this vast explosive capacity can be launched and directed by a very small number of men and the delivery means make it possible to attack and decimate any point on the earth’s surface. This is nothing less than a complete revolution2.
The effects of nuclear weapons go far beyond its destructive power alone. Depending upon its burst height, its fall-outs will contaminate hundreds of square miles making them unsafe for human habitation for a length of time. The fireball and blast will kill all living things within a given area and maim countless others over a much bigger one. If the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is any guide (and there were small 20 KT or less atomic bombs), those dead were the more fortunate ones. The fall-out of radiation lasted for more than a generation. Today’s nuclear weapons, especially thermo-nuclear ones are likely to cause severe damage to the entire earth’s atmosphere and environment. A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan for example would first decimate the cities/areas where they have been dropped, killing millions of Indians and Pakistanis in the process. Second, its radiation will affect very large areas surrounding the bombed site. Depending on the nature of explosion and the prevailing high altitude wind pattern, nearly all the neighbouring states will be adversely affected by the radiation fall-outs. And finally, these explosions would set in motion climatic changes that would affect the entire globe. As can be seen, nuclear weapons exchange between India and Pakistan does not remain a bilateral issue any more: it affects the entire world. The very scale and nature of destruction caused by nuclear weapons make them abhorrent and repugnant to human nature, making its use extremely unlikely. A nation or an individual has to be crazy or absolutely desperate to contemplate its use. Herein, lies its strength and weakness: strength, as its mere possession by one side would act as a great deterrence for the other to commit open aggression against it; weakness, as any miscalculation by either side can spell doomsday for the region.
Nuclear weapons are not just very powerful bombs. The massive destruction a single bomb can bring about together with its ability to affect other regions far and wide for a considerable length of time make them different from conventional weapons. Nuclear strategy therefore is very different to any other form of conventional warfare strategy, which the humankind has been practicing since inception.

Forms of Nuclear Strategy
When confronted with an adversary possessing nuclear weapons, a state has four possible options3:

(a) Preventive destruction of adversary’s nuclear weapons (direct offensive method).
(b) Develop ability to intercept enemy’s nuclear weapons in transit (defensive method).
(c) Build physical protection against the effects of nuclear explosions (further defensive method).
(d) Possess similar retaliatory capability (indirect offensive method).

Preventive Destruction of Enemy’s Nuclear Arsenal
This should be the most favoured option provided the nation has the ability to take out all the nuclear weapons including the production and launching bases with a very high degree of assurance. In the beginning of the cold war, USA had considerable military superiority over USSR whose nuclear weapons and means of delivery were limited. They could be pinpointed and destroyed. Annihilation tactics were worked out the essential feature of which was a sound nuclear fire plan providing for every known objective to be attacked. However, USSR was quick to respond to the threat. Increase in production of nuclear weapons, their wide dispersion and development of additional delivery means through ballistic missiles resulted in the inability of USA to ensure complete destruction of USSR’s nuclear assets through a pre-emptive strike. The strategy of preventive destruction was soon abandoned.4

Develop Ability to Intercept Enemy’s Nuclear Weapons in Transit
With the option of preventive destruction being no more feasible, USA concentrated on developing the ability to intercept enemy’s nuclear weapons in transit. A chain of radars and interceptors were deployed for the purpose. For as long as USSR’s delivery means remained aircraft based, a reasonable guarantee of preventing the Soviet nuclear bombers reaching USA’s mainland could be given. However, with the induction of ballistic missiles, it has become extremely difficult, in fact impossible, to achieve and maintain an adequate level of efficiency. In other words a number of enemy’s nuclear weapons would be able to penetrate the defensive shield. The strategy of interception of enemy’s nuclear weapons in transit could not be adopted in isolation.5

Build Physical Protection Against Effects of Nuclear Explosions
This is an extension of the defensive strategy. Before the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, it appeared that there were certain possible solutions: underground protection, dispersion, mobility, and protection by concrete etc. None of these methods provided absolute protection, but they held out the hopes of reducing the effect of nuclear attacks considerably. With the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of such measures has reduced considerably. Moreover, the expenditure for even a rich nation like USA would be so astronomical as to make the whole concept non-viable6. This strategy on its own cannot work; although some form of preventive measures for the command and control system to survive an enemy’s pre-emptive nuclear attack would still be an absolute requirement.

Possess Similar Retaliatory Capability
With the efficacy of the first three strategies remaining uncertain and changeable, the only true protection against a nuclear threat will be in the form of possessing retaliatory capability of similar or greater magnitude. This is the first and simplest form of the deterrent strategy; the object is to exert a direct effect upon the will power of the enemy without having to proceed to a trial of strength in order to do so. All nuclear strategies that have developed so far and that are continuing to develop are based on this general idea but have become more and more complex and more and more subtle.7
These four forms of reaction have been concurrently used by USA/USSR during the cold war period with varying degree of success and have ultimately been combined into an extremely complex strategic theory.

Lessons from the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy During the Cold War Period
The Cold War period lasted roughly from the end of W W-II till the disintegration of USSR around 1990. The development of nuclear strategy can be roughly divided into five phases that witnessed an almost obscene nuclear arms race between the two super powers, which eventually led to the downfall of one. These phases are covered in the subsequent chapters.

Phase I. During W W II, USA along with UK were allies with USSR in their war against Germany. At the end of the war, their conflicting ideologies (Capitalism vs. Communism) turned them into bitter enemies even before the demolition of Germany was completed. Both sides attempted to bring Continental Europe under their ideological influence and the end of W W-II saw Europe divided into two distinct groups: Western Europe under the influence of USA and Eastern Europe under the influence of Soviet Union. While a stalemate appeared to have been reached, it was at best looked upon as a temporary truce with each side attempting to enhance their influence further. Following the end of the war, USSR did not really demobilize and still had very large land and air forces compared to the combined forces of western European states. Using an operational strategy that was partly military and partly revolutionary, she was capable of subverting and taking over the rest of Europe. At this stage while USA’s nuclear capacity was still in the embryonic stage, the Americans had already demonstrated the awesome destructive power of atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. USSR as yet did not possess this capability. According to some, one of the reasons for USA to use atomic weapons against Japan was to send a clear signal to USSR, to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union even before the demise of the German and Japanese empires. The threat of Western Europe being militarily overrun by USSR was real and USA countered it by the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ through the use of nuclear strikes. Besides building up of the shattered European economy with the aid of Marshal Plan, USA shipped to Europe atomic bombs and nuclear carriage capable aircraft. A complete network of bases was established on the periphery based on the radius of action of the nuclear bomber B-36.8 This strategy checkmated the Soviet political and military machine. The nuclear deterrence effectively halted the Soviet drive in Europe.

Phase II. In the second phase, initially USSR could reply only by a defensive deterrent strategy combined with a counter-offensive in the field of indirect strategy (Korea). Since USSR did not yet possess its own nuclear devices, the deterrent was based primarily on the psychological front, led by the anti-nuclear campaign by the peace congress. Very soon, however, thanks to an unprecedented scientific and espionage effort, USSR was successful in manufacturing their own atomic weapons whose delivery means were also developed by copying the US B-36 bombers. USSR then had a rudimentary nuclear strike force. At the same time, she further enhanced her defensive strategy by enhancing her air defence system by setting up a radar chain and deploying complementary fighter interceptors. USA reacted to this strategy by increasing the threat retaliation. This was all the more necessary as Western European rearmament was slow and their conventional forces were still considered inadequate to meet the Soviet Union’s conventional threat. During the period (1955-56), despite development and deployment of USSR air defence systems, the American nuclear bombers of the B-47 and
B-52 class and later on B-58 had the capability of penetrating the Soviet air defence umbrella. American nuclear superiority remained unchallenged which forced USSR to call off its indirect campaigns in Indo-China and Korea.9

Phase III. This phase witnessed the fast bridging of gap in the field of nuclear deterrence by USSR. By then they also were in possession of thermo-nuclear devices, which along with a not inconsiderable strike element and an improved air defence system to a degree neutralized USA’s nuclear superiority and with it, USA’s deterrence. USSR resumed their indirect counter-offensive in the Middle East and in North Africa. After lengthy debates, USA opted to construct gigantic anti-aircraft defence system covering continental USA, developed inter-continental bombers based in fortress America (remaining out of range of any USSR’s pre-emptive strikes) and deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. These measures did achieve temporary stabilization but subsequent events brought out the inadequacies and shortcoming of the policy.10 A nuclear arms race between the two super powers in its true sense had begun.

Phase IV. By 1957 USSR was in possession of inter-continental ballistic missile and had launched its first satellite in space. Shortly thereafter, they demonstrated in trials that both the accuracy and yield of their nuclear weapons were high. They were on the point of catching up and overtaking the Americans in the deterrent strategy because the American air defence system set up at a tremendous cost provided little protection against the nuclear tipped Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles. Simultaneously, USSR upgraded their air defence network and equipped their land forces to fight an offensive war by providing them with tactical nuclear weapons and completely motorizing them. They now appeared to be in a position where they could get the better of American strategy in all fields. USSR re-opened the Berlin problem and directly challenged USA in Congo and Cuba. USA responded quickly by first closing the missile gap and launching their own space programme. While the strategy of massive retaliation remained valid, USA now adopted the strategy of graduated deterrence, the object being to obtain a balance in all fields-nuclear, conventional and indirect. Polaris and Minuteman missiles were developed and soon USA was able to develop the ‘TRIAD’ capability where it could launch nuclear strikes (pre-emptive or retaliatory) by aircraft, ballistic missiles (ground based) or submarine launched missiles. Simultaneously, the conventional defence of Western Europe was enhanced and it was given a further boost by developing a strong air transported reserve of conventional forces based in continental USA. USA’s missile forces soon overtook those of USSR’s and all intelligence sources agreed that the Soviet inter-continental strike forces were still of limited capacity and adequate for only ‘counter city’ and not for counter force tactics while the American missile system because of the superiority in numbers and accuracy gave them the counter force capability. At this point, apparently in an effort to close the missile gap, USSR attempted to deploy their medium range missiles in Cuba. This action would have made it possible for them to adopt ‘counter force’ tactics against USA by bringing the strategic air command’s air assets and USA’s continental based ballistic missiles under threat. USA’s reaction was restrained yet firm and immediate.11 They demanded an immediate withdrawal of any such missiles from Cuba: an ultimatum was given that should USSR fail to comply, military action would be initiated against Cuba, which could easily escalate into a nuclear exchange between the two super powers. This was the ‘Cuban Crisis’ that brought USA and USSR at the brink of a nuclear war. Because of USA’s overall superiority, USSR backed down and the crisis was averted.

Phase V. This phase initially witnessed an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear assets of both the super powers with each side trying to match and outdo the other in the nuclear field. By the end of 1970, it became clear to the US strategists that economically, they were far better placed to absorb the heavy burden of the nuclear arms race as compared to USSR. The Americans had also gained a decisive technological edge over USSR and as a result the latter was always attempting to catch up with the former in this race. USSR’s economy, which was far less robust than the American one was coming under severe pressure because of the excessive burden of defence. This was further aggravated by USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Americans used this opportunity to wage a proxy war with the help of Afghan Mujahideen, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. USSR was bled white and eventually was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan. In the meantime, USA under President Ronald Reagan stepped up the ante by promoting the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) that envisaged a near ‘fool proof’ defensive system against ballistic missile threat through the use of advanced anti-missile and laser technology, which also was nicknamed ‘Star Wars’. That such a defensive shield was still beyond the scope of the technology of 1980s, appeared to have been lost on USSR and instead it forced her to spend more on its nuclear arsenal to maintain its nuclear defence deterrence capability. A combination of factors in which the disastrous Afghanistan campaign and unsustainable defence expenditure played a major role eventually led to the collapse of Soviet economy and with it, USSR’s entity. USSR broke up into a number of independent states and the much-reduced Russia was no more a world super power. USA from 1990 onwards has become the sole super power, a position it has managed to hold till the present (2002),
A review of the five phases indicates that a nuclear arms race between two rivals would invariably result in vast expenditure of wealth without a full guarantee of security. The end result would either be a nuclear war or the economic bankruptcy of either one or both the contestants, unless the two sides agree to an arms limitation. Andre Beaufre made this prediction in the 1960s, which has since come true with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Pakistan and India have appeared to embark on a similar journey albeit at a much smaller scale. For Pakistan especially, it is imperative that its nuclear doctrine and strategy are based on sound and realistic grounds so as to avoid the fate suffered by USSR.

Prevailing Environment in South Asia
While it is imperative for both Pakistan and India to learn from the evolutionary process of nuclear strategy of USA and USSR during the cold war period to avoid making the mistakes committed by them, the geo-strategic differences in their nuclear environment and the one that exists in South Asia must be kept in mind. Unlike the two super powers Pakistan and India do not possess their sophisticated monitoring systems, which made their deterrence more stable. Also, USA and USSR did not share a common border, in fact they were widely separated and they were never directly involved in any armed conflict with each other in their fifty years animosity, preferring wars of proxy to achieve their political objectives. By contrast, Pakistan and India have a long common border and an unresolved territorial dispute over which they have already fought two inconclusive wars.
Before considering the options of a nuclear doctrine for Pakistan, a brief look at the prevailing environment would be useful.

(a) Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers with limited number of nuclear bombs. Numbers vary but most credit India to have between two to three times the numbers held by Pakistan.
(b) Neither side has demonstrated the capability to manufacture thermo-nuclear devices though both must be striving to achieve it. Also both sides have the capacity to develop tactical nuclear weapons.
(c) Delivery means are primarily based on ballistic missiles. Aircraft delivery capability also exists. Efforts to develop and incorporate submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) appear to be the next logical step both sides are working towards.
(d) Despite rhetoric, neither side has the capability or the will to annex each other’s territory, the disputed territory of Kashmir being the only exception. Till a just settlement of the Kashmir issue, conventional armed conflict of limited scale with the risk of escalation to a full scale conventional war eventually leading to a nuclear exchange remains a nightmarish reality.
(e) Indian conventional forces are superior to those of Pakistan, which may tempt the former to launch a limited military aggression by air/land or sea to force Pakistan to abandon its claim on Kashmir.
(f) Indian economy is far more robust than that of Pakistan. Any arms race, especially in the nuclear field is likely to hurt Pakistan more than India. India would be tempted to raise the stakes further in a bid to put more pressure on Pakistan’s economy hoping that it would eventually give way, similar to the strategy, which USA had applied against USSR during the Cold War.
(g) Because of the introduction of nuclear weapons in the region, India-Pakistan dispute is no longer a bilateral issue. The spectre of a nuclear exchange in South Asia is a serious concern for the whole world. While India’s size and economy does give it an edge in the way the world looks at India and Pakistan, in any crisis, India is unlikely to get away with unprovoked aggression against Pakistan. Pakistan too is an important country in its own right. The strategy of exterior manoeuvre where diplomacy and media war is to play an increasingly important role is becoming crucial in today’s environment.

Nuclear Deterrence
The fundamentals of nuclear deterrence are the possession of nuclear weapons, a fail-safe command and control system and a reliable and accurate delivery mode having the ability to penetrate the enemy defences for a successful launch.12 The deterrent effect of a retaliatory strike would, therefore, depend not upon the capacity of its strike force but upon its residual capacity after it has absorbed the first strike. Development of sophisticated detection systems (including human intelligence), survival tactics and ensuring a high number of nuclear weapons suitably dispersed to prevent the enemy from taking all or most of them out through a counter force pre-emptive nuclear attack becomes essential. Here the importance of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) becomes very crucial because compared to the land based nuclear tipped missiles or nuclear carriage capable strike aircraft capability, SLBMs are the most difficult and in most cases impossible for the enemy to detect and neutralize. The nuclear strategy a nation develops will also depend on whether these weapons of mass destruction are meant only for deterrence against nuclear attacks or they are to serve the purpose of deterring any form of aggression that threatens the country’s core interests.
Nations that are facing an adversary having a marked superiority in conventional defence forces and where serious unresolved territorial disputes exist have little option but to use their nuclear arsenal as deterrence against any form of attack that threatens their vital interests. Pakistan finds itself in this situation and its nuclear deterrence doctrine must cater for such an eventuality. Here, other factors come into play. Besides having a potent retaliatory strike capability, the nation has to convey to the adversary in no uncertain term that if its core interests are threatened by any means, it has the will and capability of launching a ‘first nuclear strike’ even if it amounts to mutual suicide. To successfully implement such a doctrine the first strike option cannot be repudiated. Also, psychological factors play as important a part in its successful manifestation, as material factors.
A deterrence doctrine that spells out use of first strike (nuclear) option in case enemy’s conventional forces are about to achieve their strategic aim is based on a degree of irrationality. Such an action against another nuclear power surely would amount to a mutual suicide or a kamikaze act. Can a sane leadership of a country contemplate such an act? If the aggressor comes to the conclusion that it is not dealing with a mad nation, it may be tempted to disregard the nuclear deterrence of its enemy calculating that it is unlikely to unleash its nuclear arsenal, as it would in all probability end up in mutual destruction of both the contestants. Nuclear deterrence would then have failed. However, human nature being what it is, suicidal acts are not entirely uncommon. While commission of suicide by itself may be an act of insanity, many sane persons have committed it under what at best can be termed as temporary or momentary insanity. Mutual suicide or kamikaze acts by a human or a nation when pushed beyond a limit is in the realm of possibility. To lend credibility to its nuclear deterrence against conventional attacks by superior foes, a nation like Pakistan would like to give the impression that it would not hesitate to protect its honour, dignity, sovereignty and vital interests through mutual suicide, if all other options are closed. At the same time, it has to be very careful not to be looked upon as an irresponsible state that cannot be trusted to handle its nuclear arsenal. In that case there is a likelihood of it being regarded as an unreliable state and the world powers would work to dispossess it of its nuclear assets. Look at Iraq: the very thought that it is clandestinely attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction is enough for USA to seriously plan a military campaign to get rid of its leadership and with it, any latent nuclear weapons capability.
In nuclear deterrence doctrine, everyone will be bluffing, but just how far is difficult to determine.13 Since the cost of a miscalculation is so horrendous, even a small chance that the other side may press the nuclear button has to be considered very seriously. Dulles’ rigidity, Khrushchev’s flying into a rage and banging the table with his shoe and De Gaulle’s haughty obstinacy during the Cold War period were all a part of this psychological game, and in the final analysis, it may be a more important factor than all the calculations based upon material consideration.14 Even in the Indian sub-continent, various apparently contradictory proclamations emanate from both sides of the border. In one instance, it is announced that if attacked, it reserves the right to use all available means to defend itself, and this is immediately followed by another statement that the nation is responsible enough not to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons no matter what the provocation. These are variations of the psychological cold war strategy: keep the other side guessing.
Andre Beaufre has expressed these ideas beautifully in the following manner:
“All this adds up to an extraordinarily subtle exercise in dialectics. What we have to do is to estimate the enemy’s probable reactions based on our appreciation of his resources and his will to use them but also on an appreciation of what his estimate is of our resources and our will to use them, and even taking into account his estimate of our estimate of his resources and his will to use them. Estimates, which must necessarily be conjectural, hypotheses and appreciations that must be based on intuition than reasoning are, therefore, piled one on top of the other, and only one certain factor emerges from all this — UNCERTAINTY. In the final analysis the essential factor in deterrence is uncertainty. Uncertainty must therefore be the aim of a special form of tactics, the object being to increase or at least maintain uncertainty”.15
In the field of nuclear deterrence, two conflicting tactical doctrines that are ‘counter force’ and ‘counter value/counter city’ exist. Counter force doctrine envisages attacking the enemy’s nuclear and conventional forces to disarm him totally, thereby, making him incapable of retaliatory strikes. This would be highly effective if it could be ensured that nearly 100 per cent of enemy’s nuclear capability can be taken out. Apart from the fact that such a doctrine requires massive quantities of nuclear weapons having a very high accuracy, which makes it extremely expensive even for the super powers, its results become more and more incalculable as survival tactics improve. One is therefore, likely to adopt the counter value/counter city doctrine, which is easier and less expensive to operate. This is also referred to as ‘the strategy of minimum deterrence’. This doctrine presumes that since we have only been able to target the enemy’s cities and his main striking power remains
intact, we shall be at the mercy of fearful retribution.16
The choice between counter force and counter city doctrines will basically depend on the strength of a nation’s economy and the level of nuclear technology. Only USA and NATO forces can exercise this option in today’s environment. All others, including India and Pakistan have to adopt the counter city strategy. One implication of counter city strategy is that those adopting it must believe in the absolute validity of their deterrence, which if it fails, there is nothing to fall back upon except mutual suicide.17
Even if a country has a credible nuclear deterrence in place, it still cannot afford the luxury of reducing its conventional forces beyond a certain level. It becomes even more pertinent when there is a serious territorial dispute and also a conventional force imbalance between the two parties. This is the reality that exists between the two nuclear powers in South Asia. Kashmir remains a hotly disputed territory and a flash point between the two and an insurgency is raging in the Indian held territory of Kashmir. India squarely blames Pakistan for its support to what they refer to as ‘terrorists’ and Pakistan calls them freedom fighters. Given the overall superiority in conventional forces that the Indians enjoy over their rival, they may be tempted to take punitive action across the line of control that could easily escalate into a wider conflict. With nuclear deterrence in place, the most likely conflict scenario from the Indian point of view would be a short but violent campaign in Kashmir, to achieve a limited space oriented objective, followed immediately by negotiation. If Pakistan is unprepared and unable to counter such a move, it will either have to accept loss of vital territory in its part of Kashmir or opt for mutual suicide. Imagine the dilemma the Pakistani leadership will be confronted with. It therefore becomes absolutely essential that nuclear deterrence notwithstanding, Pakistan must have as a minimum, what Andre Beaufre refers to, Shielded Forces (tactical land, naval and air forces) capable of defending vulnerable areas. It must not be presented a fait accompli where the losses inflicted are not sufficient enough to go for the nuclear button. Wars in a nuclear environment then take the form of an escalation ladder with a number of rungs, the lowest being low intensity conflict (LIC), followed by limited conflict, full-scale conventional war and finally nuclear war. Pakistan’s ability to be able to hold its own at the lowest possible rung therefore assumes paramount importance. To put it in other words, Pakistan’s nuclear threshold must be kept at a sufficiently high level by fielding strong Shielded Forces to ensure stability in the region.
One possible objection to such a strategy could be that will it not tantamount to an invitation to start a limited conflict and if a limited conflict should start, will not the risk of escalation of all the way to the nuclear exchange be all the greater.18 There is a degree of truth in this objection, but in the real world the hope that nuclear deterrence would eliminate all forms of conflict would be extremely naive. Nations must be prepared to engage in conflicts at the lower level and use the nuclear factor to prevent an all out war.
With the advent of nuclear weapons the danger of escalation has become so great that the area of freedom of manoeuvre has been considerably reduced. In the nuclear environment, the use of force will in all likelihood be limited to two types of war: in vital areas action is likely to be limited, probably very violent but very short, the object being to produce a fait accompli followed immediately by negotiation; in the peripheral areas, conflict would take the form of prolonged wars of attrition at a low level of intensity and using a combination of conventional or guerrilla methods19 — the type which India is accusing Pakistan of waging in the Indian Held Kashmir.
It would be unsafe to assume that the deterrent effect of the existence of nuclear weapons is enough to stop all levels of conflicts. To have effective total deterrence, strong Shielded Forces must be in place to complement the nuclear deterrence. War on a grand scale and peace in its true sense, according to Andre Beaufre, may be buried side by side in the nuclear age.20
(Footnotes from 1 to 20 have all been taken from chapter 3 of the book An Introduction to Strategy, by Andre’ Beaufre).