From: “David
L. Yarkony” <yarkony1@bezeqint.net>
To: “Ikram Chand SEHGAL <sms@pathfinder9.com>”SMS”
<sms@pathfinder.com.pk>
Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 3:37 PM
Subject: Some remarks to Columnist M B NAQVI article “The muddle
the US Middle East policy” published the August issue of PDJ
A well-written article, nevertheless carrying a number
of misunderstandings, misconceptions and misinterpretations (and some
typing errors).
Let me present some:
It may be recalled that Britain and France were, until the end of the
Second World War, the chief protectors and promoters of the Jewish cause.
NO, the British White Paper limited the Jewish emigration
to British Mandate of Palestine and by that contributed to the Holocaust
in Europe. The French Government was “busy” with their colonies
in the Middle East (Syria and Lebanon), so I can’t recall a single
event of being protectors and promoters of the Jewish cause.
The Arabs Armies (Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and
Yemen) started military operations just when the west created military
state was born;
Remarks:
The main military operations were carried out by the regular armies, the
Saudia and Yemen each contributed a very small contingent.
The Arabs revolted three times 1921, 1929 and 1936-39, the first time
against the British (having side effects against the Jewish population)
and in 1929 and 1936-9 both against the British and the Jewish population.
Those local armies were supported by the Arab countries and gained valuable
experience operating in platoon and company size forces, excluding one
or two where battalion size unit were employed.
All the notable Arab armies raced into Palestine to throttle the newborn
state. But all the Arab armies put together were trounced by the Zionists
and Jews group even before Israeli armies were born.
Most of those happened after Israel was established (15 May 1948). At
the same time let me mention one or two battles, were the Israeli losses
were substantial:
Latrun (on the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem) the Arab Legion of Trans-Jordan
inflicted tremendous losses on the IDF 600/800 killed (the exact number
is not known even today) at a time (1948) when the total Jewish population
was less than 750,000 (compared to today’s population of Pakistan
that would mean 150,000 dead in a single battle) and of course the Battle
of the Faluja Pocket a series of defensive battles where the Egyptian
Army succeeded to holdout (one of the officers was Gamal Abdul Nasser).
And by that delayed the operation to capture the whole of the Negev Desert.
1956 While the Anglo-French Forces operated in the Suez Canal region,
the IDF occupied the Gaza Strip and the biggest part of the Sinai Peninsula.
This was evacuated after American pressure (the Sinai Peninsula and not
the Negev Desert, which is totally located in Israel).
You mentioned — For, Arabs are an overwhelming majority in the ME
while Israel for all their martial and scientific accomplishments, is
a tiny little state.
Right, so how come that a single tiny little state can stand-up to 22
Arab States, having the political backing of the entire Muslim World (excluding
Turkey)?
The Israelis, on the other hand, have demonstrated that they can do anything
they like in the military sphere: they can fight all the Arabs simultaneously
and defeat them in next to no time. They can do whatever they want to
vis-a-vis the Palestinians with total impunity.
Well.
While Israel managed to project the image of a nation with nerves of steel
and virtually no conscience, the fact is that they are mortally afraid
of their own future.
If the Palestinians continue their spree of suicide bombings and actual
security cannot be provided to common Israelis, the latter will start
migrating away. In Israel the national morale is brittle.
Totally untrue. The Israeli morale is strong (remember the bombing of
London and Coventry?)
“Virtually no conscience” — you say, let me add here
some? We could “finish” with the Second Intifada in a very
short time by using more of our power (which we use with conscience, YES
conscience).
Put yourself in our place, what would you do if in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi
or Islamabad — you board a bus and it explodes, you attend a wedding,
a dinner, a coffee shop, a market or visit a supermarket and explodes
— leaving behind tens of deads and hundreds of injured, some maimed
for life? Again compare our population losses to Pakistan’s population.
The Israelis express it as Erstze (you mean Eretz) Israel or Greater Israel.
Eretz Israel means the Land of Israel and NOT the Greater Israel.
I hope that my remarks will help in the future to write more and equated
articles on the subject. May I propose Columnist M B NAQVI to discuss
with me in the future — articles to be written on Arab-Israeli subjects
(and I hope to read many of his articles in the future), NOT to convert
him to propagate Zionist propaganda, but to set some historical facts
straight.
Sincere remarks
David L. Yarkony
yarkonyl@bezeqint.net
The August issue of Defence Journal carries the interview
of Maj. Gen. (Retd) Wajahat Hussain. One third of the text is related
to the battles of Chawinda-Badiana in Sialkot sector. Since my troop was
deployed on Chawinda Railway station throughout after 11 Sept, I shall
not allow facts to be overshadowed by fiction.
There is a difference between going through an event hour by hour and
listening or reading about it. A person, who has fought, will describe
a battle with the help of date, time, location, landmarks, troops involved
and the casualties sustained by own troops (it is impossible to know enemy
casualties). Although the General has specified his five days in command
of task force as five rounds (12 to 16 Sept), he has not been specific
about the action fought by his units. The Gen has recorded the activities
of first day (12 Sept) of his command in some detail, which might be of
interest to present day officers but for me it was amazing to know as
to how stories are built out of nothing. In fact after reading the Gen
I have lost faith in history.
Now look at the statement.”The battle was fast, the information
coming very quick and the orders given were equally fast. Was constantly
on the air, without leaving my mike, even for a cup of tea from early
morning till late in the evening. By evening we had stopped the enemy,
inflicted heavy casualties but we also suffered casualties. The front
was by and large stabilized.”
The Gen. has tried to convey that the earth was trembling and heavens
were falling due to the intensity of the battle. A commentary can be made
on each ward but it is sufficient to state that there was no such thing.
12th was the quietest day because after reducing Phillorah on the morning
of 11th the enemy did not cross track Phillorah-Sialkot. Instead established
defensive line along the track and shot up Guides which was launched ill-timed
in a haphazard way. I say so because my troop was located at Phillorah
at 1700 hrs on 11th and Guides was on my left.
During night 11/12 the two regiments pulled back behind track Chawinda-Badiana
where our infantry had established defence line. On 12th there was no
fighting. The Indians occupied area north of Railway line, which was not
held by us, and consolidated their gains of 11th, 13th, 14th and 15th
saw no major operation except small scale probing activity by the enemy
to feel the extent and strength of our defences. Based on which they planned
and executed offensive on 16th.
The remarks of GOC 6 Div, on the morning of 12th, to the effect that there
were no Bde HQs resulting in big problems. There was confusion, as they
could not control so many units, are reflective of poor command. On 12th
6 Div had 24 Bde, an organized entity, and three more units (Guides, 22
Cav and 14 FF.11 Cav was out of battle). Why could the Div HQ not control
three units directly? Where were so many units, which the Gen talked about?
In any case no manoeuvrs were taking place. It was a static situation.
Why and where was the confusion? I feel the six red tabs/ papers Guderians,
about whom the Gen has mentioned, caused it.
Another cause of confusion could be abundance of alarming and conflicting
information from front line troops. This could have been taken care of
if junior staff officers in Div HQ including the ADC were attached to
the troops in the front line to act as eyes and ears for the commander
instead of arranging tea for red tabs. In any case the commander and the
senior staff should have visited the line in turn to keep themselves informed
of the latest situation on the front. Which I know they never did.
Even after formation of so-called Task Force HQ nothing was achieved.
However, the Div commander had the satisfaction of listening to the day’s
story from the Task Force commander sitting in his cozy caravan every
night without knowing that it was a nightmare (as stated by the Gen) for
the Task Force commander to drive few miles on a dusty track to reach
Div HQ. What I know is that dust and heat is the fate of a tankman.
The Gen is totally wrong in asserting, “area between Badiana and
Chawinda was held by his Task Force, 24 Bde with 25 Cavalry was covering
a frontage of 550 yds while his force was covering 12000 yds”. My
troop was deployed to cover area between Chawinda railway station and
Jasoran 2000 yds apart. 25 Cavalry was not part of his force.
The first, and may be the last, order from GOC 6 Div to the Task Force
commander is strange and reflects total apathy. I quote,”Do whatever
you can to stop the enemy advance, taking control of the units in the
area.” Is it the way orders are given and received in any Army?
I have no comments except that the enemy was not advancing on 12th. The
highup was hallucinating.
Mission to a force is given by the higher command. Here the Task Force
commander has assigned mission himself i.e.,” to prevent the enemy
from advancing on two axis. The first being Badiana and the second Chawinda>Pasror>Zafarwal
axis. By doing so the Task Force commander has clearly relieved the two
Bde commanders at Zafarwal and Chawinda and possibly the Div commander
of their responsibility and taken charge of whole front himself. May be
he could have defended Badiana but how did he plan to prevent enemy advance
on remaining three towns with limited troops under his command? I think
he was considering himself in command of all troops deployed between Badiana
and Jassar. No wonder Army Chief and the President were on his net.
I will not comment on the lengthy description by the Gen on the events
of 15 and 16 Sept. It is enough to record that the Gen was located at
Badiana and Chawinda was not his area of responsibility and therefore
whatever has stated by him is the figment of his imagination. How torturous
it is for me, as a participant of an event, to know that the history is
being defaced and restructured to serve particular interests.
Some facts have been recorded in Sept 2002 issue of DJ and more will appear
in Nov. In addition it related to the period the Gen has covered.
Maj. (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan
20-C Shahbaz Comm Lane 1
Phase VI -DHA Karachi
5845454
E-MAIL kkamir@hotmail.com
From: “Riaz Jafri”
<jafri@rifiela.com>
To: “Ikram Sehgal” <defjrnl@pathfinder.com.pk>
Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 11:24 PM
Subject: Democracy Vs Military Rule
Dear Ikram Sehgal
Democracy Vs Military Rule
Now that the October Elections are almost certain, our
politicians should have reason to rejoice the restoration of democracy
in the country. They will soon be able to fulfil their burning desire
of selflessly serving the masses to their heart’s content However,
may I respectfully ask them as to what all they will do that the present
military government (though in name only) cannot do? Do they have some
magic wand which they will wave and the masses will have immediately out
of nowhere Roti, Kapra aur Makan and now added to it are Islam, Education,
Healthcare, Employment and what not? What really amazes me beyond comprehension
is that most of our intellectuals, philosophers, scholars, academics,
judges, journalists and of course the politicians — who have their
definite axe to grind — are crying themselves hoarse day in and
day out by singing the songs of democracy and the imagery and imaginary
wonders that it will play for the well-being of the masses. I very sincerely
pray it is not a case of Bughz-e-Moawia against the army instead of the
Hub-e-Ali for the democracy. Well, if the sole purpose of all this exercise
is to ameliorate the lot of the hapless masses, then does it matter whether
it is done by a civilian elected government or a military one, as long
as the end objective of ‘weal of the masses’ is achieved.
It is also a common knowledge that the parliamentary governments, particularly
the coalition government, which is most likely to be the one in this case
are weaker governments as compared to the military ones and much slower
in implementing and executing their policies and agendas. But, if the
aim is to enter the corridors and citadel of power then it is altogether
a different matter. But, again, except for the 1070 politicians, what
will the other champions of democracy stand to gain in this multi billion
mega project? These 1070 MNAs and MPAs and add to them a couple of hundred
of Senators will form the Federal and Provincial governments and take
control of other authorities. Among them there will be Speakers and Deputy
Speakers, Chairmen and Vice Chairmen, innumerable Parliamentary Committees
and Sub-Committees, various Commissions and Authorities. Each one of them
will have huge Secretariats and Establishments, Personal Assistants and
Public Relations Officers, well-furnished residences with subsidized utilities,
limousines, cars, USVs (Utility Service Vehicles — pick ups, wagons
etc.) with liveried chauffeurs and free petrol, phones, faxes, and now
computers and laptops — you name it. Free foreign tours with accommodation
in the very best hotels and of course free Hajj and Umras to bless theirs
and their coteries’ lives hereafter. On a very modest estimate each
one of our Servants of the Masses will cost us on the average a minimum
of rupees three to four hundred thousand per month. This alone will come
to more than Rs. 4 billion per year. Expenses on holding the election
will cost at least Rs. 3 billion. Renovation of the National Assembly
— as reported in the papers — has already cost around Rs.
7 crores. Setting up and/or renovation of various Federal and Provincial
Ministers’ lodges, their Secretariats, officially provided accommodation
to other entitled Parliamentarians, Parliamentary Secretariats, MNA and
MPA Hostels, Punjab, Frontier, Sindh, and Balochistan Houses etc. etc.
are going to cost the poor tax payers another fortune. And then, lo and
behold, there will be Permits, Quotas, Deals behind the scenes, Contracts,
Development Schemes, Import and Export policy-making, Duties, Taxes and
Levies structuring, international loans, grants and aid — to name
only a few — to dabble with. Each one of such activity will generate
billions and trillions in under-the-table manoeuvrings! Correct me my
dear intellectuals if I am wrong, that, is it all going to cost you and
me billions and billions each month in such apparent and hidden revenues
alone? On top of it, the beauty is that most of these nincompoops are
not even versed with the affairs of simple governance. Haggling for the
portfolios is a common knowledge in the formulation of a cabinet. Everyone
wants to be the Minister of Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Communications,
Commerce, Industry etc. No one wants, Education, Social Development, Law
and Parliamentary Affairs and departments like them. In the event of one
not being obliged with his first, second or third preference he has to
contend with whatever comes to his lot. Now, my dear academicians and
knowledgeable intellectuals, pray put me wise as to what genes are these
politicians made of that by a simple swearing in ceremony they can transform
themselves into an all-knowing expert of say, Railways, Education, Commerce,
Law, Communications etc. etc. immediately?! Give him any hat to wear and
the very next moment he is the authority on it. Whereas, it took Shaukat
Aziz, Dr. Atta, Razak Dawood, Nisar Memon, Dr. Ranjha years and years
to learn the intricacies of their respective fields. With the result most
of such politicians turned ministers are at the mercy of their bureaucrat
secretaries, who are in turn victims of the system. Nothing moves for
years and when it moves, it moves in circles.
The biggest cry that comes from the intellectuals is for ‘nourishing’
the institutions. Agreed. Institutions must be created and safeguarded
jealously and nourished most carefully. But who will lay the foundations
of these institutions? These politicians ? Haven’t you heard the
old maxim “Khisht-e-awal choon nahad maemaar kaj - Taa surraya meyrawad
dewaar kaj” (If the mason lays the first brick incorrectly, the
wall will rise incorrectly up to the zenith). For God’s sake why
should we give our posterity a wall that will bury them instead of providing
them with the shade to relax under.
The next argument forwarded by most is that the politicians know the problems
of their constituencies and will work for them. What are the Nazims and
Naib Nazims doing then ? Do we still need them ?
Therefore, some of the illiterate and not so democratic-at-heart, souls
like me have serious apprehensions that can we afford the luxury of having
1,070 vultures gnawing at the body of Pakistan, which has put on some
flesh in the last three years, and reduce it once again to the skeleton
that it was, Musharraf or no Musharraf chairing the awe inspiring NSC.
Is it really worth it all to waste billions and billions on them for doing
something which can be done by a 25000 rupee Musharraf and a couple of
his colleagues ? There is still time to do away with the farcical democracy
and the democrats advocating it.
Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)
30, Westridge-1,
Rawalpindi 46000 PAKISTAN
Tel : (051) 546 3344
e.mail:jafri@rifiela.com.
To the Editor,
Faraz Mir (Defence, p.4, September 2002) should not worry so much about
Pat McGowan’s criticisms of the shortcomings of the Pakistani Army
in Somalia. McGowan is no doubt a competent officer but like many of his
peers, he knows only one way of being a good soldier, the US Army way.
He mechanically applies US Army conceptions to any foreign army he writes
about, harshly criticizing any deviation from US Army practices. For example,
his first and severe criticism of the Pakistani army is that it relies
on officers for its junior leadership. He simply assumes that because
the US Army relies on the junior leadership of professional, long-serving
NCOs, any good army must do so as well, ignoring obvious counter-examples,
beginning with the Israeli army, which has no professional NCOs at all.
I personally had to battle that same mechanical mindset in El Salvador,
whose society — like Pakistan’s —generates plenty of
good junior officers but lacks that “foreman” layer from which
NCOs are made. We finally did very well in El Salvador once we overruled
the US Army officers on the scene, stopped futile attempts to create a
US-type NCO cadre, and instead trained many more junior officers —whose
leadership efficiently defeated the enemy in short order. Incidentally,
Pat McGowan is also harshly critical of the Belgian Paracommandos, known
to all as one of the very best combat units in the world, clearly superior
to McGowan’s own 10th Mountain troops, good as they are. To be sure,
the Pakistani army, like any other, is in permanent need of informed criticisms,
even very harsh so long as it is accurate, but McGowan’s comments
are off target.
Edward N Luttwak
4510 Drummond Avenue
Chevy Chase, MD 20815<> USA
T: 301 656 1972<>F: 301 907 8164
eluttwak@hotmail.com
