The Romance of Soldiering —
Experience of Colonial India

The man who was a gentleman by birth could offer greater moral and material guarantees. If he dishonoured himself as an officer, he could not turn to some other pursuit, whereas the plebeian could always find some way to get along and was therefore less interested in scrupulously living up to the standards of his rank.
Frederick II of Prussia

Columnist Hamid Hussain goes down history lane.

Throughout the history men have been attracted to the art of soldiering for various reasons. Different types of experiments have been done by various groups and countries to recruit, train and use for maximum efficacy a group of men trained in the art of killing.
The military system introduced and used so effectively by British in India was a very unique experiment with very few parallels in history. One can’t find any example where ‘a soldier who will go to death at his officer’s orders, who will rescue him under fire, but who will throw away his food and starve if the same officer’s shadow falls on his cooking-pot’.1 The history of British Indian Army has been documented by many British soldiers. After independence both in India and Pakistan very little has been written about this subject. Whatever little material, is available, also gives a confusing picture due to raging ideological debate. The nationalists seeing the whole process through the prism of newly found nationhood while the soldiers and their sympathizers giving some absurd explanations, as they feel uncomfortable about this close association with the British colonial authorities. The process needs to be seen in its historic perspective and actual facts do not need to be revised or re-interpreted according to one’s own ideological inclination.
Soldiering in British India was not only a career but also a way of life. It also brought a steady source of income and also prestige to the native sepoys. General Ian Hamilton called it ‘the Chivalry of Arms’. In technical terms, the British Indian army was a mercenary one but it surely didn’t act like one in literal sense. If a mercenary soldier fights only for the pay and pension then he will make every effort to save his life to enjoy the pay and pension but that was not the case. In 1879, the Residency at Kabul was attacked and the single British officer of the small detachment of Corps of Guides was killed. All native sepoys fought and died to the last man, despite being offered safe conduct by the Afghans.2 The evolution of British Indian army was a complex phenomenon where social, economic and psychological factors freely intermingled. Over two hundred years, different groups were preferentially recruited which suited the colonial policy of initially conquest and later stabilization of a large area. The groups, which were recruited, saw the military service as a ‘vehicle for gaining respect, legitimacy and protection in a larger social order of which they are now, albeit reluctantly, a part’.3
The eighteenth century India was not a consolidated geographical or national entity according to modern definitions. It was a mosaic of different ethnic and religious groups involved in constant struggles. Shifting alliances between different groups were occurring at a dizzying speed in the face of disintegrating Mughal empire. In India, the native guards hired for the British factories of East India Company became the nidus of future colonial army. When the foreign traders got involved in local feuds and later embarked on conquests, the emergence of an effective fighting force was inevitable. The three trading posts of East India Company at Madras, Bengal and Bombay were changed to presidencies with separate armies. In 1748, native troops were organized along European lines when Major Stringer Lawrence was made Commander-in-Chief of all troops of the Company in India. Bengal army was the largest and participated in most major campaigns. The main recruiting grounds were Bihar, Oudh and Orissa. The soldiers were mainly Brahmins, Rajputs and Muslims. One can’t but appreciate the amazing success of this native army in the presence of absurd rituals and routines due to religious and caste restrictions. Each soldier has to cook his own meal. Hindus considered themselves to be polluted if their bodies came in contact with leather especially during eating. Hindu soldiers could not eat the food, which was not prepared by him. ‘It was necessary in the middle of the morning to halt and to allow the men to remove their belts, boots and all their accoutrements, to light seven hundred separate little fires and cook fourteen hundred separate little cakes of wheat’.4 Much to the grief of proponents of so-called ‘Martial Races’ theory, it was this Brahmin dominated native army which despite its handicaps conquered one after another all other fighting classes of India for the Company. This army successfully defeated all of the future ‘Martial Races’ including Marhattas, Rajputs, Gurkhas, Muslims of Central India, Sikhs, Sindhi and Baloch tribes, Sikhs, Pushtuns and Afghans. Generally, British had most respect for those groups who gave a good fight during the colonization process compared to those who offered little resistance to British.
The English officers of 18th and 19th century were not merely identified with their own land but were representatives of an expanding empire. This resulted in a combination of proud consciousness of one’s superiority, which was not only material but also moral. The sense of adventure was combined with a zeal (both religious and secular) to enlighten the populations of other lands who were considered ignorant and backward. English officers always maintained a highly aristocratic character. The promotion went entirely by the ability to purchase higher rank. In English army, the system of purchase of rank was maintained upto 1870. In most of the cases, officers were upright and stood for principles. In 1838, Commander-in-Chief of Madras Presidency forces, Sir Peregrine Maitland resigned rather than punish a British soldier who had refused to take part in a ceremonial parade in honour of a Hindu deity. Some were very frank in expressing their views and not even hesitated to criticize themselves. Major Charles Napier (later General and conqueror of Sindh) led his men in a charge at Corunna in France. He explained his emotions later frankly stating that ‘I felt cowardly and anxious’. Captain (later General) James Outram knowing the wrong acts of East India Company in dealing with emirs of Sindh, wrote in 1843, “It grieves me to say that my heart, and the judgment God has given me, unite in condemning the measures we are carrying for his Lordship as most tyrannical-positive robbery. I consider, therefore, that every life which may hereafter be lost in consequence will be murder”.5 Entry in some elite regiments was a very difficult task. Gurkha regiment did not accept officers’ fresh out of Sandhurst until 1950. Officer who wished to join Gurkhas had to spend a year with a British regiment in India. The ones who were accepted had to learn Gurkhali and have to pass the examination within three years and before any leave home.6 The officers’ mess was the school where young subalterns were groomed to be officers and gentlemen. Captain R. W. Campbell has correctly described the importance of mess in the life of the officer. He said, “The mess is the school of courage, honour, and truth. In the British officers’ anteroom you will find the foundations of that splendid chivalry which has given us fame”.7
For native soldiers, steady source of income and pension were an important incentive for military service but that alone does not explain the whole phenomenon. During Marhatta wars of 1803-04, the pay of native soldiers was seven months, and in some instances as much as thirteen months in arrears.8 Discipline and espirit de corps was the hallmark of the army. The native sepoys gave their utmost loyalty to the army. They took pride in their profession. The British instilled a strong spirit of loyalty to one’s regiment. In some cases several generations successively served in the same regiment. In Jhelum area Malik Painda Khan who had served in 19th Bengal Lancers had several members of his family serving in various regiments. His son Rahimullah Khan was a Subedar in 40th Pathans. Four of his nephews were serving with various regiments (Fazal Mahdi Khan was Risaldar in 18th Tiwana Lancers, Karimullah Khan was Jemadar in 109th Infantry, Habibullah Khan was Subedar in 46th Punjabis and Najibullah Khan was Jemadar in 46th Punjabis).9 Officer Cadet Bijay Kumar Rawat’s whole family has served Gurkha Regiment. He enlisted in 1973 in Nepal at the age of 17. He served 1/2 Gurkhas for seven years and became Corporal. He was accepted on his third application at Sandhurst. On August 6, 1981, he won the Sword of Honour for being the best overall officer cadet at Sandhusrt.10 Some regiments were more like a brotherhood and highly coveted. Natives saw some of these elite regiments as the ultimate symbol of honour, dignity and social superiority. Regimental insignia like crossed swords and slogan of ‘Rough and Ready’ of Guides assumed a mystical aura. In the early part of the evolution of Guides, many soldiers attached themselves to Guides without pay and with their own horse and weapon hoping to fill the slot during action when a soldier fell.
An old Subedar of Madras Army eloquently explains the complex role of religion in this army. He said, “We put our religion into our knapsacks whenever our colours are unfurled”. British officers were careful about the religious sentiments of native sepoys and had the general policy of strict non-interference in religious practice (There were some exceptions of some religiously devout officers like Colonel Martin of 9th Bengal Native Infantry which had disastrous results during the mutiny). 6th Lancers (6th Duke of Connaught’s Own Lancers) fought in Italy during 2nd World War. During one encounter, one squadron suffered heavy casualties. The dead could not be brought back. Muslims were buried but Hindu soldiers could not be cremated the same day. The regiment’s Hindu Risaldar solved the problem for the commandant. He said, ‘I realize the situation, colonel sahib. You can’t cremate them now, though they will be cremated later. You can bury them temporarily, but in their right hand, not their left, place some burning rope. If you can’t get rope, use a cigarette’.11 Prior to independence in 1947, when communal frenzy was engulfing the whole India, it did not infect the armed forces.
The bond between the English officer and his men was a very unique one and still defies any reasonable explanation. The Colonial officer was expected to be a model for his subordinates. The English officer underwent an evolution in India. The earlier officers (in 18th century) made India their home and many married native women. Later when travel and communications improved, many English women came to India. Now a distinct English community in every major town developed which consisted of families of civil and military English officials totally separated from the natives with very little interaction at social level. In addition, the 1857 rebellion was a watershed in Indian history. The British officers were simply shocked at the behaviour of native sepoys, which resulted in extreme hatred for Hindustanis. The new allies (Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Gurkhas, Rajputs), which sided with British and fought bravely were elevated to the mantle of ‘Martial Races’. When Sylvester joined the Probyn’s Horse, an elite cavalry regiment full of Sikhs and Pathans, he wrote, “Every man had a bronzed hearty expression and a frank honesty of face which besides his stalwart figure, proclaimed at once how much he differed from the native of Hindustan”.12 Captain Holmes used to go to Sikh villages and wrestled with strong young Sikhs with the condition that the competitor should enlist. He filled 36th Sikhs twice and proudly commanded it.13 Men like Colonel Low, the Resident of Lucknow when grabbed from neck cloth and asked to congratulate new king supported by Begum or face death remained steadfast through the insult and imminence of murder14, thus winning respect and love. Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck during the recruitment drives in rural areas used to live and eat with his men. British officers won the respect of their soldiers only with their bravery, integrity, chivalry and display of honour. Whenever, these standards showed deterioration, disaster was not far away. In early 1850s when bright officers of regiments started to go to political service which provided more benefits and adventure, regiments were understaffed and officers of regiments were older and detached from their sepoys. This was one of the factor of disaffection among the troops. Despite various turbulences and day-to-day problems of managing a large army, the bond between officers and their men was a strong one and based on mutual respect. In May 1857, when regimental commanders were summoned to the Residency in Peshawar and told about disarmament of native sepoys, there was a storm of protest from regimental officers. One Colonel fuming with rage swore that his men were loyal and he would forcibly resist the insult of disarmament. At the gathering of disarmament, the officers of cavalry regiments were so bitter at this disgrace that they threw their swords in after their men’s weapons and even ripped off their spurs and hurled them on the pile of weapons.15 Colonel Robert Warburton (His father was a British officer of Royal Artillery and mother niece of Dost Muhammad Khan. He retired in 1897) spent several years as political officer at Khyber Pass. He was respected and admired by the locals so much that among the rebellious Afridis he went about meeting various Jirgas with only a walking stick. In 1933, thirty-five years after the retirement of Warburton, a huge crowd of Afridis showed up at the Landi Kotal railway station just before the arrival of a troop train carrying a battalion of Cheshire Regiment. The tribesmen had learnt that Warburton’s grandson was an officer in this battalion and had come to see him.16 In late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the only military activity in India was frontier expeditions against Pushtun tribes. British officers had a respect for their foes. In 1920s when aeroplanes were introduced for operations, the British officers disproved of it as this was seen as against the code of chivalry. Aeroplanes were mainly used for demolition purposes. The general British policy was announcement of the day and timing of bombing to the target villages so that the inhabitants could leave the homes to the safety of nearby mountains.
In battle, both British officers and native sepoys were brave. The respect for chivalry was mutual. In operations against Marhattas, in 1817, at the battle of Kirkee, British Forces (the British forces included Bombay Europeans, Resident’s escort of 250 Bengal Native Infantry soldiers and three native regiments — 2/Ist, 2/6th and 1/7th of Bombay Native Infantry) were led by Colonel Burr. When British force was threatened by well-organized Marhatta cavalry, Colonel Burr fully knew the danger. He moved quickly to his old battalion’s side (Colonel Burr had formerly commanded 1/7th Bombay Native Infantry) and placed himself by their colours. In the ensuing battle, two of his orderlies by his side were shot. His horse was wounded and a bullet went through his own shako but the old Colonel didn’t blink. Inspired by this chivalry, the regiment withstood the storm and beat off Marhatta cavalry.17 After the storming of Bhurutpur (Gurkhas participated in the second siege of Bhurutpur in 1826,), the British were impressed by Gurkha bravery. When asked about Gurkhas opinion about British, the remark was “The English are brave as lions; they are splendid sepoys, and very nearly equal to us!”.18 In 1945, in Burma, two men of a company of 4/4 Gurkhas fell to enemy fire on an open ground in front of Japanese trenches. The heavy fire was preventing rescue of injured men. One man was hit again and killed. Seeing that, Major M. R. Strivens dashed across the open ground and lied next to the injured man. He tore off the equipment and dragged him quickly back to safety. A Gurkha rifleman Pasbahadur Matwala made the same dash to rescue the wounded man’s rifle and equipment.19 Major Charles Reid (Commandant of Sirmoor Battalion) during the siege of Delhi in 1857, came across a fourteen year old Gurkha boy who was holding a rifle and wounded in both legs. The boy told Reid his story. He was the son of a soldier and helping his father load the rifle. When his father was killed, the boy went to help a soldier of 60th Rifle. When that soldier was wounded, after carrying the wounded soldier to hospital, he picked up the soldier’s rifle and joined the battle where he was wounded. He told Reid that, ‘But I am not much hurt’. Reid enlisted him on the spot and after two weeks of recuperation, he joined the regiment.20 The progeny of Gurkha soldiers who were born and brought up in the regiment were called ‘Line Boys’. These kids brought up in a military environment were natural fighters. At the battle of Aliwal and Sobraon, out of seven men who received Order of Merit, five were line boys. Similarly, at the siege of Delhi in 1857, out of twenty-five Order of Merit, twelve were line boys.21 Different Indian regiments had been employed in frontier expeditions against Pushtun tribes and won respect of their foes. It was a saying among Mahsuds of Waziristan that Mahsud respect the prophet and the Gurkha with the Khukri.
The belonging to the brotherhood of arms had a special meaning. The friendships and respect was not only at individual level but also at regimental level between British and native regiments. After fighting together in Sudan, The Berkshire Regiment and 15th Sikhs became friends. The Gordon Highlanders and 2nd Gurkhas were also friends. 2nd Gurkhas also had special relationship with King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The 2nd Gurkha possessed the part of the mess table on which the bodies of slain officers of King’s Royal Rifle Corps were laid during the siege of Delhi in 1857. When an earthquake destroyed a Gurkha station in Dharamsala in 1905, the Gordons subscribed 680 rupees to a relief fund for Gurkhas. Gurkhas subscribed from their meagre pays to a fund for the families of fallen Gordon Highlanders and King’s Royal Rifle Corps.22 Regimental loyalty was a very strong bond which withstood even the pressures of partition. Hindu and Muslim officers may have differed politically but the maddening communal frenzy around them didn’t infect them. Colonel Muhammad Idrees of 2nd Cavalry told his departing Hindu and Sikh officers that, “wherever you go, we will remain brothers because we have spilled blood together”. On the same note, Brigadier Cariappa of 1/7th Rajput told Muslim officers in Delhi Gymkhana, “We have been brothers. We will remain brothers. We shall never forget great years we have lived together”. In 1971, Field Marshal Manak Shaw was Indian army chief and belonged to the Frontier Force (FF) Regiment. In 1971, when Major Shabbir Sharif of 6 FF won the highest gallantry award (Nishan-e-Haider), Manak Shaw wrote to his former British officer in England that he was so proud that an officer of his regiment has won such a high award. After ceasefire, when Manak Shaw came to Lahore for negotiations, the silver ware of his old regiment was especially brought to Lahore (6 FF was then stationed at Okara) for the old memories.23
Viceroy Commissioned Officers (VCOs) were the link between British officers and native sepoys. VCOs were men of considerable experience who despite lack of any formal education had the extraordinary skills of handling men. They were respected by British officers. Adrian Hayter (he joined 2/2 Gurkhas in 1930) said about his Subedar that ‘I secretly worshiped him’. Lt. Colonel J. G. Marindin of 3/5th Gurkhas (In 1944, the regiment was in Burma front) instructed his inexperienced young British officers that ‘when in doubt, listen to your Gurkha officers’.24 During the second half of nineteenth century, there was a lengthy debate about opening of officer’s corps for natives. In 1917, seven Indians, already serving in Indian army were given King’s Commission. In 1918, Daly Military College at Indore started training cadets. The first batch of 42 candidates was selected, out of which 15 were soldiers already serving. The ethnic makeup of the class was; 4 Punjabi Muslims, 8 other Muslims, 9 Sikhs, 7 Rajputs, 2 Coorg Hindus, 2 Baroda Hindus, one Punjabi Hindu, 3 Burmese, 2 Bengalis, 3 Roman Catholics and one other Christian.25 Royal Military College at Sandhurst was opened for natives in 1918. Only few selected men from fighting classes (the sons of VCOs got special preference), landed aristocracy and princely states were allowed to enter Sandhusrt. The native graduates of Sandhurst were called King’s Commissioned Officer (KCO) and they elevated themselves into a ‘distinct, colourful and tradition minded elite’.26 In 1932, Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun became recruiting ground for native officers who were called Indian Commissioned Officers (ICO). Naturally, KCOs considered ICOs inferior. In words of a new KCO about his new ICO colleagues, “imagine our feelings when we have to call these Dehra Doon pansies our brother officers... after all these pseudo-officers are young men who could not afford to go to Sandhurst”.27 During Second World War, due to increased demand for manpower, officer’s ranks were opened for various groups who were considered non-martial. These Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECOs) in general received short training, were less educated, had weak English and were motivated more for a government job opportunity rather than military service. Naturally, ECOs were considered at the bottom of the officer’s cadre far below KCOs and ICOs of Dehra Dun. This mindset continued in post-independence Indian and Pakistani armies. When General Muhammad Musa (He was an ICO who has been selected from the ranks) was appointed Commander-in-Chief by Ayub Khan, Sandhurst graduates resented the appointment. The polo playing offspring of a princely state, Major General Sher Ali Khan Patudi resigned in disgust. He later sarcastically wrote, “why are we so particular, before purchasing a horse, a dog or a cat, to check its pedigree? And yet when selecting the most sophisticated animal — The man — we do not always apply this rule”.28 Another Lieutenant General and close confidant of Ayub Khan, Muhammad Azam Khan commenting about Ayub’s decision to appoint Musa as C-in-C and stated, “Ayub did a strange thing. He declared that he will give charge only to an ICO. He cut our throat and perpetrated this cruelty”.29 The independence of India and Pakistan was achieved by constitutional and legal struggle in an environment when British decided to leave India. It was not the result of an armed struggle against colonial rule. Nationalist leaders were, therefore, in no position to denounce officers of armed forces for being siding with the colonial rulers. Despite that this fact created some embarrassment for almost all officers as they have joined the army prior to independence. Instead of rationally analyzing the history, some senior officers gave bizarre reasons for participation of Muslims in Indian army. To this was added the complication of two-nation theory which also had to be accommodated in this discussion. Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan wrote in 1960, “so far as the area now forming Pakistan is concerned, its manpower was generally employed to man the British armies to maintain and protect the Empire. For this reason, this part of Indian sub-continent was purposely kept industrially backward so that the populace would not be diverted into another channel of employment”.30 The facts do not support this analysis. The economic benefits of military service could not be matched by any amount of industrialization (in whatever rudimentary form which existed in nineteenth century) of the arid areas of West Pakistan, which were the grounds for recruitment. The military recruitment areas were at much advantage economically. In 1918-19, each district of Jhelum and Rawalpindi was receiving between 15,000 to 20,000 pounds sterling per month in the form of remittances from the soldiers. In addition, these areas benefited from the remissions of land revenue exceeding 100,000 pounds sterling.31 Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan described the British Indian Muslim soldiers as “They fought and died not as hirelings of a mercenary army, but as loyal soldiers conscious of their worth and proud of the splendid part they were playing in defending their own country, their own culture and faith”.32 This is totally contrary to the fact that native army helped conquer territories of India for British and later fought many battles all around the globe, sometimes against Muslims. Ayub Khan had similar dilemma about how to explain the service of his own father (Ayub’s father Mir Dad Khan was a Risaldar Major in Hudson’s Horse). Ayub wrote about his father that, “he had a vague but strong sense of Muslim nationalism”. He then went on to describe an encounter of his father with a religious scholar, “my only desire is to die under the flag of Islam but where is that flag? There is no Muslim country today, which is free. They are all dominated by colonial power”.33 This is just a belated attempt by a grateful son to portray his father in better light by attributing ideas which never existed. It will be very difficult for any one to accept this reasoning. A Muslim nationalist who is aware of the subjugation of Muslim lands by colonials and wants to die for Islam. But seeing that there is no free Muslim country, rather than retiring to his village life and pray, he joins a colonial army to help colonials conquer the Muslim lands. Some tend to suggest that British somehow were distrustful of Muslims and didn’t want them in large numbers in the armed forces or somehow discriminated against them.34 Again, even a cursory look at the history of British Indian army does not support this assertion. Generally, Muslim soldiers were highly regarded by British as trustworthy allies and were overrepresented in army compared to their percentage of population of India. In 1916, a retired Subedar Major Ajab Khan (76th Punjabis) was appointed to the Viceroy’s Council. Of the seven native officers given final consideration for this appointment, three were Pathans, two were Punjabi Muslims, one Decanni Muslim and only one Non-Muslim who was a Gurkha.35
The colonial army of India was a unique experiment which evolved over two hundred period. British used it very effectively for their own interest of colonial conquest and later stabilization of a large empire. It was a complex result of the peculiar social and political conditions of that time which had a significant influence on the future events especially in Pakistan. The phenomenon should be viewed in its historical perspective for better understanding and it’s historic value.

It is better to die than to be a coward - A Gurkha Proverb

Notes
1Woodruff, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1954), p. 345

2Barthorp, Michael. Indian Infantry Regiments 1860-1914 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1979. Reprint 2002), p. 13

3Enloe, Cynthia H. Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1980), p. 27
4Woodruff, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India, p. 354

5Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 28

6Farwell, Byron. The Gurkhas (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), p. 114

7Farwell, Byron. Mr. Kipling’s Army: All The Queen’s Men (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), p. 62

8Barat, Amiya. The Bengal Native Infantry: It’s Organization and Discipline 1796-1852 (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopabyay, 1962), p. 176

9Griffin, Lepel H and Massy, Charles Francis. The Punjab Chiefs (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993. Reprint from 1909 Edition), p. 216-17

10Farwell, Byron. The Gurkhas, p. 133

11On Campaign With Bengal Lancers. World War II, Volume 17, No: 4, November 2002, p. 56

12Mason, Philip. A Matter of Honour (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975 (Reprint), p. 390

13McMunn, George. Lieutenant General. The Martial Races of India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1979, Reprint), p. 258

14Thompson, Edward & Garratt G. T. Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule In India (New York: AMS Press, 1971, reprinted from 1934 edition), p. 333

15Haigh R. H. and Turner P.W. Punjab Military History in the 19th Century (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), p. 102-103

16Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars, p. 312-313

17MacMunn, George. Lt. General. Vignettes From Indian Wars (Lahore: Rina Art Press, 1978. Original work published in 1920s), p. 69

18Vansittart, Eden. The Gurkhas (New Delhi: Ariana Publishing House, 1980), p. 41

19Farwell, Byron. The Gurkhas, p. 55

20Farwell, Byron. The Gurkhas, p. 45-46

21Vansittart, Eden. The Gurkhas, p. 68

22Farwell, Byron. Mr. Kipling’s Army:, p. 37-38

23Author’s interview with a Frontier Force officer, September 2001

24Farwell, Byron. The Gurkhas, p. 134

25Ellinwood, DeWitt. Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army in Ellinwood, DeWitt & Enloe, Cynthia H. (Ed.). Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1981), p. 124

26Cohen, Stephen. The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 125

27Kundu, Apurba. The Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), p. 21

28Khan, Sher Ali. Major General (r). The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan (Lahore: WAJIDALIS, 1978), p. 15

29Interview of Lt. General Muhammad Azam Khan in Hassan, Ali. Pakistan, Generals aur Siyasat (Pakistan, Generals and Politics), In Urdu (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991), p. 288

30Khan, Ayub. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38; No: 4, July 1960, p. 555

31Pasha, Mustapha-Kamal. Colonial Political Economy: Recruitment and Underdevelopment in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 241

32Khan, Fazal-Muqeem. Major General. The Story of Pakistan Army (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1964, Second Edition), p. 2

33Khan, Ayub. Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 2

34Haq, Noor ul. Brigadier (r). Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1997), p. 178

35Ellinwood, DeWitt. Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army, p. 124