due to a unforeseen and unfortunate oversight, some questions put to Maj Gen S Wajahat Husain were not published in dJ. We are publishing these questions/answers which did not appear in the DJ August 2002 issue. The oversight is deeply regretted.

Remembering Our Warriors
Maj Gen (Retd) S Wajahat Husain

Please tell us briefly about your early life, family background and education.
Born and educated at Aligarh, in the United Province of British India, from an old family of civil servants and lawyers. Father was senior servant later an advocate like my grandfather.
The family migrated to Lahore after Partition. Traditional childhood education by resident tutors was at home, for the Secondary schooling joined Minto circle Muslim University School matriculating in ’40: soon after world War’s start, graduated from the University in 1944. Closely following the war, which upset father’s plans to send me to UK for higher studies to join the Indian Civil Service, motivated me to join the Armed Forces inclined from childhood. The war generated an atmosphere of great excitement and challenging future career prospects by the war efforts in India, the main base of British operations against the Axis Powers. The University actively utilized the opportunity following its Founder’s vision, provided all facilities to the students to join the Armed Forces to maximize Indian Muslims disproportionate representation in Officers ranks. With everyone joining the forces followed my two first cousins, Khurshid Hyder (Major General) and Masroor Husain (Air Commodore). Selected for all the three services I joined the Royal Indian Air Force as GD Pilot Cadet. The war ended just as we started flying and was demobilized.
Still under nineteen years was offered to compete on all India basis eventually selected for the Indian Army’s first Post War Regular Course starting at the (British) Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun in 1946.

During your school and university life Aligarh Muslim University was at the threshold of sub-continent’s great historical and political events. please give us some idea of the prevailing atmosphere and influential personalities.
It certainly was, though little did we realize at that time! With the war at its peak, the British retreating in every war theatre, exerting maximum efforts for India’s cooperation, the future sweet carrots of freedom, developments etc were promised; generating political expectations. Equally apprehensions vis-a-vis the Japanese knocking at India’s doors after the fall of Burma and Singapore’s surrender! For the realists the choice was simple; better to support the devil we know having politically traversed long way rather than the unknown Japanese devil with whom we may have to start all over again! If at all! To which the Indian Muslims subscribed!
Reflecting over those years I consider myself exceptionally lucky having closely witnessed our freedom struggle, the inception and achievement of Pakistan with its agonizing birth pangs, and active participation in its growth; a life long experience of many indelible impressions. The educational and cultural atmosphere was influenced by Allama Iqbal’s perceptions and vision, ably projected by our dedicated and intellectual teachers. Islamic resurgence through Mustafa Kamal Attaturk’s concept of modern Turkey, turning the “sick man of Europe” into a vibrant progressive nation was the role model. Both affected our freedom struggle and Muslim India’s aspirations; greatly influenced the Aligarh University students; I was no exception. It conformed with the University’s ideals of liberal modern educational ethos of Islamic brotherhood where we all prayed in the same mosque without any distinction imbibing the ideals of Islamic Brotherhood in modern progressive environment. Distinction between Qadiani, Shias and Sunnis was never aired, experienced or talked about! Religious bigotry was shunned.
Aligarh University and its school were renowned throughout India and the Muslim World for very high class professors and teachers. Most of them became pioneers of University education in Pakistan; like Professor ABA Haleem, Ehsan Rashid (my class fellow) and Dr Aziz etc. At the School the Headmaster Mr G. C. Woods a W W-I veteran, took special interest to develop my academic aptitude so did our Science Teacher Mr Abdul Jabbar in coaching me to be a Debater. At the College, Professor Jamil-ud Din our English Teacher close to Quaid-e-Azam and Dr Aziz our Political Science teacher were noteworthy for projecting Quaid’s vision. Both later at Karachi University distinguished themselves by compiling Quaid’s speeches and many books.

Interested to know the Muslim university’s political environment before partition and Mr Jinnah’s Pakistan vision?
In the early forties Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s dramatic political philosophy of Pakistan had fired en masse students of Aligarh Muslim University, described by him the “Arsenal of Muslim India” : The Aligarh Movement’s core aim of Indian Muslim’s solidarity crystallized the concept of an independent Muslim State, to release us from the suffocating British rule and Hindu dominance. Mr. Jinnah spurred the Pakistan movement from this “Citadel of Muslim Renaissance” through regular visits and addresses to the students. On this highly motivated and extremely responsive platform, Mr Jinnah the country’s best constitutional lawyer, articulated his political doctrine with great legal finesse and logical force. Especially memorable was his historic ’42 visit during Gandhi’s Quit India Movement against the British to discourage the students falling in the Gandhian trap of following the Congress. The biggest crowd of students at Aligarh Railway Station received him and removing the horses from his carriage pulled it all the way to the University Campus. Riding alongside the carriage with our Riding School escort, for the first time I saw the great leader : an elegant and impressive personality. University’s packed Strachey Hall received him reciting the resounding our student poet Shakeel Badayuni’s popular poem “Quaid-e-Azam Hamare Quaid-e-Millat hain aap”, the most appropriate enduring title was firmly bestowed. He exhorted us to concentrate on our studies, not to waste time participating in demonstrations, equipping ourselves to shoulder Pakistan’s future leadership responsibilities with utmost honesty, dedication and loyalty. Next day Jamaat-e-Islami siding with Congress dubbed him ‘Kafir-e-Azam’!
The complex struggle of Indian Muslims unlike the Indians was on two fronts, against the British for freedom and against the Indians for Pakistan. Quaid’s Two Nation Theory concept was an independent Muslim State carved out of British India’s Muslim majority areas, rich in natural resources, land of dedicated brave people, to be moulded into a progressive, liberal democratic country, in the polity of emerging new nations under enlightened leadership.
Our talented university professors, with intellectual depth and broad political vision, guided us to fully understand Quaid’s struggle for freedom and Pakistan’s vision. During the Quaid’s visits, they encouraged us to meet him informally to discuss his perceptions. The Quaid-e-Azam receiving us in the Chatari Manzil’s drawing room where he usually stayed, impeccably dressed, relaxed and informal, freely discussed and elaborated his views to us: a great exhilarating experience and political education! Condemning religious bigotry and obscurantism, continuously stressed upon a liberal, tolerant and outward reaching progressive
PAKISTAN advising us to guard against religious fanaticism; the negation of Islamic doctrines. He was sensitive to this as India’s Muslim religious organizations, like Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahrars, were against his Pakistan concept. Abhorring sectarianism, corruption, nepotism and favouritism; rampant in Nizams Hyderabad, consistently advised against these “malignant Muslim diseases”; during all his Aligarh speeches. How right were his emphatic pronouncements; today these very afflictions with growing impunity are threatening to tear further apart our mutilated country. His much thought our specific guidelines of Unity, Faith and Discipline were the correct panacea of Muslims perennial problems which alas we have not followed and have damaged the national fabric in every field. Interestingly, the current much repeated “Islamic ideology and Pakistan Ka Matlab La Illah Illah” were not heard in popular quarters. A later Pakistani euphemism.

Please tell us about the Indian Military academy Dehra Dun [1946] and your joining the first post-war regular course.
In 1945 C-in-C India Field Marshal Auchinleck formed a high power commission to determine post war Indian Army’s composition and the Training of Indian officers in view of expected freedom, W W-IIs experiences and future requirements anticipating 12,000 officers shortage after Indianisation and demobilization. The Emergency Commissioned Officers Training Schools [OTS] were closed, reconstituted IMA was reverted to pre-war Academy role of training regular officers, modelled on the new US West Point and Sandhurst academies. Most experienced and high calibre officers, mostly British from the Brigadier Commandant downwards, were posted to start the Academy. Major Attiq-ur Rehman MC FF Rifles and Major Zorawar Singh MC Central India Horse were the only Indian Major Company Commanders joined later by others and a few Captain Platoon Commanders notably Tikka Khan and S.G. Mehdi.
The Auchinleck Battalion comprised 130 first Course Cadets of four companies. Halfway through the Second larger course joined. My first Platoon Commander was a young Royal Armoured Corps Officer fresh from Montgomery’s Normandy Campaign. I was selected to be a Junior Under Officer and Coy Senior Under Officer till passing out in December 46. Second term Platoon Commander was Tikka Khan highly regarded in the Indian Army for his excellent war record. The legendary British Guards RSM with his team of tough British Sergeants under the outstanding Adjutant from the Rifle Brigade, Major A.J. Wilson MC OBE (later Lt General Sir James Wilson) were the hallmarks of the exacting hard training. The surrounding Shivalak hills provided excellent tough weapons and tactical training grounds. The academics imparted by Oxford and Cambridge Universities trained staff gave good higher education background. All in all the most useful professional solid foundation of the career to be proud of. In the sports having distinguished in the Equestrian activities was awarded the coveted Riding Cane.
During the last term we could sniff freedom and Pakistan’s hazy picture in the air, soon the communal disturbances started with the “Great Calcutta Killings of Muslims” followed by the reaction in Rawalpindi. However, the Army’s strong spirit de corps traditions and strict discipline ensured that the cadets and staff from varied religious and regions were not touched! The course coming its end noted the high rate of our colleagues not graduating for not measuring up to expected highest standards of character, discipline, professional competence and gentlemanly qualities; 98 out of 130; only 28 Muslim officers qualified. Field Marshal Auchinleck took the Parade on 21 December 46 followed by Academy Dinner. Was honoured to sit on the special dais next to the Field Marshal as SUO passing out with distinction; the Field Marshal invited the three top ones to stay with him at the C-in-C’s House passing through Delhi which I availed later.
My Indian course colleagues, luckily well-placed and aptly qualified after their excellent training, rose to the highest ranks; approximately nine Lieut Generals and over a dozen reputed Major Generals from the small course, subsequently termed in Indian Army as the “Elite First”! On our side we were not so lucky!

Please say something about the regimental life of those days, early career in the Central India Horse (December 46-November 47).
I joined CIH at Ahmednagar (also the home of Indian Armour). Reconnaissance Regiment of the famous 4th Indian Division, distinguished for its North African, Sicilian, Italian and Greek campaigns. So all the officers, mainly British, with Muslim Jat, Dogra personnel were experienced veterans. My British Squadron Commander immediately put me through regulated practical training regime as well as introducing to the regimental life. Sports in the evening and four regimental dinner nights, not wearing badges of rank, were general form. I was put at ease from the first day by the British commandant addressing me by my family nickname as per regimental custom from Colonel downward! Like a close family all officers considered equal and gentlemen but the discipline was correct, fair and strict. Due cognizance was immediately taken by the Colonel of any omission or commission.
After a short stay proceeded to the famous British Small Arms Weapons Training School Saugar, mandatory for every young officer, under tough British Sergeants.
Qualifying with high marks proceeded to attend Mhow Infantry School for the Junior Leader Course; joined by young officers from British regiments and Indian Emergency Officers commissioned earlier; in all over three hundred officers. From British Brigadier downwards to British Sergeants, with few choosen Indian officers all were experienced veterans imparting very practical, balanced and tough tactical training at Coy/Bn levels.
I was taken by surprise on the final passing out day to “step-out” to be at the dais with the commandant having stood first. Adjudged the best Junior Leader of the course year 1947: a great honour indeed. The coveted Championship Cup was also awarded. After the course I was back with the regiment in Ahmadnagar. In the country, Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General, was carrying out hectic negotiations with Congress and Muslim League for India’s freedom.
On 3 June Pakistan became a reality: shortly afterward exercised my option, without any hesitation, for the future Pak army after signing a cyclostyled few lines form, though the future appeared hazy but pregnant with positive high confidence in the new country! In early August our Muslim Squadron under their British Squadron Commander left for 19 Lancers, the 1st Indian Army element to join the new Pak Armoured Corps!

You were one of the few Muslim Officers served with distinction in the Punjab Boundary Force. Please give us your experiences (August-October ’47).
On 14 August ’47 my British Colonel driving me for the Pakistan Day Celebrations at Ahmadnagar Club told me he had appointed me second-in-command of the Squadron under Major Peter Hussy proceeding to join the Punjab Boundary Force (mixed Jat and Dogra) as urgent reinforcements for the hard pressed 50,000 strong Forces mainly under British Officers specially raised to maintain law and order along Indo-Pak Border. Reminding the Colonel of having been detailed for the Young Officers Course he snapped back “you will learn more with the Boundary Force than sitting on your ass in the Armour School”; How right he was!!
Serving with the Boundary Force was a unique experience. Apart from its professional value gave an insight into the forthcoming dimensions of the new Country’s acute problems. The military trains move, whilst Peter was bringing the Road Party destined for Lahore became quite an operation. Normally taking three days, took seven days with constant threats of attacks and nerve wrecking delays, no food, living on hard rations, no passenger bogies, sleeping under the tanks, facing blazing sun and rain. As we crawled into the suburbs of Amritsar was horrified to see thousands of Muslim refugees lying on both sides of railway lines. On the main platform witnessed slaughtering of Muslim families. The same spectacles repeated coming into the Lahore Cantonment Station, for miles refugees on both sides of the track. From the Mianmir bridge was awestruck watching the red glow of the old city burning. At Lahore, after the horrendous journey was informed to turn about and proceed to Jullunder as East Punjab was out of control. At Jullunder unloading the tanks on the main platform, went straight into action in the city to quell the heavily armed Sikh jathas attacking and burning Muslim mohallas and adjoining villages.
From that day onwards the Squadron was continuously engaged in operations in East Punjab, fighting the Sikhs and Hindus systematically attacking the Muslim majority belt of villages in the Doab and Muslim localities in towns. Our mission was first to prevent these attacks, defend the areas, evacuate the Muslims to safer places, establish refugees camps and finally escort them to Pakistan and bring back Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India. Sikh and Hindu jathas armed to the teeth were joined with thousands of armed and trained State Forces deserters from the East Punjab States (Patiala and Kapurthala etc) making the PBF job very difficult. We had to fight pitched battles with tanks and infantry against these to save the threatened villages, localities and trains, witnessed the most agonizing scenes of our country’s painful birth. Incomprehensible now to imagine the hardship, cruelties, tribulations and the massacres these poor innocent people went through. Thousands of lives were lost, mostly women and children. The worst destruction spread South towards Delhi and beyond! In East Punjab at least, couples of million Muslims were affected and lakhs lost their lives.
How can people now say Pakistan was achieved cheaply without paying any price? Absolute rubbish of ignorance and apathy! Worst was the last phase! Trudging hundreds of miles without food, water or shelter along the hot dusty GT Road to Pakistan Border, the EI Dorado of the ordeal! Looking back with pride, on escorting the history’s greatest mass exodus of humanity, sharing their pains and anguish and able to do one’s best to mitigate the most trying circumstances, we learnt many enduring lessons. Specially roughing it out under most unhygienic conditions and grapping with unpredictable situations; a job well carried out to establish Pakistan for Muslims to live, by a handful of soldiers with self-reliance, courage, steadfastness and above all initiative.
To top it all, unprecedented floods also took heavy toll of the refugees. Just as their camps were established on GT Road near small streams, overnight heavy rains turned into roaring swirling rivers drowning thousands of them. Having saved and evacuated them to these camps ready to move to Pakistan. I had to do the most unpleasant job of their mass burial!

It is said that Colonel Muhammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s Senior Officer attached to the Punjab Boundary Force in 1947 was not very effective in performing the assigned task vis-a- vis his Indian colleague? Can you please comment?
Colonel Ayub Khan was merely a liaison officer representing Pakistan with no staff and no troops at his disposal attached to Major General Chimni’s ad hoc cell in Amritsar, established for the Recovery of Abducted Women. Chimni also neither had any staff nor troops, dependent upon the Boundary Force HQ in Jullander for operational support. The cell worked for a short time, did not achieve much, and was soon dismantled. I undertook an operation for them failing to recover any girls! The reasons for failure were sensible and obvious; the abducted girls were well looked after by Sikh masters not prepared to go to Pakistan where they were not sure of their family’s whereabouts, alive or dead? Nor were they sure to be acceptable after their abduction ordeal! Not a single girl came forward for return to Pakistan! Colonel Ayub Khan has been incorrectly blamed for a No Go Operation from the start!

Circumstances in which you were posted to the guides cavalry and comparison of 19 Lancers with the Central India Horse?
As per Indian Army Partition Council’s plan the Muslim Squadron (A) of the Central India Horse was to join 19 Lancers along with all the Muslim Officers. Consequently, three of us — Capt. M.I. Karim (later Major General) Capt (R G Hyder (Brig) and myself joined 19 Lancers at Peshawar. In December, after most of the officers ex-Indian Army joined the Pak Armoured Corps, the GHQ carried out readjustments leaving only one senior officer from CIH in 19L the rest posted to Guides, short of officers involved in Operation Curzon in the Frontier. So Bachoo Karim and myself joined the Regiment at Dera Ismail Khan. Later proceeded to Bannu with my Squadron operating in Waziristan involved in Curzon operation.
Both these Regiments having belonged to the old Indian Cavalry Group had intimate association including cross posting of officers and men. Both fine regiments with excellent men and selected officers with good family and professional backgrounds. During my short stay at Peshawar witnessed the contentious issue of the British Officers wanting to take the Regimental silver to UK being the main contributors. This was discussed in a Regimental Mess Meeting, joining the discussion (in minority) as the junior most officer, could not contribute much. The silver was taken away! However, on joining the Commander-in-Chief’s staff I apprised General Gracey about the episode and its adverse reaction to rectify the mistake Gracey took up with Field Marshal Montgomery, British CIGS. The silver was later duly returned under a senior 19 Lancers British General with lot of fanfare in a special ceremony.

Please comment on Major General Naseer’s part in the principle causes of failure of the first armoured division’s offensive operations in the ’65 war?
This contenious, unfortunate issue has been amply flogged: pertinent lessons derived and duly stressed at our training institutions. Briefly, principle causes were: Poor planning and inadequate preparations, hastily conceived plan without comprehensively covering various hypothesis, enemy reactions and resultant contingencies, no articulation of proper command and coordinating headquarters, nor were arrangements made for air support, adequate time was not catered for Commanders reccees etc (bundles of maps from GHQ were tossed while the tanks were moving)! etc. While the usual imperatives of rehearsing the Plan, participants discussions on Sand Model and War gaming was not possible, even its salient features did not filter down amongst ranks and file!
General Naseer’s alleged lack of initiative and weak command and control and friction amongst the higher commanders with mutual lack of confidence, were lesser contributing factors. For the above iniquitous lapses the GHQ, principally the DMO Brigadier Gul Hasan Khan, cannot be absolved of their intrinsic responsibilities and inept planning.
Equally, the cardinal principles of armoured formations employment were violated. Firstly, totally insufficient lodgment area in the bridgehead (hardly 1500 yards!). Secondly, armours’ premature involvement in the bridgehead its enlargement battles. Thirdly, loss of strategic and tactical surprise in not debouching for 48 hours giving precious time to the enemy to react strongly. Lastly, no air support for the crucial breakout battle. These serious omissions doomed the formation.
Soon after the ceasefire, interestingly had the opportunity to hear the other side of the story personally from General Naseer at dinner in his Caravan (just two of us;) He took over 8 Div in Narowal area after 1st Armoured Division’s debacle while I was commanding 11 Cavalry in Sialkot Sector. Manning the forward defence line in Chawinda, letting off his steam till midnight gave his side of the operation. He mentioned that his first reaction on receiving the GHQ plan/orders was “are these from Pak Army or Indian Army?” The plan was never discussed with him nor the GHQ or higher HQ’s attended to his observation of the Plan nor the various essential various points coordinated by GHQ before operations. No time was given for essential reccees by Commanders and other preparations in his chain of command. To top it all, on the last day, returning from his quick reccee seeing some tanks moving in the opposite direction he stopped and asked “Where are you going”? “The operation has started” we have been launched was the answer! Rushing to his HQ the GOC was surprised to find that the VCGS having flown from GHQ to his HQ had launched his Division without the GOC’s knowledge!! ‘An incredible performance! Considering the aforesaid, it is arguable how far General Naseer could be held responsible for the disastrous operations?

What was Major General Abrar Husain’s role in the battle of Chawinda as a Field Commander and why was it downplayed after the war?
A strange incorrect question based on ill-founded perceptions, General Abrar as GOC 6 Armoured Division, the most crucial battles of the 65 War blunting enemy’s main offensive against very heavy odds. Taking with courage and determination, final stand inflicted heavy losses in the bloody battles. From the President, Corps Commander, PAF etc messages were received on the successful completion of the defensive campaign for “the exemplary, courageous and successful battles fought” under his able leadership in the field. “The whole Nation is proud of these untarnished deeds of valour”! A successful, able and courageous field commander proved his mettle with his apt handling of the Men of Steel; with sheer guts and determination.
It is equally wrong to imagine the down playing of his role, acknowledged officially, historically and practically at every level! His higher Commanders and the ranks and file of the Division bear testimony to his and the Division’s performance.

Your views on the ’65 War in terms of high command’s strategic perceptions, commanders concepts and conduct of operations and their execution at tactical levels?
The ’65 War was our short history’s biggest mistake: drifted into it without proper preparations, pushed by a coterie of ambitious self-interested persons, wishfully based on fallacious premises mis-appreciating and miscalculating India’s political and military responses. FM Ayub admitted as such in later years. Badly advised: the fact remains the final decision was his, failure to grasp the serious consequences catalyzed by Operation Gibraltar. Consequently neither the Nation nor the Armed Forces were adequately prepared. Equally, it was the first and last wasted chance to square up with the Indians as the country and Armed Forces — politically stable, well-equipped, internationally respected — were at their best. The country started sliding afterwards, losing its equilibrium all-round. Addressing 6 Armoured Division Officers the day after Ceasefire at the Pasrur Airfield we were amazed at the FM Ayub’s opening naive remarks “Gentlemen, the first lesson we have learnt is that if we take any action in Kashmir, India will cross the International boundary”! showed limited strategic vision grossly under estimating the enemy responses. This immutable lesson is valid even today inspite of our nuclear capability!
However, from the initial conceptual stage General Musa, given due credit, was against the operation, certain will lead to open war for which the Army was not prepared, wanting more time and two Infantry Divisions. Foreign Minister Bhutto and his office wrongly reading the Indian vibes, confident will not attack, tauntingly bulldozed Musa to launch the operation. Neglecting the fact that going to war for a nation of over hundred million is a very serious business requiring years of military, national and economic preparations, specially against a military and industrial giant, with no industrial and defence self-reliance capability. Consequently, essential contingency plans based on likely enemy hypothesis were not made by Defence Ministry and GHQ. Our consistent failing due to lack of strategic and limited perceptions. Precisely the reason which Gracey gave to Quaid for not committing regular troops in Kashmir in ’47. Appreciating India’s military potential and our weakness, correctly appreciated by Gracey, Quaid immediately understood the implications. Unfortunately, our over confident ’65 leadership wilfully or ignorantly could not due to preconceived faulty perceptions.
GHQ strategic concept of launching limited operation to lift the menacing CFL pressure was sound, achieved its desired limited objective but missed out on the final main Akhnur objective (as acknowledged by Indians). Same applies to Khem Karan operations, concept, sound execution left much to be desired! Our faulty conduct of operations in resolute leadership by the Commanders to firmly and boldly press the offensive left the Indians off the hook! Indian XV Corps was unhinged and the Western Commander was very concerned! Sluggish execution of operations, missing critical opportunity, due to serious command and control lapses, with lack of initiative and determined efforts and no effective articulation of Headquarters were the major weaknesses turning possible victories into disaster. The fact was the High Command and GHQ taken by surprise by India’s unexpected two pronged offensive unnerved FM Ayub, making no contribution thereafter and Army lost its balance! With no contingency plans and no resources GHQ merely reacted. Armoured formations were unnecessarily moved hundreds of miles, wasting precious track mileage, exhausted crew joining crucial battles! Absence of proper higher HQ and effective direction, formation Headquarters as best as possible fought own battles. Comd 1 Corps ably assisted by Generals Attiq and Yaqub playing important roles quickly gained grip of Sialkot and Lahore sectors after initial set backs and confusion. In short, where Commanders were mentally robust and aggressively resolute with determination as in Armored Division and the Desert areas results were equally satisfactory. The weaker ones as happens courted near disasters.
By and large, at the unit/sub unit tactical levels, barring some infantry units, all fought with grit and determination in adverse conditions, against heavy odds with limited resources, no relief and totally exhausted. The mediocre performance of some motor battalions, failing to support tanks or temporarily hold ground, repeatedly caused concerns! Unfortunately, in general, our Infantry continues to be shy of coming to grips with the enemy, a major serious failing since 47-48 operations.

Lessons learnt by the Pakistan armoured corps from the 1965 War and comments upon the employment of armour in ’65.
After both the ’65 and ’71 wars extensive analysis and studies were carried out by the Formations, GHQ and Training Institutions. Lessons learnt were incorporated in the GHQ/Formation Training Directives, imparted at the training institutions and included in the training material of the Armour School and Command and Staff College pointless to enumerate them here.

Having served in the army for a period spanning four decades how fair is the assessment of officers system in the army?
In view of recurring criticism, the system had been critically examined and analyzed several times over the years for consistent improvement. General Tikka took measures to review and improve it with the result that the last Selection Boards I attended (76-77) were jointly chaired by the Prime Minister with the COAS. In spite of best intentions, like any system, it largely depends on the fair, unbiased and balanced judgment of senior/reporting officers: the fault chiefly lies there!

What lessons were learnt by the Pakistan Armoured Corps from 1971 war?
The COAS General Gul Hasan Khan on my return from Special Envoy in Ankara in 1972 directed me to prepare detailed report for the Reorganization of Armoured Corps. I was appointed Director Armoured Corps at GHQ prior to taking over 6 Armoured Division. After extensive study the Report was submitted to the COAS.
Naturally, the report was based on the lessons learnt from both the wars. Soon after Gul Hasan was removed: doubt for the Report to have seen light of the day after that! A few years later though General Zia rang me up in Australia asking for a copy!!

You led the Pakistan Defence Services Delegation to study the third Arab Israeli War 1973. Please give us details of this experience and what did the Pakistan Army learnt from this war?
The day 1973 Arab-Israeli war was declared PM Bhutto correctly appreciating the Middle Eastern situation, took the diplomatic initiative of immediately phoning Presidents Saadat and Hafez Al Asad offering every possible assistance: Egypt wanted some defence stores and mines, immediately air lifted the same night while the Syrians under great Israeli air pressure urgently requested Pak Pilots: Promptly flown same evening, arrived Damascus (under air attack) via Amman early next morning, taking off immediately in Syrian MIGs shot down the first ever Israeli planes by midday. This timely and effective grand gesture established our excellent credentials in the Arab world. Again on Ceasefire whilst Kissinger was still shuttling between the contending capitals, Bhutto taking advantage requested and got agreement for a Pakistan Defence Delegation’s visit to study the War and its pertinent lessons for the Pak Armed Forces. Consequently, Ministry of Defence organized a Ten Member Delegation including officers from all the three services, Defence, Science organization and POF. The Prime Minister and the COAS selected me to head the Delegation to proceed to Cairo and Damascus for a fortnight to carry out detailed study of the Operation preparedness, National Strategy, conduct of operations, characteristics of the Weapons systems used and the lessons for Pakistan.
In Cairo the Defence Minister FM Ismail personally gave detailed briefing followed by other Service Commanders including the present President, then the Air Force Chief. In spite of the highly classified nature of the visit and the prevalent war tension very frank and comprehensive briefings at every level were provided. Their great feat of the Suez crossing and capture of the Bar-Lev line was closely studied at the Suez Canal sites and the Bar-Lev line defences: I inspected the knocked down brand new US tanks with the American dead crew still inside wearing the dog-tags: From the Sinai airfield straight into battle on Golda Meirs frantic call to Nixon. Were briefed by Commander 2nd Army in Sinai, as the 3rd Army was encircled by Sharon, spent some time with the Armoured Division HQ. Saw their excellent Missile Air Defence system. After a week’s field visits back in Cairo for final round of discussions and analysis. An exciting, interesting and scintillating experience much appreciating the Egyptians hospitality, very appreciative attitude and extremely cooperative in spite of the security sensivities, since the US and Russians were interested to find out about their respective armaments performance as the wars turned into practical laboratory.
Arrived Damascus on Eid’s eve. The President specially invited us for a reception prior to the prayers at the great Masjid-e-Omayyed, magnificent Islamic architecture. We were received in the big Reception Hall by the President amongst all the State dignitaries and Ambassadors. Making me sit next to him placing his hand on mine said “General, you are more than welcome as our best trusted friend since Pakistanis and Syrians blood has now mixed. Your pilots could not have done a better job. The whole Syria is grateful to Pakistan. (We had lost a few pilots). We were very touched. I suitably replied with thanks! Later proceeded for prayers in the historical huge hall, with John the Baptist buried on the side. Appreciating the grandeur, with President Hafez Al Asad on my left, had difficulty in concentrating in between rows of his Para Battalion soldiers shoulder to shoulder between the Safs: Fingers on their triggers inches away from my head and bowing for Sijda between their boots! A great experience.
Detailed briefings by their War Minister General Mustafa Tlas and other senior officers followed. Again was most touched on their Director General Operations pulling out the only marked single sheet of Operation Planning Map from his safe, remarked “General, as our most respected and trusted friend you are the first one to see it after our President since the operations”! Spent few days (the coldest ever) at their 6 Armoured Division HQ short of Golan Heights, visited the famous battle site of Mt Hormon and the Naval and Air Bases along the coast. Back in Damascus held very informal and frank discussions continuing late at night with General Mustafa Tlas (an able Armour officer) on the conduct of operations. All these activities provided excellent material profiling our Report.
Whilst the team members returned home I carried on to Amman for breakfast meeting with Prince Hasan, King Husain being away, the Army Chief to discuss the overall Arab overview. I also touched Beirut to get their side of the story, though Jordan and Lebanon had kept out. Intended to visit Tripoli also to meet Colonel Qaddafi, availing opportunity to see my younger brother Admiral Iqtidar heading our Military Mission, but advised against it due to internecine Arab politics returned home instead.
The delegation under my direction prepared our comprehensive detailed Report for the Prime Minister: our excellent members of the team had in put lot of work in preparing the Report. It was presented to the Defence Secretary, General Fazle Muqeem, whose immediate reaction on glancing through the copious contents was “Excellent, after so much effort you must write book on it”. It will be best seller! Later the PM conveyed through the Ministry his commendation on our excellent work. The COAS directed me to go round the formations and training institutions to address the officers starting from GHQ projecting the salient features and lessons. Took me a hectic touring fortnight to accomplish. Professionally, a very rewarding experience. Everywhere the lessons were thoroughly stressed. What has since been implemented unable to ascertain. Understand the Air Force and the Navy were prompt while the Army as usual got entangled in future studies/discussions, though the immediate important ones were undertaken. I was glad to see that our main recommendation of starting Army Air Defence, independent of the artillery is now on the ground! The rest of the report, like most of our reports, must be collecting dust somewhere!!

You saw General Zia from your early years in the army till 1988. Please tell us about Zia’s personalities as a man and as a soldier?
Enough has been written about him. Having known him well, right up to his tragic demise, would not like to comment much after his death. Actually, in his early service he was mostly at the Armour Centre, with only short spells in the Regiment, so did not see much of him.
He joined the Guides Cavalry in 1950 on Review Report from another regiment but did not stay long. Professionally, nothing exceptional, an average officer, affected with the religious bug from the beginning hence known as Maulvi in the Regiment. A fairly meticulous staff officer though very slow and indecisive known for pushing difficult files literally under the carpet! In command more interested in PR and keeping the boss happy. Did not participate in any active combat operations during the wars.
An exceptionally lucky person having made to the highest office despite initial medical handicap, placed on Review Report on joining Pakistan Army and narrowly missing Court Martial as Brigadier. Thrived on sycophancy upward and flattery from below! Acquired political ambitions on becoming Divisional Commander onward, meticulously planning his moves with excellent PR fooled Bhutto!
It may interest, a week before taking over, he asked me to fly down from Quetta to discuss important matters. At the Army House before lunch, just two of us, discussed the prevailing political deadlock facing PM Bhutto! In sensing he was toying up with taking over the country. I suggested against any military action. Whereupon he quipped “taking over is no problem I could do tomorrow”! I said “taking over is easy as we experienced in the ’58 Martial Law but your problem will be how to get off the tiger? You will not like to give up power come what may! It will have serious political repercussions generated by Mr. Bhutto”. With his characteristic both hands on his chest, “by Allah I promise it will be for only 90 days, on the 91st day I will blow the whistle as referee to hold General Elections”! I urged upon him “Zia, you must avoid military action, instead keeping pressure on Bhutto, make him come to political agreement with implement his part without trying to get out of it.” You must make matters work politically! Knowing he could not face Bhutto, was waiting for this chance he would take action at Bhutto’s back. The rest is history. This meeting has been mentioned by author Emily Duncan in her book “Breaking the Curfew”!

You have been an active Polo player all your life, why has Pakistani Polo team failed to do well internationally?
You are right, we have not been doing well in the International Polo fields. Basic reason, of course is we do not have enough high handicap good Polo players as of yester years like the Effendi boys or the Baig brothers. Mainly because senior Army Officers are no longer playing polo. There is a lack of patronage and support from Army’s senior officers, consequently very few young officers play polo. During our time senior officers groomed, trained and supported the upcoming young players: no longer the case. Equally the reconstituted Pakistan Polo Association has not contributed much and is not very active. Some individual — civilian teams do participate in international tournaments but due to lack of sponsors, indifferent selection and training and lax management their performance has left much to be desired.

Anything you would like to say for the benefit of Defence Journal.
The improved and changed form of the Defence Journal over the year has considerably contributed towards projecting defence and security issues. Improving its editing and get-up, it needs now to enlarge its scope to cover the critical and all encompassing national management, mature political, cultural and liberal progressive political issues as anunciated by our Founding Fathers. A Herculean task requiring persistent long-term efforts! In this context reorientation of our main internal and external policies has to be undertaken to change the tone of our country in a freshly changed national atmosphere.