Back
to Barracks -
Pakistan Army's experience of withdrawal from active
control of the state
Columnist Hamid Hussain studies the lessons the Army learnt when not in control.
Introduction
Every military government at some point has to decide about the withdrawal
from the direct control of the state. As one commentator has pointed out
correctly that, 'control of coercive resources provides a demonstrable
advantage in struggles for power but, by itself, it grants no magic formula
for effectiveness in governing beyond mere preservation of order and the
status quo'.1 The decision of General Musharraf to hold general elections
in October 2002 has resulted in a flurry of activity in the country. In
the last few months, different segments of the society have expressed
their views in the print media about the recent decisions of the military
government. A debate has been raging about the pros and cons of the proposed
constitutional amendments by the military government. Similarly, a lot
has been written about the various recommendations of the National Reconstruction
Bureau (NRB), a think tank for the military government headed by retired
Lieutenant General Tanveer Naqvi.
Such exercises have become routine as the present military government
is the fourth one in the fifty-five year history of Pakistan since independence.
In such debates, it usually happens that most of the participants argue
about one or another aspect of the different proposed plans of the military.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, there has been no serious, in-depth analysis
of the whole phenomenon of military's withdrawal from the active and overt
control of the state and its effect on the society. This article will
attempt to explain some basic elements of the complex phenomenon of military's
withdrawal from active control. The first section, will explore the thought
process of senior officers of the armed forces about governance which
is essential for any understanding of the various decisions which military
leadership makes. The second section, will briefly discuss general theories
about military withdrawal from politics. Third section, will explain Pakistan's
previous experience in such ventures over the last fifty-five years. In
last section a brief summary of the overall process and its effect on
Pakistan's polity will be outlined. The article will not discuss causes
of various military coups and policies and consolidation measures of different
military regimes which are separate topics requiring detailed discussion.
General's Dilemma
- What is Soldier Thinking?
One cannot understand the methodology of military rulers without first
comprehending the thought process of the military's brass. After all,
we all act according to our beliefs and thoughts. One has to get a fair
idea of what the soldier thinks about the civil polity of the state he
serves. Second, what kind of image he has for himself and his self-assigned
role. Without understanding these two factors, it will be very difficult
if not at all impossible to understand why military rulers act in a particular
and predictable way. In a modern nation state, the ghost of legitimacy
haunts every military ruler. This means that despite universal disdain
for politicians and political activity, he has to publicly acknowledge
about some form of participative form of government.
Soldier by nature of his training develops a particular set of social
behaviour. Generally, it includes strong emphasis on order, a recognized
chain of command, clarity about instructions, obedience and a sense of
loyalty. These qualities are must for a professional soldier. These traits
while a plus for a good soldier at the same time hampers soldier's understanding
of the civil aspect of life. In a modern nation state, there are several
groups, which are involved in an exercise of control and competition.
It is very difficult for the soldier 'to compartmentalize his attitude,
holding one set to be appropriate in one context and another set elsewhere'.2
This results in a generalization of attitude of the officers corps towards
the civilian sphere which in the long run is detrimental for both the
army and the society at large. Soldiers by nature of their profession
and training consider themselves 'endangered by decentralization, deconcentration,
democratization, pluralization and re-regimentation'.3 It is quite natural
then that the officers see these activities bad for the civil society
also. 'Military officers generally lack the judiciousness and the sagacity
to appreciate the delicate nature of complex socio-political equation'.4
Soldiers hate disorder and have their own preset ideas about what a right
conduct is? Field Marshall Cariappa (First Indian Chief of Indian Army,
who retired in 1953) after Ayub Khan's successful coup in Pakistan advocated
that President's rule should be imposed in India for two years and civil
administration be made subordinate to army. He suggested that, "it
is good to have military rule under civilian control in places where things
had gone bad' and democracy and socialism could wait till India's teeming
millions were assured of a square meal a day'.5 To India's luck, such
ideas didn't gain any foothold among the Indian military leadership. As
a universal rule, soldiers see political activity as 'selfish' and party
politics as 'divisive'. The expression of 'popular interests' is seen
as narrow-mindedness and demands on part of masses as 'absence of respect
of authority'. Politicians are seen as 'corrupt, inefficient, factious
and opportunistic'.6 This is due to the nature of their belonging to military
organization, which has a different role to play in the affairs of the
state.
The utter contempt for civilians is quite obvious from the writings of
many officers of Pakistan army. A retired Colonel compares military and
politics in these words, 'military remembers the past, it cares for the
present and secures the future. Whereas politics sleeps with the past,
plays with the present and experiments with the future'.7 General Zia
ul Haq in a press conference stated his views about politics, 'my own
view is that the less political activity we have, the better would it
be'.8 A retired Lt. General points that "The soldier class has the
highest status in Pakistan, the trades like carpentry and politics are
taboo!". In explanation of his statement, he gives bizarre reasons
blaming British colonials, Hindus, Mullah and doctrines of Islam in the
same breath.9 Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan has summed up the Pakistani
soldier's opinion about politics and democracy, "politics had not
been a strong point of the Muslims in this sub-continent for about a hundred
years. Traditionally, the good and capable young men went into services;
those who entered politics regarded it not so much as a serious occupation
but as a profitable pastime...... politicians had been ignorant, vainglorious
good for nothing, only able to influence the polling of the votes often
by far from honest means".10 About the political leadership at the
time of independence, he has this to say, "The new education had
thrown up leaders who, for the most part, did not come from the traditional
ruling classes, and had no experience or understanding of subjects like
defence".11
Soldiers see democracy as a danger, which breaks down the discipline of
the nation. In 1954, four years before the coup, General (later Field
Marshall) Ayub Khan wrote these words about the dangers of democracy.
"Unfettered democracy can, therefore, prove dangerous, especially
nowadays when Communism from within and without is so quick to make use
of its weaknesses". While elaborating his views on universal suffrage,
he was of the view that if it can't be altogether scrapped up then at
least, ' ... to provide checks here too so as to prevent its becoming
irresponsible'.12 As far as public opinion was concerned Ayub was of the
view that, "In the light of the past experience, it will be highly
dangerous to talk about people's representatives formulating the Constitution".13
Half a century later and a new generation of senior officers at the helm
of affairs and nothing seems to have changed in the thought process. In
2001, Lt. General (r) Tanveer Naqvi who is heading National Reconstruction
Bureau (NRB) states that, "The army has the right to amend the Constitution
as it cannot be silent spectator to the country being damaged".14
Strangely, this utter contempt and disdain of politicians is combined
with the belief that somehow democracy is a good thing. In his mind, soldier
separates politics and politicians from democratic process. After the
1958 coup, Ayub Khan said, "Let me announce in unequivocal terms
that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people
can understand and work".15 Yahya Khan in his first address to the
nation stated, "I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I
have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the
establishment of a constitutional government".16 General Zia ul Haq
in his first address stated, "I genuinely feel that the survival
of this country lies in democracy and democracy alone".17 General
Musharraf is a bit ambiguous. He stated that, "Pakistani environment
is not fully conducive to real parliamentary democracy". After reaching
that conclusion, he then laments that, "But at the same time, the
demands of the whole world, particularly United States and of our own
people make it imperative that we give it our best shot".18 The general
is convinced that parliamentary democracy is not good for Pakistan but
in anyway due to many pressures, he has to give a try. He embarked on
what he called 'fine tuning' of the system.19 All present efforts are
towards this fine-tuning of the democracy. He stated in a press conference
that 'political restructuring' was one of the four priorities (good governance,
economic revival and poverty alleviation are other three) which he identified
in 1999.20 With this mindset, when generals replace the civilian rulers,
they do not feel any remorse or carry any guilt feeling. After all, if
you remove a much hated person or government, what is there to be sorry
for. In fact, the generals can congratulate themselves for removing the
menace.
In comparison to the civilian, soldier has a very exaggerated view of
himself. The qualities of disciplined and organized life of soldiers is
considered a model for the whole nation to adopt. The military leadership
thinks that, 'if good government works within the military, if it can
be imposed by adherence to regulations, law, and tradition, then the broader
society should be amenable to the same kind of orthosocial control'.21
In countries like Pakistan, with a tradition of repeated military interventions,
the ever-expanding image of army reaches an abnormal level. The expansion
of this image damages the professionalism of the organization and it 'succumbs
to a kind of narcissism'. This in turn produces 'a strong sense of self-righteousness
and self-complacency'.22 They see it as their duty to 'inject stability
and continuity into the polity' 23 totally oblivious to the complexity
of the national problems but convinced that they are right. This disdain
of civilians and a self-righteous attitude is accompanied with an authoritarian
bent, as expected from a military ruler. Ayub Khan wrote in 1954 that,
"Laws should be operative only if certified by the President ...
No change in constitution should be made unless agreed to by the President'.24
Ayub while rejecting some of the recommendations of his hand-picked Constitution
Commission commented, "If there is anyone who should have an overall
view of the conditions and problems of Pakistan, it is me".25 After
giving his outline of the Constitution, he then sermoned the people by
saying, 'Here are some of my ideas on the (constitution) which have in
them the fire of my heart; give them a trial for your own good'.26 Similarly,
General Zia formed a special Committee of the nominated Federal Council
(Majlis-e-Shoora) and Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) (another body
whose members are nominated by the government) to certify his authoritarian
plans. When both these bodies recommended adult franchise and party based
elections, the onus fell to Zia's hand-picked Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari
to anoint Zia's plans as God's own version of government. General Musharraf
in one of his statements commented that, 'Unless there is a unity of command,
unless there is one man in charge on top, it will never function'.27 While
elaborating his plans after the October 2002 elections, General Musharraf
declared that, "As the President of Pakistan, I am going to retain
the authority to dismiss the Cabinet or the Assembly".28 He said
that he has a vital role to play and 'I can't detach myself from this
process'.29 With this well-entrenched thought process and a general conservative
outlook, the military leaders draw upon their own experiences in military
life, whenever they take direct control of the state. When soldiers act
on their beliefs convinced that military is much better than the civilian
counterparts, the solutions which they impose are in line with military
organization. The result is a highly centralized, hierarchical and closed
government. This combination of contempt of participatory politics, self-righteous
attitude and crisis of legitimacy which needs some kind of civilian accommodation
creates a confusing scene. This confusion of thought process is well illustrated
by writings of some senior officers. One retired Lieutenant General admits
that the growth of political institutions was stunted 'because of the
heavy involvement of the armed forces in national policy formation and
militarization of the society'.30 In his advice to General Musharraf to
strengthen democratic institutions, he then stresses that, 'military should
retain firm control through the president and the National Security Council'.31
He is offering the same medicine which has caused all the side effects
as cure also. Despite the soldier's contempt of politics, military rule
invariably involves officers of the armed forces in politics. In case
of Pakistan, the degree of political involvement has been variable during
different military rules. The level of politicization of even mid-level
officers in present government has reached a crisis level which is not
a good omen for the professionalism of the armed forces in long run. The
most unfortunate aspect is the fact that even with the hindsight, the
military brass is unable to comprehend the futility of this exercise.
Former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Jehangir Karamat defended the
behind the scene maneuvers of the military and intelligence high command
in the post 1988 period. He said, "I am sure that under the circumstances
in which they were operating, they acted in the best interest of the country
and thought what they were doing would help create a stable political
environment".32 The military leadership is oblivious to the cost
to both the civil society and armed forces. Army tainting its good professional
soldiers and society getting more corrupt and militarized.
Mechanisms of
Withdrawal - Theory
Taking control of the state by the military is an easy task. In countries
like Pakistan, the generals send few companies of soldiers to arrest prime
minister and occupy the television and radio station and that is the end
of the civilian regime. One commentator states that, 'if the military's
entry into power was surprisingly easy, going back to the barracks - and
remaining there - has proven to be a formidable challenge'.33 When military
rulers decide about the withdrawal, they face several challenges in this
transition. The military elite may oppose the type of polity and society
which is going to follow them, the military rule's programme may be challenged
and most importantly there may be backlash or revenge from the civilian
rulers threatening the military as an institution.34 The subject of military
withdrawal from politics is a complex one and includes both military and
non-military areas. Ulf Sundhaussen has correctly pointed to this complexity
by stating that, "Military disengagement from politics appears to
be rare, blurred, incomplete, temporary, and codependent on extra-military
actors".35
The first question which needs to be answered is why a military regime
which is in control of the state will decide to give up the power? Several
military and non-military factors may be operational at a given time,
which makes the military rulers to think about withdrawal. Ulf Sundhaussen
gives three sets of reasons of military withdrawal;
1. Opposition to its continuing rule - this may be in the form of mass protests or armed and violent struggle.
2. Military regimes which depend economically, militarily and logistically to a large extent on external powers can be threatened when the patrons decide to desert them (Fall of many Latin American client military regimes) or direct intervention from outside (Fall of Idi Amin of Uganda).
3. Internal Military Factors - the differences
among the officer corps reach such a level that military's cohesiveness
and capacity as a fighting force is seriously compromised. In this situation,
a group of senior military leaders conclude that the only way of protecting
the armed forces from complete disintegration is pulling out of politics.36
Eric Nordlinger describes three reasons for military withdrawal from power:
Extensive civilian opposition, counter coup and in the absence of extensive
pressure a 'voluntary' withdrawal can follow a military regime.37 Paul
Brooker describes three modes of transferal of power from the military
to civilians:
(a) Elections that have been unilaterally scheduled, organized and supervised by the military.
(b) A negotiated agreement with civilian representatives.
(c) The military simply abandoning power.38
Clapham and Philip describe in detail various models of transition from
military to civilian rule;
1. Handback: This involves the handing back of country's rule to civilians after correction of constitutional deficiencies as military views it.
2. Civilian Renewal: This is similar to handback but with a difference that civilian rulers are not constrained by any previous arrangement with officers. This usually occurs after a violent internal or external jolt. A variety of this type occurs in an extreme situation where there is a quick and undignified exit from the corridors of power leaving a chaos behind.
3. Authoritarian Clientalism: In this scenario, military acquires civilian allies who accept military hegemony in exchange for share in power and benefits of running the state.
4. Factional Clientalism: This entails a personal regime in which after ascending to the highest post by a coup, the general uses his personal skills to establish links with few civilian factions of the society along with strong backup from the military to rule.
5. The Military Party State: In this set up, civilians and military are mobilized into a single party state due to complete rejection of the previous set up. Baath Party of Syria and Iraq are examples of this methodology.
6. Impasse: Many a times, military regime is unable to create any of the above-described situation resulting in an impasse. Most of the times, such regimes are overthrown by another group of officers from within. Ghana in 1978 and Argentina in 1982 are case examples.39
In different countries, one or more of the above mentioned factors have been responsible for the withdrawal of soldiers from politics.
Pakistan Army's experiments of
Withdrawal
Pakistani military elite had time and again expressed their wish to have
a role in the country's affairs apart from their duty to defend the borders.
They see as their inherent right and duty to 'define Pakistan's supreme
national interest, gauge the civilian government performance, and take
appropriate action' which may be the pressure to change the course or
removal of the government'.40 They have repeatedly insisted that they
should have a constitutional role to act in case of emergency. This means
that the military high command can ask any civilian government to give
way in the event which a group of generals can define as crisis. For obvious
reasons, polity and general populace has not accepted this argument and
are not willing to give this supra-constitutional blanket authority to
a group of generals. The result of this divergent view is that military
being the sole reservoir of violent means has pushed the civilians out
of way without much problem whenever the army brass felt that a crisis
is at hand.
In case of Pakistan, 'military regimes have developed means of relinquishing
the form but retaining much of the substance of military rule'.41 Pakistani
military leaders have embarked on a policy of 'two steps forward; one
step backward' whenever they decide to give up direct rule. This methodology
enables the army brass to avoid massive repressive steps and at the same
time gives them the leverage to engineer a system in which they do not
lose complete control (The only exception has been in 1971 when military
was not in a position to negotiate with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in view of
surrender of East Pakistan garrison). This exercise has invariably involved
them in domestic political arena. Military regimes in an effort to 'civilianize'
the military rule end up 'militarizing' the politics. The instruments
available to a military government are coercion, selective patronage and
repression and cultivation of new civil groups who would accept military
hegemony (albeit temporarily). In a pluralistic society like Pakistan,
this exercise has resulted in the fracture of the society on different
fault lines and resulted in increasing polarization. The roots of many
current severe pressures on the national fabric can be directly linked
to the policies adopted by various military regimes.
The experience of Pakistani military rulers to hand over power to civilians
has been a diverse one and depended on a host of factors. Each transition
of government occurred in the crisis situation and was a complicated one.
Ayub Khan after 10 years of rule had to face a difficult situation. Ten
years of highly centralized rule by civil and military bureaucrats (both
dominated by West Pakistan) resulted in complete alienation of Bengalis.
In West Pakistan, it caused resentment among newly emerging industrial
labour, students, lawyers and intelligentsia as they were kept at bay
from the corridors of power. In East Pakistan, Mujeeb ur Rahman (leader
of Awami League) became the spokesperson for Bengali nationalism while
in Western wing, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (leader of Pakistan Peoples Party)
emerged as a fiery spokesperson for all alienated groups of that wing.
The only point of agreement between these two divergent and actually mutually
hostile groups was the removal of Ayub Khan. A mass protest which very
quickly became violent paralyzed the country. Ayub Khan who had shed his
uniform to become President was seen more as a politician rather than
brother officer by the military. His hand-picked Commander-in-Chief General
Yahya Khan waited patiently until Ayub was totally isolated and then asked
him to move out of the President House. Ayub Khan having shed his uniform
had no direct control over the armed forces. In addition, being the head
of a highly centralized government and ever present in all media, he had
become the symbol of all what was wrong with the government. These factors
combined with no real political assets had sealed the fate of Ayub and
he had to go. All this did not occurred in a vacuum. It took a heavy toll
from the civil society. By 1969, Bengalis in general were convinced that
their interests did not lay in united Pakistan and to achieve their goals,
they must break the knot with West Pakistan. The stage was thus set for
a showdown between the two wings.
General Yahya Khan inherited a very volatile and complicated situation
in 1969. The polity of the country was divided probably irreversibly.
The need of the hour was a genuine attempt at reconciliation and if that
was not possible a mechanism of separation of two wings with minimum damage.
Only the representatives of the two wings could do this. Military due
to the very nature of its organization, training and ideology has only
the course of repression to prevent disintegration of the state and that
is the course which Yahya Khan took. This course of action should have
been expected as no military ruler (in fact even a West Pakistani civilian
ruler) could do different. Yahya Khan announced for the general elections
based on adult franchise. This didn't mean that military will simply hand
over power after elections. He introduced certain measures to guarantee
some control of the future events. In 1970, Legal Framework Order (LFO)
was introduced. Two clauses of LFO gave military a veto power over elected
representatives. According to LFO rules, if the President (General Yahya
Khan) didn't authenticate the Constitution, the National Assembly would
be dissolved (National Assembly was given 120 days to frame the Constitution
of the deeply divided country). The second most crucial rule was that
in the interpretation of LFO, if any question or doubt arise, only the
President would give his final verdict which could not be challenged in
any court of law. Military rulers usually negotiate the exit strategy
before allowing power sharing with civilians to protect the personal interests
of officers aligned with the regime and corporate interests of the armed
forces. The only exception to this rule is the hasty and compulsory withdrawal
after a humiliating defeat where army is unable to maintain its aggressive
posture against the civilian contenders of power. This is what happened
after the war with India and surrender of garrison in East Pakistan in
December 1971. Not only general discontent and hostility against the military
brass was at its peak but also mid-level officers openly came out against
the ruling generals threatening the cohesion of armed forces. Colonel
Aleem Afridi (Colonel Staff of Army Reserve North) and Colonel Staff of
Armoured Division met with Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt. General Gul
Hassan Khan and told him that troops were very angry at the debacle and
wanted Yahya Khan to quit.42 Two Brigadiers and one Colonel (F. B. Ali,
Iqbal Shah and Agha Javed Iqbal) were court martialled and released from
the army on charges of a plot to overthrow the Yahya regime. Chief of
Staff (COS), General Abdul Hamid Khan addressed young officers at the
jam-packed auditorium of National Defence College. After his address,
many officers burst into anger and hurled abuses at the senior army brass.
The shocked generals left the hall in silence.43 In December 1971, Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto emerged as the strongest civilian leader who gradually asserted
full control over the military. He was able to achieve this difficult
feat for two reasons. One, the military defeat and general hostility of
the public was not conducive for any general to bid for power and in addition,
having secured his position in Punjab and Sindh, Bhutto had political
assets to back his claim to power. He had the legitimacy which he cleverly
combined with his oratory skills to strengthen himself. It was his arrogance
and authoritarian bent which will lead him to the gallows six years later.
General Zia (1977-1988) had a long run due to various domestic and international
factors. The hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1979 on charges of
ordering the murder of a political opponent drove a permanent wedge between
the ruling generals and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) because Bhutto's
widow, Nusrat Bhutto and daughter Benazir Bhutto dominated PPP. The mutual
hostility between two powerful players, military which relies on its coercive
power and PPP which attempts to mobilize popular support has significantly
impeded the growth of political institutions in Pakistan. The ruling generals
to justify their actions against PPP, portrayed it as an anti-state party
and a danger for national security. The result of this long exercise is
that Pakistan army as an institution stuck with the ghost of Bhutto and
find it very difficult to defeat the 'legacy of Bhutto' than Bhutto himself.44
PPP became a dilemma for General Zia. Any civilian set up in which PPP
had a significant role was simply unacceptable due to various reasons.
Threat of retaliation against the military brass, challenging and reversing
the policies adopted by military government were two major factors which
made Zia uncomfortable with the experiment of civil participation. Zia
countered PPP by portraying its secular credentials as anti-Islamic. In
1980, he stated, "as long as I am at the helm of affairs and there
is with me the overwhelming force of Islam-loving people, we will not
let the country go into the hands of anti-Islam and secular elements".45
When Zia was pressed about future plan of the country, he admitted that
he had to take into consideration many factors like the future of the
country and his subordinates.46 In 1985, due to increasing internal and
external pressures, General Zia reluctantly embarked on the path of a
limited and controlled civil participation in governance. Internal pressures
included the civil disturbances especially in Sindh province during the
Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which required the use of
troops at large scale. More important than that was the signs of turmoil
in armed forces. In 1980, Major General (r) Tajamal Hussain was arrested
on charges of an attempt to overthrow the government. Several senior generals
close to Zia including Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti (Corps Commander of
the most important 10th Corps based in Rawalpindi) were sacked/retired.
In 1983, about two dozen mid-level officers were arrested on charges of
plotting to overthrow Zia regime. General Zia and his intelligence Chief,
Lt. General (later General) Akhtar Abdur Rahman were concerned with involvement
of any senior officers with this group. Several senior officers were put
under surveillance and in the next few weeks five generals (General Iqbal
Ahmad Khan, Lt. General Sawar Khan, Lt. General S. M. Abbassi, Lt. General
Ahmad Jamal Mian and Lt. General C. A. Ubaid) were retired. Internationally,
Reagan administration was facing the pressure from pro-democracy Democratic
lobby and conveying their apprehensions to Zia lest the large scale cooperation
regarding Afghanistan is jeopardized. Zia was forced by these circumstances
to allow some kind of civil participation. He introduced many 'safety
mechanisms' before allowing the civilians to come near the corridors of
power. This included non-party elections, a drastically amended constitution
with increased powers to the President and change in election commission
rules for effective control of the parties.47 The 1985 elections were
held on non-party basis. Parliament chose Zia's pick, Muhammad Khan Junejo
(a non-entity form Sindh with no real political authority or following)
as Prime Minister. Zia shrewdly invited Junejo along with his Interior
Minister Aslam Khattak to attend two Martial Law Administrators (MLAs)
conferences. Zia made it clear who the boss was by stating that the possibility
of Martial Law could not be ruled out as the military was unlikely to
become a silent spectator if the country faced an internal threat.48 By
this manoeuvre, Zia conveyed the message to civilians that the policy
was not his personal but whole senior military brass wanted this arrangement.
The Martial Law Administrators (MLAs) acting as board of directors by
their various decisions (albeit minor) strengthened this impression that
military was acting a corporate body. In a MLA's conference, the military
governors of provinces gave the names of persons to be nominated Chief
Ministers of their respective provinces. Sindh Governor, Lt. General Jahandad
Khan told the exalted audience that in his opinion no elected member of
the provincial legislature was suitable to become Chief Minister. He gave
the name of Ghaus Ali Shah (a retired Judge of Sindh High Court who was
not an elected member of the legislature) and he was appointed Chief Minister.
(Lt. General Jahandad Khan was of the view that Sindh needed a leader
who had the 'qualities of both head and heart', being an elected representative
of the people does not seem to be that important. He thinks that criticism
on this issue is due to the ignorance of the people about special situation
of the Sindh, of which off course, the general is the best judge.)49 Governor
of Balochistan Lt. General K. K. Afridi stated about his nominee Jam Sahib
of Lasbela that he was a weak and corrupt person but he will be watched.50
Zia managed to get a large number of close allies of the regime elected
to the Senate to keep a hold on that house. The list includes veteran
bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaque Khan, Zia's economic wiz kid Dr. Mahboob ul
Haq (whose talents were earlier used by Ayub Khan), Lt. General (r) Jamal
Said Mian, Lt. General (r) Saeed Qadir and Lt. General (r) Sahibzada Yaqub
Khan. The Revival of Constitution Order (RCO) of March 1985 introduced
amendments in 67 of the 280 articles of the 1973 Constitution.51 The most
important clause was 8th Amendment which gave the President power of dismissing
the elected Prime Minister and Parliament. The parliament members accepted
these enormous powers to the President after a commitment by General Zia
that he will retire from the army after lifting the Martial Law. He reneged
from his promise. 52 Zia also pushed for National Security Council but
even the pliant Parliament rejected that idea. The martial law was officially
lifted after all these guarantees but Zia kept the twin hats of President
and COAS. The non-party basis of general elections resulted in the emergence
of a new class of politicians relying mainly on local, regional and ethnic
loyalties. To keep a large segment of this diverse group loyal, the government
has to give them economic patronage to not let them go astray. The phenomenon
of giving large sums of bank loans (which were almost universally defaulted
by everyone with impunity) which has shattered the Pakistan's economy
can be directly linked to this era. This civil-military chimera was inherently
unworkable and within three years, Zia has to wind it up, sending Junejo
and National Assembly home.
In August 1988, General Zia died in a plane crash along
with the top army brass. The new army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg had
to make decisions in consultation with Corps Commanders on an emergency
basis. The decision of holding elections on party basis was made due to
changed national and international circumstances. It was clear in the
mind of army brass that there will be share of power not transfer of power
to the civilians. The 'safeguards' put in place by General Zia will be
operational which meant that army will have a veto power on certain vital
policy issues. Pakistan People's Party won the majority of seats of National
Assembly. Army brass allowed Benazir Bhutto to become Prime Minister after
getting assurances that certain areas of policy will not be changed. This
included Afghan policy and economic policies. In addition there will be
no accountability of military leadership. The powerful weapon of Eighth
amendment was the key which military kept in its pocket. This was used
to dismiss previously four elected governments. Two Presidents, Ghulam
Ishaque Khan and Faruque Ahmad Khan Leghari (both former bureaucrats)
who had no real influence or popular support dismissed elected Prime Ministers
as they merely executed the wishes of the army high command. All care
taker governments were established by military brass. General Headquarters
(GHQ) monitored and wherever necessary adjusted the outcome of elections
to suit the policy of military high command at that particular time. During
the caretaker government in 1995, military asked President Faruque Ahmad
Khan Leghari to create Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS).
The body was created in January 1996 and included President as Chairperson,
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, three service chiefs, prime
minister and ministers of defence, foreign affairs and finance. As it
was created without any civilian input, it remained dormant during the
second terms of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The turbulent period
of 1988-1999 has shown the fallacy of military thought process. Military
establishment thought that by having three centres of power (Prime Minister,
President and Chief of Army Staff - the troika) will create a kind of
balance where they will have the final say in major policy issues without
appearing to be directly involved in country's management. They were unable
to comprehend the complexity and inherent incompatibility of this arrangement.
The failure of democratic process was the direct outcome of this absurd
arrangement. The three distinct sources of authority being quite obvious,
those who got disaffected from one fountain of power turned to another.
The stage was thus set for the palace intrigues of medieval mould. Disaffected
members of the ruling party or opposition members will try to curry favour
of GHQ or President House. In this manipulative game, 'Parliament, political
parties and public opinion are all left irrelevant'.53 By operating behind
the scene, a situation is created where military power is divorced from
responsibility.54 The civilian government takes a particular action under
strong pressure from the military but all unwanted consequences are to
be faced by the civilian authorities. The involvement of Pakistan in various
US sponsored security pacts in 1950s, continuation of Afghan policy formed
and executed by Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate by the civilian
governments in 1988-1999 period, decision to detonate nuclear device in
1998 and retreat from Kargil hills in 1999 are examples of this methodology.
Now the fourth military regime is following the footsteps of its uniformed
predecessors. General Musharraf after initial consolidation with the help
of his peers (Lt. General Muzaffar Usmani, Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad and
Lt. General Muhammad Aziz Khan) had to face an enormous challenge in the
post-September 11 totally changed international environment. One of the
positive outcome for Musharraf was that it gave him the opportunity to
sideline the group in which he was one among the equals. The second line
of officers which he had put in critical positions are junior to him and
owe their positions to him alone. Unflinching personal loyalty will be
expected and demanded from this group. After securing his base, he then
embarked on the predicted plan. First by a referendum, he got himself
elected President for five years. NRB was given the task to come up with
a plan according to prescribed guidelines. President (who will keep the
COAS stick) is given blanket authority with no checks. National Security
Council (NSC) with all military heavy weights will keep the corporate
interests of the military adequately protected in case of the accidental
removal of the President (as happened in case of General Zia). Various
measures have been made to neutralize the two main parties, PPP and Muslim
League (Nawaz Sharif Group). To prevent any serious challenge from the
rightist religio-political parties, next logical step will be to neutralize
them. This can be very easily achieved by enticing some of them by dangling
the carrot (which will soften a large number of their leadership). The
stick of anti-extremism and anti-terrorism measures will beat the ones
not coming in line. On August 21, 2002, General Musharraf flanked by one
serving and one retired general announced the far reaching constitutional
changes which are named Legal Framework Order (LFO) (with so many military
takeovers, military is running out of even phrases and using the old ones.
General Yahya Khan's package was also called LFO in 1970). Should all
the measures which have been taken so far by General Musharraf surprise
anybody? Not to the ones who have some understanding of the working of
military regimes and Pakistan's history. When General Musharraf has all
his brain storming sessions with veteran bureaucrats, serving generals
and retired army chiefs and generals, one should not be surprised at the
decisions which have been taken so far. One can be sure that the constitutional
magician, Mr. Sharif uddin Peerzada has offered General Musharraf same
gems which he has given to General Ayub Khan and General Ziaul Haq. Pakistan
has never been short of otherwise eminent and respectable gentlemen whose
talents and hidden qualities only shine under the sun of an authoritarian
rule. The tragedy of Pakistan is that in this country neither old soldiers
nor old bureaucrats fade away. They simply become ghosts which haunt the
nation forever. The simple fact that even a capable and sincere person
gives his best upto a certain time and when the time comes, he honorably
hands over to future generation. Every younger generation has to tackle
the problems facing their society to the best of their abilities as they
fully comprehend the problems and possible solutions. Current measures
of Musharraf regime have all the ingredients of instability. These measures
will have two fold effect. It will undermine the credibility of military
leadership (thus setting the stage for disagreements among the top brass
and strain on cohesion of high command) and will polarize the civil society
further (the new elite patronized by the military coming close to the
corridors of power has to be placated by economic incentives resulting
in alienation of other segments of the society).
Conclusion
It is interesting that Pakistani army brass is going backwards on issues
where the rest of the world is going forward. Indonesia, which has a long
standing history of repeated and prolonged intervention by military in
civil affairs has been trying to regain the civilian control. Recently,
Indonesian parliament has attempted to end military hold by ending reserved
military seats in the parliament. It has also amended the Constitution
for direct election of the president in 2004.55 In contrast, Pakistani
military leadership is planning for a more direct role in the governance
of the country with a veto power on all major decisions. The military
leadership is not content with one or two control mechanisms but going
all the way to completely subjugate the polity. The President, who is
also army chief has the authority to dismiss the elected Parliament. As
if this is not enough, a National Security Council with top military brass
will breathe on the neck of the future civilian government. The National
Assembly has to have elected representatives who accept military's hegemony,
thus justification for making and breaking of political party alliances
by the military men. In addition, attempt will be made to pack the Senate
with retired senior officers of the armed forces and other coat hangers
of the regime. All these efforts are just the foundation stones for the
instability for the next one or two decades.
The problem with military leaders is that due to the very nature of their
organization which is based on discipline and hierarchy, they are unable
to address fundamental issues facing the nation which are political. Pakistan's
problems are complex and multi-faceted and 'cannot be solved by the straightforward
approach of a soldier with a sense of a God-given mission'.56 Political
problems need the tools of consensus development, bargaining and conciliation,
which are anathema to soldiers. Military rulers pride themselves that
they have outmanoeuvred other political aspirants of power but in the
process they not only increase their vulnerability but also destabilize
the state further by adding new complexities. Whenever, the military leadership
decided to wean away from direct control, it engineered cooption of new
groups. This strategy has resulted in addition of new problems rather
than solving the existing ones. Military brass has looked for a civilian
client who has sufficient popular support to partially answer the legitimacy
question and on the other hand weak enough not to threaten the military's
superiority. These are contradictory objectives and are never successful
in long term. The classic example is the rise of Nawaz Sharif in the politics
of Pakistan. One can only guess about how in a normal parliamentary electoral
process Sharif could have achieved what he did. He started his career
under the direct patronage of military rulers (Late Lt. General Ghulam
Jilani Khan groomed him for his future political role. In early 1990,
Sharif was seen by military brass as meeting the both criteria (sufficient
popular support for legitimacy and accepting military's hegemony). For
Sharif, to become strong, he has to assert himself to prove that he was
nobody's stooge. Sharif has been alleged to make the remarks at a breakfast
meeting with Pir Pagaro (Leader of his own faction of Muslim League),
"Pir Sahib! You will see. I'm neither Bhutto nor Muhammad Khan Junejo.
If I get even six months, I'll straighten out all these generals".57
This should have been expected. After all, if Muhammad Khan Junejo with
no political assets and popular support had to assert himself to show
his strength, one could expect much more independence from Sharif. The
fundamental fact which all military rulers have ignored is that they can
restrict the number of players who can play the political game but they
have no complete control of how the players which they have allowed will
behave and cannot predict their actions.
The constant confrontational battle between civilian and military leaders
has 'deeply polarized the political and civil society, creating deep cleavages
over the identity of the state and system of government as well as over
the relationship between Islamabad and provinces'.58 The most damaging
effect has been the alienation of the units of the federation which do
not have adequate representation in the bureaucratic-military hegemonic
state apparatus (Bengalis in pre- 1971 period and Sindhis and Balochs
in post-1971 period are case examples). If the country wants to try a
different system of governance that is fine and a debate should start
on that issue. If the general consensus of the population is that parliamentary
democracy should be the system of governance then it is imperative that
efforts towards achievement of that goal be made. The chimera of democracy
and military hegemony has never worked either in Pakistan or in any other
country and unless this fact is brought home to the officer corps there
will never be a solution to the dilemma which is faced by Pakistan. No
amount of rules and regulations and constitutional guarantees will assure
civilian supremacy unless the officer corps accept that fact at psychological
level. The military leadership's thinking that democracy starts with Bhutto
family and ends at Sharif family needs a lot of education. A civilian
government under the military hegemony will always be unstable. Gerald
Heeger has predicted this outcome which has proved correct in case of
Pakistan that, "a post-military regime truly reaps the whirlwinds
of its predecessors and is far less developed and more likely to be unstable
than they were".59 The change from ground reality of military's hegemony
to the ideal concept of military's subordination to civil authorities
will not come suddenly. Both military leadership and civilian groups vying
for power have to work to find a middle ground in this transition. Democracy
itself is not a magic stick which will cure Pakistan's woes overnight.
It is an evolutionary process and each society learns how to run its affairs
to the best of their abilities by learning from their positive and negative
experiences.
'The chaos of democracy represents, in its tumult, greater inherent stability
than the mortal silence of our dictatorships'.60
Notes
1Welch E. Claude and Smith K. Arthur. Military
Role and Rule (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974), p.
260
2Nordlinger, Eric. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 54
3Lasswell, Harold. The Garrison State Hypothesis Today in Essays On The Garrison State (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 112
4Akbar, Abrar. Generals: A Case Study. The Nation (Daily, Lahore. Online Edition. All further references are from online edition), July 23, 2002
5Muthana, I. M. General Cariappa: The First Indian Commander-in-Chief (Mysore City: Usha Press, 1964), p. 86 cited in Kundu, Apurba. Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus (London & New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), p. 110
6Nordlinger, Eric. Soldiers in Politics, p. 56-57
7Anwar, Masood. Colonel (r). Military and Politics. Defence Journal (Monthly, Karachi, Online Edition), June 2001
8Dawn, October 26, 1980
9Cohen, Stephen P. The Pakistan Army (Stanford,
California: University of California Press, 1984), p. 109
10Khan, Fazal-Muqeem, Major General. The Story of Pakistan Army (Lahore:
Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1964), p. 192-93
11Khan, Fazal-Muqeem. The Story of Pakistan Army, p. 12
12Khan, Ayub. Field Marshal. Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 188
13Gauhar, Altaf. Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 80
14The Nation, December 13, 2001
15General Ayub Khan's first broadcast to the nation. October 08, 1958 cited in Rizvi, Hassan-Askari. The Military & Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1986 (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1988), Appendix C, p. 277
16General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan's first broadcast to the nation. 26 March 1969 cited in Rizvi, Hassan-Askari. The Military & Politics in Pakistan, Appendix: F, p. 285
17General Muhammd Zia ul Haq's first address to the nation. 5 July 1977 cited in Rizvi, Hassan-Askari. The Military & Politics in Pakistan, Appendix: H, p. 289
18The News (Daily, Lahore. Online Edition. All further references are from Online Edition), June 03, 2001
19The Nation, August 01, 2002
20Press Conference of General Pervez Musharraf. August 21, 2002. Government of Pakistan website. http://www.pak.gov.pk/public/Legal-Framework-Order.htm
21Cohen, Stephen P. State Building in Pakistan in Banuazizi, Ali and Weiner, Myron (Ed.) The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987), p. 322
22Siddiqi, A. R. Brigadier (r). The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996), ii
23Sattar, Babar. Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism in Alagappa, Muthiah (Ed.) Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 387
24Khan, Ayub. Friends Not Masters, p. 190
25Gauhar, Altaf. Ayub Khan, p. 95
26Khan, Ayub. Friends Not Masters, p. 225
27The News, June 23, 2002
28The News, June 23, 2002
29Press Conference of Pervez Musharraf. August 21, 2002
30Masood, Talat. Lt. General (r). Are We Moving Towards Real Democracy? Dawn (Online Edition), December 17, 2000
31Masood, Talat. Lt. General (r). Political Changes Ahead. Dawn (Online Edition), April 01, 2002
32Interview of General Jehangir Karamat. The Herald (Monthly, Karachi), March 2001, p. 79
33Magyar, Karl P. Nigeria in Danopoulos P Constantine and Watson, Cynthia (Ed.) The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 304
34Barkey. Why Military Regimes Fail? Armed
Forces and Society, p. 174-75
35Sundhaussen, Ulf. Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility.
Armed Forces and Society, Volume. 10, No. 4; Summer 1984, p. 544), p.
544
36Sundhaussen, Ulf. Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility, p. 548-49
37Nordlinger, Eric. Soldiers in Politics, p. 139-143
38Brooker, Paul. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), p. 201
39Clapham, Christopher and Philip, George. The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), p. 11-15
40Sattar, Babar. Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism, p. 386
41Brooker, Paul. Non-Democratic Regimes, p. 121
42Khan, Gul Hassan. Lt. General. Memoirs
of Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1993), p. 341
43Taseer, Salman. Bhutto: A Political Biography (Delhi: Vikas Publishing
House, 1980), p. 130
44Maniruzzaman, Talukder. Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), p. 70
45Dawn, October 26, 1980
46Arif, Khalid M. General (r). Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1947-1988 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 226
47Yasmeen, Samina. The Military in Pakistan Politics in Selochan, Viberto (Ed). The Military, the State and Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), p. 168-69
48Arif. Working With Zia, p. 246
49Khan, Jahan Dad. Lt. General (r). Pakistan: Leadership Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 258-59
50Arif, Khalid. Working With Zia, p. 238
51Rizvi, Hassan-Askari. The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan. Asian Survey, Volume. XXVI, No. 10, October 1986, p. 1070
52Arif. Working With Zia, p. 248
53Lodhi, Maleeha. Pakistan's Encounter With Democracy (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1994), p. 210
54Perlmutter, Amos. The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 107
55The Nation, August 12, 2002
56Haqqani, Hussain. Price of an Afghan Delusion. The Nation, November 24, 2001
57Suhail, Azhar. Agencion ki Hukumut (The Government of Agencies in Urdu) (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1993), p. 39
58Alagappa, Muthiah. Asian Civil-Military Relations in Alagappa, Muthiah (Ed.) Coercion and Governance, p. 492
59Heeger, Gerald. Politics in a Post-Military State. World Politics, January 1977, p. 262
60Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's letter to French President Giscard d'Estaing cited in Akhund, Iqbal. Memoirs of a Bystander: A Life in Diplomacy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 345)
