An analysis from 12 Sept to 20 Sept

Columnist Maj (Retd) SHAMSHAd ALI KHAN gives a detailed account of facts as they were on the ground.

This is the closing article, ninth of the series started in Oct 1997. The preceding eight articles were published in quick succession while this one has been delayed due to my lethargy. These articles would not have seen the light if IKRAM SEHGAL had not persuaded me to write. In addition he also provided a medium in the form of DEFENCE JOURNAL where I could bring to light those facts which had remained unexposed for 35 years.
Primarily, what I have written is for the young officers to read because they are the ones who would bear the brunt of a future conventional war. Our wars will always be of short duration and, therefore, men and officers cannot afford to learn through own experience. They must learn through the experience of all those who have fought 1965 and 1971 wars. But how can that happen if concerned soldiers consider it expedient not to narrate their war experiences or do not get an opportunity to do that. I urge the concerned soldiers to reveal their experience through Defence Journal. It is in this spirit that I have described the operations between 8 and 21 Sept 1965 and commented upon the operations between 8 and 11Sept in two separate articles. In the process I may have caused discomfort to my respected seniors and officers of my regiment. But then we must realize that others must learn through our mistakes.
In this article events between 12 and 20 September will be examined. After the victory of 11 September at PHILLORAH, the Indians consolidated their gains and occupied area north or railway line CHAWINDA - Sialkot. No significant event came up on the battlefield between 12 and 15 Sept and the details of this period have been recorded in the March 98 issue of DJ. However, the June 98 issue of DJ carries an article by Brig (Retd) Mohammad Hayat (SJ) which has revealed to me for the first time that a counter-attack was launched on Jassoran on 14 Sept under the personal supervision of General Abrar Hussain. I will comment on this attack to put the record straight.
The reader would have appreciated and even now will appreciate if Brig Hayat can describe the counter-attack in a manner and form an attack is described in military sense. He should disclose the FUP, timings, troops involved, objective, route to objective, fire support plan and the casualties sustained by attacking troops. Merely eulogizing a general will not suffice.
On the morning of 14 Sept my troop was deployed behind Chawinda in area MS 5 along railway line embankment facing Jassoran which was under my direct observation 2000 yards away. I did not locate or see the enemy in that village. For those who may not know I may mention that we have high power binoculars and telescopes in tanks.
Secondly, in the afternoon I was ordered to occupy Mondykiarian and defend that village against an impending attack. I ordered the troop to cross the railway line and follow me in the direction of the destination that was visible in the far distance west of Jassoran.
At this time I noticed that a Sherman tank was approaching towards Buttardograndi from the direction of track Chawinda- Jassoran. By the time I reached near Buttardograndi that tank had also reached close to my tank. It was manned by a JCO of 33 TDU. He mounted my tank and told that his two tanks had crossed over the railway line and had been knocked out by Indian tanks located in Wazirwali. Since the enemy tanks were out of his gun range, he wanted me to accompany him and destroy those tanks. His troop was most probably deployed in static anti-tank role in support of 3 FF, which I was not aware of at that point of time. It is, therefore, clear that the enemy had not crossed the railway line on 14th.
My Squadron Commander did not allow me to go along with that JCO as my reaching Mondakibarian was more important. In his assessment my direction was also wrong.
Thirdly, I was recalled to railway line and a village was physically indicated to me on ground as Mondekibarian. I was ordered to reach there immediately. On reaching there I found that it was Khupa from where Jassoran was 3000 yards away in the north while Mondekibarian was 2000 yards in the north west. These two places were under my direct observation. I did not observe any movement in these villages nor I witness an attack being launched on Jassoran. In fact my troop was placed there to check enemy penetration from Jassoran to Pasrur. It follows that my RHQ was informed by Div HQ that Jassoran was held by the enemy. Factually it was vacant.
Fourthly, in the late evening I observed a tank appeared from the clump, on the outskirts of Jassoran, and started moving parallel to the track towards railway station. In my judgement it was an M 47 tank and I reported to my Squadron Commander accordingly. But my 2 IC Maj Sikander insisted that it was an enemy tank and ordered me to open fire. I fired few shots, which went off the mark as the tank was out of range ie, 3000 yards. The tank turned left and went north of track. It was a Pakistani tank, probably 19 Lancers, which had got detached from main body and lost its way.
Finally, Mr Ashok Nath has described the action of Poona Horse on 16 and 17 Sept, based on the regimental history of that unit, in two issues of DJ (Oct 1978 and Feb-March 1999) which reveal that Indian forces crossed the railway line for the first time on the morning of 16 Sept.
The point, I want to make is that when it was not occupied by Indian forces on 14th how come an attack was launched on Jassoran. Confusion was definitely there about the status and occupancy of that village which was caused due to absence of boundaries resulting into lack of coordination and cooperation between defending units. To my knowledge, Brig Hayat's 4FF was in area Zafarwal and he could not possibly be an eyewitness to that attack. Gen K.M Arif has not mentioned about this attack in his article "Abrar's Battle Decisions" published in Pakistan Army Green Book 1992. He was the GSO 2 of Gen Abrar and, therefore, not expected to omit such an action by his commander.
At this stage it is essential to comment on the events of 16 Sept as described by Gen Arif in "Abrar's Battle Decisions". The narration is sketchy and incorrect which for the benefit of the reader is reproduced below.
"The battle raged with considerable intensity on 16 Sept. After its failure to capture Chawinda the enemy attempted to envelop it by two-prong attack. In the process, the village of Jassoran and Sodreke fell and Buttar Dograndi came under attack. The severe fighting resulted in heavy casualties. The situation was confused and outcome uncertain. So fluid became the battle that at 1630 hrs 24 Brigade requested permission to take up position in the rear. Abrar told the Brigade Commander on telephone, "you know what is there in the kitty. There is no question of falling back we shall fight to the bitter end from our present position." 24 Brigade fought gallantly. Soon the danger subsided. Chawinda defences remained impregnable and the attack was successfully repulsed. "The tank battle in this theatre of war was described by some western annalists as the largest and most fierce since the Second World War."
The narrative is entirely incorrect. However, I shall take on the major points the Gen has tried to make. Indians never attempted to capture Chawinda before 16 Sept nor did they launch two prongs attack on the town on that day. I say so because my troop, along with 3 FF, remained deployed on Chawinda railway station, throughout after 11Sept and nothing has escaped my eye. A position falls to attacking troops only if defending forces either withdraw or surrender.
In case of Jassoran, I can say with confidence that it was not held by our troops. The enemy just walked in. I have nothing to say about Sadreke because it was nearly two thousand yards away from Jassoran in the west and thus not under my observation.
It may be a news to the Gen after 35 years, although he was GSO 2 of 6 Armoured Division and should have known on 16 Sept that Buttar Dograndi did not merely come under attack but was captured by Indians at 1200 hours and remained in their possession for two days.
The battle was not at all fluid. In fact it was extremely sluggish affair. In support of my viewpoint a short description of the battle is given below: Indians started the manoeuvre from Wazirwali at first light to outflank Chawinda with 17 Poona Horse supported by infantry battalion plus. The leading elements of this force reached Jassoran by 0900 hours. Minute to minute information was passed on to higher echelon by me and N/Ris Khaliq who was located on 15r on the outskirts of Chawinda in the north. From Jassoran the enemy tried to push a troop of tanks onto railway station which was made impossible by my two tanks which were deployed there. To the best of my knowledge, at no other place except Chawinda, and that too from Jassoran side did the enemy resolutely press in the face of opposition along entire front of 6 Armoured Division. (For details see April 98 issue of DJ).
The enemy did not move beyond Jassoran till 1100 when they started outflanking my position (Chawinda), after bringing up another squadron and an infantry battalion, and occupied Buttar Dognandi at about 1300 hours.
There was no fluidity and confusion on the front line. It may have prevailed in Divisional HQ, as mentioned by General K.M. Arif. This confusion was due to the fact that neither the commander nor any of his staff officer ever visited the front and mostly depended on the information provided by front line troop, who always are inclined to misreport and exaggerate the battle situation.
The enemy remained stuck up for three to four hours in Jassoran before it reached Buttar Dograndi but our troops at Modykibarian (if at all they were there) and south of it did not react.
The tragedy was that armour battle was being conducted through line communication from a bunker and not from copula of a tank through wireless.
Here it is what was in the kitty in Sialkot sector on 16 Sept.

1. 19 Lancers-location not known.
2. 22 Cavalry, somewhere between Badiana and Chawinda.
3. Remnants of 11 Cavalry some where between Badiana and Chawinda.
4. Remnants of Guides Cavalry between Badiana and Chawinda.
5. 20 Lancers -Jammu Sialkot Road.
6. 31 TDU location not known.
7. 33 TDU less squadron plus squadron 22 Cavalry area Zafarwal.
8. 25 Cavalry plus squadron
33 TDU area Chawinda.
9. 5 Horse area Pasror as strategic reserve.

Facing these nine regiments Indians had five regiments
1. 2 Lancers.
2. 4 Horse.
3. 16 light Cavalry.
4. 17 Poona Horse.
5. 63 Lancers.

About infantry, it was a ratio of 1:3.Since we were defending, this ratio should not have caused anxiety to us. In any case Indians never used infantry in isolation except in a night on the last day of the war. An infantry brigade was launched to capture Chawinda by reaching MS 5 behind that town. The attack was repulsed.
The general has taken support from western analysts to describe the tank battle in this theatre as the largest and most fierce since the second world war. This again is not correct. To compare the battle of Sialkot sector with those of WW 2 is a cruel joke.
The western analysts had no first hand information. They had formed the opinion based on details provided to them by the high command of both sides. Since there was nothing much to talk about, they had given descriptions of imaginary battles.
On no particular day throughout the war, except on 11th Sept, more than a squadron was committed to battle from either side. On 11th, Indian used Poona Horse as a regiment and we employed three regiments ie, 11th Cavalry, Guides Cavalry and 25 Cavalry. Throughout the war most of the armour units on both sides remained static and were not committed to battle in the real sense of the word. Ferocity and magnitude of a battle is assessed by the quantum of troops engaged and the number of casualties suffered by opposing forces. Looking from this standpoint, the battles of Sialkot sector are an apology to tank warfare.