Crises of Nuclear Neighbours

Columnist Muhammad Irshad looks at the dangers of nuclear confrontation.

Along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, over a million Pakistani and Indian troops await a war. This disputed region set off two of the three wars India and Pakistan have fought since they emerged out of the remnants of the British Empire in 1947. Since the latest war in 1971, the conflict has smoldered on, driven by Pakistan’s open support for the cause of Kashmiris. The situation grew exponentially more dangerous when each state deployed nuclear weapons, revealed to the world in tit-for-tat nuclear tests in the spring of 1998. Though, US led efforts to head off war seem to be making headway, historical animus and nuclear weapons will sustain the potential for disastrous conflict.
The latest amassing of troops on the line of control has arisen because of India’s movement of troops on Pakistan borders after an attack on Indian Parliament, on Dec 13, 2001, which India blames to have been arranged by Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand has strongly denied the claim and also made an offer for a joint inquiry, which was instantaneously rejected by the Indian side. There is a lot of evidence to prove that Indian planning for this troops movement to the borders was planned since quite sometime and this attack on the Indian Parliament could have been arranged by India herself to execute its plan of troops movement.
Why the troops movement on Pakistan borders? For the reasons we have to go back even to times before the division of India-Pakistan, when the British were planning to leave the sub-continent, and India starting claiming to be the rightful heir of the British legacy and had started demanding that world should consider her as they used to consider and respect the ex-British empire.
The father of India’s foreign policy, Sardar K.M.Pannikar, if one may recall, had very clearly spoken out in 1940s that the South East Asian region and the Middle East (which Americans call as Near East) as being the eventual areas of India’s political influences. The increasing capabilities of the current variants of the Indian missile system like Agni, Prithvi etc; are reflections of the extent of the desired range of New Delhi for asserting its ultimate sphere of influence. This, of course is a thought process, which India’s policy framers want to happen and which they know it cannot happen without first putting Pakistan in “its proper place”. They feel their plans are not going to work as long as there is a Pakistan not willing to accept the Indian hegemony. From this arises the Indian urgency to try and bleed Pakistan through a slow burn, such as the current military stand off on the Indo-Pak LoC which is seen to be economically harmful for both the countries, but the Indians feel it may be more hurtful for Pakistan than for India, because of relative weaker economy of Pakistan.
Although, both governments have declared that “there are no chances of a war”, yet both countries are worried of a possible “accident” which may prove to be disastrous for the whole region, and the disaster would certainly be tremendous, and irrespective of who claims to be the winner, the sub-continent would be taken back by at least a century. According to US Defence Intelligence Agency, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could claim 12 million lives within a matter of minutes. If nuclear weapon is used against a major urban centre in India or Pakistan, hundreds of thousands would immediately be incinerated or crushed by falling debris. They would be the lucky ones. The true horrors of a nuclear war lingers long after the initial blast wave and intense firearm produced by a nuclear explosion.
Everyone within a radius of two to three kilometres from the ground zero would receive severe, if not fatal burn. Those who survive the initial blast would later succumb to radiation sickness caused by acute exposure to deadly radioactive fallout. Early symptoms of radiation sickness include nausea and hair loss, and progress into fever, bleeding, emaciation and ultimately death. While the Hiroshima bomb immediately killed an estimated 45,000 people, after four months the death toll had climbed to 1,40,000 — more than half of the city’s population before the bombing.
Many political theorists argue that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides will prevent another major war. By making the risks of war unthinkable, the logic goes, nuclear weapons create a balance of terror, sobering leaders and necessitating dialogue, as in the Cold War. Yet today in Kashmir the threat of war looms despite these weapons. Are nuclear weapons then containing or causing conflict in Kashmir? Perhaps both. Because both states have nuclear weapons, neither is likely to intentionally launch an all-out war. But nuclear weapons permit the states to take lesser violent actions — risks that attempt to exploit the chance of catastrophe for strategic gain.
In 1999, over 1,000 Pakistan-based militants and Pakistani regulars crossed the Line of Control into the Indian Kargil area and seized Indian army outposts in a surprise attack. The Indian army regrouped, driving the Pakistani forces back. As the Indians attacked, Pakistan prepared its intermediate-range missiles for nuclear strikes, perhaps to deter India from attacking Pakistani territory. US diplomacy helped persuade Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull his troops out and temporarily head off full-scale war. So the situation came to the position of square one. Was the Pakistani offensive because of nuclear weapons or the withdrawal because of Indian deterrence? One thing is positive. The situation, in absence of nuclear weapons, would not have returned to “as you were” position.
Tensions mounted again in December 2001, when five militants attacked the Indian Parliament, killing 14, leading India to mass its army along the Line of Control. Pakistan responded by massing its forces and under international pressure announcing a crackdown on Islamic militants infiltrating from Pakistan to Kashmir. But on May 14, three infiltrators killed 32 people, mostly the families of Indian soldiers, near Jammu. Recent reports indicate that Pakistan-based militants may have joined forces with al Qaeda terrorists driven out of Afghanistan by the US military.
Pakistan’s refusal to institute a no-first use policy for its nuclear weapons (Pakistan considers it an Indian trap because of Indian superiority in conventional forces) is designed to keep Indians guessing about when Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons, preventing a major conventional attack against the smaller Pakistani army. In February, Pakistani General Khalid Kidwai, Chief of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which controls Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, said that should India threaten to conquer a large portion of Pakistan (including Azad, Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir), destroy the Pakistani army, strangle Pakistan economically, or politically destabilize Pakistan, Pakistan might use nuclear weapons.
Any Indian attack into Pakistan could lead to some of those scenarios. Nonetheless, Indian leaders reason that since their nuclear arsenal would survive a Pakistani first strike and hit back, Pakistan would never order a nuclear strike unless its very existence was at stake. Should the infiltrations continue, India might then attack the militant’s bases across the Line of Control, calling Pakistan’s bluff. One danger in that strategy is that Pakistan might construe even a limited Indian offensive into Pakistan as a threat to its national existence and use nuclear weapons, starting a nuclear exchange that kills millions.
Even assuming that such a scenario is impossible, that a rational leader like Musharraf would never intentionally start a nuclear war in the face of a conventional attack, a number of paths could still lead to a nuclear war. The problem with the nuclear brinkmanship that presumes a limited war can be fought under the nuclear umbrella is that it assumes the prevalence of rational decision-making, transparent intentions, and perfect command and control. In a crisis, such assumptions may not hold.
Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War who had enough weapons to destroy the opposing nations several times over after surviving a nuclear strike, India and Pakistan have relatively few nuclear weapons. Pakistan is generally estimated to have between 25 and 50 nuclear weapons, with some designated for delivery by its F-16s and some outfitted for its missiles. India most likely has between 30 and 60 nuclear weapons, also available for planes and missiles. Each leader, despite public assurances to the contrary, may worry that the other nation could destroy its nuclear arsenal with a surprise first strike, necessitating quick trigger fingers. This problem is of greater concern for Pakistan, because without its nuclear weapons, the smaller Pakistani army might be at India’s mercy.
This instability is exacerbated by proximity. As neighbours, nuclear missiles would arrive in minutes in an attack, meaning the leaders have little time to verify intelligence about the other’s intentions. Given the fear of having his small arsenal destroyed and the short decision timetable, either nation’s leader might then order a nuclear attack based on faulty reports that the other is preparing to strike. For instance, although both sides generally keep their warheads stored separately from the delivery vehicles, during a crisis like the current one, this may change. The need to quickly arm the weapons might be misconstrued by the other side as presaging an imminent launch, leading that state to launch. Moreover, the risk of a disarming first strike might lead one side to delegate launch authority to military leaders in the field who lack their leader’s discretion. A conventional Indian attack that severed Pakistani command and control might lead a Pakistani military officer to launch a nuclear attack on his own. Additionally, a stunning military victory by India might lead the extremists within the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies to unseat Musharraf. Islamic extremists might not be deterred by the prospect of nuclear war.
These are only a few of catastrophic scenarios that could play out in between India and Pakistan, possibly as a result of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. Nuclear weapons may help prevent a fourth India-Pakistan war, but they also may embolden their keepers to take grave risks for strategic gains. Such gains, purchased through nuclear blackmail, will be worthless if error or treachery deliver the potential disaster they exploit.
The worries of international observers as well the locals grow more as the prospects of growth of nuclear weapons appear to be increasing in numbers everyday. In particular the recent US termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia could have dramatic repercussions for the security situation in South Asia, according to regional experts. The balance of power between China, India and Pakistan may be increasingly difficult to stabilize as the three countries adapt their nuclear and missile development plans to a new global security environment, they said.
In a study recently released by Henry L. Stimson Centre, USA, several experts based in South Asia speculated how the three states would probably react to any US deployment of national and
theatre missile defence systems and what effect their actions would have on regional security. While the viewpoints differ — corresponding in large part to each author’s home country and its stated policy toward the US move — a common theme emerges throughout.
China because of its Taiwan compulsions and the fact that Americans have frequently counted it as “Enemy No 1”, is bound to drastically increase its nuclear and missile delivery systems. India after 1962 defeat by the Chinese has learnt very successfully and has tried it on many occasions that a “supposed threat from China” will always bring it unlimited rewards from western powers, afraid of spread of communism. So for India it would be a God-given opportunity to collect advanced weapons (which obviously will be used on smaller neighbours to ensure expansion of Indian hegemonic designs). With India amassing advanced weapons, Pakistan, irrespective of its state of economy, is not likely to lag behind.
China, India and Pakistan have no formal constraints on their nuclear and missile programmes and, unlike the United States and Russia, they lack parity in nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, the three have declined any significant transparency over their respective programmes. At best, informal arrangements might help forestall a destabilizing nuclear and missile arms buildup in the region, but US missile defence plans are likely to accelerate nuclear and missile competition in the region and breed further distrust in coming years. “China, India and Pakistan are enmeshed in a three-cornered interaction that will not be easy to stabilize,” wrote Michael Krepon, an arms control expert at the Stimson Centre, in the collection, The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defences on Southern Asia, published recently. “They make a triangle of three unequal sides — an inherently unstable geometric form.”
The United States formally backed out of the 1972 ABM Treaty last month to enable it to deploy comprehensive missile defences. Russia’s nuclear deterrent — which may consist of thousands of strategic warheads even after the recently signed arms treaty is in effect — is expected to remain intact in the face of US plans to field only limited defences. The same cannot be said about China, India and Pakistan, which have “minimalist” nuclear weapons and ballistic missile inventories. Their deterrent value might be eroded — if not militarily, then politically — in the face of proliferating missile defence systems or a weapons buildup to overwhelm those defences. For example, a nuclear or missile buildup undertaken by China to strengthen its deterrent against the United States might set off a chain reaction in the region.
In addition, the distinction made in the United States between national and theatre missile defences - one designed to protect US territory from long-range missiles and the other intended to prevent short-range missiles from striking US forces overseas — does not apply to the region, the experts said. Indeed, theatre missile defences are national missile defences in South Asia because China, India and Pakistan do not require intercontinental ballistic missiles to attack each other.
Recently, tensions between the three have been high. India has continued to clash with Pakistan over Kashmir. It has jockeyed with China over disputed border areas including Tibet. China and India both have been developing advanced navies and preparing for a regional competition for command of the high seas. “Nuclear weapons and missile programmes now overlay these neuralgic issues, making it even harder for national leaders in China, India and Pakistan to create and sustain a stable strategic environment,” according to Krepon. “Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear requirements will be derived from an interactive set of conditions that are subject to change based on domestic and external factors. Prospective missile defence deployments add one more external factor to this mix.”
US deployment of missile defences would affect all three countries, according to the report, destabilizing actions on the part of one would probably ignite a chain reaction. For example, Krepon said, “Beijing’s calculations of nuclear sufficiency will reverberate in New Delhi, and India’s recalibrated nuclear requirements will reverberate in Islamabad.” “US missile defence deployments and transfers could prompt cascading military requirements in China and around the periphery of Asia,” he said. These include “accelerated growth in nuclear stockpiles, missile inventories and conventional capabilities. A trickle-down effect on South Asia is already underway, but it has yet to become a cascade. “China’s close cooperation on nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan could be another complicating factor. Even if India chose not to react to a Chinese buildup, any new technical assistance to Islamabad could force India to accelerate or expand its efforts.
The authors of the essay collection agreed that the outcome would depend largely on China, which is currently the strongest military power in the area with the largest nuclear and ballistic missile forces. China has been the most vocal opponent of US missile defence plans and has been particularly concerned by the prospect of the United States transferring missile defence technology to Taiwan. Distrustful of US assurances that its defences would not erode Beijing’s nuclear deterrent, China may be compelled to accelerate its nuclear enhancement efforts to avoid any such erosion.
Krepon argued that while China’s actions to counter US defences would have only a limited effect on the US China equation, they “could be compelling on the subcontinent.” Another of the experts, from the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India, argued that China’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes could be accelerated as a result of the US national missile defence system, including introducing multiple-warhead missiles. The transfer of missile defences to Taiwan, meanwhile, could serve the same purpose, prompting China to expand its arsenal of short-range missiles, which could theoretically also hit targets in India.
These scenarios would in turn prompt India to improve its nuclear command and control structure and mate its nuclear weapons with delivery systems to ensure a more credible nuclear deterrent. To have such a credible deterrent against China, India would need a nuclear force in the “low hundreds” of warheads. “India is not reassured by China’s no-first-use guarantee, or its claims that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive and not on hair-trigger alert, because of a lack of transparency in China and the absence of reliable warning systems in India, India needs a better sense of Chinese behaviour and intentions, which would in turn help India in shaping its strategies and planning for its force structure.”
Krepon said he believes that the trickle-down effect from US missile defence plans is already underway. “The extent of acceleration will depend, in the first instance, on decisions taken in Washington and Beijing,” he said.
India sits apart from its neighbours as one of the only vocal supporters of the Bush administration’s decision to scrap the ABM Treaty, construct wide-ranging missile defence systems and share some of this technology with allies. According to another Indian expert from the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India, New Delhi’s support for US missile defences is based on a deep-rooted cultural aversion to nuclear weapons (he must be joking?) and longtime opposition to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. He argued that it, therefore, makes sense for India to support US missile defences and to aspire to have a limited missile defence of its own. “India has long accepted the nuclear gap between itself and China.The widening of the gap will not make much difference. China will still be vulnerable to an Indian strike as and when Indian capacity develops. The number or relative sophistication of Chinese forces does not matter.”
On the other hand, other experts point out that India has yet to codify its nuclear force structure goals and strategy. “While India has embraced the concept of minimal, credible deterrence, the size and scope of the Indian nuclear deterrent are not fixed,” wrote an expert from Madras Christian College in Chennai, India. “India’s commitment to nuclear minimalism could be challenged by developments in China and Pakistan, as well as by prospective US missile defence deployments.”
Unlike India, Pakistan has opposed US missile defence plans and seen India’s aspirations for a missile defence as an effort to increase its military and political dominance. An Indian missile defence system would probably cause a buildup by Islamabad, according to a Pakistani expert from the University of Karachi. “In response to Indian acquisition of missile defences, China and Pakistan are likely to engage in nuclear buildups and to continue established patterns of strategic cooperation,” he said. Pakistan might “be compelled to respond to Indian ambitions by increasing military cooperation with China and keeping its nuclear option open as the last resort in a war against India.” The world’s hottest nuclear flashpoint — and the cause of three previous wars — is the disputed territory of Kashmir, which nuclear-armed India and Pakistan both claim as their own. “New Delhi’s deployment of missile defences could jeopardize improved relations between India and China ... and make the resolution of the Kashmir dispute more remote,” he wrote.
The prospects for reaching any formal agreement to reduce the spread of nuclear and missile forces in South Asia are considered low, according to the report. China, India and Pakistan have been opposed to the degree of transparency necessary for such agreements. “Cold War models of nuclear risk reduction are only partly relevant to Asia,” Krepon wrote. “The Hot Line agreement and other accords to prevent dangerous military practices could certainly be adapted to meet Asian circumstances. But the stabilizing aspects of strategic arms limitation and reduction accords, especially their codification of equality and intrusive monitoring provisions, are unlikely to be applicable to this region.” The best hope for stabilizing the region, Krepon argued, is for the United States to avoid weakening China’s nuclear deterrent. “If future US administrations do not seek the negation of China’s strategic deterrent, cascade effects on the subcontinent could be greatly reduced.”
Otherwise, till a miraculous solution of Kashmir, agreeable to both parties is found, the prospects of tension, in one shape or the other, on the Indo-Pak frontier is not likely to be reduced. Now the two countries have a history of not having been able to resolve their mutual problems without a third party intervention. “Indus water accord”, “Runn of Kutch” and “Tashkent Agreement” are some of the obvious examples. Even now to reduce the tension, a third party intervention is considered necessary. India is against such an idea. It insists on a bilateral solution which have produced zero result in the last thirty years. Whether they like it or not. The pressure of the western countries, particularly American pressure, has been effective in reducing the recent tension, and thus the Americans are getting closer to the role of a mediator, and this apparently is the only way the two nuclear neighbours are likely to have for the solution of their very serious problem.