Where Pakistan and India Disagree

Columnist Muhammad Irshad goes over the causes of Indo-Pak friction.

The solution of Kashmir, according to the will of the people of Kashmir, is the biggest hurdle between Pakistan and Indian relations. But it is not the only irritant. There are few other areas which need to be sorted out for smooth relations. Some of these areas are:

Siachen
At the northern extreme, India and Pakistan face off along the Saltoro mountain range in an area named for its most prominent feature, the Siachen Glacier. Since 1984, the two nations have battled over a 2500 square km triangle of contested territory. The Siachen Glacier is one of the most inhospitable and glaciated regions in the world. Sliding down a valley in the Karakoram range, the glacier is 76 kilometers long and varies in width between 2 to 8 kilometres. It receives 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 10 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can reach speeds upto 150 knots (nearly 300 kilometres per hour). The temperature drops routinely to 40 degrees C below zero, even with the wind chill factor. For these reasons, the Siachen Glacier has been called the "Third Pole".
The dispute arose over differing interpretations of a provision of the 1949 ceasefire, as well as the subsequent 1972 Simla agreement, that left a portion of the ceasefire line in Kashmir undefined. The boundary was specifically delineated only to map coordinate NJ9842. The ceasefire agreement had only defined the line to a certain specified point and from there "thence north to the glaciers." This segment meandered through rugged mountainous terrain upto a surveyed point NJ 9842 -lying about 19 kilometres north of the Shayok river, forms the foot of the glaciated region. Since there were no troops, contact north of this point and because operations in this inaccessible region beyond NJ9842 were considered unfeasible. No effort was made to mark out the line upto the Chinese border. This left a distance of about 65 km to the north undemarcated. The area remained undemarcated until 1984, when Indian troops occupied the watershed line along the Saltoro range northwesterly from NJ9842. Pakistan laid claim to a line from NJ9842 northeasterly to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border.
For the past 18 years, armed conflict has ensued along this "line of actual contact" the area is among the highest in the world and is characterized by mountain altitudes of over 7,500 meters and by troop deployments at altitudes upto 6,700 meters. Nearby is K2, the second highest mountain in the world at over 8,500 meters.
The Karachi Agreement stated that beyond NJ9842, the line moved northward towards the Chinese border. When Pakistan signed its border agreement with China in 1963, the alignment of the ceasefire line was seen as linking NJ9842 with the Karakoram Pass. Now, under the Karachi Agreement it was clear that Siachin Glacier formed part of Baltistan in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. This reality was reflected in British and American maps including in the Britannica Atlas, the National Geographic Society's Atlas of the World, the Times Atlas of the World and the Historical Atlas of South Asia published by the University of Chicago. In addition, all mountaineering and trekking expeditions to the Siachin region had to get their authorization from the Government of Pakistan. Even Indian writers like PL Lakhanpal conceded this position when he included Owen Dixon's report to the UN in 1950 in his book "Essential Documents and Notes on the Kashmir Dispute". Dixon had, in his report, pointed out that Siachin Glacier fell within Pakistan's Northern Areas. Then, in 1984, they took an action which for all intents and purposes put the final nail in the coffin of the LoC's sanctity. This was the military incursion into Siachin whereby India transformed a 'No Man's Land' into the highest battlefield in the world.
By airlifting its forces, it occupied two critical northern passes, Bila Fond La and Sia La. Pakistan reacted and seized passes in the Soltoro Range. But India now occupied 2590 sq kilometres of Pakistani territory. What is causing concern to the Indians is that Pakistan has managed to surprise the Indians and occupy heights along the LoC - which has never been respected by the Indians. These heights allow the Pakistan army to oversee the whole supply route into Siachin. Now if the US or the western powers wants the 'sanctity' of the LoC restored it must first get the Indians to vacate Siachin - otherwise there is no recognised LoC left.

Siachin being world's largest non-polar glacier is also sometimes referred to as the third pole. It is 76 kms long and situated at an altitude of 5,472 metres above sea level. Siachin Glacier is the great Himalayan watershed, that demarcates, Central Asia from the Indian sub-continent. It also separates Pakistan from China in this region. To the east beyond the Shaksgam Valley lies China's vulnerable Sinkiang region. As nothing was demarcated on the map beyond point NJ9842, Shaksgam Valley was a no-man's land. The 76 km long Siachin Glacier is hemmed in between the Saltoro ridge line to the west and the main Karakoram range to the east. The Saltoro ridge originates from the Sia Kangri in the Karakoram range and the altitudes range from 18,000 to 24,000 ft. The major passes on this ridge are Sia La at 20,000 ft and Bila Fond La at 19,000 ft. India's position on Line of Control is based on the terrain configuration, which runs along the Saltoro ridge line upto Sia Kangri.
Pakistan claims that the Line of Control is a straight line joining NJ9842 to Karakoram Pass north of the Indian Dault Bag Ouldi outpost. The Pakistani cuts across the river valleys Nubra and Shyok of Indian Ladakh, 10,000 sq km of Indian territory, which includes Siachen Glacier. Presently India holds two-thirds of glacier and commands two of the three passes. Pakistan controls Gyong La pass that overlooks the Shyok and Nubra River Valley and India's access to Leh district. Indian imperatives are that if Pakistan is allowed to control the glacier, it would endanger the security of Ladakh and also of J&K. With Chinese already in control of Aksai Chin, it is argued that the whole of northern Ladakh would be imperilled if Pakistan is allowed unfettered movement through Siachen.
In longterm perspective, Indian strategists also feel that this Himalayan watershed can yield its access to resource rich Central Asian Republics through the Afghan panhandle. Through its control of the glacier, Pakistan intends not only to threaten Leh-Ladakh but also to take her border to meet that of China. It believes then it can find an alternate route to the treacherous Karakoram highway.
Currently Pakistan maintains three battalions, while India has seven battalions defending Siachen. Pakistan spends Rs 10 million a day, which amounts to Rs 3.6 billion a year. Indian expenditure is Rs 14.40 billion a year. On an average, one Pakistani soldier is killed every fourth day, while one Indian soldier is killed every second day. Ninety five percent casualties have been due to extreme and intolerable weather conditions. The number of wounded is nearly twenty times more, while the number is in thousands of those traumatized.

LoC Border
The Line of Control (LoC) extends south of Siachen through the former principality of Kashmir. This line was established in January 1949 as a ceasefire line at the conclusion of the first India-Pakistan war. The ceasefire line was formalized with the signing of the Karachi Agreement in July 1949. Following the third India-Pakistan war in 1971, the ceasefire line (with some modifications) became the Line of Control. The Simla Agreement of July 1972 specified the Line of Control resulting from the December 1971 ceasefire and called for the line to be respected by both sides without prejudice to the position of either side. The length of the LoC is 740 km. The line is characterized by different terrain from valleys and rivers in the southern regions to high mountains in the north.
Detecting and characterizing illegal cross-border movements are vital to regional stability. These crossings may be politically, militarily, or economically motivated but, in each case, threaten the fragile relationships of the region. Border tension could be reduced through military-to-military interactions in the form of enhanced communication, exchange visits to deployment locations, reduced threat posture, and efforts to implement provisions of the Lahore Declaration. International praise for the Lahore Declaration was predicated on the belief that India and Pakistan had finally decided to commit themselves to a peaceful resolution of all disputes between them, including Kashmir. Lahore Declaration implied recognition that conflict was no longer an option and that "an environment of peace and security" is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential." In praising the Lahore process, the international community, particularly the United States, was cognizant of the history of Indo-Pak wars and the role of the LoC violations in sparking a larger conflagration, e.g., in 1948, 1984 and in 1965. Hence, after the summer of 1999, active interest in managing the LoC and finding ways of reducing the likelihood of conflict there received greater attention.
Beyond the LoC, the entire border between India and Pakistan remains susceptible to problems that could easily spill out of control in today's environment of suspicion. At present, India has amassed its troops on the Pakistan border, creating a tense environment between the two countries. India accuses Pakistan of supporting infiltration via the LoC in order to stir the insurgency inside Indian Kashmir. Pakistan insists that the borders are porous and that the cause of the problems in Jammu and Kashmir are the harsh policies of New Delhi creating a real human rights problem.
Most of the 2900-km boundary between India and Pakistan is an internationally recognized border. The border is formed between the Indian States of Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat with the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The terrain varies from coastal salt marshes, through deserts, to the agricultural districts of the Punjab. While there is little official cross-border traffic, there is a great deal of smuggling and unofficial commerce. This area has also seen past conflict and near conflict accompanying large military deployments and military exercises.
The whole issue of the LoC needs to be clarified - especially when the Indian former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh was too quick to declare that Siachin is not part of the LoC in response to the Sharif-Clinton Joint Statement that called for a 'restoration of the LoC'. Which really brings one to the heart of the problem: The so-called sanctity of the LoC. To begin with, there can be no sanctity attached to what is a temporary arrangement allowing for a cessation of hostilities between two warring sides. The Kashmiri people have never accepted the LoC - or the earlier Ceasefire Line - and the Indians above also undermined the LoC by their frequent violations of it. But now the Indians are actually questioning the very existence of the LoC in its accepted form by declaring that Siachin is not a part of the LoC - so Pakistan cannot unilaterally accept the LoC and respect its sanctity.

So what exactly is the LoC?
To understand this, one must go back to the origins of the Kashmir dispute and its internationalisation by India in 1948. When India took the dispute to the UN on Jan 1, 1948, it took it under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which deals with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes - and not under Chapter VII dealing with aggression. In response, the UN brokered a ceasefire marking out the positions of both Pakistan and India and also creating the UNMOGIP for the implementation of this ceasefire. Even at that time the arrangement was seen as temporary aimed at facilitating the implementation of UNSC resolutions relating to a plebiscite in Kashmir. Pakistan and India signed the Karachi Agreement in July 1949 relating to this ceasefire line and jointly verified this line visually with the aid of UN observers before the end of the year. The line itself was never delineated on the ground because of its assumed temporaries.

The Siachen factor
What was established in 1949 as the CFL - and, with minor alterations, became the LoC, after the 1971 Pak-India war it was about 516 miles long (with some unmarked areas), with three distinguishable segments. One was, the Working Boundary separating Pakistan from Indian Occupied Kashmir. The second segment, meandered through rugged mountainous terrain upto a surveyed point NJ9842 - lying about 19 kilometres north of the Shayok river. This forms the foot of the glaciated region. Since there was no troops' contact north of this point, and because operations in this inaccessible region beyond NJ9842 were considered unfeasible, no effort was made to mark out the line upto the Chinese border. But the Karachi Agreement stated that beyond NJ9842, the line moved northward towards the Chinese border.
The Simla Agreement of 1972, unlike the 1965 War, did not restore the ante bellum position along the ceasefire line. Instead, the Indians insisted on retaining the 'toe-holds' they had managed in the Central and Southern sectors of the ceasefire line, including in Kargil. So, in many ways the LoC represents the gains of military aggression by India. The Simla Agreement stated: In Jammu and Kashmir, the LoC resulting from the ceasefire of December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Of specific interest is the commitment by both Pakistan and India that, neither side shall seek to alter it (LoC) unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or use of force in violation of this line.
The problem is that while the US may want a 'restoration of the LoC' (As stated in Sharif-Clinton Joint Statement), the LoC has been violated as far back as 1972 when the Indians crossed the LoC, after the ceasefire had been in place, and established about eight posts on the Pakistani side of the LoC that had been left unoccupied. Then, in 1984, they took an action which for all intents and purposes put the final nail in the coffin of the LoC's sanctity. This was the military incursion into Siachin, whereby, India transformed a 'No Man's Land' into the highest battlefield in the world. By airlifting its forces, it occupied two critical northern passes, Bila Fond La and Sia La. Pakistan reacted and seized passes in the Soltoro Range. But, India now occupied 2590 sq kilometres of Pakistani territory.
Now, if the US wants the 'sanctity' of the LoC restored it must first get the Indians to vacate Siachin - otherwise there is no recognised LoC left. Of course, the issue of sanctity itself is questionable since such 'lines' are always temporary in nature and totally different from international borders which are sanctified by international treaties. LoCs and Ceasefire Lines merely freeze unresolved political conflicts which have military dimensions. One can, therefore, discern a whole new game plan - which has been in the making for some time now -aimed at eventually getting Pakistan to accept the LoC as a permanent border between Pakistan and India. This suggestion has been supported by many US analysts and the Kashmir Study Group, and has gained increasing favour amongst Indian policy makers and analysts in the wake of India's military stalemate in Occupied Kashmir. Once Pakistan accepts the notion of the 'sanctity' of the LoC, then it will be the first step towards accepting the LoC as the international border. And that would mean legitimising military aggression. Such an option is totally unacceptable by any international standards - moral, political or military. Hence, the need for Pakistan to make clear that the issue of Kashmir is an issue of the right to self-determination by the Kashmiri people - as reiterated through the UN Security Council resolutions. It is not a territorial issue that can be settled by simply accepting a temporary military ceasefire line as a permanent demarcation of territory. The Kashmiri people will not accept it and Pakistan must not accept this new Indian scheme.

Sir Creek
Sir Creek is a 100 km long estuary in the Rann of Kutch. The Rann of Kutch that lies between Gujarat on the Indian side and Sindh on Pakistani side, has many creeks such as Kajhar, Padala, Kori, Sir etc. The significance of the Sir Creek is that it lies between the boundary of India and Pakistan, which has not been defined precisely by both the countries so far. The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Tribunal's Award in 1968 did not include Sir Creek, because India and Pakistan had then agreed to exclude, the boundary from the head of Sir Creek upto the mouth of the creek on the Arabian Sea from the scope of the Tribunal.
India's stand and Pakistani response: the present problem between India and Pakistan arises from their differing interpretations of the boundary line dividing the Sir Creek. India maintains that this line should run through the middle of the Creek. India supports its case by referring to the Thalweg Doctrine in International Law, according to which the river boundaries between states are divided by the mid channel. Pakistan does not agree, because it says the Thalweg Doctrine is only applicable to water bodies that are navigable. Since, the creek, according to Pakistan is not navigable, the Thalweg Doctrine is not applicable to this case. India maintains that, even if the Creek is navigable only during high tides, it is still navigable and in reality fishing boats are using the Sir Creek to go out to the sea.
Pakistan's stand and Indian response: Pakistan maintains consequently that the boundary should run along the eastern bank of the Creek. Pakistan supports its position, with a map appendixed to a Bombay Government Resolution in 1914. According to Pakistan, the Green Line on the map, that lies on the eastern bank of the Creek, is the historical boundary line. India considers this line as a riband that could have been drawn on any convenient side of the creek before the demarcation stage, hence rejects this line as only a symbolic representation.
Proposals of India and Pakistan during the last talks: India proposed a Seaward approach, viz, until the boundary is formalised in the Sir Creek, India and Pakistan could delimit the maritime boundary from the sea. This could commence from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and proceed to a mutually acceptable limit as per the provisions of Technical Aspects of Law of Sea (TALOS). Pakistan rejected this proposal, on the ground that such a proposal could only be considered after the determination of the boundary in the Sir Creek. Besides, Pakistan emphasised that the two issues should not be delinked but should be discussed in one package. Instead, Pakistan proposed, if India is confident and its case was valid, then both India and Pakistan should go for an international arbitration. India rejected Pakistan's proposal for a third party arbitration in line with its general objection to outside mediation.
Why should India and Pakistan fight for swampy land? Does Sir Creek have any strategic significance? What are the motives behind the proposals of both the countries and the rejection of each other's proposals? Sir Creek assume importance because of the prospect of finding petroleum deposits, and the presence of schools of fish in the continental shelf, off the coast of Rann. Secondly, India wants to solve the issue as early as possible because according to the UN Convention on the Law of Seas, India and Pakistan will have to demarcate the Continental Shelf by the year 2004. Hence, it is believed that international pressure is bound to operate on India to meet this deadline, and hence India will ultimately agree for third party arbitration. Thirdly, the area of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) will change by hundreds of square kilometres, with the change in boundary in Sir Creek. It is this economic aspect of the EEZ that makes the Sir Creek dispute significant.
Why does India refuse international arbitration if it is confident of its case? India fears that if it agrees to mediation in Sir Creek, there will be pressure on India to agree for international arbitration in solving other issues, like most importantly, Kashmir.

Maritime Boundary
Not to be overlooked is the boundary between nations that extend beyond land into the sea. Because of disputes over the coastal land boundary along Sir Creek, there is an accompanying dispute over the maritime boundary that extends 200 miles into the sea, covering the exclusive economic zone of the two nations as well as their national security boundary. The undemarcated and disputed nature of this maritime boundary has already caused international incidents; fishermen from both sides have been detained for claimed violation of maritime boundaries. Continuing this boundary dispute could lead to increased naval conflict. Conflict in the region also limits the potential of both sides to attract the capital investment to develop the natural resources potential of the region, including offshore oil or gas deposits.

The waters of the Indus river
The lifeline of West Pakistan -were divided and a mechanism was set up for compensation to India by Pakistan for the share of water released. On May 4, 1948, the Inter-Dominion Accord entered into force. While the matter was not considered resolved, a working solution was found while the search for a more permanent solution continued.
Later, with the help of the World Bank, permanent solution was worked out. The agreement awarded the three eastern tributaries of the Indus to India and the western three were awarded to Pakistan. A programme for the joint development and operation of the Indus Basin river system was initiated. Careful arrangements were made to build canals and storage dams to divert waters from the western rivers and to replace the supply lost to Pakistan from the eastern rivers. It was remarkable that India and Pakistan worked with the World Bank and its appointed engineers to fashion an agreement that did not rely on the principle of historical usage of the waters of the Indus basin. Instead, they found an equitable way to resolve the issue permanently. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty in Karachi, Pakistan, on September 19, 1960. This treaty has served as the ultimate CBM, surviving many downturns in the relationship between India and Pakistan.
This treaty was not violated in the wars and conflicts till 1984, when India started constructing a barrage on Jhelum river and Kishenganga (390 mw) hydro-power generating unit on Neelum river. Pakistan calls this as a violation of the Indus water treaty, and asked Indians to abandon the projects.
Indian reasoning is as follows: One among the various irritants in Indo-Pak relations is the issue of Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage. (India refers to it as the Tulbul Navigation Project and Pakistan terms it the Wular Barrage). It involves the construction by India of a barrier on the Jhelum River, downstream of the Wular Lake, to make the river navigable during the lean period between late October and mid February. Navigation on the Wular becomes impossible during the lean period as the flow falls reduces to 2000 cusecs with a depth of 2.5 ft. - a minimum of 4000 cusecs and 4 ft. depth is required for navigation. In 1984, India thereby started construction of a structure, 440 ft. long with a navigation lock, at the mouth of the Wular Lake, in the town of Ningli near Sopore, 40 kms north of Srinagar. This was to enhance navigation in the lean period between Sopore and Baramula, a distance of about 20 kms. Construction stopped in 1987 when Pakistan, referring to the construction as a barrage meant for water storage, accused India of violating the Indus Water Treaty 1960. India has reiterated that the construction, only meant for enhancing 'navigation', is permissible under the treaty.
India's position. The Indus Water Treaty divided the six rivers of Punjab between India and Pakistan. India got unrestricted use of the three eastern rivers - Beas, Ravi and Sutlej, and Pakistan got the three western rivers - Chenab, Indus and Jhelum. However, Article III (1) provided that both countries have access to each other's rivers for four distinct purposes: domestic use, agricultural use, restricted use for generation of hydroelectric power through a "run-of-the-river" plant, and non-consumptive use. Non- consumptive use included use of the waters for navigation and other purposes provided the water is returned to the river undiminished in quantity. India constructed the barrage to enhance navigation in terms of Article III (1). The estimated cost of the scheme in 1984 was Rs. 29.78 crore, and about 30 per cent works were completed by October 1987. The expenditure incurred till March 2001, by the Indians, was Rs. 36 crore.
Pakistan's position: Pointing to the storage utility of the barrage, Pakistan has argued that India has violated Article I (11) of the Treaty which prohibits both parties from undertaking any "man-made obstruction" that may cause "change in the volume ...of the daily flow of waters" unless it is of an insignificant amount. Further, Article III (4) specifically barred India, from "store[ing] any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers". Though the treaty permitted limited storage (not exceeding 10,000 acre ft.) for purposes of flood control, it prohibited storage of water "for the purpose of impounding the waters of a stream". The question germane to the issue is whether the construction is designed for "impounding" the waters or "controlling" them. India's right to utilize the waters for navigation becomes nugatory if it is unable to use the river during the lean period. Therefore, it has to control the waters, even if temporarily in a manner so as to enhance its navigability. This is in violation of the Treaty. Until now, eight rounds of talks have been held. The two sides almost reached an agreement in October 1991 whereby India would keep 6.2 meters of the barrage ungated with a crest level at EL 1574.90m (5167 ft), and would forgo storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet out of the provision permitted to it on the Jhelum (excluding Jhelum main). In return, the water level in the barrage would be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90 ft. Indians are not satisfied with this arrangement, therefore, the issue lingers on.
In February 1992 Pakistan also objected that India should not construct the Kishenganga (390 mw) hydro-power generating unit. While India had accepted all the earlier conditions, it has refused to accept this prohibition. According to Pakistan, the Kishenganga project on River Neelam affects its own Neelam-Jhelum power-generating project in its Punjab province.
Talks on this issue were held in November 5-13, 1998. The Indian side was led by Water Resources Secretary Z. Hasan and the Pakistan side by Water and Power Secretary Syed Shahid Hussain. There was no forward movement as the two sides stuck to their earlier positions. Though initially, Pakistan wanted to start the dialogue process afresh, India insisted on to the resumption of the dialogues from where they had stalled in August 1992. Pakistan could not be convinced that the project was only for navigation. On its part, the Indian side rejected the assertion that the project was for storage reiterating that the Wular Lake was an existing lake and Indian action amounted to only "regulating the flow" and not "storing" the waters. The project was suspended; it has remained so till date. Despite their differences, a joint statement issued after the talks said the two sides would continue discussions during the next round of composite dialogue to find a solution consistent with the Indus Treaty.

Overflight and Trains Agreement
On April 6, 1991, India and Pakistan agreed on Agreement on Prevention of Airspace Violations. Another agreement dealt with Permitting Over-Flights and Landing Military Aircraft. Given the shared border and the potential for inadvertent violations, the agreement sought a buffer against violations of airspace and resulting escalation of tensions. Similarly, during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, to Lahore in Pakistan in February 1999, joined the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in signing a declaration which among many others, allowed a train to be run between the two countries.
However, in December, on the pretext of an alleged Pakistani attack on the Indian Parliament, the Indian government stopped the train as well as the overflights. The Indian traders strongly protested against the stoppage of train, as it seriously was hampering their trade with Pakistan as well as with Afghanistan. They even went to their high court which ruled the action of stoppage as improper. So the Indian government immediately asked Pakistan for restoration of the train service. Similarly, the overflight stoppage was a decision which affected the Indians much more than it hurt the Pakistan side. Pakistan International Airlines had to divert a total of about 18 flights, whereas the Indians had to divert about 114 of their flights. Thus the Indian government soon lifted the ban on over-flights between the two countries.
The Pakistan side, however, refused to continue with the train or the over-flights. The Pakistan government linked this with the main cause of stoppage, that is, the amassing of troops on borders. Pakistan feels that unless India withdraws troops and create an environment of talks, the agreements in pieces cannot be restored.