The end state of
US war in Afghanistan-
Possibilities and options

Brig (Retd) Muhammad Mehboob Qadir analyses the future in Afghanistan

The US and its allies are waging an open ended war on terrorism in Afghanistan. There is a curious similarity in ambiguity between US war in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. Just as in Vietnam US perceived itself to be the champion and leader of the free world against aggressive expansion of communism in Asia. In Afghanistan and again in Asia US has undertaken to lead the fight against another illusive foe - the terrorism. Just as President Truman had decided to transplant the policy of containment of communism from Europe to Indo-China. So did President Bush decided to carry his war against terrorism from mainland USA to Afghanistan and now possibly to Far East and Iraq. These striking similarities could be best described in Professor Stoessinger's words:-
"Vietnam has been the Thirty Years War of the Twentieth century. In the course of a single generation five American Presidents misperceived reality in Indo-China and substituted their own phantoms, first called fear and later called hope. These fears and hopes obscured reality until they produced a nightmare that could not be denied ...In retrospect, the tragedy of the American encounter with Vietnam is plain. But the question remains whether it was an example of Greek tragedy "the tragedy of necessity", Where the feeling aroused in the spectator is "What a pity it had to be this way" or of Christian tragedy "the tragedy of possibility", where the feeling aroused is "what a pity it was this way when it might have been otherwise".
"In 1948 a major change occurred in America's concept of its world role as the crisis went on to erupt from Berlin to Greece and to Czechoslovakia. The concepts of an "iron curtain" and "containment" came to pervade the entire American view of foreign affairs. The chasm between East and West appeared deeper by the day, and President Truman, the architect of North Atlantic Treaty, began to see himself as the leader of an embattled "free world" resisting the expansion of a ruthless totalitarianism".
It should be by now quite obvious that besides a large element of tentativeness and ambiguity common between the two military undertakings, the next and more unfortunate commonality is the element of fatal US commitment in Afghanistan which in other words means the outline of an evolving Greek tragedy if a realistic reassessment of the whole situation is not carried out in time. Disarray in Al-Qaeda and Taliban failure to regroup so far may provide just such an opportunity to the Coalition leadership to rethink their approach to the problem of international terrorism. It may help them to come up with a more rational and lasting solution to the menace. Meanwhile, we may proceed to examine what is happening in Afghanistan and some of its consequences.
A barrage of contradicting, at times moralizing and often militarily posturing statements has been issued from the White House, State Department, Pentagon, President Bush and other US civil and military spokesmen regarding the military and political aims and objectives of the war in Afghanistan. However, the revealed intentions, the effort in hand and the projected timeframe do not tally. The result is a thickening politico-military fog that impairs clear vision of the nature of events taking place in Central Asia. This opacity could be deliberate since the war is against an unconventional and a shadowy enemy. But is confusing the allies also equally or perhaps a little more. This state of affairs is resulting in a gradual slackening of support to US cause, mutual friction and eventually could cause a possible break-up of the Coalition. In any case, the responses of Coalition partners are restrained by various reservations. An alliance with provisos is normally doomed to failure or at best can achieve limited success.
In the absence of a clearly pronounced US concept of operations in Afghanistan, it can only be inferred from the pattern of military engagement so far. Broadly, it appears that through a combination of deception and stratagem Taliban Forces were drawn towards the north roughly in the line of Amu Darya-Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul for their defence against a possible attack by Northern Alliance-Coalition's Forces from that direction. Taliban High Command were made to believe that Coalition's main effort was likely to be launched against Kabul so they shifted their forces north concentrating armour, artillery, air and anti- aircraft assets forward. This enabled Coalition Airforce to destroy most of these assets through aerial bombing subsequently. While a potent threat was being posed to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif pinning down bulk of Taliban Forces in that theatre. Lesser or secondary threats were being posed in the south to Kandahar and in the west to Herat. It appears that Taliban were being forced to react in three widely apart theatres of war so that a strategic vacuum is created in the Central and Eastern Afghanistan. As also other effects like dispersal of Taliban Forces, lack of coordination due to unwieldy command and control and weaker responses to ground attacks could be achieved. Simultaneously the vital ring road connecting major Afghan cities was severed at number of places to prevent movement of Taliban reserves from one theatre to another when ground attacks began. Special forces continued to pick out opportunity targets behind Taliban lines wherever found including ultimate destruction of Bin Laden and his terrorist network. A major military objective was the destruction or disabling of the more fanatical and better equipped Arab Contingent acting like Republican Guards in Afghanistan. Northern Alliance Forces were preparing for the capture of Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif with a view to destroy Taliban as military and political force, replace it by a broad-based government in Afghanistan without Taliban. Thereafter, undertake reconstruction of the country with the help of US and the West.

The Taliban Trap?
However, an important question remains to be answered. Were Taliban setting up a strategic trap for the Coalition ground forces? We know that Afghans had earlier shown their military abilities and guile under a different flag while fighting against Soviet occupation forces. Their local military skills were well-known to Northern Alliance troops also. They had possessed a certain degree of political expertise which was discernible the way they had held highly volatile and quick-shifting Pushtun tribes of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan together for the six years of their rule. Their ability to contain and regulate Bin Laden and his network was another evidence and the way they handled Indian plane hijack episode at Kandahar Airport in 1999 was yet another proof. Their attempts to incorporate ex-freedom war commanders into their command structure was a sign of awareness of political compulsions. So it may be deduced that Taliban were not really operating straight out of medieval caves. They had a certain method. They may not have been spectacular in presentation but they were quite deadly in effect.
What needs to be understood correctly is the nature of Taliban's rag-tag military and the basis of their government in Afghanistan. No notion of a conventional army applied to Taliban Forces except that they had mastered the use of reasonably modern weapons like Stinger missiles, tanks, guns, antitank weapons and other small arms. Basically, they were irregular Afghan tribal forces with a flexible organization and loose command and control system. They specialized in guerilla warfare, could quickly throw out a defence or mount a lighting attack and as quickly disappear into desolation to prevent destruction or entrapment as they did in Kabul and Kandahar. Steady in adversity these fighters could be a reasonable match to an attacker if the odds were stacked roughly evenly. Their doggedness in combat pre-dated the advent of Islam. Since medieval times these Afghans have been fighting for their land, tribe and a homegrown sense of worth regardless of the odds against them. They normally excel in nap-of-the-earth fighting and instinctively smell a kill.
Major cities like Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat may have had a political importance for Taliban but not so much of a military meaning as the Coalition wanted to believe. The factor of time was not of a great significance in their strategic calculations unlike the Coalition. They seemed to work on an elastic timetable and therefore would come-up with astounding endurance on this score. Since they were generally rooted among the population therefore, there were hardly any conventional military barracks or warehouses and little delineation between strictly civilian or purely military. Their future resilience may lay in the fact that their military centre of gravity was embedded in the Afghan mass and difficult to identify. What seems to have been overlooked that they had the necessary elasticity and expertise to lead on a massed military offensive against them into an eventual nothingness causing unacceptable moral and physical casualties to the enemy. This oversight could spell trouble. Soviet defeat in Afghanistan after nine years of unforgiving war is a case in point. One may like to examine how operation against Tora Bora, Operation Anaconda and offensive against Shahikot hit thin air.
It should have been clear that Taliban regime was also not a conventional government in the real sense of the word. They had risen from the grassroots not as a political force but as citizens fed up with plunder and misrule of former freedom fighters and local warlords, determined to rid themselves of that menace. It was along the way that they gathered political weight and the trappings of a government particularly after the capture of Kabul. They were grim, tribal in nature and largely free of cumbersomeness of traditional administrations. Their rule by religious edict was both the result of conviction and convenience of a simpler system. Nationally they were less brittle if a collision occurred and tended to attach lesser than expected importance to the loss of Kabul as a symbol of their political ascendancy in Afghanistan. Taliban were a state of mind not a people or race.

Lessons from History
At this stage it is proper to recollect a few major lessons from Afghanistan's socio-political history, which every policy maker dealing with it must keep in mind. Professor Toynbee had described Afghanistan in his landmark work, "A Study of History" as one of the two roundabouts of history. The other is Syria. According to him anything and everything that affects the world must pass through one of these roundabouts. A country of such great historic significance must be handled with great care. For an invader it is easy to get into Afghanistan but very difficult to get out. Alexander the Great, the Persian Empire, the Mongols, the colonial Britain and the Soviet Union learnt this bitter lesson the hardway. No non-Pushtun can rule in Kabul for long let alone with foreign help or sponsorship. Any attempt to alter the Pushtun nature of the throne of Kabul is likely to fail including the latest US initiative. Kabul and rule over Afghanistan is a Pushtun right as has been firmly established by tradition and demographic equation of that country. Northern Alliance stands no real chance to retain their borrowed power for long. Afghanistan has never accepted a proxy ruler or a foreign foisted regime. Soviet Union, before them colonial Britain, Iran, US, UN and Pakistan have had the experience of badly burnt fingers trying to do just that. Rulers in Kabul have invariably succeeded through violence and bloodshed to the seat of power and eliminated the same way. This pattern is likely to continue for a long time to come. Afghans are volatile and bellicose. They can engage in horrible civil wars for years but have a way of stabilizing through internal mechanisms. They dislike a foreign manipulative or suggestive intervention even if made with the best of intentions. Lastly, their lust for money, religious convictions, tribal affiliations and ready capacity for treachery are hopelessly intertwined. Any attempt to make any sense out of it is condemned to fail.
Taliban's political language and articulation of state power did not conform to any stereotype Western model. It was stubbornly parochial, archaic and fluid. At this point it would be prudent to note what Justin Cartwright, The Guardian News Service/Dawn had to say while discussing British Afghan Wars of 1838 and 1879:-
"Afghan's, predictably, do not wait around for set-piece battle and some British Commanders tried to pursue them with disastrous results. In 1879 the British were puzzled by the Afghans. They were particularly unable to understand their religious and tribal adherence, though they were quick to discover their fierceness in defending their convictions. Afghanistan then as now is a place that operates in a different universe of belief".
"It is a place where our assumptions cannot be taken for granted and it is a place where military adventures are usually disastrous. In Afghanistan, perhaps more than anywhere, it is true that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

Main Conclusions
The preceding brief review of Afghanistan and erstwhile Taliban's military and political framework, set in that region's historic perspective leads to a number of pertinent conclusions:-
a. Control over a particular territory meant less to Taliban. Coalition air and ground offensives aimed at Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul, Qandahar and other major cities destroyed Taliban's heavy equipment and met success. The loss of these strategic objectives and disencumberance from heavy armament freed large number of Taliban troops from fixed defences for a form of warfare in which they excel--guerilla operations whose commencement may not be anytime soon. It may be noted that for Northern Alliance and the Coalition Kabul was the grand prize of vast propaganda value which the Taliban did not contest to the point of annihilation, not as expected.
b. Effectively, Taliban as a political and military force disintegrated after the loss of Kabul and Kandahar. This defeat threw them back to their roots, ironically strengthening their centre of gravity, which eventually might enable them to regain a fighting balance. They are likely to re-emerge as popular Afghan fighters resisting foreign occupation. At that stage former commanders of war against Soviets like Hikmatyar, Nabi Mohammadi and scores of others are likely to join them. Fresh volunteers would swell their ranks. They will no more represent discredited and repulsive Taliban ideology but fierce freedom loving Afghans. This fact will radically change the context of the conflict. Repercussions of this change will be felt across the whole of Middle East, Central and South Asia. Original Coalition assumptions regarding war in Afghanistan will have to be drastically reviewed.
Northern Alliance dominated regime is finding it difficult to retain and exercise political writ over Afghanistan from the captured capital city. Coalition will have to continue to maintain a large military presence in that country particularly in Kabul. ISAF's role will have to expand beyond Kabul. As it happens, Afghans are likely to rally behind a resistance coalition comprising of ex-Taliban, Pushtun Tribal chiefs and former anti-Soviet resistance commanders led probably by a senior member of Royal family or a leading Pushtun chief from Southern or Eastern Afghanistan.
This would be a repeat of Soviet occupation scenario. Unhappily in the popular Afghan sentiment, Coalition Forces may come to be regarded as occupiers rather than liberators. Rising incidents of snap attacks on Kabul and Kandahar Airbases, Coalition base camps like Khost and hit and run attacks against US patrols in Eastern Afghanistan are a sign of future things to come.
The enigma of Al-Qaeda and more than that Bin Laden's insertion in Afghanistan's power equation was an ill-fit and unsupported by political history of that country. Afghan's are averse to sharing power with non-Pushtuns let alone being dictated by a total alien from a position of political superiority forcibly acquired within the country. Bin Laden and his hideous clique may have been accepted as colleagues of convenience. But an Arab warlord was clearly unacceptable in the Afghan society. A strong pulse of resentment against these aliens was already underway amongst the locals. Going by the evidence of the past history this modern 'Bacha Saqa' of Afghanistan i.e. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda might have sooner or later met the same gory fate as did Bacha Saqa in 1929. The difference could have been that Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network would have been eliminated root and branch by Afghans themselves being totally foreign.
Afghanistan is a vortex of anarchy in the region. Political and military upheavals in that country invariably upset regional equilibrium intimately affecting geo-political textures of Pakistani, Iranian and Central Asian border areas. Disorder inside Afghanistan revives territorial ambitions and ethnic apprehensions of the neighbouring peoples leading to intervention, lobbying and proxy pushing. Every Afghan chaos has always required a regional approach but invariably an indigenous solution. Nations on Afghanistan's periphery have to maintain a vigil in their own interest against proliferation of drugs, weapons, assassinations and terrorism in their societies.
Having drawn major conclusions from the complex Afghan situation now let us take a look at a few hypothetical probabilities. Although President Bush and British Prime Minister have time and again reiterated their resolve to pursue an open ended war in Afghanistan till Bin Laden is taken out, Al-Qaeda network is destroyed, Taliban threat permanently removed and a broad-based elected administration in Kabul is installed. As recently as 17th August 2002 addressing a news conference at Pentagon, US Secretary of Defence said that US planned to station its troops in Afghanistan for 'years and years' to guard it from becoming a terrorist haven again. Yet all this would make more sense if a timeframe was given, and force levels indicated. According to Jacob Heilbrunn, Los Angeles Times, 'Bombing campaigns, no clear objectives and no exit strategy are bad news'. In the absence of these important inputs the nature and extent of operations in Afghanistan will have to be conjectured. One way to forecast the outcome would be to see Coalition operations in the context of time i.e. short-term long-term. We shall build our succeeding discussion around these two parameters of time and attempt to visualize how the probabilities could unfold and conclude.

Short-Term or Mid-Future Scenario
Going by the declared Coalition aims in Afghanistan, it appeared the same were achievable in a relatively shorter timeframe with some adjustment in goals to make them more realistic. Coalition Forces were able to destroy Taliban regime but their suppression or sufficient conditioning could have been a more sensible objective. A weakened regime could be brought around to listen to the logic of the moment and open its doors for a negotiated settlement of issues such as Bin Laden's custody or banishment, rolling up of Al-Qaeda network, closing down terrorist bases and establishment of an acceptable administration in Kabul. Thereafter, a process of reconstruction of Afghanistan could have begun led by the US. The advantages could have been that US and Coalition Forces could have disengaged from the region early and in reasonable composure. Afghanistan could begin an early national reconstruction and regional reconciliation. UN would have had a role to play and US left with sufficient diplomatic influence. Cost of war would have been curtailed quite effectively. Apprehensions of the "Clash of Civilizations" or "Modern Crusade" theorists would have been put to rest along with growing unrest in the Islamic World. So much for an option which was deliberately not pursued.

Long-Term or Distant Future Scenario
The scenario is based on the growing perception of a prolonged US power projection in the region to address her future strategic interests. Under this predominant premise, war objectives so far stated by the Coalition could be initial or intermediate strategic objectives. Ultimate strategic aim would necessarily take long to materialize and effects would appear even later. The natural region of US interest comprises potentially rich political economies of Central Asia. That is where bases or launch pads for power projection must be and are located. Ideally in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. A volatile regime like Taliban in Afghanistan or Al-Qaeda breeding nests thereabout could pose a nasty threat from down below therefore, had to be eliminated. Organizationally, US power bases are filled-up and maintained with the help of US Navy. The nearest friendly sea access to Central Asia is through Pakistan coast where men, materials ad systems can be off-loaded for onward overland transportation to the bases via Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the smooth flow of US power projection components and access to bases in Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan will have to be stabilized. Since necessary infrastructure and expertise exists therefore, Pakistan can be easily stabilized with the injection of sufficient capital investment to revive her economy, industry, agriculture and widen the job market. Judiciary, law enforcement and education will require immediate attention. It may be an economic package of 100 billion dollars at this point in time and opportunity of the century to create a model, moderate, democratic Muslim state in this vital region.
Afghanistan will be difficult to stabilize. Coalition's present politico-military approach to Afghanistan is flawed. A deliberate alienation of Pushtuns could cause the whole effort to crash. US needs to diligently avoid creating an impression of a political manipulator and a muscleman in that country if it is seeking to stabilize Afghanistan. It should also shun temptation to alter demographic composition of nationalities or propping up minority over majority Pushtuns. In other words don't tinker with history. America's long-term interests in the region could be best served through non-partisan benevolent assistance to Afghanistan's civil society. Jaded Pushtun majority needs to be pacified by assuring predominant political role in a representative broad-based government in Kabul. Frictions in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan will have to be brought down, preferably dissolved. Supported by US diplomacy and power, UN would have to play a greater and active role to bring about a new and just political, economic and social contract between the countries of the region. It appears to be a tall order and is perhaps easier said than done. But these are the burdens of being a superpower with global interests.
Afghanistan and terrorism are not synonymous. It should be understood that Taliban were an archaic socio-political assumption which collapsed due to mismatch under its own oppressive weight. Whereas, Afghans are an ancient people with thousands of years of history and a fierce identity of their own. A harsh dogma cannot be equated with the people upon which it was clamped down. Therefore, Afghans should not be weighed in the same scale as Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden and his odious network were predatory birds of prey hovering temporarily over Afghanistan's horizon and their cohort Taliban were an aberration. Hopefully, one day these eruptions will disappear. And then Afghans will sit down to count their blessings and pass the memory on to the next generations. USA may like to be remembered as one of the few friends that Afghans have had in their long tormented history. Afghans have a habit of not forgetting their friends or forgiving their foe. It will be good investment to keep such determined people on one's right side and usher them into global mainstream at an early point in time. Meanwhile, we may listen to what Dmitry Yazov, former Soviet Defence Minister who pulled-out Soviet Forces from Afghanistan in 1989 had to say on their experience (Adam Tanner, Reuters, Moscow, Friday November 9, 2001):-
"We did not try to win: We wanted to help but not everyone accepted our help so we left...Moscow badly misjudged struggle for Afghan hearts and minds".
"The main lesson that the Afghan people did not support the presence of Soviet Forces, although they welcomed material help. We were uninvited guests and our presence did not cement society but divided it".
"We did not understand what Islam as religion was, and who really was in charge of villages, the local Muslims".