The career of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson was nothing short of spectacular, not least for having been the first and only ranker to advance from private to field marshal in the British Army. The apex of Robertson’s career was his service as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from December 1915 to February 1918, a crucial period in British history when the nation was fighting for its survival in the unparalleled conflagration of the Great War. This fascinating book, while including initial chapters on Robertson’s early life and career and on his January to December 1915 tour of duty as Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France, focuses on Robertson’s tenure as CIGS, the controversial issues that dominated it, and the prosecution of the war effort.
When Robertson became CIGS in December 1915, the War Office, under the influence of the dominating Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, was in a “state of muddle and chaos”. Robertson revitalized the moribund General Staff and consolidated his own authority. Having earlier witnessed the disunity and dissension between the War Office and the commander in the field, Robertson established a strong relationship of mutual trust and support with General (later Field Marshal) Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, “to prevent the civilians from undermining Britain’s commitment to the land war in France and Flanders.” Indeed, Robertson’s strategy, that Germany could be defeated decisively only on the Western Front and that all other “peripheral” operations only detracted from this objective, remained constant throughout his tenure as CIGS.
Robertson welcomed the fall of the indecisive Asquith government in December 1916. The CIGS was soon at odds with new Prime Minister David Lloyd George over his policy “of hoarding British infantry and delaying an all-out British offensive against the formidable German defences in the west until Britain’s allies had exhausted Germany’s reserves.” By concentrating on the war in the west and opposing peripheral operations, Robertson found himself increasingly isolated at the inner councils of war. The devious and disingenuous Prime Minister slowly chipped away at Robertson’s authority and tried to subordinate him to the Supreme War Council. This internecine struggle culminated in February 1918 with the principled Robertson refusing to compromise any longer and forfeiting his position as CIGS in the process.
Author David R. Woodward, professor of history at Marshall University, has been studying the First World War for three decades. He has conducted extensive research in primary source manuscript collections of the leading protagonists; in Cabinet, Foreign, and War Office files of memoranda, meeting minutes, and others; and in secondary source material. The depth of research is revealed by the extensive and illuminating endnotes that follow each chapter. The result is a masterful reconstruction of Robertson’s tenure as CIGS and an insightful analysis.
Woodward’s volume is impeccably researched with a fast-paced and riveting narrative. As a study in civil-military relations, in the policies and politics of the higher direction of war, and of generalship under adversity, this study is wholeheartedly recommended.