During the 1965 war, there was quite a difference between fact and fiction as the legal notice from Col SG Mehdi's lawyer to Gen Musa shows.

"A Matter of Honour"

24 June 1986

To:
General (Retd) Mohammad Musa
Governor House,
Quetta.

Dear Sir,
Under instructions on behalf of my client Col. (Retd) Syed Ghaffar Mehdi MC I have to address you as under. This notice is being addressed to you not in your official capacity but as the author of the book 'My Version' in your capacity as a private civilian.
That in your book 'My Version' 1983 edition on pages 65 and 66 you have made in clear and unambiguous terms harmful and damaging accusations and imputations against my above named client. My client at that time was serving as the Colonel Staff of the 15 Division of the Pak Army. In your narration of the events at the relevant time you assailed the conduct of my client without verifying the facts. In the second para of the preface of your above mentioned book you have yourself alluded towards the doubtful authenticity of events and the haziness of your memory. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:
"The book is strictly my personal account of the 1965 War compiled from memory and my private notes and no help has been taken from official documents in writing it. But where my recollection was hazy, I have freely sought assistance from my retired colleagues and staff officers of that period."
The details of the damaging imputations against my client
vis-a-vis the correct position have already been communicated to you in the letter dated the 10th April, 1986 addressed to you by my client which is self-explanatory and comprehensive. The copies of the above mentioned delivered to you on the 13th April 1986 were also forwarded by my client to the Defence Minister of Pakistan, the C.O.A.S. Army, the V.C.O.A.S. Army, the Military Secretary GHQ, Lt. Generals (Retd.) Attiqur-Rahman, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and Brig. Khalil Ahmad Khan. But you have not responded to the above letter. Your remarks about the conduct of my client in the 1965 war with India tend to lower in the estimation of others the moral and intellectual character of my client and damages his credit in such a manner that his personality appears in the eyes of the public as disgraceful.
In view of the above, you are therefore asked to make necessary amendments in your book 'My Version' in such a manner that the harmful imputations against my client are removed. You are also asked to desist from making similar imputations against my client in any of your future publications including the translations of your work already published.
If this is not done within one month of the receipt of this notice my client shall be constrained to seek redress through the legal process in the appropriate court of law.

Yours faithfully,
SYED FEROZ SHAH
Advocate

My dear General Mohammad Musa,
I have read and re-read your 'My Version' 1983 edition. In the chapter - 4 of your book on pages 65 and 66, certain incorrect remarks have been made by you about my role as the Colonel Staff of the 15 Division. This Division was deployed in the Sialkot area during the 1965 war. Referring to the eventful day of the 7th September, 1965 you have given a categorical statement accusing me of certain acts and mistakes of commission and omission on my part. The relevant portion of your remarks in your book on page 65 para 3 reads as under:-
"During this period the headquarters of this division appeared to be in a state of delirium. Its Colonel Staff was sending messages to GHQ and its lower formations that enemy commandos had infiltrated and were operating behind Sialkot town, without first verifying any report of information he might have received in this connection to ascertain the true facts, and was thus spreading panic. It regained sanity only after the Acting Divisional Commander and the Colonel Staff were relieved of their jobs and Major General Tikka Khan took over command of the Division."
Though my name has not been mentioned in the above remarks yet the unmistakable accusation towards me as the Colonel Staff causes aspersion on me in absolutely certain terms. This is inaccurate, unjust and unwarranted as the facts are contrary to what you have stated. I, therefore, want to put the record straight.
2. "I was flown into Sialkot on 31st August, 1965 from CHERAT under a fast gathering war storm which was clearly visible to a "professional eye". Throughout the month of August, I had made repeated requests to the Vice Chief General Staff through my GSO 2 Operations at Inf-8-Maj. Nishat (now Major General) for the cancellation of privilege leave of SSG in particular - as through my mind's eyes I could see the war clouds about to burst on our borders. I was not listened to just as my assessment of Operations GIBRALTAR as another 'Bay of Pigs' was not appreciated.
3. I have given this brief background because my actions on assuming the appointment as Colonel Staff at SIALKOT directly stem from my analysis of the situation. I could see clearly an impending Indian offensive by the end of the first week of September 1965. It was this conviction which led me to recommend to the GOC (Brig ISMAEL) to move 15 Division to its battle location. This was done a clear 48 hours before the Indian attack. The presence of 115 Brigade, with its complete armoured regiment. saved JASSAR bridge and NAROWAL from falling into enemy hands with all its frightening possibilities....On 6 Sept '65, 15 Division was mentally and professionally ready to meet the challenge of aggression".
As regards the alleged rumours about the presence of the Indian commandos behind the 15 Division F.D.Ls. (Forward defended localities), I not only did not believe in them, I actively sought to dispel their effects in as much as I as the Colonel Staff ordered 15 Division OC F.I.U. (Field Intelligence Unit) to thoroughly investigate and report about these rumours. As a result of this investigation it was established that there was no evidence of any enemy commandos whatsoever operating behind the 15 Division. Consequently, through a signal GHQ was asked to relegate the powers of Field General Court Martial to the GOC for establishing such courts to award deterrent punishments with a view to put an end to the spread of panic. In support of my contentions I reproduce below, the contents of the letter since published in the National Press (a. Daily News, Karachi 26 May, 1984, b. Defence Journal, Karachi April, 1984 and c. Jang, Karachi 10-11 July, 1984) of Brigadier Khalil Ahmad, Acting Adjutant General, who had visited HQ 15 Division, Sialkot during the hostilities:-

25/4 B Zafar Road
Lahore Cantt.
2-2-1984
Brig (Retd) Khalil Ahmed

My dear Colonel Mehdi,
Thanks for your letter of 1 Feb. 1984. I still vividly remember the briefing given by you on or about 15 September '65 when I visited 15 Division HQ as Acting Adjutant General to find out problems concerning A.G's Branch. GOC 15 Division (Major General Tikka Khan), new Colonel Staff (Ibrahim Akram), who probably arrived the same day and A/Q were present.
The important and thought-provoking point in your briefing was the false alarm of the enemy commandos operating in the rear of 15 Divisional area. The troops got jittery and trigger-happy resulting in the loss of lives of about 20 personnel including one or two officers. In fact there were no commandos in the area at all. Your recommendation was that GHQ should relegate the powers of Field General Court Martial to the GOC for establishing such courts and awarding deterrent punishment to the offenders promptly so that such undisciplined action on the part of our own troops for shooting at each other was stopped for the good of the army. I was also told at the briefing that a thorough enquiry had already been carried out by the Field Security Officer, and consequently signals to GHQ (P.S. and M.I. Directorates) had already been sent. Consequently, I asked for the report, which along with copies of signals were handed over to me. I assured that needful action would be taken after orders of the C-in-C.
Early next morning before I could process this report, GOC 15 Division (Tikka Khan) personally spoke to me on phone to return that report for certain details/amendments, which I returned forthwith. About a couple of days later, ceasefire was announced. I did not receive that report. The loss of lives could not have been accounted except showing them as "killed in action".
From the above it was evident that the discipline of the troops was not good and no prompt deterrent action was taken against them except quite rightly suggested in the beginning for trying them under Field General Courts Martial.
Why the paper was withdrawn by the GOC is not understood. Such lapse on the part of troops if not corrected speedily and firmly will help the enemy and will harm the discipline of the Army. Also if such indiscipline acts are not dealt with firmly and ruthlessly and rather camouflaged for short term or personal motives, troops will lose confidence in the honesty, truthfulness and character of commanders. May Pakistan Army overcome such weakness, where present, in their battle-worthiness and no officer whose hallmark of character is truthfulness and nothing but truthfulness should ever be guilty in hesitating in not boldly pointing out such weakness and lapses where noticed.

With regards.
Yours sincerely
Sd/-
Khalil Ahmad

5. To counter any argument that I am bringing forward certain facts of 1965 war, after an interval of 20 years, I now produce testimony of a senior distinguished General of Pakistan Army dating back to January, 1966. This testimony also stands published in the Defence Journal Karachi, issue of April, 1984, besides Daily News, 26 May, 1984:-
"Lieut General M. Attiqur Rahman, MC provides additional incontrovertible evidence confirming Brigadier Khalil Ahmed's testimony. General Attique was G.O.C. 12 Division in December 1965-January 1966. I was his Colonel Staff. During this period I had submitted a formal representation to C-in-C. Here is Gen. Attiqur Rahman's version, of which, at this stage, I am releasing a small extract only:
My dear Mehdi,
... You stated that some correspondence from you to GHQ about your representation regarding your removal from Colonel Staff was seen and passed through me as your GOC in 12 Division. I had seen this correspondence and the attending documents which if I remember correctly included a signal to GHQ about there being no enemy Commandos in the rear of 15 Division. I also remember General Tikka's initial on it....

Sd/-
M. Attiqur Rahman

3 Sept., 1983.

6. Besides the above testimony of Brig Khalil and Lieut General Attiqur Rahman the then G.O.C. of 15 Division, Major General Tikka Khan had never and nowhere stated, verbally or in writing, anything contrary to the facts enumerated above. General Tikka Khan, as a matter of fact, had differed with me, his Colonel Staff, to the effect that the signal to the G.H.Q. should not have been sent, because:-
"a signal of the nature sent by me to the GHQ would indicate that there was something wrong in the rear of 15 Division."10
There may well be as indeed there is, differences of perception over the despatch of the said signal between General Tikka Khan and its sender; but General Tikka Khan did not give it the twist that you did, and I do vehemently protest to the unfortunate conclusion arrived at by you.
7. Your contention on page 66 of your book regarding my having been relieved of my job along with the Acting Division Commander is also contrary to the facts. While the Acting Division Commander was certainly relieved of his duties on the 7th September, 1965. I continued to serve as the Colonel Staff of the Division, upto the 19th September, 1965.
This can be easily verified by you, as the former C-in-C of Pak Army, from the Military Secretary's branch of GHQ. However, I am enclosing herewith as Annexure 'A' a copy of the document for the claim of Sitara-e-Harb for your reference. This document shows inter alia, my presence as Colonel Staff at Sialkot from 6th September, 1965 to the 19th September, 1965 (both days inclusive).
8. At this stage of submission, it would be appropriate to reproduce the last para of my Representation submitted to you on 19th January, 1966, through my G.O.C., 12 Division, then Maj General Attiqur Rabman:
"I do however want the C-in-C to know that a grave injustice has been done and deep scars inflicted on one of his officer's twice in 1965 whose sole apparent crime was that he possessed professional vision and moral courage."
9. My fears are that the above mentioned Representation of mine had never been seen or read by you, otherwise you would not have inflicted a deep scar for the third time, on a patriotic soldier of Pakistan, decorated with Military Cross for bravery; a graduate of Command and Staff College Camberlay, U.K., who held instructional appointments at I.M.A. Dehra Dun, PMA Kakul, Staff College Quetta, and Armed Forces War College 1963 - in the very first year of the inception of this course.
10. You Sir, also promoted me out of turn to the rank of Colonel, to command the Special Service Group of our Army in 1964; just as your predecessor, then General Mohammad Ayub Khan had given me accelerated promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. in 1956. Two years before that, in 1954, I had attended the Senior Tactical Command Course at Quetta and had the privilege of not only coming first in a class of well over seventy officers - but got the singular distinction of being awarded "D"-"D" standing for "Outstanding". And surely, it must be within your knowledge that after my early retirement at the age of 46 years, with 26 years service, in 1968, my services in my personal capacity, were requested for by the Government of Iran as Military Adviser to the Iranian National Defence College as well as Iranian Staff College. My services in Iran were acknowledged by the Conferment of Nishan of the Iranian Armed Forces. This news item was splashed in Iranian and Pakistani newspapers. The point made herein is simply this; that no country would invite a foreign national to teach its Officer Cadre unless the Instructor had an unblemished record of service - on and off the battlefield. Only in September-October 1985, I had visited Islamic Republic of Iran, on their Government's invitation and had the honour of being given Nishan of ALQUDS by the HQ of Ground Forces of the Islamic Republic in recognition of my unbiased reportage of the Gulf War in Pakistani National papers - both in English as well as in Urdu.
11. I am sure, that you are also aware of the fact that I enjoy considerable reputation and respect as an unbiased and independent military, political, economic and social analyst and commentator. My writings have been appearing quite frequently in the national dailies and periodicals of repute. My views on various national and international issues are also contained in a number of books authored by me. In short, substantial knowledgeable readership of my work has been developed in the country since I left the Government Service. I have also been a frequent guest speaker of various prestigious organisations throughout the country. In the pre-independence days I have been in direct contact with the father of nation Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He had very kindly acknowledged my sentiments for him and for the Pakistan movement. The documentary evidence of these facts are contained in more than one of my books and those written by other authors.
12. From the above I do not want to indulge in self-praise. In fact the purpose of the above submissions is only to bring it on record that due to sheer dedication towards the national cause and betterment of Pakistan I have been awarded and blessed with a status and respect which can be an envy of many in my country. Motivated always by nationalistic considerations and professional imperatives, I had the vision, knowledge and courage to analyse as early as 1963, in my position as O.C. Training Team of the First War Course, that ignoring of factors of Economics of War, Military Geography and Strategic Theory of Exterior
versus Interior Lines, could lead to a terrible situation where:-
"A Pakistani Pritzwitz can surrender East Pakistan without even a good fight".
This analysis stands authenticated by (then) Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, Commandant of the War Course, and documented by Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission; besides, the substance and pithy conclusion of the analysis continues to be published in the National Press over a period of years. Though my clarion call given in 1963, could not prevent the surrender of East Pakistan in 1971, I did indeed succeed in persuading the then President of Pakistan in 1972 to establish Institute for Strategic Studies. Annexure "B".
13. Your remarks about my conduct in the 1965 War come in direct conflict with status and respect being enjoyed by me throughout Pakistan and abroad. Your observations and comments about me are obviously based on misinformation and or misunderstanding. This could be the only reason as to how and why total falsehood about my conduct in the 1965 War, prompting your above quoted uncharitable remarks about me, has found its way in your book under reference. The answer, partly lies in para 2 of the Preface of your Book, where you stated that:-
"The book is strictly my personal account of 1965 War compiled from memory and my private notes and no help has been taken from official documents in writing it. But where my recollection was hazy, I have freely sought assistance from my retired colleagues and staff officers of that period to whom I am grateful."
14. Your recollection of my conduct in 1965 War as given on pages 65-66 of your book, is certainly hazy. And what is more, you have, according to your own confession, taken no help from the official documents. And it so appears that you don't seem to have been served well by the Staff Officers whom you claim to have consulted when writing your book; otherwise they would have briefed you of "Mehdi's Version apropos facts and fiction of Indian Commandos, appearing in the National Press day in and day out, year after year. Annexure -C.11. You are, therefore, earnestly requested to make necessary amends and corrections in your book under review. You are also requested to please make sure that the unfortunate remarks about me are not repeated, ever, in your future writings. I am very much aware of your present preoccupations and involvement in your official duties. I, however, request you to kindly do the needful at your earliest convenience. I shall be waiting with extreme eagerness to hear from you within a month or so from the date of despatch of this registered communication. For the sake of historical accuracy and for the honour of my military reputation, the record must be put right, Sir.
15. How much do I value 'honour', is illustrated by the reproduction of my Farewell message to my Comrades in arms on the eve of my retirement on 19th December, 1968:-

Farewell and Greetings
"The only guide to a man is his conscience- the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so mocked by the failure of our hopes; but with the shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the rank of honour."

Sd/-
(Col. S.G. Mehdi)

16. Patriotism, professionalism and sincerity of actions have guided me to follow the great Quaid from 1940 onwards, to serve the National Army with Spartan and professional dedication; to oppose Gibralter Operations because of its faulty perception; to deploy 15 Division in its operational position by 4th September, 1965; to arrange a raid and provide unimpeachable proof of the presence of 1st Indian Armoured Division in Samba Jammu area. This performance of mine, has been acknowledged by Major General Shaukat Riza in his latest book on 1965 War. From such background of moral and professional values, it was but a short step for Mehdi to deny the presence of Indian Commandos behind the 15 Division front.
I am not seeking any credit from you Sir, for the role played by me, before and during the 1965 War. I shall get my due from the polity of Pakistan in richness of time. You are only being requested to put the record straight.
17. I am also forwarding a copy of this communication to the C.O.S. and V.C.O.S. Army, Military Secretary G.H.Q., Lieut. Generals Attiqur Rahman, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and Brigadier Khalil Ahmed Khan. The names of the last three have been mentioned and it is therefore, only fair that they should be aware of my action.
18. One copy is sent to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, as he also holds the portfolio of Defence Minister of Pakistan.
19. I am sending a copy of this letter under Notice from my Lawyer, to the Publisher of your Book, not to publish any Edition of your book(s) under reference, in English or Urdu, till this serious and grave matter of honour is resolved.
I am Sir, a Patriotic Soldier of Pakistan.

Sd/-
(Col. S.G. Mehdi)

10th April, 1986

Annexure -A
CLAIM FORM FOR SITARA-I-HARB, Clasp KASHMIR 1964-65 and Clasp KUTCH 1965 TAMGHA-I-DIFA'A
1. No: PA-941 Rank: Colonel
Name: SYED GHAFFAR MEHDI, M.C.
Present Fmn and unit: Station Headquarters, Karachi.
2. Claim - SITARA-I-HARB
CLASP KASHMIR 1964-65
CLASP KUTCH 1965
(Note:- Cross out what is not applicable.)
3. SITARA-I-HARB
a. Fmn and Unit with which IM 15 Div. served in Operations. Area.
b. Area where served SIALKOT
c. Period with dates 6 Sept. '65 to 19 Sept '65 (AN) (Both days inclusive)
4. CLASP KASHMIR 1964-65
a. Fmn and Unit with which served in Operations. Area (As officer Commanding Special Service group well over a month
(Not consecutively) was spent in the Northern Area.
b. Area where served. TT operation conducted is still TOP SEC, but details available with CGS.)
c. Period with dates Jan. '64-Sept. '65
5. CLASP KUTCH 1965
a. Fmn and Unit with which served in Operations. Area (As Officer served in Operations. Area. Commanding Special Service Group, planning and supervising Operations. Conducted by SSG Troops.)
b. Area where served Entered Fd Svc Area: Period With Dates
6 May 65} CORO
Left " " " : 1 June 65} Part 11
Entered Operations. Area : 28 April 65} Order 53
Left " " : 2 May 65} of 7 Sept.

6. Pers Wounded or Fallen
Sick (attributable to Service)
PsW and evacuated outside on Area.
a. Place }
} Nil.
b. Date }

7. Pers Granted Gallantry Awards
a. Name of Award }
}
b. Place and date where} Nil.
Award was earned }
}
c. Authority
}

Signature of Claimant

(S. G. Mehdi)

Colonel
Certificate (To be completed by Units)
8. Claims checked from available records and found correct/incorrect.

Brig. Comd SSG
OC Unit
(Chaudhri Nasir Ahmed)
Station C/o Stn. HQ Cherat
&
Date 18 July 67

(To be completed by Record Offices concerned)

9. Claim verified from records and:-
a. Found correct in respect of the full awards and published in Pt 11
Order No................dated..............:-
* SITARA-I-HARB CLASP KASHMIR 64-65
Clasp Kutch 1965
(*Cross out which is inapplicable)
O i/c

Records/CORO
CONFD

Annexure-B

No. F. 19/72/DIA
Government of Pakistan
Ministry of Defence
Rawalpindi, the 9th August 1972
MEMORANDUM

With reference to his letter dated 15th July 1972, Colonel (Retd.) Syed Ghaffar Mehdi is informed that his original letter was seen by the President under whose direction all aspects of the matter were examined and a reply was accordingly sent to him. He is also informed that his proposal for setting up of an Institute of Strategic Studies is under consideration of the Government.
Sd/-
(Mairaj Husain) PSP
Deputy Secretary to the Government of Pakistan

Colonel (Retd) Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, PA-941
18/A, Park Lane
National Park, Rawalpindi.

General Musa did not cancel Pakistan Army's leave.
"General Musa, then Army Commander-in-Chief, and his principal aides and field commanders come in for equally severe criticism. According to Mehdi, "Pakistan's Army goes to battle, minus 25% of its strength." Here, the allegation is that Army authorities at various levels, acting obviously on their own, had allowed as many as a quarter of their entire strength to proceed on leave, at a time when the country was or ought to have been preparing for war."

Indians Admit That 20% PAK ARMY Was On Leave.
"If not 25 percent, a considerable part of Pakistan's soldiery may well have been on leave during August 1965. This is because, in Pakistan as in India, troops get two month's leave of absence every year, which means that in theory, at any one time, one sixth of the personnel of an army unit may be on leave. In practice, however, units are kept in full strength during the dry winter months from October to March/April to facilitate troops training. During the rest of the year, i.e. during the period April to August/September, it is possible, therefore, that during these months some units may have no more than 70 to 75 percent available for duty."

Tragedy of 1971 Was Avoidable - Mehdi's View.
Mehdi's main purpose in making these observations on the 1965 War is to suggest that had Pakistani leaders "raised the curtain from the acts of omission and commission in the planning and conduct of the 1965 War at higher levels, the ignominy of 1971 could have easily been avoided."
Note:- Extracts from 'The Organiser' - An Indian Weekly carried this Article in its October 1977 Issue and Reprinted by Daily 'Nawa-i-Waqt', Lahore in its Issue of 12 September, 1978.

GENERAL MUSA REPLIES

General (Retd) Mohammad Musa
Governor's House Quetta
Telephone: 70101
No. 0021/PA
24 July 1986

Lt Cdr (Retd) Syed Feroz Shah
Advocate & Tax Consultant
Secretary General, National Thinkers Forum
B.C. 2, Block 9, Kehkashan, Clifton,
Karachi.

Dear Syed Feroz Shah
Your contention stated in your letter dated 24 June, 1986 regarding the subject matter printed on pages 65 and 66 of my book, "MY VERSION", 1983 edition, is ill-founded. Statements to which you refer relate to the events that were reported to me as the then Army Commander by my staff concerned during the height of the fighting in Sialkot. I have had no intention whatsoever to defame/damage the reputation of your client or any other individual.
I hope that your client is conscious of the fact that for many years he has been writing, and giving interviews, about the 1965 War in various newspapers and that some of his comments are tantamount to defamatory imputation to my reputation as ex- Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army. I reserve the right to seek legal remedy against your client.

With regards.
Yours Sincerely
Sd/-
Mohammad Musa

SECOND LEGAL NOTICE TO GENERAL MUSA
Date: 19th August 1986
Ref: Your Letter No. 0021/PA dated
24 July, 1986.
My Dear General Mohammad Musa,

7. Your letter under reference sent in reply to my Notice dated 24 June, 1986, through "silence" and "absence of contention" admits that the accusation on page 65 of his book, "My Version" levelled against my client (Colonel S.G. Mehdi) that he was removed from his job along with the Acting Divisional Commander was patently false. Colonel Mehdi had provided unimpeachable evidence, documentary and otherwise, of his continued service as Colonel Staff HQ 15 Division after removal of the Acting Divisional Commander, Brigadier Ismail, in his letter addressed to you dated 10 April 1986. Besides official documents, the fact of Colonel Mehdi's continued service can be vouchsafed by the following witnesses to the events:-
a) Brigadier Ismail Khan - the outgoing Commander, now living in Defence Officers Society, Karachi.
b) Major General Tikka Khan (General Retd) the relieving Divisional Commander - now a resident of Satellite Town, Rawalpindi.
c) Colonel A.I. Akram (now a retired Lieut. General) who relieved my client and became Colonel Staff HQ 15 Division effective 20 September 1965 -currently Chairman, Regional Studies, Islamabad.
8. Should you therefore agree to delete the false reference to the act of relieving of my client Colonel S.G. Mehdi from his job along with the Acting Divisional Commander as mentioned in your book, then that part of the libel case would become infructious and shall not be pursued by me on behalf of my client.
9. That matter having been hopefully resolved, it still leaves us with the second false accusation made by you against my client on pages 65-66 of your book, "My Version", viz:-
"During this period the (6-7 September '65) the headquarters of this Division appeared to be in a state of delirium. Its Colonel Staff was sending messages to GHQ and its lower formations that enemy commandos had infiltrated and were operating behind Sialkot town, without first verifying any report or information he might have received in this connection to ascertain the true facts, and was thus spreading panic."

10. It seems that due to your Gubernatorial commitments, you did not find time to read the solid evidence produced by my client in his letter dated 10th April, 1986 which refutes and negates your unwarranted and unjust accusation. I am therefore reproducing for your careful and judicious examination the relevant parts from para 4 of my client's letter, dated 10th April 1986, which reads as under:-
"As regards the alleged rumours about the presence of the Indian commandos behind the 15 Div. F.D.Ls., I not only did not believe in them, I actively sought to dispel their effects in as much as I, as the Staff Colonel ordered 15 Div. OC F.I.U. to thoroughly investigate and report about these rumours. As a result of this investigation it was established that there was no evidence of any enemy commandos whatsoever operating behind the 15 Div. Consequently, through a signal, GHQ was asked to relegate the powers of Field General Court Martial to the GOC for establishing such courts to award deterrent punishments with a view to put an end to the spread of panic. In support of my contentions I reproduce below, the contents of the letter since published in the National Press (A) Daily News Karachi 26 May, 1984, (B) Defence Journal Karachi April, 1984 and (C) Jang Karachi 10-11 July, 1984, of Brigadier Khalil Ahmad, Acting Adjutant General, who had visited HQ 15 Div. Sialkot during the hostilities.
11. This unambiguous and clear evidence of the Acting Adjutant General of the Pakistan Army alone proves beyond any doubt whatsoever that:-
a) my client was performing his duties as Colonel Staff on or about 15 September 1965:
b) my client had also performed his duties in ascertaining the facts regarding the rumours of operations of enemy commandos in the rear areas thus completely belying your libellous accusation that the Colonel Staff, was sending information "without verifying any report or information ........." With your long service experience, you would readily agree that verification of the report does take time even in peace time, leave alone the war. But it goes to the credit of my client, that he continued to dispel and nail the lies during the height of the battle and after the ceasefire, consistently and persistently.
12. In substantiation of this viewpoint, I am producing the supporting testimony of a senior and distinguished General Officer of the Army, dating back to January 1966. This testimony of Lieut General M. Attiqur Rahman, MC included in my client's letter dated 10 April 1986, which inter alia, stands published in the prestigious monthly of Pakistan "The Defence Journal", issue of April 1984, besides 'Daily News', Karachi dated 26th May 1984, reproduced as under - as a ready reference.
"Lieut General M. Attiqur Rahman, MC provides additional incontrovertible evidence confirming Brigadier Khalil Ahmed's testimony. General Attique was G.O.C. 12 Div. in Dec. 1965 - Jan 1966. I was his Colonel Staff. During this period I had submitted a formal representation to the C-in-C. Here is Gen. Attiqur Rahman's version, of which, at this stage, I am releasing a small extract only.
13. Your attention is also drawn to para 6 of my client's letter dated 10th April, 1986 addressed to you. The relevant para of which is reproduced here under:-
"Besides the above testimony of Brig. Khalil and Lieut. General Attiqur Rahman the then G.O.C. of 15 Division, Major General Tikka Khan had never and nowhere stated, verbally or in writing, anything contrary to the facts enumerated above. General Tikka Khan, as a matter of fact, had differed with me his Colonel Staff, to the effect that the signal to the G.H.Q. should not have been sent, because:- "a signal of the nature sent by me to the GHQ would indicate that there was something wrong in the rear of 15 Div." There may well be as indeed there is, differences of perception over the despatch of the said signal between General Tikka Khan and its sender, but General Tikka Khan did not give it the twist that you did, and I do vehemently protest to the unfortunate conclusion arrived at by you.
14. In para 7 of his letter, my client further pointed out to you, as under:- "Your contention on page 66 of your book regarding my having been relieved of my job along with the Acting Div. Commander is also contrary to the facts. While the Acting Div. Commander was certainly relieved of his duties on the 7th September, 1965 I continued to serve as the Colonel Staff of the Div. upto the 19th September 1965...."
15. In the final analysis you would observe that your unjust remarks against my client stem either from misinformation and or a hazy memory or a libellous motive. In any case you are asked to delete the inaccurate remarks against my client from your book under reference and any other publication authored by you.
16. As for the threat made by you in the last para of your letter under reference, to my client, it is now clear that you have been nursing a grudge against my client for quite some time which motivated and prompted you to make the uncalled for libellous remarks against my client in your book. If you honestly wanted to take legal action against my client why did you not do so during the last decade or so, i.e. ever since my client's analysis started appearing in all major newspapers/magazines, of the country?
17. Be that as it may, I have been instructed by my client that he shall be willing and ready to face any of the suit against him by you, as you have indicated in your letter under reference. My client's contention is that in the greater interest of the country he has been trying to analyse the concept and conduct of the 1965 War which eventually and consequently led to the debacle of East Pakistan in December 1971. My client never did have any intention to defame anyone in particular - including yourself. My client wishes to stress that his observations and conclusions have always been based on irrefutable facts and thus cannot be termed as libellous or defamatory. However, my client would greatly appreciate and welcome the process of shifting facts from fiction through the unbiased analysis and scrutiny of our respected judiciary if you choose to file the suit against him. This will eventually unmask the actual villains who did irreparable damage to Pakistan, which in itself will provide invaluable lessons to the posterity. Every country analyses its campaigns and wars, so that lessons for the future good of the country could be learnt and applied in its defence planning strategies.
In the end you are once again asked to get the libellous remarks against my client removed from your book within a month or so to prevent any further action to litigation.

With regards,
Yours faithfully,
(SYED FEROZ SHAH)

To: General (Retd) Mohammad Musa
Governor's House, QUETTA.