Perils of befriending the US:
latest are Saudis to discover

Columnist M B NAQVI says that it is dangerous being America's friend.

There has been a non-stop rumpus ever since a certain briefing given by the Rand Corporation experts to high US Defence Department officials in Washington some weeks ago. In the briefing, the consensus of the Rand Corporation experts was that the Saudis are no longer true friends of the US and it is incumbent on the US authorities to regard the Saudis not as friends but as potential enemies. The immediate background was of course obvious. The Saudis have been clearly saying that the US should not mount an invasion of Iraq but if it does, it should not rely on its bases in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi rulers shall not allow their use for attacking Iraq. This was another setback to the US President George W. Bush. Saudi Arabia is not alone. Talking of setbacks to America, the voices heard in Third World can, upto a large extent, be dismissed as traditional anti-Americanism. But this time round the EU is also up in revolt. Most of the important countries of Europe are prescribing that the US should respect the discipline of the international law. They all want that the US should operate through the UN. In other words, they are asking the US to listen to others and act on a consensus that at least the UN Security Council is able to arrive at. True, unlike always, Mr. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, is not jumping to toe the American line with enthusiasm. He happens to being bombarded from within his own party. Voices are being raised that he should stop play being a poodle of George Bush. The German Vice Chancellor has totally disassociated Germany from any such enterprise. Not only that. He has made it an election issue in Germany. Perhaps he is guarding against the possibility of having to foot a large bill of the war similar to what the Bush Senior had forced the Germans to pay after the 1991 war: $ 9 billion in the war that the Americans had started for basically obscure reasons. Some say the reasons of that war were not obscure. Apparently, no sensible or independent-minded person anywhere is able to appreciate the presumed policies of this Bush administration. Why cavil at the Saudis?
It is true that Mr. George W. Bush, the American President, is hellbent on starting a war. The sober assessment elsewhere is that a war does impend. Mr. Bush will find some support in the ruling circles even in the Middle East despite their public opinion. At least the US Vice President Dick Cheney is said to think so. Few can suppose that the Egyptian, Moroccan or Jordanian rulers can afford to defy the American wishes. The US has already twisted the arm of Hosni Mubarak: this year's aid might be cancelled. Then there are countries like India and Pakistan which would, it is thought, be competing to win the favours of the Americans; both governments will actually be happy to see their bases being used for whatever purpose the Americans can find for them, were it not for this public opinion. The real background to the Saudi disaffection needs to be seen in perspective. First, there is the question of merits of the case. The Americans have made it abundantly clear that whatever the Saddam regime does -- whether it invites the international (UN) arms inspectors or does not -- the US wants him to go. It is a regime change that it is after. In other words, the US wants a change of the kind that it has imposed on Afghanistan. Extending the principle, it boils down to: governments that the Americans do not like have to go -- whether as a result of military option and an American nominee to be imposed as was the case in Afghanistan, or through some other method, such as a US-inspired coup or through assassination. Some such fate is to be visited on Iraq. That Iraq is sitting on a huge lake of hydrocarbons is certainly a factor.
That Mr. Saddam Hussain is a particularly undesirable kind of dictator for a country like Iraq is true. But it is not upto a distant country to decide to which government where is despicable or ought to be removed. The reason to doubt such a preposterous theory is that an individual country's government can have any number of selfish reasons for recommending an extreme step regarding some other country. International law has been evolved just to prevent the possibility of every state opting for selfish reasons to come to blows every now and then on minor and major issues. Today, the largest emblem of international law is the UN. Virtually all states of the world are its members and upto a large extent it operates democratically. Where authorisation of the use of force is concerned, a non-democratic element does enter in UN: It divides the international actions in its names into two categories: one is arrived at democratically through the General Assembly resolutions and recommendations of its specialised agencies; it is non-binding on member states. The second is binding decisions of its 15-member Security Council; it can authorise use of force against another state provided (a) it is a majority decision of the SC but has the consensus of the five veto-wielding Permanent members of the Council. This decision-making is heavily weighted in favour of 5 Permanent members - a negation of democratic principle and a weakness equally of the UN as well as international law: both lack real teeth. Originally, it was a big compromise: on the one side was the consideration in 1945 that the new UN should act democratically in accordance with international consensus and, on the other, there were the facts of power. The really great powers, actual and potential, which at the time of UN formation were taken to be five and the defeated major powers like Japan and Germany were ignored. Thus, the US possess a veto in the UN.
Ordinarily, it was understood that the veto will be used to protect that great powers' vital or core interests. Here, in this case, the US has used its veto extensively against virtually the united wishes of the rest of the world in countless cases. The most striking of them, and repeated every year, is the Arab-Israeli dispute. Year after year the UN General Assembly has castigated Israel for its brutish behaviour toward the Palestinian Arabs and has recommended action against it. The US has routinely used its veto to axe any such proposal. The conclusion is inescapable that the US use of its veto in the UN has been unabashedly motivated by its powerpolitics, caring little for international law or UN. Now, of course there is this clear fact that Americans have shown a distinct dislike of the UN and they underrate all its good work. It has been tearing up solemn treaties with other powers: it has been violating the various UN compromises and decisions in specialised fields like weather control, sustainable development and questions where the US was required to do something in accordance with the international consensus; they have violated many UN decisions and have shown a defiant face. The American Congress, no less, has used US contributions to the UN as a stick to beat the UN with. The thought that US should consult the UN and operate under its banner seems to be a red rag to the bull that the Bush government seems to have become.
The third part of the background is the growing radicalisation of the Arab public opinion as a result of the American behaviour vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli dispute. The general American support to the Israelis has been highlighted by the recent statement of Mr. Bill Clinton, the former US President, in which he said that should anything happen to Israel, his instinct would be to pick up a rifle, jump into a ditch and start shooting to defend Israel. He went to the extent of visualising his own death in the effort to defend Israel. The present American government of course regards Mr. Ariel Sharon as a man of peace and has consistently supported almost all his ideas and proposals vis-a-vis the Arabs. If the Arabs see the US as a non-friendly power, they cannot be blamed. The kind of brutalities that the Israelis are able to visit on the hapless and unarmed Palestinian civilians, women and children mostly, has made the US an object of utter dislike equal to Israel. This dislike, often degenerating into hatred, is not confined to the Arabs alone. Many Muslims, particularly those in the Subcontinent, who are still under the spell of a historically suspect pan-Islamism also share it. America is unpopular in general Muslim opinion everywhere. The existence of Islamic extremists in Pakistan springs naturally from multiple sources. And this is not confined to Pakistan alone. Strong pro-Arab sentiment is to be found in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and many other places. Today the US supports the Israelis, right or wrong; they have not begun to distinguish between what they still regard as the rights of Israelis to survive as a state and Israel's colonial proclivities.
But the Americans want all others to obey the international law and live in a civilised relationship with the Israel with no hesitation to bend that law to protect -- and promote Israel. They blindly support all Israeli actions. Not merely Europe that is fed up with this American weakness; most of the Third World which is neither Muslim nor Arab is also broadly and regularly supporting the Palestinians. The UN General Assembly has been condemning Israeli atrocities and aggressions on the Arabs year after year. But within the Arab world the impact of this UN campaign is felt much more keenly. Americans wince but the fact is the US is seen as the real culprit. If it had not been for the blind US support for whatever Israel does, the latter would dare not behave the way it has. Which makes Arabs mad at the Americans some more; they do not see any merit in the American policies on other Arab issues. Now, there is this clearly intended 'aggression' on Iraq, as many Arabs see it. But since no Arab country has a democracy, where public opinion can be freely expressed, the popular opinion remains more or less suppressed. This makes for its becoming more radical. But at a certain level for radicalisation of the opinion, the rulers themselves are forced to aspirate it for fear of inviting disaster. The recent Saudi stand can be explained in these terms. For them to go on being seen as the errand boy of the Americans would be a death knell for their survival as Kings, Sheikhs, Amirs and dictators. That goes for all, even for Iraq: to behave more bravely! The support to Palestinian Arabs is now a must for all Arab regimes, no matter how friendly they may really have been or may still might want to remain, they have to articulate the general Arab opinion in order to prevent a furore or perhaps rebellion within their own country. The Arab Kings' outspokenness in trying to restrain the Bush administration vis-a-vis both Palestinian-Israeli war or intended war on Iraq; King Abdullah of Jordan has repeatedly called such American policies a Pandora's box and a can of worms. This is also due to the fear of the backlash from their own people that may topple them.
The US is furious, of course. It has suddenly woken up to the fact that the Saudi regime is a Medieval and anti-democratic. Other Arab regimes in the region have begun being seen by Americans as non-democratic. It would be fun to track this American awareness. Should the Saudis and the rulers of UAE, Kuwait and Qatar fall in line, like Bahrain, one suspects that the American enthusiasm for democracy for these countries will distinctly cool down. Perish the thought that by this rhetoric of democracy the Americans are only dragooning these Medieval rulers into fully supporting American offensive against Iraq.
Since the US has massive interests in the Middle East it should be appropriate for the Bush administration to take notice of the widespread Arab disillusion and disaffection against all pro-American regimes in their part of the world. The idea is mistaken that a quick surgical operation to change the head of a dictatorial regime with a nominee of Mr. Bush shall pass muster as normal international activity. It can be firmly said that Mr. Saddam Hussain -- no matter what opinion one has about his style of ruling and the amount of human rights observances that he fails to make etc. -- is no pushover. He runs a tight ship -- in the most dictatorial, indeed totalitarian, fashion. Each citizen is in mortal fear of being reported by his neighbour. His regime can be excoriated on a number of grounds. Not too many tears will be shed for Mr. Saddam Hussain, if he does go. The point is that it is not for a Mr. George Bush to make up his mind that the next target in his interminable and endless War on Terror would be Saddam Hussain. The consequences of again militarily defeating Saddam Hussain alone might not remain controllable either by Saddam Hussain or by the victors. Even before he can be replaced and a new person sits on the dictatorial chair, things might get out of hand throughout Iraq.
One has had occasion to mention elsewhere that Iraq can split up into three tarts. Historically speaking, there are two major ethnic fault-lines in Iraq: there is the Kurdish north on a line nearly horizontally that runs from Sulaimania is the one. The second major fault-line between centre of the country and its south runs, again horizontally, from Basra. The first is pure ethnic divide between the Kurds and the Arabs and the second one is a sectarian one along the ancient Sunni-Shia divide. It is not a question of delivering a value judgement over this is right or wrong. The question is that these are hard demographic facts, recognised by all Arab experts on Arab affairs, western, eastern or from Third World. The best thing to do is to hope and work for democracy in Iraq. The US, Europeans and the rest of the world has enough resources and ways to unite for democracy and against dictatorship in all places. And if Mr. Saddam Hussain is regarded as particularly vicious dictator, let Iraq be the first in the democratisation campaign by all means. But that should be through non-violent action. Let Iraqis alone decide their future.
Today, the grievances against the US in the Arab parts of the Middle East is coloured by many factors: Israel is seen as an outpost of the American military juggernaut; and Israel is meant to preserve the American interests in the oil-rich Middle East. The Americans have helped it create with the intention of controlling the oil of the Middle East through the Israelis - after it succeeds in its long-term ends becoming the region's leader to impose discipline, stability and development through regional integration. This aim is seen by the Arabs as a grave threat by the white west to go on perpetuating its domination of the Arab people. They see its two faces: crude colonialism of the Israelis and modern American imperialism. This sentiment should pose a dilemma for the Americans. One hopes that there are many area experts in America who command respect, despite the consensus reached by the Rand Corporation specialists, who would counsel the American government to act more gingerly and be more careful of the international opinion. It should not rush headlong into what might turn out to be totally unpredictable. They should counsel moderation and restraint at the Bush administration's hasty military action against anyone in general and against Iraq in particular because complexities that are galore.
Insofar as the tiff between the Saudi rulers and the Americans is concerned, it is a bit of nonsense. There is too great an interpenetration of interests among the leading Saudi personalities and the big and powerful Americans. That neither side can sunder the relationship without damage to both sides should be obvious. It may be true that the Americans find the present Saudi rulers distasteful who have refused to lend their bases to the British administration for mounting attacks on Iraq. That refusal was not envisaged by the Americans; they had always taken the Saudis for granted. Now that they cannot, that makes them mad. This is understandable in human terms. But the merits of the case and recent history should induce more restraint on America. Whatever the Saudi governments had been doing in the past - that is to say from the 1960s onward - the Americans finally took over from the British in political terms. The change was at American insistence and for American interests, though they were gracious to keep the British as junior partners to utilise their colonial contacts and expertise. That the Saudis have been funding what is called World Muslim League for promotion of religious education in all the Muslim countries was always known to the Americans and had their approval, even if it was not at their behest. During the cold war this was one of the main means of countering the appeal of communism in the Muslim parts of the Third World. The Saudis were performing a wonderful service for the Americans.
The highest point of it was reached when Pakistan led a war in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1980s with the help of religious fanatics who were educated, indoctrinated, trained and funded largely by the Saudis under American advice. By that time the Saudi money had mobilised a large Islamic lobby of opinion that was dead set against the atheistic communism. The success of the Afghan war testified both the strength of money power that the Saudis had deployed and the ease with which primitive passions, when combined with religious zealotry, can move mountains. In human affairs there is such a thing as inertia. There is always a momentum in such long drawn-out things. If the Saudis have been financing religious seminaries and various other activities of the Islamicists, they cannot discontinue at a sudden and arbitrary word of command from America. They will have to continue to carefully monitor their friends and try to channelise their energies into less fierce and destructive directions. A sudden stoppage can mean that the whole of the fierce tribe of bigots will turn on the Saudis themselves. Since all the Saudi-financed operations were known to the Americans and Osama was their friend and find -- even if they were not initiated by them -- they should be the first to realise the importance of going slow. It will have to be a long drawn out process through which all that money should dry up and energies of earlier Mujahideen are channelised into other directions.
The fact that the American friendship has now shown a new face to the Saudis, the latter may feel pain at being so needlessly misunderstood. But this has repeatedly happened in the past. While the Saudis should familiarise themselves with the new face of America, the Americans are far more practical people. If their policies have changed from fomenting Islamic fundamentalism to fighting Islamic Terror, well, the Saudis should hurry up and catch up. Insofar as the Arab opinion as a whole and even inside the Saudi Arabia is concerned, it has become too radicalised in anti-Americanism. Well, the Saudis have to be more patient and work to defuse it. They can also hope for its deflection into other directions. At any rate, this is the business of the Saudi rulers. They should find means of survival as best as they can. But all not have been lost. Since basic interests of both the Saudi dynasty and the America's oil lobby more or less coincide, the possibility, indeed the likelihood of rapprochement is there. None should worry over the volume of non-friendly articulation. The Bush government is so hungry for concrete support for its Iraq operations that, should some satisfaction is given it the ground, it will eat all those many words and continue dealing with the Saudi dynasty. The word for it is: just do it.