Orde Wingate:
Irregular Soldier

By Travor Royle. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995. 355 pp.; $ 34.00

Major General Orde Wingate was born in 1903, commissioned into the British Army in 1923, and died in an airplane crash in Burma in 1944 while directing his “Chindits” in their second long range penetration operation against the Japanese. Dying in wartime at the height of his popularity, Wingate remains to this day a controversial and enigmatic figure.
In this sympathetic yet not uncritical study, prolific British historian and author Trevor Royle has written an excellent biography of Wingate. Wingate’s youth and formative experiences, especially the impact of his strict retired colonel father and the dominant moralizing influence of the Church of Scotland (in which Wingate considered himself one of the “elect” - predestined to eternal bliss), are described and placed very well into their cultural and societal context and a key to understanding his future behaviour and conduct.
Wingate developed his theories of unconventional warfare during a series of understanding his future behaviour and conduct.
Wingate developed his theories of unconventional warfare during a series of unorthodox assignments: as a company commander in the Sudan Defence Force, 1928-1933; in Palestine, 1936-1939, where he originated and led the “Special Night Squads”; as leader of “Gideon Force” in the guerrilla warfare against the Italians in Ethiopia, 1940-1941; and finally, culminating as the commander of the Chindits in Burma, 1942-1944. Wingate’s actions and evolving philosophies in all of these assignments are assessed in detail.
Throughout his career, however, Wingate was an eccentric soldier. He was unkempt, disliked bathing, frequently lost his temper and objectivity, suffered severe bouts of depression (he “appeared unhinged”), and attempted suicide in 1941. The author suggests. “If {Wingate’s} soldiering had been confined to peacetime it is unlikely that he would have risen to the high rank he achieved during the war,” and” would probably have been dismissed as an objectionable crank” without having been promoted “beyond the rank of major”. There are many lessons, some subtle, to be learned from this thought-provoking book. A key point may be that while non-conformity may not be valued highly in peacetime, unorthodoxy is an important asset in war — as is the patronage of senior officers.
Frequent comparisons have been made between Wingate and the noted irregular soldier of the Arab Revolt, T.E. Lawrence. Most of the references to Lawrence in this book (pp. 2, 86-87, 156, 157) pertain to his familial relationship with Wingate. The author clarifies any confusion surrounding this issue by nothing that in 1934 Wingate revealed to his fiancee’s mother the then little-known facts of Lawrence’s illegitimacy: “Lawrence’s father changed his name from Chapman after abandoning his wife and setting up home with his mistress, Sarah Junner. Chapman’s sister Maria had married Thomas Browne, Wingate’s great-great-grandfather” (pp. 86-87).
There are two additional references to Lawrence in this book, both pertaining to a paper entitled “Palestine in Imperial Strategy” written by Wingate in mid-1939, and both revealing interesting and not unusual anti-Lawrence sentiments. In his paper Wingate characterized the average Arab as “lazy, ignorant, feckless and, without being particularly cowardly, sees no point in really losing his life” (p.156). Wingate elaborated that numerous “myths” had surrounded the Arabs, due largely to Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom. “that unfortunate masterpiece” (p. 156). In response, the senior full general who read Wingate’s report, according to Royle, “agreed with Wingate’s summary of the myth surrounding the Arab revolt and the part played by ‘that unfortunate charlatan Lawrence” (p. 157). One must wonder what had caused such thought-provoking opinions of Lawrence.
Numerous unpublished sources, including Wingate’s papers and correspondence; the reminiscences of Wingate’s friends, colleagues, and participants in his campaigns; and government documents, were used in the preparation of this narrative. The author ably synthesized recent secondary source material in his study, all of which is included in an 11-page “References and Bibliography” section. Over two dozen interesting photographs, and four excellent maps, supplement the text.
In his final assessment, the author states, “of {Wingate’s} military genius there is little doubt.” Wingate showed that long range penetration operations, enhanced by radio communications and resupply and support by air, could effectively complement conventional forces. While the reader of this superb study may form his own opinion of Wingate’s foresight and leadership abilities, he will certainly have no doubt as to the excellence of this highly-recommended biography of Wingate, the consummate “irregular soldier”.