Introduction
In 2003, the state of Iraq has gone a radical change in a very short time unprecedented in modern times. United States stating that the government ruling Iraq was undesirable embarked on military operations and within weeks the whole landscape changed. When change occurs suddenly sometimes it takes time before the reality sinks in. However, change does not occur in a vacuum. A set of forces is already in motion long before the change but the significance of these forces is not fully appreciated until the actual change occurs.

During the recent crisis, all over the world there was an intense debate about different issues pertaining to Iraq. In Pakistan also, a number of individuals of different backgrounds wrote and spoke about the issue from their perspective. Retired military officers commented about the military operations, peace activists berated United States, diplomats talked about international repercussions while religio-political leaders protested based on religious fraternity with Iraqi people. Each group had its own point of view and one should respect that whether one agrees with it or not. The only thing common among all these groups was a dramatic lack of information about Iraq and Iraqi society. For a meaningful discussion and debate, some basic information about the background and ground realities is the essential prerequisite, regardless of the position taken. In the absence of that one’s perspective will be very limited and superficial. In addition, another result of this approach is complete amnesia about the issue once the acuteness of issue is removed. This is exactly what happened in Pakistan about the Iraq situation. It is also important to keep in mind that US government failing to find weapons of mass destruction may use the brutal history of Iraq as a justification for their invasion to create post-fact legitimacy for their actions. There is likelihood that different parties will use the painful facts of Iraq for political purposes and no meaningful lesson will be learned by anyone.

This article is a review of essential elements of Iraq and Iraqi society. The article will briefly look at the historical background and evolution of modern Iraq. The society and its dilemma of the last fifty years will be narrated in detail especially the critical period of rule of Saddam Hussein. The article will also outline the fault lines of the society, which will be followed by the uncertain current scenario. In the end, some possible future trends will be discussed followed by a conclusion. This exercise is relevant, as it seems that after a century, the country is looking like as it was at the beginning of the century. The cycle of history has gone full circle and Iraq seems to have reached the point zero again.

Historical Background
An Iraqi soldier wrote these words on the wall of the living room of the house in Kuwait during Iraqi occupation in 1991, “Would that my mother had not brought me into this world to have to live through the anguish of these times”.1 These few words summarize the bewilderment of the masses in most of the Arab world including Iraq. The identity dilemma is haunting almost all post-colonial Muslim states relentlessly for the last half a century. For centuries the region of present day Iraq was contested between Sunni Ottomans and Shia Saffavids of Persia. After First World War, three empires (Ottoman, Hapsburgs and Czars) disintegrated. From the debris of Ottoman Empire several new nation states emerged. Britain and France controlled these newly created countries directly or indirectly.2 The Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were put together in a kingdom and named Iraq (a medieval term for the central and southern areas of present day Iraq).3 Iraq was under British mandate since its creation in 1921 and gained its independence in 1932. The area carved by British to make Iraq was composed of diverse communities, which had very little common interests. For centuries, different regions of Iraq were oriented in different directions, which were now part of newly created nation states. Mosul had trade and cultural relations with Damascus, Aleppo and Turkey, Najaf and Karbala being religious centres had close interaction with Persian Shias, Basra was oriented to Gulf and India while southern region bordering Arabia had trade relations with tribes in Saudi Arabia. Northern Iraq (the vilayat of Mosul) has been part of Turkey and its fate was settled in 1926. It was added to Iraq on the undertaking that Turkey would receive 10 percent of royalty of oil revenues.

After First World War, the whole region of present day Middle East went through a very traumatic transformation. This process was put in motion by the powerful forces of history in which the local communities had very little if any input. In early part of the century with very little communications, most communities now joined together in Iraq were based on local economic and political lines. There was no genuine effort on part of the general population to be enthusiastic about an imported concept imposed by aliens. British gave a very comprehensive model of a modern nation state, which looked very impressive on paper. It had a constitution, a functional political system, elections, newspapers and an imported non-Iraqi monarch, Faisal. The only thing missing was total disregard of the people and what they wanted? Iraqis became independent in 1932 with this dysfunctional model. The new ruling elite now embarked on a gigantic task of creating a nation from these diverse communities. The fractured ruling elite with no vision and equipped only with vague ideas and lot of emotions and rhetoric were not up to this gigantic task.

Chaos in Mesopotamia – Iraq Before Saddam
In the Book of Politics we are a people
Owners of sovereignty: yet we do not even possess wreckage we could call our own,
In the Book of Politics we are a people
With law and order: yet our lives are ruled by chaos,
In the Book of Politics we are a people
Free: yet we are no more than handicapped orphans.
An Iraqi poet 1931
Of Coups and Counter Coups

From military standpoint, Iraqi armed forces were as fractious as the society. Since its independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced twelve successful and about six unsuccessful coups. When Iraqi army was defeated in 1941, about 2,879 officers were purged. In ten years between 1958-1968, 2,000-3,000 officers were retired. The military coups clustered in two periods; 1936-1941 and 1958-1968.

In the first cluster, senior officers trained during Ottoman and British mandate period who were members of traditional middle class and belonged to Baghdad and Mosul were major players. In the second cluster, young officers of mid-ranks (Major to Colonel) who were politicized and were from Rummadi and Tikrit area were the leaders.4 The officer corps was predominantly Sunni and there were very few if any Shia officers especially senior ones in a Shia majority country.

In October 1936, General al Fariq Bakir Sidqi (acting commander of the Army) along with General Abdul Latif Nuri (commander of Ist Division) and Muhammad Jawad (commander of Air Force) staged the first military coup. After dropping leaflets over Baghdad and few bombs near the Prime Minister’s office and executing Defence Minister (Jafar al-Askari), all was well. In August 1937, when Sidqi and Jawad were resting in the Officers mess in Mosul on their way to the official tour of Turkey, a private shot both officers at point blank range killing them instantly. The central government ordered that the arrested assassin should be sent to Baghdad. The military commander of Mosul garrison General Amin al-Umari instead took control of the town and after getting support of the military commanders of Kirkuk and Baghdad garrisons sent his own list of demands to government.5 The cabal of seven senior officers (Amin al-Umari, Mahmud Suleman, Salahuddin Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Hussain Fauzi, Fahmi Said and Aziz Yamulki) became the power house in Baghdad. They allowed a civilian facade while holding all key positions of the government. By 1939, the cabal decreased to four. When the civilians tried to post the four away from Baghdad to provinces, they struck back. The soldiers occupied all-important buildings, forced the civilian prime minister to resign and took the letter to regent who instead eluded them and later escaped to Jordan rather than signing the letter.6

In July 1958, when government ordered military to send a contingent to Jordan, the officers instead turned to Baghdad. Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim (commander of 19th Brigade) and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif took control of Baghdad. A new web of intrigues started. Qasim and Arif were poles apart. In 1962, the Military Bureau of Baath Party was formed. The leading members were Brigadier Ahmad Hassan al-Bakar and Lieutenant Colonel Salih Mahdi Ammash. The counter-coup was planned in this bureau. In 1963, when the two officers were arrested, a chain reaction started. The Chief of Air Force Brigadier Jalal al-Awqati was assassinated. Members of communist party rallied around Qasim while Baathists around their own officers. When the dust settled the Baathists have won. Colonel Abdul Salam Arif became President and Brigadier Bakar Vice President and Prime Minister. Very soon internal conflict among the officers set the stage for another cycle of violence. Arif rallied troops loyal to him and unleashed them in November 1963 on the National Guard militia throughout the country and came out winner in this round. In 1964, another failed coup attempt resulted in jailing of Bakar and Saddam Hussein. In September 1965, Arif appointed commander of Air Force Brigadier Arif Abdul Razzaq as Prime Minister and Defence Minister. The impatient newcomer waited only six days after his appointment to launch a coup of his own. Failing to dislodge the occupants, he fled the country. In 1968, Bakar had learnt from his earlier mistake. Rather than thinking about ideology and other lofty goals, he looked for few key supporters of the regime and got the help of four, which mattered. Colonel Abdul Razzaq al-Naif (Chief of Military Intelligence), Colonel Ibrahim Abdul Rahman al-Daud (commander of Republican Guard), Colonel Sadun Ghaidan (Commander of the Republican Guard armoured regiment) and Colonel Hammad Shihab al-Tikriti (commander of Baghdad garrison) switched sides and the coup was successful this time. Aref was put on a plane heading out of Iraq.7 Merely thirteen days later, two of the conspirators Naif and Daud were arrested and exiled to clear the deck.8

In 1973, the chief of secret police, Nadhim Kazar planned a coup against Bakar. When the plan didn’t take off, he took interior and defence ministers as hostages and ran for the Iranian border. When he was cornered by government troops, he shot both of his hostages. Later, he was executed along with thirty-five others.9 Bakar’s protégé Saddam shrewdly increased his influence by taking control of all key decisions and in 1979 emerged as the strongest member of the coterie.

There were many failed coup attempts while at other times government concocted stories of alleged coups to purge and sometime execute undesirable officers. Iraqi history is full of such pathetic exercises. In addition, the extensive use of armed forces against dissidents further fractured the cohesion of army. Many officers deserted and some even joined the rebels from time to time. The political and military elite of the country was hopelessly out of touch with reality. Just the simple fact that Nuri al-Said had served Prime Minister fourteen times between 1930 and 1958 tells a lot about the system of governance of the country.

Clans Unlimited
The modern nation state of Iraq was carved out by a foreign power based on her own ideas and needs. The natural process of evolution of a modern state was not operational, therefore it is not surprising that from day one the inherent instability was part of Iraq. Arab and non-Arab, Shia and Sunni, tribal and non-tribal, rural and urban and many other fault lines prevented emergence of a national identity. The idea (modern nation state), symbols (national flag, anthem and other paraphernalia of state), instruments (colonial structure) and methodology (parliament) were all alien to the local population. No wonder that nobody trusted the whole exercise and every group rose in revolt from time to time against the central authority. There have been several popular violent uprisings in Iraq. The major ones occurred in 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1977 and 1991. Different groups have used armed insurrection against government prompting a swift and brutal response from government forces. Kurds rose from time to time to challenge the legitimacy and authority of government. Shias have been protesting against the central authority since the creation of Iraq. In this situation, it is natural that people tend to rally on ethnic or sectarian lines. The system in place also did not allow genuine national feeling. Until 1958, there were two legal systems operating in the country, one for the urban centres and one for tribes.10

Every government used a narrow base of supporters to exercise some kind of control over diverse and competing groups. Military rulers also used narrow personal, institutional or tribal links to get hold of power. Bakar after his coup enlisted the support of his clansmen and put them in key positions. He used provincial links based on patronage rather than any ideological commitments. When Arif replaced Bakar, he embarked on relying on his tribe, al Jumaila. He formed an elite praetorian unit in the army named Republican Guard. The unit was stationed in Baghdad to protect the regime. The command of this elite unit was given to one of Arif’s kinsmen Colonel Said Slaibi. The principle recruiting ground of this unit was the territory of al-Jumaila tribe in al-Rammadi.11 When Bakar staged a come back in 1968, his clan again gained prominence. General Hadran al-Tikriti was appointed Chief of Staff and Commander of Air Force. Another relative Saddam rose to the top. When Hussain Kamil Hassan al-Majid (Saddam’s cousin from his father’s side and son-in-law) became in charge of Republican Guards, he added a special forces battalion, which was solely recruited from Tikrit area. During Iraq-Iran war, due to heavy casualties, Tikrit alone could not provide the manpower. The ranks were now open to other Sunni tribes. Men from Duleimi tribe, west of Baghdad, Jibouri from northwest of Tikrit and Ubaidi in north of Tikrit were increasingly recruited in Republican Guard.12 Officers from the Sunni heartland of Tikrit, Dur, Mosul, Rammadi and Falluja occupied all senior positions in the military.

Kurds though proud of their identity are fractured on many lines. For a while Kurds were organized under Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by a traditional and more conservative group. A tribal chief, Mullah Mustafa Barzani was accepted leader by a large number of Kurds. The traumatic events of mid seventies strained Kurds. The leftists and intellectual group splintered and formed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership of Jalal Talabani. KDP had greater influence in the mountainous north where Kurmanji dialect speaking Kurds reside. KDP leadership is with Barzani clan. Talabani’s influence was more in the Kurdish towns in South where Sorani dialect is dominant. In addition, Barzani adheres to the Naqshbandi while Talabani to the rival Qadiri Sufi order.13 KDP and PUK had fought many sanguine battles with each other. The central government in Baghdad organized Kurdish irregulars in National Defence Units and used them against other Kurdish groups. Government called them ‘Saladin Knights’ while Kurdish nationalists called them ‘jahsh’ (little donkey). This exercise further brutalized and fractured Kurdish community.

The majority of Iraqis are Shias but they are also not monolithic. The communities in Najaf and Karbala were under the influence of the religious leadership. Historically, Shia clergy had also different visions for their community. In early part of the century the influential Shia Mujtahid instructed his followers to avoid politics and discouraged even enrolment in secular schools. This left many Shias out of power arena. Many Shias struggled against their own clergy to convince them about importance of education. The economically disadvantaged Shias in slums of Baghdad became communist supporters due to economic factors. A new politicized Shia clergy elite tried to win back these Shias by incorporating more revolutionary ideology in their political themes. The Iranian revolution of 1979 had also its impact on Iraqi Shias. Some of them espoused Iranians and wanted to replicate the model but a large number insisted on their Arab and Iraqi heritage and didn’t want any close relationship with new Iranian leadership. This was the main reason that a large number of Shias remained loyal during Iraq-Iran war and participated in military operations against their religious kin. Government co-opted some Shias to show that it was a representative entity. The traumatic events of 1991 uprising and government’s brutal response also shocked Shia community to its core.

A Nation Betrayed – Iraq Under Saddam
Saddam’s three-decade rule had far reaching effects on the state and society. This was due to two factors of very long rule spanning about three decades and due to different contradictory policies adopted during this time, which didn’t allow a steady course for the society and state. In 1979, when Saddam took power, he had decided that he alone would be ruler of Iraq. ‘The 1979 purges were designed to transfer already existing bonds of complicity away from the party and firmly into the person of Saddam’.14 All his policies were towards this single aim. He used Iraqi nationalist, socialist, pan-Arabist, Islamist and tribal idioms and symbols, which threw the whole Iraqi polity into a confused mass. Of course, Saddam was not the original author of the brutality and violence in Iraq, but surely he took it to the level unprecedented in modern Middle East.

Internal Control
Immediately after take over, Saddam purged senior members of Baath and officers of the military. His ultimate goal of unchallenged personal rule resulted in series of purges in thirty years of his rule. In 1979, large number of senior officers was executed. In 1982 about 300 high-ranking party and military officers were executed. Once getting firm control of party and military, he expanded his coercive instruments covering all segments of society. All his initial efforts were designed to transfer the allegiance from Baath Party to himself. There was no room for even minor grimace against Saddam. Long time allies and party stalwarts could be dispatched as quickly to the other world as a staunch foe.

Police, secret police, party militia and armed forces were organized on the pattern of his ideal Joseph Stalin. Every activity of the citizen was monitored as absolute loyalty to Saddam was demanded. Travel inside and outside the country was severely restricted. Print and electronic media was firmly under government control to a level where an average Iraqi was completely cut off from the outside world. There was no option of discussion of policies adopted by Saddam let alone any criticism. Exemplary punishments in the form of random arrests, torture, execution and even elimination of family members were used to send the message what price one has to pay for the disagreement. On the other hand lavish material rewards for the loyalist showed the fruits of conformity. Informants in every walk of life even family members spying on each other was institutionalized. The control and eavesdropping of all communications was named Al Hadi Project 858. It monitored entire country for any illegal communication and was reportedly could triangulate in 30 seconds.15 Baghdad was divided into various security sectors, which were responsible for the internal control. Religious schools, seminaries and mosques were under surveillance to check the earliest sign of any disagreement with government.

Extreme repression was accompanied with the carrot of patronage to those who professed loyalty to regime. Knowing the extreme alienation of Shias, efforts were also made to co-opt them. In mid-seventies with increasing revenues from oil exports due to increased prices provided the regime with money to spend on different projects. Many large-scale projects were established in Shia communities. Housing schemes, schools and hospitals were provided in these communities. In addition, more Shias were inducted in Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). By 1982, thirty three percent of the members of RCC and fifty percent of the members of the regional command party of Baath were Shias.16

Control of Military
Saddam had a very clear understanding of the militaries of the third worlds and their love of coups including Iraqi army. In 1978, Saddam assigned his cousin and Defence Minister Adnan Khairullah al-Talfah to cleanse the military. Dozens of officers were purged which included Chief of Air Force and many divisional commanders. About 60 officers were executed. When Saddam took control in 1979, he purged armed forces along with Baath Party. Many officers were executed including Major General Walid Muhammad Seirat who was commander of one of three Corps of Iraqi Army. Another round of purges was carried out in 1982 on suspicion of discontent in army. About 300 officers were executed. Saddam himself admitted ordering the execution of two Divisional and one Brigade commanders.17 In July 1986, Major General Adin Tawfique blamed for poor performance was called back to Baghdad and later disappeared. In another round of executions in 1990, about 40 officers including a member of Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and General Omar al Hazaa were executed. (al Hazaa’s nephew Raad who was an officer in Republican Guard became inside informant for an opposition underground small party). Later a number of officers of 3rd and 7th Corps were executed.18 In 1995, General Muhammad Madhlum al Dulaimi was executed for alleged involvement in a plot against Saddam.

To decrease the power of military, Baath Party militia called Popular Army (al Jaish al Shaabi) was expanded. It had its own recruitment and training infrastructure and was not under military command. It was also expanded during Iran-Iraq war reaching about one million member strong and trained in heavy weaponry. Presidential Guard was also expanded. In 1982, its strength was increased from six Brigades to sixteen. The total strength was about 25,000 men equipped with armour including T-72 tanks.19 These units were used to balance the military and a safety valve against any coup. The result of all these efforts was that the armed forces became the mirror image of larger society. In 1981, a Kurdish General Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib deserted and created a front in the north to fight his former comrades.20 After the Gulf War in 1991, the popular uprisings in north and south resulted in large scale defections of soldiers to rebel cause. In August 1995, Saddam’s two sons-in-law drove to Amman with their families. In Amman, in a press conference, Hussain Kamil in a press conference denounced his father-in-law and appealed to army and Republican Guard to overthrow Saddam. In June 1996, a CIA sponsored coup failed. The military leaders of this attempt were General Adnan Nouri, General Bara Najib al-Rubaye, Colonel Muhammad Ali Ghani and a former Iraqi Brigadier General Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani who was running a business in Amman. Shahwani’s three sons (Major Anmar, Captain Ayad and Lieutenant Atheer) serving in Republican Guard were the key players. Iraqi authorities arrested about 120 officers. This was the most serious attempt to topple Saddam as officers involved belonged to Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, Special Forces and Security apparatus. Among those arrested included General Muwafiq al Nasiri of Special Security, Colonel Riyad al-Duri of General Intelligence Directorate and even the Commander of Unit 32, General Ata al-Samawal. Unit B32 was Saddam’s special unit to communicate securely with military units without using a telephone.21 In 2003, when US decided on removal of Saddam, a number of senior officers who had defected helped US military planners.22 Real and imaginary conspiracies and coup plots had fractured the armed forces beyond recognition.

Family Business
The ultimate fear of an autocrat is betrayal of his close confidants. This dilemma haunted Saddam all his life. Because of this fear, he took many decisions, which undermined him in long run. He patronized, used and punished his family members and kinsmen based on the single factor of absolute loyalty to him.

Saddam used his family and clan members for key positions. Saddam’s maternal uncle Khairullah Talfah became Mayor of Baghdad. His son Colonel Adnan Khairullah Talfah served as Minister of Defence and member of RCC(1977) and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of armed forces (1979). Saddam’s son-in-law and cousin General Hussain Kamil Hasan al-Majid served as Commander of Republican Guard, Defence Minister, Presidential Advisor, Minister of Industry and Military Production and Commander of Country’s long-range missile units. Hussain Kamil’s brother Saddam Kamil Hasan al-Majid was married to another daughter of Saddam and served as Colonel in the long range missile unit, commander of Presidential security guard and head of Tribal Chief’s Bureau. General Ali Hasan al-Majid, another cousin of Saddam was a senior commander (he was architect and executioner of the genocidal campaign against Kurds in 1988) and served as Defence Minister and for few months Governor of Kuwait after Iraqi occupation. In 2003, he was given the command of Basra Corps. Saddam’s three half-brothers on stepfather side served at key positions. Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti served as head of Party Intelligence (Mukhabarat) and later ambassador to United Nations, Wathban Ibrahim served as Governor of the province of Salahuddin (the centre of the province is Saddam’s hometown Takrit) and later Chief of State Internal Security (Amn), while Sibawi Ibrahim served as Deputy Chief of Police and later head of Mukhabarat.23

Father-in-law of Saddam’s son Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri served as Interior Minister and Deputy Chairman of RCC. General Mahar Abdul Rashid served at many senior and command posts during Iran-Iraq war. His daughter was married to Saddam’s son Qusay. The commander of Presidential Guard and later Chief of General Staff (CGS) was a kinsman General Hussain Rashid al-Takriti. The chief of air force was Hamid Shaban al-Tikriti, another kinsman. Sadun Shakir, another relative of Saddam served as Interior Minister. Saddam’s personal secretary was another kinsman Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Takriti (he was a non-commissioned officer who started as personal body guard of Saddam and was later promoted to Lieutenant General).

Being a family member of Saddam Hussein didn’t mean immunity from his paranoid delusions. Saddam’s close family was divided into three groups; first group was his three half brothers, second group consisted of al-Majid clan, cousins from his father’s side while third group comprised his two sons. There was fair amount of competition, jealousy and intrigue among these three groups. When in 1983, Ibrahim brothers objected to marriage of Saddam’s daughters in al-Majid clan fearing rise of al-Majid at their expense, they fell from favor and were removed from their important positions. Later after reconciliation they were brought back in inner circle. Al-Majid’s fell from favor in 1995 when Ali Hasan al-Majid was removed from the post of Defence Minister and Hussain Kamil al-Majid lost lucrative oil smuggling business to Saddam’s son Uday. 24 Uday used his newspaper Babal to attack his rivals and engineer their removal from important posts. Prime Minister Khodair, Interior Minister Watban and defence Minister General Ali Hassan al-Majid lost their jobs after scathing attacks in Uday’s newspaper.25 In May 1995, Watban was removed from his interior minister post. In July, during a private party at his house, he blamed Uday for his sacking. One of the guests telephoned Uday about it and Uday arrived quickly with his guards to teach Watban a lesson. In the shoot out six people at the party were killed and Watban was shot in his leg.26 Hussain Kamil al-Majid along with his brother and other family members defected and went to Amman in August 1995. Ali Hassan al-Majid (he was the uncle of the defected brothers) fearing a backlash from Saddam publicly declared that he had absolved in advance anyone who killed the two defected al-Majid brothers. In February 1996, al-Majid brothers were lured back to Iraq with promise of pardon. Saddam’s wife and stepbrother went to Amman to persuade them to come back and assured pardon. When they came back to Baghdad, Saddam’s daughters divorced them immediately. On February 23, a group of armed men led by General Ali Hassan al-Majid attacked the house of his own brother in Baghdad. When the shoot out ended after five hours, three brothers (Hussain, Saddam, Hakim), their father (Kamil Hassan al-Majid) and one sister along with her children were all dead.

In 1988 General Mahar Abdul Rashid was removed from his command and placed under house arrest. Qusay divorced his wife (Mahar’s daughter). Mahar’s brother, also a general was assassinated. Saddam’s cousin Adnan died in a mysterious helicopter crash in May 1989 widely believed to be eliminated on orders of Saddam. In 1988, Uday beat to death one of Saddam’s guard and food taster (Kamal Hanna Jajo) who was an intermediary in Saddam’s affair with Samira Shahbandar. Saddam imprisoned Uday and later send him to exile in Switzerland. A year later, he was brought back and rehabilitated. In 1995, when Uday again created trouble and shot his uncle, he was chastised. Saddam stripped him off all-important positions leaving him only chairman of Iraq Football Association.27 The younger son, Qusay showed more maturity and was given gradually increasing responsibilities.

In a society, which is multiethnic, personalized rule and politics of patronage prevents the development of true national identification, which can have devastating long-term consequences. This is what happened in Iraq. ‘If people already believe that the power to reward and to punish lies in the hands of networks based on family trust, or common provincial; and/or sectarian origins, they will seek to operate the logic of such a system to their own advantage’. The result is that ‘the foundations of such patrimonially based systems of power tend to reproduce themselves’28 at the detriment of national institutions and efficacy of the state.

Delusions and Fairy Tales
If I go out and sell pebbles in the streets of Baghdad, a thousand Iraqis and foreigners may be there to offer one million dinars for one single pebble. They will tell me, Saddam Hussein, you are carrying a gem, not a pebble, without knowing. Saddam Hussein’s speech on national radio, November 1989. Saddam had applied for the Baghdad Military Academy but failed the entrance examination. In 1976, the rank of Lieutenant General was conferred on him and in 1979, he elevated himself to the rank of Field Marshal. He is the only Field Marshal in recorded human history that has never served in the military. His son Uday graduated from engineering college in 1984 with grades of 99.5 percent. After graduation he became the President of Saddam University.

The personality cult was carefully nurtured over three decades. A number of writers, poets and journalists were recruited for this specific purpose. Saddam used many historic heroes extensively for building his image. At different times Saddam was compared to Ali ibn Talib, the fourth Caliph (to increase his credentials with Shia), Saad ibn-e-Waqas (the Arab who wrested Iraq from Persians in early period of Islam and used during Iran-Iraq war), Caliph al-Mansur (for political and military greatness), Nebuchednazzar (for greatness and connecting to ancient Iraqi heritage), Saladin (military greatness and to entice Kurds). Saddam also used several names for himself based on historical events. He was called Baba Saddam (Daddy Saddam), Saddam al-Arab (Saddam of Arabs), Saddam al-Fath (Saddam of Conquest), Saddamuna (Our Saddam), Sayf a-Islam al-Battar (Islam’s sharp sword), Rasul al-Shams (messenger of the sun), Abu al-Azmat (Father of great decisions). His biography was named Sira and he named his personal aircraft al-Buraq (the name of the legendary animal that took prophet Muhammad (PBUH) from Mecca to Jerusalem and then to heavens and back during the night).29 Grandiose symbols and rhetoric was extensively used. The war with Iran was called Qaddissiya. (named after the famous battle in 636 A.D. when Muslim Arabs conquered Sassanian empire of Persians and opened the gate of conversion to Islam in that region). The operation against Iranians to take back Fau peninsula was named Ramadan Mubarak (the blessed Ramadan) and was launched in the fasting month of Ramadan (the illusion was also made to the final victory of prophet Muhammad when Mecca was conquered during the month of Ramadan). Some great historical events of Muslim history were callously used for perverted ideas. Four operations against Iran were named Tawwakkalna ala Allah (our trust in God). The Ist Iraqi Brigade, which was used for the suppression of Shias in south was named Musa al-Kazim (after the seventh Shia Imam). In 1988, the genocidal operation against Kurds in north was code-named al-Anfaal (a sura of Quran which deals with Battle of Badar). The units participating in these operations were called Quwwat Badr (the BadarForces). The operation was started by using chemical weapons against civilians on the anniversary of the Battle of Badar (16 March). Other operations against Kurds were named Muhammad Rasul Allah (Muhammad, the messenger of God) and Sayf Allah (Sword of God).30 A brigade of Republican Guards stationed in Najaf was named Al-Quds.

In October 1990, when the whole world was arraying against him, Saddam told his audience, ‘the weapons of Zionists and the Americans would miraculously be rendered impotent because ‘we shall throw sand in their eyes and they will be blinded and thus we will turn them into harmless elephants’.31 During Gulf war, lofty names of Nebuchadnazar, Tawwalkana, Tawalzala and Medina were given to different divisions. After 1991 Gulf war, Saddam appeared with many Shia dignitaries and portrayed himself as Imam Hussain who was not defeated but martyred. When he faced rebellions in north and south, he promoted tribal values to rally tribes. He would invite tribal sheikhs and television will show Saddam participating in tribal dance and firing his pistol in the air. A large volume of speeches of Saddam and his many actions over last three decades gives an interesting insight into his mind. It is no surprise that a man with such delusions brought one disaster after another upon his countrymen.

Trail of Blood and Tears
‘We will give you your son but you must not cry, you must not hold public mourning (Fatiha), no wailing. You must take him, bury him and go home without commotion.
An Iraqi security person’s directions to the mother who came to the mortuary to collect the dead body of her son who was tortured to death.

Since its creation, there have been periodic cycles of violence between government and different groups. The most disturbing aspect of this exercise is the fact that the perpetrators of graphic violence and inhuman torture didn’t hide their actions. Many a times the acts were recorded and showed to general public to convey the message. In February 1963, when Qasim regime was overthrown, Qasim along with some of his colleagues were pushed into the music studio of the state run television. They were asked to sit on chairs and then shot. The cameras are then turned on and the whole Iraq saw the graphic corpses of their leaders. In 1969, when thirteen Iraqi Jews were publicly hanged in a Baghdad square, cheering and dancing crowds of people were brought to the place where corpses were dangling. The country’s head (Ahmad Hassan al-Bakar along with Saddam) came in open car to visit these cheering crowds.32 In August 1979, ‘twenty one members of the RCC were dragged to their feet, accused of treason to the party, and executed’.33 The whole macabre seen was recorded and later shown to public. In Kurdish pogroms, videocassettes of mass execution and chemical attacks were distributed to other villages. Video films were made of a novel death sentence. The accused had their hands tied behind their backs, a small piece of explosive was then placed in their shirt pocket and detonated by remote control blowing the bodies into pieces.34. After the Gulf War in 1991, the rebellions in north and south brought out the real intense hatred of general population. In Najaf, due to presence of senior Shia clergy there was some control on general violence. In other towns, the rebels took their revenge against Baathists and anyone who was thought to be allied with government with extreme brutality. In north, a group of prisoners was brought out by the Kurdish commander and pronounced death sentence. The crowd, which had gathered pounced on prisoners with their knives and cut their bodies into pieces. In Suleimaniya, a group of police and Baathists who was captured alive was brought to the roof top of a three storey hotel. One by one, each man was thrown from the roof top and at ground a large crowd including young women rushed at the broken bodies and cut them into pieces with their knives. In south in the town of Samawa, the local Baath representative Naji Hamid al-Sarraj was crucified on the walls of the local Hussainiyya and then his head, arms and legs were chopped off and thrown on the town’s rubbish dump.35 When government forces took control back from rebels, they took a terrible revenge from the rebellious Iraqis.36 This vicious cycle of orgy of blood have been repeated several times during the history of Iraq.

Ethnic Fires – Tragedy of Kurds
We have been deceived many times by foreigners. We are determined not to make the same mistakes again’. Kurdish Leader Jalal Talabani 1990.

In northern part of the country, the history since creation of Iraq is full of violence. Kurds have fought many battles against Turkemans, government forces and other Kurds. In March 1959, after a failed coup attempt centred in Mosul, large-scale killing of nationalists and well off families was done. In Kirkuk, the clash between Turkeman and Kurds resulted in heavy casualties.37 After the 1963 coup, large-scale killings mainly of communist supporters of previous regime resulted in more than 3,000 deaths in north.38. Kurds have been struggling against the central governments from times immemorial.

In March 1965, government launched a large-scale operation against Kurds. Kurdish political and guerrilla activity was under the control of Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).

In mid-seventies there was flare up of Kurdish activities and a large number of Iraqi forces were deployed in north. Iraqi Air Force strafed and bombed Kurdish towns and villages. Many years later Saddam himself admitted that in the year between March 1974 to March 1975 there were more than 60,000 casualties. In addition, large numbers of Kurdish villages were razed along Iranian and Turkish borders to create security zones and deny guerrillas their sanctuaries. In 1975, Iran suddenly stopped its support of Kurds when it reached an accord with Iraq in Algiers. Iraqi army came after Kurds with a vengeance. A wave of arrests, executions, deportations and systematic destruction of villages shattered Kurds. Even those who surrendered didn’t escape death. About one thousand Kurdish fighters who surrendered were shot down in cold blood.39 A large number of Kurds were re-settled in southern Iraq and by 1979 the number forcibly relocated reached 200,000.40 Kurds splintered and a new faction led by Jalal Talabani formed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Government also used tribal divisions of Kurds to its advantage. In early 1960s, government patronized Zibari tribe, a traditional enemy of Barzanis. In later conflicts with Barzani, government also recruited Baradost and Herki tribes on its side.41

In 1983, Kurdish guerrillas intensified their attacks in coordination with Iranian attacks on northern frontier. This was the most serious threat to the viability of the regime. Saddam started to negotiate with PUK while ruthlessly suppressing KDP. About 8,000 members of Barzani’s clan were imprisoned. Two years later most of these prisoners were executed.42 This was accompanied with another round of forced resettlement of about 500,000 Kurds. It was during this campaign that chemical weapons were used first time by Saddam’s army. In March 1984, 24 young Kurds were executed for draft avoidance. Several Kurdish students died when army opened fire at them at Arbil University. Talabani’s brother Sheikh Hama Salih along with his two daughters was executed by Iraqi forces.43 Iraqi forces used chemical weapons first time in April 1987 against Kurdish village of Shaikh Wisan.44 In May 1987, about 20 Kurdish villages came under chemical weapons attack but this was on a small scale. It was in March 1988 when the town of Halabja came under chemical weapon attack on an unprecedented scale resulting in death of 5,000 people while nearly 10,000 suffered injuries.45 Scores of scared Kurds fled out of the country including 60,000 to Turkey. During 1988, the whole of First and Fifth Corps of Iraqi army was involved in the campaign against Kurds.46 In summer of 1989, two large cities Qala Diza (population 100,000) and Raniya (population 50,000) were depopulated.47 One conservative estimate about the civilian deaths during Anfaal campaign puts it at 100,000 and total destruction of 1,276 Kurdish villages.48

After the Gulf war in 1991, Kurds rose in revolt en masse and took control of many towns including Kirkuk. Saddam hit back the north with the same ferocity as he had done in the south. Deaths of hundreds of civilians resulted in the mass exodus of Kurds towards Turkey and Iran. Within few days more than two million Kurds were on the move to escape the wrath of Iraqi troops remembering very well the al-Anfaal campaign of late 80s.49 Fortunately for Kurds, one of the most successful rehabilitation operations performed by United Nations was accomplished when safe havens were created for them in northern Iraq. This resulted in return of most of Kurds to their lands.

Religious Persecution – The Tragedy of Shias
Iraq has a Shia majority but government is overwhelmingly Sunni. Shias are not a monolithic entity. Shias have been protesting throughout the history of Iraq to get their share. Every protest has been met with increasing brutality by government. To deal with the Shia question, a special branch was created in the security services to deal with Shia opposition. Iraq’s long time hostility with Iran was also at interplay in this suspicion of Shias. In April 1969, government started a systematic campaign against Shias under the guise of uprooting the ‘Iranian threat’. Kufa University at Najaf was closed, many Iranian religious students were arrested and expelled and about 20,000 were expelled to Iran claiming that they had Iranian descent. In June, Shias protested under the leadership of Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim pressing for their rights. The demonstrations of Shias showed to the government the extreme alienation of Shias and the potential of Shia clergy to lead an opposition movement against government. Government responded by closing religious schools, confiscation of religious endowments and arrest and execution of clergy50 to limit the role of clergy. After Saddam’s take over in 1979, attempts were made to further cut influence of Shia clergy. Many senior Shia clergy were assassinated. The list includes Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Khoi, Ayatollah Murtaza Ali Burujerdi, Ayatollah Mirza Ali Gharavi and Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr along with his two sons.51

In 1991, the retreating soldiers (most of foot soldiers were Shias) who came back to Iraq were furious. The result was a spontaneous uprising called Intifada. The first spark started in Basra. The commander of one of the returning soldier’s column turned his tank turret to a giant mural of Saddam in the centre square of Basra and fired few shells.52 Within hours huge crowds of soldiers and civilians took control of the city and the rebellion spread like wildfire. In several cities government authority ceased to exist. This was a very short-lived phase and Saddam’s Republican Guards regained control of all cities and took a terrible revenge.

Everybody is a Fair Game
Iraq has a violent history where every change of government was accompanied with large-scale purges and executions. In 1958 after the army’s coup, Prime Minister Nuri Said, King Faisal II and many members of royal family were executed. In less than a year, when one of the coup members Colonel Arif developed differences with the leader, he was arrested, tried for treason and condemned to death but later pardoned. Air Force Chief was assassinated in 1963. After the 1963 coup, Qasim and his associates were summarily executed and their bullet-riddled bodies were shown on Iraqi television.53 Country’s Minister of Health was executed in 1982 while former Mayor of Baghdad (Abdul Wahab Mufti) was hanged in 1986. Many who fell from grace of the ruler were assassinated inside and outside Iraq and several died in accidents especially helicopter crashes. Many Iraqis wondered that they have not lost as many senior commanders during Iran-Iraq war than during peacetime especially in helicopter crashes.

With the creation of the state of Israel and intense hatred, which was generated in all Arab countries, the fate of prosperous and large Jewish community of Iraq was sealed. With active encouragement of government, Jews were killed and their properties and businesses confiscated. Almost all of them immigrated to Israel. Another very small minority community in northern Iraq is Yazidis living around Jabal Sinjar. In early 1972, several thousand Yazidis were forcibly relocated.54 The tribes in southern marshes also tasted the brutality of Saddam. When repeated aerial bombardment and economic blockade did not cow them down, a ‘final solution’ for the rebellious community was planned. Third River Project diverted main rivers, which drained the area and destroyed the marshes forever. 55

Large-scale violence against women on a systematic and official way has no precedent in any Muslim country. In Iraq, rape, torture and execution of women as official policy was used to break the spirit of the opposition. In some tribes in Iraq the Bedouin notion of ‘breaking someone’s eye’ by molesting women has been used. In Ottoman era, in Tikrit area, the authority of a non-Tikriti official was destroyed by ambushing his family and gang-raping his wife in front of him. Personal accounts of some brave Iraqi women had given the glimpse of violence against women but it was only after the 1991 uprisings in north and south and capture of documents which revealed the large scale use of rape as government policy. In 1970s, young women from leading families of Baghdad were kidnapped and held captive for several weeks.56 Even children were not spared. In 1985, about 300 Kurdish children age 10-14 were imprisoned, some of whom were tortured and executed.57 Violence and brutalization was glamorized and shown to public. After the Baath coup, the bullet-riddled body of Qasim was brought to television studio where close ups of bullet wounds were shown. In the end, ‘a soldier grabbed the lolling head by the hair, came right up close, and spat full face into it’.58 In February 1986, the military magazine al-Thawra carried a picture of Saddam Hussein decorating a man who had shot his own son for refusing to go to the war front during Iraq-Iran war.59 The Iraqi national theatre performed a play in which a mother burns her son alive for having deserted from the army.60 In operations against Kurds, close family members were dragged out of their homes to watch their loved ones being executed. Sometimes families were charged for the cost of ammunition and transport of the dead bodies of their relatives. Government restricted even the mourning ceremonies preventing families even to grieve for the ones they have lost. In north, the bodies of executed Kurds were handed to the families only after the payment of ‘execution fee’ of 300 Iraqi Dinar.61 This prolonged brutalization of Iraqi society has left many psychological scars and created wounds which will be very difficult to heal. In short-term, the most difficult and painful task will be to how to bring these brutalized communities together.

Unchartered Waters – Iraq After Saddam
Iraqi society is already divided on various fault lines and with the removal of Saddam, ‘competing religious, tribal and territorial political forces’ have moved in to fill the vacuum. These diverse forces ‘threaten to divide the country rather than unite it’.62 When the government authority collapsed so quickly, many groups operating from mosques started to provide essential services such as water, garbage removal and security guards. By making themselves indispensable to their people these groups will try to get a larger share of power in any future settlement.

After the eradication of Saddam, US has embarked on a gigantic task. The initial US plan was to invite about 300 representatives from different Iraqi groups, exiled parties, tribal leaders and other influential people to select an interim government and prepare a new constitution. This interim set up was to be followed by elections in one to two years. The new plan carves a larger role for Iraqis who stayed inside Iraq rather than exiles.63 US have decided in favour of an American and British occupation authority for one to two years before allowing an interim set up. This has caused simmering resentment among various groups.

Such quick collapse of the regime has come as a surprise to all policy makers in Washington. US troops have not even been able to have effective control of a large country with relatively small numbers when they were expected to provide humanitarian and administrative duty in coordination with Iraqis. The time is too short for an effective reorientation. Baghdad has only 12,000 soldiers. In Iraq, US troops are overstretched. US quickly got 10,000 Iraqi policemen for joint patrols. The administration and control task has come too soon than expected and that is why there is slow pace of activity. A private company DynCopr has been awarded a $150 million contract to train new Iraqi police force. Research Triangle Institute is hired by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to help create 180 local and provincial governments in Iraq (the contract is worth $167 million).64 These measures will take time for full effect. The low level hit and run attacks against US soldiers have slowed down the administrative process as US soldiers are now diverted against these elusive small units.

Large-scale violence, forced relocations and settling large number of Arabs among Kurds have created a volatile situation now when the feared enforcer is not on the scene.

There have been reports of some killings of Arabs and forcing them to leave the northern Iraq. In addition, Shias in Baghdad, Karbala and Basra who suffered are taking revenge on the Baath members. The threat, which the newly emerging diverse groups who have armed men under their control can pose for a stable Iraq is acknowledged by US policy makers. About 700 paramilitary fighters called ‘Free Iraqi Forces’ rallied by INC who participated in military campaign were dissolved. In addition, members of Badar Brigade (military wing of SICRI) have also been disarmed.65 Due to its peculiar and violent history, nothing short of a miracle will be needed to bring even some resemblance of stability in the country. Constructive forces are very few while potential spoilers are plenty.

Where to go from here?
When they give me a rose, why would I give them a bullet. Iraqi Guerrilla leader Karim Mahoud talking about his cooperation with US, 2003. Whether one likes it or not, US is calling the shots in Iraq. At present, there is an internal struggle among various branches of government about Iraq. Pentagon, CIA and State Departments have different visions. For now Pentagon has a free hand in Iraq, which is resented by State Department. National Security Council (NSC), which should have been coordinating the conflicting views of different departments is dormant. For US policy to be successful, putting NSC in central role is critical so that now the State Department gets a larger responsibility of Iraq while the influence of Pentagon be reduced when the major military operations have ceased. State Department has the expertise and vision to embark on this difficult task. Personal favourites of Pentagon and CIA (Ahmad Chalabi and a small coterie of exiles) were selling all sorts of stories and their words were taken as gospel truths by many in administration. Now the post-war events have proven what influence these people have inside Iraq. Engagement of all Iraqi groups and regional players especially Iran will be a critical factor in stabilizing Iraq. Iran has legitimate concerns regarding its neighbourhood but has no desire at present to lock horns with US. More interaction between Iran and US can help thaw the relations and help bring stability in the region. US is giving warnings publicly but is quietly engaging Iranians although the degree of this interaction is not clear. In Geneva, US and Iranian diplomats are breaking some grounds and some gestures by US such as disarming of Iranian dissidents, Mujahideen-e-Khalq based in Iraq and arrest of several members of exile groups in Paris has re-assured Tehran to some extent. In addition, giving United Nations some role in post-war Iraq will help to decrease the current tensions.

At strategic level in Washington, there is a serious lack of vision and most senior policy makers have very simplistic notions about a very dangerous area of the world. At least at tactical level, the lower level policy-makers especially those on ground in Iraq have shown flexibility and have been able to keep things getting out of hand in short term. They brought all major opposition leaders together so that nobody feels being left out. They arranged meetings between Ahmad Chalabi and Ayad Alawi of Iraqi National Accord, two main Kurdish leaders, Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani and Abdul Aziz Hakim of SICRI. Members of all these organizations have been encouraged to fan out to all 28 Iraqi provinces to engage local leaders.66 This process needs to be expanded. When retired General Garner came under criticism from various groups especially Iran based Iraqis, US wisely replaced him. The civilian administrator Paul Bremer III has been assigned a Herculean task. The major disadvantage for US is that almost nobody trusts it. Current policy is dictated only by the sheer weight of military might, which has its limitations. Almost all regional and many other countries have absolutely no confidence in present administration in Washington.

From US standpoint, the major unknown factor is the nature of resistance to US forces. At present low level hit and run attacks are keeping the temperature high. The resistance seems to be isolated to the Sunni heartland, which was the key beneficiary during Saddam regime. If these attacks are isolated to one group or smaller geographic area, US may stick to the original plan. However, if this increases in intensity where guerrillas can keep a figure of one US soldier dead every other day, US may have to overhaul its plans. More important than that is the fact that if the resistance spreads to other groups and some disgruntled Shia groups join then the game can become very messy. If that situation arises, US will not continue to police the dangerous neighbourhood for long period of time engaging a large number of soldiers. US may take one of the two courses. If violence is manageable, it will try to bring peacekeeping troops from other countries. Many poor countries will be willing to police Iraq if the reimbursement is good. The divisions of Iraqi society are too obvious to ignore. Recent history of violent relations between different groups will make it very easy to just arm one group against the other. This would mean disaster for Iraqi society and division of Iraq will be the natural outcome. At present, division of Iraq is not on the cards for various reasons but if unexpected turn of events occurs where US has to disengage quickly from the region, then that option may come on table. If violence escalates unexpectedly, then US may decide to partition Iraq on ethnic lines, although not many regional players will be happy. In north, a Kurdish enclave with rich oil fields in Kirkuk will make both Kurds and US happy (Kurdish leaders are talking about a democratic and federal Iraq due to deference to US. By all independent accounts, majority of Kurds are in favour of independence). In south, a Shia majority state with enough oil resources to help them live happily but not enough to become major players. The spoilers in Sunni heartland will be left to keep quarrelling with northern and southern neighbours whom they suppressed during their heydays.

Kurdish political leaders have governed their enclave in north under US protection since 1991. Though riddled with large-scale corruption, they have a functional economy. The local police are Kurdish. In addition a significant number of well-trained Kurdish fighters are at their disposal. On negative side, the two main Kurdish factions are based on powerful personalities based largely on family and tribal lines. At local level, Shias have shown their cohesion and been able to gain the confidence of local populations by controlling chaos. However, at national level, they have not closed their ranks and present a viable and practical plan for whole country. They have to reassure other communities of Iraq and US administration that they will stick with a democratic model. The Sunni Arab minority is still in shock and fearful that in future the role-play may change and they may have to play the role of a persecuted minority. The same fear was one of the major factor that a large number of Sunnis (though most of them were not supporters of Saddam but they saw it as an issue of survival) participated in mass murder of Kurds and Shias in 1991. For a stable Iraq, it is important that they should be assured and encouraged to select local leaders who can interact with other groups. US will very soon realize the fact that military victory against a chaotic land is a cakewalk while trying to effectively control the same area can be a nightmare.

Conclusion
Iraq is a country, the boundaries of which ‘reflect the interests of foreign powers rather than domestic realities. As a result, the country is fragmented among various ethnic and religious communities that share little tradition of cooperation and even less sense of a common national identity’.67 Having said that, it is also important to remember that many events in history are shaped by powerful forces of history in which a group of people may not have any significant role. With a visionary leadership and a committed polity one can take control of events and shape one’s own destiny. It is in this task that the Iraqi people in general and leadership specifically failed. The instruments of failure were built into the very system employed therefore the results are not surprising. Iraq in 2003 is the logical outcome of the events happening over the last few decades. Over an extended period of time, ‘the selective, exemplary and often terrible use of violence and the seductions of privilege have been used to drive home to all Iraqis the rewards of conformity and the price of dissent’.68 This had a far reaching impact on Iraqi state and society. The impersonal institution of Iraqi state with which different groups can identify never existed. When US came to Iraq in 2003, it was a broken society scarred by wounds inflicted not by outsiders but Iraqis. The major negative factor in present day Iraq is the lack of even minimum trust needed for living together of diverse communities. Extreme polarization of the society on different fault lines and violent events of last several decades have left a great impact on the society and a lot of sincere efforts will be needed to prevent disintegration of Iraq. These instruments of failure need to be recognized and removed if one expects that the results of new exercise should be positive. This difficult task has to be performed by Iraqis and no one else. Outside players have their own interest’s paramount.

Several internal, regional and international factors are at play at present making the task of putting Iraq back at rails very difficult. However, there are several factors, which can favour positively. The most important is the will and desire of Iraqi people to come out of the current dilemma and take the destiny of their nation in their own hands. Recent violent past can be seen as a painful but valuable lesson for all groups that they have to work with each other to bring back some harmony. A large number of Iraqi Diaspora, which has excelled in different fields all around the world is an ample proof that Iraqis are capable of running their own affairs. It was the political mismanagement, which haunted the nation. These highly educated and experienced Iraqis can contribute a lot for the betterment of their society. Relatively small population and presence of oil can bring economic recovery quicker compared to other shattered areas. However, for any meaningful recovery, internal stability and political compromise among Iraqis is essential. A clear understanding on part of US policy makers will be critical. The quest of hegemony and trying to beat everybody on the block will bring a severe backlash in long run. For better understanding of the region, the administration has to get some input from other sources, which give accurate picture of the sentiments of the population. Sole reliance on run of the mill experts of Middle East whose work is surely scholarly but severely limited will give an incomplete picture as most of them interact only with the ruling elite. Iraqi Shias have their own unique identity and even if the clergy become rulers they are not going to drink all the oil but have to sell to someone preferably Americans. The paranoid obsession with Iran and short-term policy goals regarding that region may turn Iraq into another festering wound, which is not in the interest of any party.

The crumbling of Iraq without much noise has more to do with the inner fault lines of the Iraqi state and society and less to the US military might. Groups of people who genuinely feel as citizens of the state, regardless of how weak militarily are able to show resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. All non-Iraqi Arabs and Muslims who were now expecting that Iraqis should give a sanguine battle to Americans to sooth their raw emotions had been criminally silent during all these years when the whole society was pulverized by a ruthless regime. In their perverted logic, protest only comes when the bullet of a non-Muslim kills an Arab or Muslim. It does not matter a bit if literally thousands of Muslims are butchered in most inhuman way and dumped in mass graves if the perpetrator is a Muslim. This is the dilemma which Muslim communities all around the globe are facing.
What happened in Baghdad must be taken into consideration by Arab rulers because the people are the ones who defend a country, and if they are tortured and their honour is violated then they will be the first to abandon it. A Saudi citizen, May 2003.

References
1- Cited in Kanan Makiya. Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 58

2- For an excellent and in-depth study of that period see David Fromkin. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East New York: Avon Books, 1989

3- Bernard Lewis. The Shaping of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 137

4- For details of politicization of Iraqi army, see, Ayad Al-Qazzaz. The Changing Patterns of the Politics of the Iraqi Army in Morris Janowitz & Jacques Van Doorn (Ed.) On Military Intervention. Studies presented at Varna International Sociological Association Conference 1970 (Rotterdam University Press, 1971), p. 337-357

5- Mohammad A. Tarbush. The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1982), p. 149

6- Tarbush. The Role of the Military, p. 173-74

7- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 191-92

8- A. Abbas. The Iraqi Armed Forces: Past and Present in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 21

9- Samir al-Khalil. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California, 1989), p. 6-7

10- Derek Hopwood. Social Structures and the New State 1921-1958 in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, Thomas Koszinowski (Ed.). Iraq: Power and Society (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), p. 13

11- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 176

12- Hiro. Neighbours, Not Friends, p. 92

13- Michael M. Gunter. The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 23

14- Khalil. Republic of Fear, p. 71

15- National Review Online.
http://www.nationalreview.com/contributors/robbinsprint022102.html

16- May Chartouni-Dubarry. The Development of Internal Politics in Iraq from 1958 to the Present Day in Hopwood (Ed.) Iraq: Power and Society, p. 35

17- Karsh. Saddam, p. 88, 118 & 167

18- A. Abbas. Iraqi Armed Forces in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 224

19- A. Abbas. The Iraqi Armed Forces in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 218

20- Gunter. The Kurds of Iraq, p. 38

21- For details of this coup attempt see, Hiro. Neighbours, Not Friends, p. 102-107

22- Or details of the role of these dissidents see Hamid Hussain. All Roads to Baghdad – Military Operations in Iraq 2003. Defence Journal, June 2003

23- For details of this close family network see, Karsh. Saddam, p180-81

24- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 266-67

25- Dilip Hiro. Neighbours, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran after the Gulf War (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 91

26- Hiro. Neighbours, Not Friends, p. 95

27- Hiro. Neighbours, Not Friends, p. 95

28- Charles Tripp. The Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi State in Hopwood. Iraq: Society and Power, p. 95

29- For extensive and excellent details of this phenomenon see Ofra Bengio. Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.79-85

30- Bengio. Saddam’s Word, p. 189-190

31- Bengio. Saddam’s Word, p. 199

32- Sandra Mackey. The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), p. 202

33- Mackey. The Reckoning, p. 233

34- Author have seen many such videos

35- Makiya. Cruelty and Silence, p. 79, 88 & 93

36- For a detailed account of these atrocities by an Iraqi see Makiya. Cruelty and Silence)

37- Iraq – A Country Study. Federal Research Division. Library of Congress. (Washington, D.C. US Government Printing Press, 1990), p. 51

38- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 171

39- Khalil. Republic of Fear, p. 23

40- Efraim Karsh & Inari Rautsi. Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 81 & 98-99

41- Peter Sluglett. The Kurds in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 192

42- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 243

43- Gunter. The Kurds of Iraq, p. 39

44- For documentation of the genocidal policy against Kurds by Iraqi government see Kanan Makiya. The Anfal: Uncovering an Iraqi Campaign to Exterminate the Kurds. Harper’s Magazine, May 1992, pp. 53-61

45- Karsh. Saddam, p. 169

46- Makiya. The Anfal, p. 58

47- Gunter. The Kurds of Iraq, p. 47

48- Makiya. The Anfal, p. 58

49- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 257

50- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 202-203

51- for the details of these assassinations see Hiro. Neighbours, Not Friends, p. 172-73

52- Makiya. Cruelty and Silence, p. 59

53- Charles Tripp. A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 171

54- Sluglett. The Kurds in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 196

55- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 270

56- For details of violence against women and children see Suha Omar. Women, Honour, Shame and Dictatorship in Iraq Since Gulf War, p. 66-67, Baath Terror – Two Personal Accounts in Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? (London: Zed Books, 1989), p108-114 and Deborah Cobbett. Women in Iraq in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 128-29

57- Celine Whittleton, Jabr Muhsin and Fran Hazelton. Whither Iraq? in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 249

58- Khalil. Republic of Fear, p. 59

59- Cited in A. Abbas. Iraqi Armed Forces in Saddam’s Iraq, p. 224

60- Bengio. Saddam’s Word, p. 156

61- Gunter. The Kurds of Iraq, p. 48

62- Los Angeles Times, May 05, 2003

63- Los Angeles Times, June 02, 2003

64- Los Angeles Times, May 05, 2003

65- The New York Times, May 26, 2003

66- New York Times, May 06, 2003

67- Phebe A. Marr. The Political Elite in Iraq in George Lenczowski (Ed.) Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 109

68- Tripp. A History of Iraq, p. 278.