possibly the most dangerous in the world. It started with the US decision to go back on its liabilities — agreed quantities of aid — under the 1995 agreement with North Korea. Very little is known about why did the Bush Administration break that agreement. Why indeed!

The agreement was working well. North Korea was fulfilling its commitments; the UN inspectors on the site had certified it. In retaliation the North Koreans disclosed they had a secret nuclear weapons programme, they opted out of NPT, expelled the UN inspectors, and reactivated the Yongbyon reactor. They played an audacious hand: no one doubts that the chief North Korean objective is aid: food, fuel and some money from IFIs. For the purpose it wants bilateral talks with the US, the power that matters and whose actions have aggravated their domestic economic crisis.

North Koreans were, and probably will easily again agree, to another accord with the Americans that guarantees them adequate fuel and food supplies and wants the US not to create difficulties in their quest of getting loans from IFIs. In a way it is a coercive diplomacy by a weak and poor state, threatening to become a nuclear power unless the outsiders (chiefly the Americans) provided them adequate aid. To neutral non-expert opinion, North Koreans need to be sympathised with and befriended. The deal Bill Clinton made need not have been thrown out.

It is a welcome development that the Bush Administration refuses to be provoked into a military response. It wants to deploy diplomacy. But it refuses a bilateral format, preferring a multilateral ambience in negotiations, in contrast with North Koreans’ demand for bilateral negotiations. The Chinese intervened to host both Washington’s and Pyongyang’s representatives in Beijing. The talks between the two sides did go through. Except that the basic differences between Pyongyang and Washington apparently remain, little else is known of what progress was made and what is the outlook.

Given the penchant of North Koreans of talking tough, there is the risk of their playing into the hands of Washington’s hardliners who are gung ho about Asia’s Northeast. What precisely do these Neo-Cons want remains obscure. Maybe they want North Korea to exacerbate the situation so as to pursue their own strategic aims. For the present, the Bush Administration is, rather uncharacteristically, playing it cool at North Korean threats of nuking South Korea, the US troops and converting the South into a hell. Pyongyang is certainly mad at South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun’s apparent alignment with US policies at his summit with US President on May 14 last. President Roh appears to go along with the US suggestion that “other steps” are necessary – presumably a range of steps beginning with tough sanctions to naval blockade.

Anyway the confirmation that North Korea is a nuclear power and, having already demonstrated its missiles’ range by overflying Japan to land in the Pacific, is likely to cause a tectonic change in the geo-strategic situation in the East and Far East. The most pacific of all Asian countries, Japan, may be tempted to go nuclear — a denouement most of its people abhor but it might delight its conservatives. The Right in Japan is in power. Japan has been inching away from the intention embodied in its Peace Constitution; it recently sent its naval ships to the war zone to reinforce American armada. Its ultra right wing has been emphasising, sotto voce, the need for Japan going nuclear.

Japan’s reactions hold the key to much of the change in Asia. Japan is deeply concerned with what goes on in the two Koreas. It had colonised Manchuria for half a century before the Second World War ended its occupation. Korean Nationalism — shared by both the North and South — is primarily oriented against the Japanese. The latter, like any colonial power, had committed many atrocities — among them having made a large number of Korean women sex slaves. A large number of Koreans are still aggrieved and are demanding compensation from the Japanese authorities through court action.

Given last Century’s history, Japan’s conduct before and in the Second World War had made it a colonial power. From the 1930s onward it was on an expansionist and aggressive course. Looking for markets for its goods, it created a zone of its influence called the Co-Prosperity Zone. In 1937 it invaded China and occupied large parts of it. After 1941 it swung through Southeast Asian countries like a knife in butter. It occupied most states right up to Burma and Assam; the British Navy was mauled, making India vulnerable.

The Japanese occupation has left a scar on the psyche of the concerned people. Japanese occupation troops behaved brutally. Perhaps it is an inseparable part of occupation; without brutal behaviour the purposes of occupation — extracting maximum resources both for home country’s prosperity and for the prosecution of a total war — could not be achieved. But the victims of that occupation have neither forgotten nor would trust Japan ever again, if it became a militarised great power engaged in high stake power game.

Big Business in Japan is facing a threat of a semi-slump. In such conditions, militarisation can become attractive. A crash military build up yield big profits for the Big Business. Thus Big Business can always support a big militarisation programme; it can be justified in defensive terminology. Anyway, the threat of Japan going nuclear is what terrifies others. While Japan may not embark on a huge build up, the dynamics of others’ reactions is sure to make it full-scale militarisation (including conventional armed preparedness).

For Japan to go nuclear is technically easy: its hoards of fissionable materials are perhaps second biggest because of the number of nuclear reactors producing electricity is large while each reactor produces fissionable byproduct that makes the Bomb. Japan’s aerospace industry can produce any number of missiles of any reach, not to mention its ability to expand its war industry. Japan will need a political decision to militarise and it will quickly become a big military power. Mercifully such a decision seems — so far — distant.

China will be convulsed instantly. It will immediately tend to consult Russia, North Korea, the rest of Shanghai Six and may be other South East Asian states that have the experience of Japanese occupation during the Second World War. It will naturally wish to form as large and varied an alignment as possible to oppose Japan. This will have a fair chance of success.

The US role will, however, be crucial. It is sure to head the other alignment comprising Japan and Taiwan. Where would South Korea go is a moot question, despite the recent indication of a reversal of soft policy by the new South Korean President after his recent meeting with US President. It is hard to see which other country will or will not side with the US. The fact that the US has increased its influence in Central Asia, complete with so many military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrghizistan, Tajikistan and Georgia, not to mention friendly arrangements with most others. But this was possible at the start of War on Terror and with the tacit support of both Russia and China. What of now, when Japan’s nuclearisation is likely to muster American support.

There would be turmoil throughout South East Asia. What will that plucky small state, Vietnam, will do will matter. So will Australia’s attitude and decision — for which it will first watch the S.E. Asian states reactions. The US in the new situation might encourage nuclearisation of the Down Under also. The more one thinks of the ripple effects the more depressing one becomes.

That earthquake will not leave South Asia unaffected. If India continues to be ruled by BJP, with its policy of ‘core and natural alliance’ with the US and Israel, it looks likely to join the US-led alignment. What of Pakistan? If President Musharraf remains in power he will anyhow find his place in the pro-America line up, probably beating India to it. But public opinion in Pakistan — which can count in an emergency — is sure to be pro-Chinese but the government policies might move in a contrary direction. But that’s nothing new for Pakistanis. Anyway, all this is too iffy.