The
current debate over US and British policy statements
regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
is disguising a much more serious set of intelligence
problems that will exist long after the current political
furore is over. The following analysis provides an
updated summary of these issues.
Intelligence
Strengths and Weaknesses
The Coalition had overwhelming overall superiority
in the intelligence aspects of IS&R. It had also
the advantage of experience and a vast range of intelligence
collection and analysis to build upon. The US had
used space and other intelligence assets to study
and target Iraq for more than 12 years from the summer
of 1990 to the beginning of 2003, and had had to prepare
for war several times after 1991.
The US and Britain carried out major strikes in Desert
Fox in 1998, and repeatedly flew reconnaissance missions
and strikes over Iraq to enforce the “No Fly
Zones” during 1998-2003. This combination of
intelligence effort and combat experience provided
a unique degree of situational awareness before the
war began. At the same time, it is important to temper
any lessons about the advantages of US intelligence
assets with the understanding similar experience and
knowledge may not be present in future contingencies.
At the same time, the Iraq War is warning that even
the world’s most advance intelligence systems,
and more than a decade of intensive intelligence collection
and analysis coverage could still leave major gaps
and serious intelligence problems. As has been discussed
in the broader analysis of the IS&R effort, and
throughout much the preceding analysis, the US and
its allies still had serious problems in the following
aspects of intelligence collection and analysis:
* The US and Britain were never able to establish
a credible picture of Iraqi links to terrorist organizations,
including Al Qaida. Many charges were made, but none
were substantiated.
* The US did not have enough area experts, technical
experts, and analysts with language skills at any
level to make optimal use of its sensors and collection.
This was as true at the national level as at the tactical
level, and collection overload was a problem in many
areas.
* The US had a far greater capability to target buildings
than characterize what went on in the building, and
the effect of strikes on most sets of structures.
It could not measure the level of wartime activity
in many cases (facilities with high emission levels
were an exception), and this made the efforts at “effects-based”
operations discussed in later chapters difficult and
sometimes impossible. Moreover, estimates of the level
and nature of underground and sheltered facilities
and activity were generally highly problematic.
* The IS&R effort mistargeted leadership facilities,
exaggerated the importance of C4I strikes, and overtargeted
fixed military facilities. It is, however, unclear
that the US and its allies had any choice. Striking
more targets in the face on uncertainty was probably
better than striking only those targets where a high
confidence could be established as to the effect.
* The IS&R effort often had to take a “worst
case” approach to the potential role of Iraq’s
security forces, intelligence services, irregular
forces like Saddam’s Fedayeen, and unusual military
formations like the Special Republican Guards. In
fairness, however, it is difficult – if not
impossible – to accurately characterize the
warfighting capability of forces that have never fought
and which do not conduct open and realistic exercises.
* The IS&R sensor and analytic effort focused
more on major combat forces, with heavy weapons, than
on infantry or irregular forces. It could do a much
better job of locating and characterizing weapons
platforms and military emitters than dealing with
personnel and forces that relied on light vehicles.
It was generally difficult or impossible to locate
distributed forces in a built-up or urban environment
until they were forces into some form of open military
activity and the US often lacked the density of specialized
assets like UAVs to carry out this mission even when
open activity took place.
* The IS&R effort did much to reduce collateral
damage and the risk of civilian casualties. It was
neither organized nor capable, however, of assessing
either civilian or military casualties.
* The speed and intensity of the war seems to have
led to a major breakdown in the battle damage assessment
(BDA) process. Quite aside from the many gaps and
uncertainties reaming in the BDA process, the IS&R
system could not close the cycle in terms of target-shoot-assess
on a timely and accurate basis which remains a critical
challenge in creating true netcentric war.
* The IS&R effort was not able to characterize
and target the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction effort
before or during the war, or provide reliable warning
of the tactical threat. It seems to have been somewhat
better in dealing with potential delivery systems,
but the level of improvement relative to the inability
to locate the Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear
effort is unclear.
The Need for Better Assessment, Characterization,
and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key
Delivery Systems
The most controversial failures in intelligence lay
in the area of weapons of mass destruction. It may
be months or years before it will be possible to locate
and analyze the data the war makes available on Iraq’s
history of proliferation, its imports, and domestic
programmes, its capabilities at the time of the Iraq
War, and its goals or objectives.
It has since become clear that the US and British
governments had only a tenuous understanding of the
threat they faced from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,
and were unable to characterize the scale of the Iraqi
effort that they described as a key motive for the
conflict, during the period before the war began.1
It is also clear from the previous chapters that Coalition
commanders had little intelligence on Iraqi WMD programmes
and warfighting capabilities as they advanced, and
it is clear from a wide range of reports during the
war that there were many false alarms when elements
of the advancing forces though they had found weapons
of mass destruction or the facilities to produce them,
and when Coalition forces either donned chemical protection
gear they later turned out not to need or Coalition
commanders had to ignore the risk Iraq might use such
weapons without adequate tactical intelligence support
to give them a clearer picture of the risks involved.
Key
Points in the US and British White Papers
President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, and numerous
US and British officials made numerous charges before
the war that Iraq was actively developing weapons
of mass destruction, had probably deployed combat
ready chemical and biological weapons, had an active
nuclear weapons programme, and was developing new
delivery systems, including missiles and UAVs. The
British government issued two white papers on Iraq,
and the US issued one. In addition, US officials like
Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz made additional
charges, and Secretary of State Colin Powell presented
a detailed briefing to the UN, highlighting US charges
against Iraq.
Most of the attention regarding the charges against
Iraq since the war has focused on the fact that one
of the British white papers paraphrased unattributed
material from a graduate student, that the British
paper on weapons of mass destruction stated that Iraq
could deliver weapons of mass destruction with only
45 minutes warning, and that both British and US speeches
and briefings included unvalidated statements that
Iraq had sought Uranium ore and was ready to use weapons
of mass destruction.
In reality, however, US and British intelligence made
a long series of complex charges, only some of which
were properly qualified. In order to understand the
true scale of the intelligence problems involved,
and the need for improvement in this intelligence,
it is necessary to understand that the charges issued
in the British Joint Intelligence Committee and CIA
white papers involved the following detailed points:2
Summary
Conclusions
British Summary
Intelligence shows that Iraq is preparing plans to
conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating
documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms
that despite sanctions and the policy of containment,
Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit
weapons programmes.
As a result of the intelligence, we judge that Iraq
has:
* Continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
* Military plans for the use of chemical and biological
weapons, including against its own Shia population.
Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes
of an order to use them;
*Command and control arrangements in place to use
chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately
resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence
that he may have delegated this authority to his son
Qusai);
* Developed mobile laboratories for military use,
corroborating earlier reports bout the mobile production
of biological warfare agents;
* Pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled
materials of potential use in the production of chemical
and biological weapons programmes; tried covertly
to acquire technology and materials which could be
used in the production of nuclear weapons;
* °Sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power
programme that could require it; recalled specialists
to work on its nuclear programme;
* Illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles,
with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical
or biological warheads;
* Started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant
missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors
to work on extending its range to at least 200km,
which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the
United Nations;
* Started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100,
and is making efforts to extend its range to at least
200km, which is beyond the limit of 150 km imposed
by the United Nations;
* Constructed a new engine test stand for the development
of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base
Areas in Cyprus and NATO members Greece and Turkey),
as well as all Iraq’s Gulf neighbours and Israel;
* Pursued illegal programmes to procure materials
for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
* Learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections
and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment
and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.
US
Summary
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programmes in defiance of UN resolutions and
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological
weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess
of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably
will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
* Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD
efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate
the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.
* Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained
its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile
programme, and invested more heavily in biological
weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting
its nuclear weapons programme.
* Iraq’s growing ability to sell oil illicitly
increases Baghdad’s capabilities to finance
WMD programmes; annual earnings in cash and goods
have more than quadrupled.
* Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological
weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert
Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure
under the cover of civilian production.
* Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with
its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal
means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical
warfare agents.
Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear
weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains
intent on acquiring them.
* How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon
depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade
fissile material.
* If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile
material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon
within a year.
* Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably
would not be able to make a weapon until the last
half of the decade.
* Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed
high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern.
All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking
nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used
in a centrifuge enrichment programme.
* Most intelligence specialists assess this to be
the intended use, but some believe that these tubes
are probably intended for conventional weapons programmes.
* Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire,
a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable
of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a
couple of weapons per year.
Baghdad has begun renewed production
of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard,
sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced
during the NSCOM inspections and is probably more
limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war,
although VX production and agent storage life probably
have been improved.
* Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric
tons of CW agents.
* The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs,
artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess
CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited
number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.
All key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization
– of Iraq’s offensive BW programme are
active and most elements are larger and more advanced
than they were before the Gulf war.
Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents
and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing
a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery
by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives,
including potentially against the US Homeland.
* Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant,
and concealed BW agent production capability, which
includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade
detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the
production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development
programmes, including for a UAV that most analysts
believe probably is intended to deliver biological
warfare agents.
* Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that
Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen
Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
* Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100
SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized
150-km range limit.
* Baghdad’s UAVs – especially if used
for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
agents – could threaten Iraq’s neighbours,
US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States
if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.
* Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile
capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in
building specialized facilities.
Developments
Since 1998
* British Summary of Developments Since 1998
Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons
capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included
recent production of chemical and biological agents;
Saddam continues to attach great importance to the
possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles that he regards as being the basis for Iraq’s
regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities;
Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using
an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall
bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons,
in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been
sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application
in Iraq;
Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD
ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687, which are
capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran
and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic
missiles;
Iraq’s current military planning specifically
envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;
Iraq’s military forces are able to use chemical
and biological weapons, with command, control and
logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military
are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes
of a decision to do so.
Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections
and is already taking steps to conceal and disperse
sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of
the return of inspectors;
Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missiles programmes are well-funded.
CIA
Estimate of Developments Since 1998
Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow
UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security
Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems
installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and
missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad
prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights
of Iraqi facilities by UN aircraft and helicopters.
Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections
since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only
a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq’s
stockpile of uranium oxide.
In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad’s already
considerable ability to work on prohibited programmes
without risk of discovery has increased, and there
is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting
prohibited programmes. Baghdad’s vigorous concealment
efforts have meant that specific information on many
aspects of Iraq’s WMD programmes is yet to be
uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly
demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq
to deny information.
Limited insight into activities since 1998 clearly
show that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors
to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile
development facilities and to increase its ability
to produce WMD.
Chemical
Warfare Programme
*
UK: Chemical Warfare Programme
Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has
monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence,
of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and
biological warfare capabilities. In the first half
of 2000 the JIC noted 17 reports of intelligence on
Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and on
the reconstruction of civil chemical production at
sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare
programme.
In mid-2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some
chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment
and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks
would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities
of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within
months. The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi
former chemical and biological warfare facilities,
their limited reconstruction and civil production
pointed to a continuing research and development programme.
These chemical and biological capabilities represented
the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass
destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence
of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade,
which was providing hard currency.
In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier
judgments on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare
capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means
to deliver chemical and biological weapons.
Subsequently, intelligence has become available from
reliable sources which complements and adds to previous
intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that
Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence
also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing
a number of issues related to these weapons. This
intelligence covers:
Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons
play an important role in Iraqi military thinking:
intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance
to the possession of chemical and biological weapons
which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional
power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on
its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable
of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam
is determined to retain this capability and recognizes
that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if
Iraq’s military power rested solely on its conventional
military forces.
Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons
systems: Iraq is already taking steps to prevent UN
weapons inspectors finding evidence of its chemical
and biological weapons programme. Intelligence indicates
that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous weapons
inspections, has identified possible weak points in
the inspections process and knows how to exploit them.
Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed
and in some cases this is already happening. The possession
of mobile biological agent production facilities will
also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is determined
not to lose the capabilities that he has been able
to develop further in the four years since inspectors
left.
Saddam’s willingness to use chemical and biological
weapons: intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq’s
military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical
and biological weapons, including against his own
Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi
military are able to deploy chemical or biological
weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.
When confronted with questions about the unaccounted
stocks, Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it had
retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf
War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render
them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to
having the knowledge and capability to add stabilizer
to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents that
would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also
examined some munitions which had been filled with
mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained
very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration.
Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce
chemical agent. During the Gulf War a number of facilities
which intelligence reporting indicated were directly
or indirectly associated with Iraq’s chemical
weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following
the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless
facilities and equipment used in Iraq’s chemical
weapons programme. Other equipment was released for
civilian use either in industry or academic institutes,
where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored,
or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure
that it was not being misused.
This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq
in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although
the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna
was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been
rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the
chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These
include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah
2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses,
chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals
that contribute to the production of chemical agents.
Other dual-use facilities, which are capable of being
used to support the production of chemical agent and
precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped. New
chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal
foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational
or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina
Company at Tarmiyah which is a chemical research centre.
It undertakes research, development and production
of chemicals previously imported but not now available
and which are needed for Iraq’s civil industry.
The Director General of the research centre is Hikmat
Na’im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf War worked
in Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme and after
the war was responsible for preserving Iraq’s
chemical expertise.
Parts of the al-Qa’qa’ chemical complex
damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and
are operational. Of particular concern are elements
of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa’qa’.
These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and
dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since
been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial
uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent
or as a precursor for nerve agent.
Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare
research, agent production and weaponization. Most
of the personnel previously involved in the programme
remain in country. While UNSCOM found a number of
technical manuals (so called “cook books”)
for the production of chemical agents and critical
precursors, Iraq’s claim to have unilaterally
destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be
confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence
indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of
concealing such documentation in order to ensure that
it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.
Almost all components and supplies used in weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes
are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical
or biotech industry, as well as public health organizations,
will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment
required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons.
Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult
therefore to be sure about the true nature of many
of Iraq’s facilities.
For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex,
Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at
al-Sharqat. This site is a former uranium enrichment
facility that was damaged during the Gulf War and
rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part
of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in
1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the
site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded
by a high wall with watchtowers and guarded by armed
guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will
produce nitric acid, which can be used in explosives,
missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.
Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for
both chemical and biological agents. These include:
free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged possession of four
types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills
including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and cyclosarin;
artillery shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive
use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents
during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used
for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known to have
tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological
agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted
for by UNSCOM; helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers:
Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination
of biological agent using these platforms prior to
1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these
devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability
for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological
agent over a large area; al-Hussein ballistic missiles
(range 650 km): Iraq developed chemical agent warheads
for al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical
warheads for al-Hussein that were intended for the
delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However,
technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces
of VX degradation product which indicate that some
additional warheads were made and filled with VX;
al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150
km plus): it is unclear if chemical and biological
warheads have been developed for these systems, but
given the Iraqi experience on other missile systems,
we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for
doing so; L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme:
we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted
to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used
as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially
capable of delivering chemical and biological agents
over a large area.
The authority to use chemical and biological weapons
ultimately resides with Saddam but intelligence indicates
that he may have also delegated this authority to
his son Qusai. Special Security Organization (SSO)
and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be
involved in the movement of any chemical and biological
weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds
artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout
the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with
them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational
control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple
Launcher Rocket Systems.
*
CIA: Chemical Warfare Programme
Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW)
agents within its chemical industry, although it probably
depends on external sources for some precursors.
Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover
of civilian industries, that it could use to advance
its CW agent production capability. During the 1980s
Saddam had a formidable CW capability that he used
against Iranians and against Iraq’s Kurdish
population. Iraqi forces killed or injured more than
20,000 people in multiple attacks, delivering chemical
agents (including mustard agent1 and the nerve agents
sarin and tabun2) in aerial bombs, 122mm rockets,
and artillery shells against both tactical military
targets and segments of Iraq’s Kurdish population.
Before the 1991 Gulf war, Baghdad had a large stockpile
of chemical munitions and a robust indigenous production
capacity.
Although precise information is lacking, human rights
organizations have received plausible accounts from
Kurdish villagers of even more Iraqi chemical attacks
against civilians in the 1987 to 1988 time frame –
with some attacks as late as October 1988 –
in areas close to the Iranian and Turkish borders.
UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000
chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 litres of chemical
agents, 1.8 million litres of chemical precursors,
and seven different types of delivery systems, including
ballistic missile warheads. More than 10 years after
the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current
production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq
maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably
VX, 3 sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard.
Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production
equipment, documentation, and other items necessary
for continuing its CW effort. Baghdad never supplied
adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed
all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons
of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled
munitions, including Scud-variant missile warheads,
remain unaccounted for.
UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters
in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least
6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN
it had used during the Iran-Iraq War-bombs that remain
are unaccounted for.
Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets
that in the past were its preferred means for delivering
nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery
shells filled with mustard agent.
Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons
(MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents.
Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure
that it could divert quickly to CW production. The
best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at
the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate
civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis
of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and
nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants
that have much higher capacity for civilian production;
these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient
to meet Iraq’s civilian
Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the
UN Oil-for-Food Programme since 1997, Baghdad used
only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock,
suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine
has been diverted to such proscribed activities as
CW agent production.
Fallujah II was one of Iraq’s principal CW precursor
production facilities before the Gulf war. In the
last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility
and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping
containers with a large amount of production equipment.
They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf
war production levels – capabilities that can
be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking
to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production
equipment and is trying to hide the activities of
the Fallujah plant.
Biological
Warfare Programme
*
UK: Biological Warfare
Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has
monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence,
of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and
biological warfare capabilities. In the first half
of 2000 the JIC noted intelligence on Iraqi attempts
to procure dual-use chemicals and on the reconstruction
of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated
with the chemical warfare programme.
Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and
weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of
any kind has been produced to support this claim.
In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies
between the amount of growth media (nutrients required
for the specialized growth of agent) it procured before
1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having
manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce
more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly
manufactured.
Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials
and equipment that could be used for a biological
warfare programme. Personnel known to have been connected
to the biological warfare programme up to the Gulf
War had been conducting research into pathogens. There
was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce
biological warfare agents in mobile production facilities.
Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr
Rihab Taha, known to have been a central player in
the pre-Gulf War programme. The JIC concluded that
Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material
to produce biological warfare agents within weeks
using its legitimate biotechnology facilities.
In mid-2001, the JIC concluded that intelligence on
Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities,
their limited reconstruction and civil production
pointed to a continuing research and development programme.
These chemical and biological capabilities represented
the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass
destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence
of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade,
which was providing hard currency.
In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier
judgments on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare
capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means
to deliver chemical and biological weapons.
Subsequently, intelligence has become available from
reliable sources which complements and adds to previous
intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that
Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence
also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing
a number of issues related to these weapons. This
intelligence covers:
Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons
play an important role in Iraqi military thinking:
intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance
to the possession of chemical and biological weapons
which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional
power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on
its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable
of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam
is determined to retain this capability and recognizes
that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if
Iraq’s military power rested solely on its conventional
military forces.
Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and
weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of
any kind has been produced to support this claim.
In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies
between the amount of growth media (nutrients required
for the specialized growth of agent) it procured before
1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having
manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce
more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly
manufactured.
We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued
to produce biological warfare agents. As with some
chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment
that could be directly linked to biological weapons
production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability
to design and construct biological agent associated
fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other
equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the
technology required to produce biological weapons.
Almost all components and supplies used in weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes
are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical
or biotech industry, as well as public health organizations,
will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment
required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons.
Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult
therefore to be sure about the true nature of many
of Iraq’s facilities.
Experienced personnel who were active in the programme
have largely remained in the country. Some dual-use
equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring
by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their
biological weapons programme. This newly purchased
equipment and other equipment previously subject to
monitoring could be used in a resurgent biological
warfare programme. Facilities of concern include:
* The Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah: this
was damaged in UK/US air attacks in 1998 (Operation
Desert Fox) but has been rebuilt. The residue from
the castor bean pulp can be used in the production
of the biological agent ricin;
* The al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute:
which was involved in biological agent production
and research before the Gulf War;
* The Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib:
UNSCOM established that this facility was used to
store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological
warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf
War. It has now expanded its storage capacity.
UNSCOM
established that Iraq considered the use of mobile
biological agent production facilities. In the past
two years evidence from defectors has indicated the
existence of such facilities. Recent intelligence
confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile
facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect
biological agent production from military attack or
UN inspection.
Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for
both chemical and biological agents. These include:
* free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the
deployment to two sites of free-fall bombs filled
with biological agent during 1990-91. These bombs
were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.;
* artillery shells and rockets: Iraq is known to have
tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological
agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted
for by UNSCOM;
* helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried
out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological
agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM
was unable to account for many of these devices. It
is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol
dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over
a large area;
* al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650 km): Iraq
told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax,
botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.;
* al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150
km plus): it is unclear if chemical and biological
warheads have been developed for these systems, but
given the Iraqi experience on other missile systems,
we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for
doing so;
* L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme: we know
from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify
the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially
capable of delivering chemical and biological agents
over a large area.
*
CIA: Biological Warfare
Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate
vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare
(BW) production and already may have done so. This
capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq
has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying
about the existence of its offensive BW programme.
After four years of claiming that they had conducted
only “small-scale, defensive” research,
Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in
1995 to production and weaponization of biological
agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being
faced with evidence of their procurement of a large
volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn
Kamil, former director of Iraq’s military industries.
Iraq admitted producing thousands of litres of the
BW agents anthrax, 6 botulinum toxin, (which paralyzes
respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to
36 hours), and aflatoxin, (a potent carcinogen that
can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion),
and preparing BW- filled Scud-variant missile warheads,
aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the
Gulf war.
Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support
its claims that it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents
and munitions. Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad’s
declarations vastly understated the production of
biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually
produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that
it acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracis
– the causative agent of anthrax – and
botulinum toxin.
The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally
“civilian” facilities that were directly
associated with biological weapons indicates that
key aspects of Iraq’s offensive BW programme
are active and most elements more advanced and larger
than before the 1990-1991 Gulf war.
*
The al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine
Facility is one of two known Biocontainment Level-3-facilities
in Iraq with an extensive air handling and filtering
system. Iraq admitted that before the Gulf war Al-Dawrah
had been a BW agent production facility. UNSCOM attempted
to render it useless for BW agent production in 1996
but left some production equipment in place because
UNSCOM could not prove it was connected to previous
BW work. In 2001, Iraq announced it would begin renovating
the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce
a vaccine to combat an FMD outbreak. In fact, Iraq
easily can import all the foot-and-mouth vaccine it
needs through the UN.
* The Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute is an ideal
cover location for BW research, testing, production,
and storage. UN inspectors discovered documents related
to BW research at this facility, some showing that
BW cultures, agents, and equipment were stored there
during the Gulf war. Of particular concern is the
plant’s new storage capacity, which greatly
exceeds Iraq’s needs for legitimate medical
storage.
* The Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant is
situated on a large complex with an historical connection
to Iraq’s CW programme. Of immediate BW concern
is the potential production of ricin toxin. Castor
bean pulp, left over from castor oil production, can
be used to extract ricin toxin. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM
that it manufactured ricin and field-tested it in
artillery shells before the Gulf war. Iraq operated
this plant for legitimate purposes under UNSCOM scrutiny
before 1998 when UN inspectors left the country.
* Since 1999, Iraq has rebuilt major structures destroyed
during Operation Desert Fox. Iraqi officials claim
they are making castor oil for brake fluid, but verifying
such claims without UN inspections is impossible.
In addition to questions about activity at known facilities,
there are compelling reasons to be concerned about
BW activity at other sites and in mobile production
units and laboratories. Baghdad has pursued a mobile
BW research and production capability to better conceal
its programme.
UNSCOM uncovered a document on Iraqi Military Industrial
Commission letterhead indicating that Iraq was interested
in developing mobile fermentation units, and an Iraqi
scientist admitted to UN inspectors that Iraq was
trying to move in the direction of mobile BW production.
Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant, and
concealed BW agent production capabilities based on
mobile BW facilities.
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