Opinion

OPINION

The Bear and The Eagle Operations in Afghanistan by two Superpowers

Columnist Hamid Hussain looks at both Soviet Union and USA in Afghanistan.

Introduction
‘ One of the characteristics of local war is that its scope may expand manifold as the war develops. Therefore, it is necessary to take any local war seriously’.1

Afghanistan was in the media limelight during Soviet occupation in early eighties. Soviets left in early 1989 and the country gradually descended into a fratricidal civil war. Only regional players especially Iran and Pakistan remained involved in country’s affairs including intelligence and military affairs. In late nineties, the name of Afghanistan periodically appeared in news media in connection with extremist Arabs who had found refuge in the war torn country under the patronage of Osama bin Ladin. After the September 11 attacks in United States and the subsequent US campaign in Afghanistan to root out Taliban and extremist Arabs brought the country again on the centre stage of world media for a short while. The general trend during all these years have been only comments about the main personalities and intrigues, which go with such operations. There has been very little serious look at the military operations conducted in the country both by Soviet Union and United States. While the US campaign is too fresh and with very little available information that a comprehensive analysis is not possible but even the Soviet military campaign has not attracted serious study. In Pakistan, very little piece meal information has been clouded in the ideological and religious rhetoric thus preventing a rational analysis for lessons learnt. Similarly, intense anti-American view of general populace in Pakistan has prevented any serious and rational look at the US military operations in Afghanistan. Very few retired senior officers of armed forces involved in Afghanistan have written but even that material is less defence related and more political and rhetorical. One factor being that most of the officers writing about Afghanistan are involved in many controversies and their opinion is more to justify their own actions rather than serious efforts to understand and learn.
This article will review military operations conducted by Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan with brief comments about the weapons systems used. This will be followed by the US military operation in Afghanistan. As no two wars or even two battles are same, therefore, this is not a comparison of the operations of the two superpowers. Both superpowers got involved in Afghanistan with totally different aims, objectives, and plans and in a different regional and international environment. In this article, only military operations will be discussed and the broader political, economic and social factors operating in that region will not be discussed which are beyond the scope of this article. However, it should be remembered that for full appreciation of any conflict, the complete picture (including social, political and economic) need to be seen in proper perspective to understand the conflict. Only one-dimensional view can lead to wrong assumptions and conclusions.

Soviet Operations
I’ve left Afghanistan, but I am an afganet, and always will be. I can’t walk away from what I have seen and done’. A Soviet veteran of Afghan war 2

We were no angels. But we were fighting devils. A Soviet veteran of Afghan war 3

The major deficiency of Soviets at the strategic level was the fact that despite long involvement in Afghanistan, ‘their intelligence was poor and hampered by the need to explain events within Marxist-Leninist framework’. The result of this fundamental weakness was that ‘the Soviets never fully understood the Mujahideen opposition that’s why many of their policies failed to work in Afghanistan’.4 Contrary to popular belief and what Pakistani and western media projected at that time, the initial deployment of Soviet troops was only for a limited regional objective with no long-term strategic goals or quest to take a dip in ‘warm waters’. The Communist Party’s cabinet called Politburo had a Commission on Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Gromyko headed it and its members included KGB Director Andropov, Defence Minister Ustinov, Chief of General Staff Ogarkov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko. Since the April 1978 coup, the two main factions of People’s Democratic Party of Pakistan (PDPA), Khalq and Parcham had been constantly undermining each other. In addition, the mutual hostility between two Khalq leaders, Nur Muhammad Tarakai and Hafizullah Amin and Parcham leader Babrak Karmal undermined the cohesion of Afghan armed forces. Perpetual intrigues, frequent purges and assassinations were the hallmark of this drama. The result was that Afghan armed forces strength dropped to about 40,000 from 90,000. In August 1979, Politburo’s Afghan Commission invited the reports from Chief Military Advisor in Afghanistan, Lt. General Gorelov who strongly advised against any Soviet deployment in the country. In contrast, KGB officer in Afghanistan General Ivanov and Soviet Ambassador in Kabul Puzanov favoured Soviet troop deployment. The same month, Commander of Ground Forces General Pavlovskii was sent for a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. He also advised against Soviet deployment giving the argument that there was lack of clear military mission. Ogarkov and his deputy Colonel General Akhromeev were also against any military intervention.5 The availability of recently declassified documents from former Soviet Union points towards conflicting views about military intervention among various members of Soviet leadership. This was due to personal and organizational conflicts among different individuals who were in the Soviet hierarchy.
The deterioration of Afghan scene due to fracturing of the ruling group and emergence of resistance in country side convinced Soviet leadership that some kind of military intervention was necessary before things got out of hand in the backyard of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military mission was called Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCOSF). Later when it expanded, it was also named 40th Army. The initial main objective was overthrow of Hafizullah Amin and solidification of Babrak Karmal regime. The Soviet high command was not envisioning use of Soviet troops against resistance fighters inside Afghanistan even after deployment. This was despite repeated requests from Afghan regime leader, Babrak Karmal. In Defence Ministry, both Marshal S. L. Sokolov (Defence Minister 1984-87) and General S. F. Akhromeev (Chief of General Staff from 1984-88) were of the view that Soviet troops will only respond if they are fired upon. The operations staff and General Staff were ordered by Brezhnev for plan of gradual withdrawal right from the beginning. Few facts support this view. The Spetsnaz forces, paratroopers and KGB teams, which participated in initial control of key places in Kabul were withdrawn by January 7, 1980. In early 1980, there were about 50,000 Soviet troops.6 The Soviet contingent was largely composed of reservists and many transport vehicles were civilian. Many Soviet leaders especially Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko were against withdrawal. Their argument was that withdrawal at this stage will embolden the resistance fighters and may bring US sponsored Muslim extremists to Soviet borders destabilizing Central Asia. In February 1980, there were massive anti-government protests in Kabul. The frightened Karmal pleaded to Moscow for use of Soviet troops against rebels. It was at that time that Moscow issued the order of engagement of Soviet combat units inside Afghanistan. The possibility of a collapse of Karmal regime in view of massive anti-government activities all over Afghanistan may have influenced the decision of Soviet leadership. In March 1980, LCOSF began its operation in eastern province of Kunar, which rapidly progressed to all over Afghanistan. At operational level, the reservists were replaced with conscripted personnel and military ones replaced all civilian transport vehicles as the task was now different. By summer of 1980, the number of Soviet troops increased to 80,000.7 Compared to the military power of the Soviet Union, the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was still a limited one. During the ten-year period, the Soviet military strength never exceeded 120,000. Four Soviet divisions, four separate brigades, three separate regiments and smaller support units were strained to provide security for the 29 provincial centres and the few industrial and economic installations’.8
At conceptual level, the Soviet operational strategy for Afghanistan was based on the following objectives:

- Garrisoning the main cities, airbases, logistics areas and main routes to give stability to the central government.
- Strengthening Afghan forces to a level where they could tackle resistance and Soviet troops could be withdrawn.
- Using Afghan troops for operations in the countryside with intelligence, artillery and air support from Soviets.
- Minimum interface between Soviet troops and local population.9

In general terms, for better understanding, the Soviet operations in Afghanistan can be divided into four phases.10

Phase I:
(December 1979-February 1980)
In this phase, Soviets mainly secured bases and installations and settled in various garrisons. Soviet troops participated in combat missions along with Afghan troops. Only very difficult missions were carried by Soviets alone. More than 35 percent of men and equipment were committed to securing regime installations and line of communications. There were no proper accommodations for the forces and the bulk of force remained in the field in tent cities. This arrangement also meant that huge resources would be spent on force protection.

Phase II:
(March 1980-April 1985)
In this phase, Soviets were involved in active combat on their own as Afghan forces were not in a position to tackle resistance fighters. Large-scale operations were carried out. Both the strength and firepower of Soviet troops was enhanced. 40th Army was reinforced with 201st Motorized Rifle Division and two additional motorized rifle regiments. About 600 tanks, 500 aircraft and helicopters, 500 pieces of artillery along with armoured personnel carriers were engaged. In mountains, there was increasing use of gunship helicopters. Several division strength operations were carried out by Soviets especially in Panjsher valley during this time period. In December 1981, the dynamic Marshal Petrov took over the command of Soviet Ground Forces. Under Petrov, there was gradual evolution of new tactics with increasing role of air-assault troops and light infantry. He also restructured the force gearing it towards counter-insurgency operations. 66th and 70th Independent Brigades were the first prototypes of this strategy.11
During this period, Soviets had enough successes, which worried the backers of resistance fighters. The Chief of Afghan Cell of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Brigadier Muhammad Yusuf became very vocal about importance of acquiring shoulder fired Stinger missiles. He pressed General Zia and American officials for Stingers as he was of the view that ‘without it Mujahideen morale would not hold out indefinitely’.12

Phase III:
(April 1985-January 1987)

In 1985, Soviets tried to win by sheer force although the operation was still limited, as the number of Soviet troops was not increased. In addition, Soviets did not embark on destroying Mujahideen’s bases in Pakistan. High altitude carpet-bombing to destroy the infrastructure to force large scale migration from rural areas and large scale assaults were used for a quick military victory.13 Unable to achieve military victory, Soviet Union under the new leadership of Gorbachev decided on winding up the adventure. In this phase, the major fight was transferred to Afghan forces. Soviets boosted Afghan troops and supported them with artillery, airborne and engineer units. Soviet troops were involved in small size ambushes and were kept mainly in reserve to support Afghan troops in various operations. Soviet Special Forces, Spetsnaz were used in various small-scale special operations. In early 1987, Spetsnaz successfully ambushed a Mujahideen party in Kandahar area and hit the jackpot. They were able to get hold of three stingers after annihilating the Mujahideen group.14 Large scale operations were carried only when absolutely necessary, such as 1986 operation to destroy resistance fighter’s base in Khost (Zhawar II) and 1987 Operation Magistral to relieve the garrison in Khost. Soviets along with Afghan government troops were successful in destruction of a major supply base at Zhawar in Paktia. By attacking a major supply base, Soviets forced the resistance fighters to response to this threat. The activation of resistance assets in the whole region exposed them and Soviets took care of them one at a time. The major disadvantage for resistance was that they could not defend in a coordinated and organized way.

Phase IV:
(January 1987-February 1989)
This was the period of national reconciliation in Afghanistan under the new Afghan President Muhammad Najibullah. Co-optation and compromise more in tuned with Afghan traditions was used to decrease the aggressiveness of the resistance fighters. Soviet troops entered combat only when directly engaged. They did not participate in offensive actions. This was the phase of preparation of total withdrawal, which was completed in two stages. In first stage, half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn and after a three-month break the remainder forces were withdrawn.
In Afghanistan, Soviet military leadership could not apply their standard training methods, which were geared toward fighting large concentration of regular army troops in corps, division and brigade level engagements. This meant that they were hard pressed to come up with innovative ideas to counter their opposition in Afghanistan. ‘The Soviets formulated new concepts for waging war in nonlinear fashion’. The units and formations were reorganized to ‘emphasize flexibility and hence, survivability’.15 The most effective method was use of airborne troops along with a mechanized ground attack but Soviets could not bring adequate number of heliborne detachments. The air assault forces consisted of an airborne division, a brigade, parachute regiment and two air assault battalions. A large number of air assault forces were stationed in Bala Hisar Fort in Kabul. The airborne troops were used in coordination with ground offensive and mainly involved in blocking the retreat of resistance fighters or prevent their reinforcements. They were also used in ambushes deep in Mujahideen controlled areas, where they will spend several days in the field away from their base camp. They were used in border areas near Pakistan and Iran to disrupt Mujahideen supply lines. Overall these troops performed very well and were involved in many close battles with Mujahideen. The main disadvantage they had was that due to the nature of the terrain and very small size of the landing zones, they could not use their specialized armoured personnel carriers. These troops were generally better equipped. For better efficiency and to decrease the load carried by each air assault trooper, smaller weapons were used. The assault rifle had folding stocks with eight to ten ammunition magazines along with few grenades and a bayonet. A shortened lighter version of AK-74, 5.45 mm AKR submachine gun was also used by these troops. Good intelligence due to penetration of resistance groups by Afghan government, well coordinated small assault groups, flexibility of small units and superior air power were responsible for the success of these operations. Another new concept dictated by the nature of operations was bronegruppa (armoured group). This method used ‘the fire power of the personnel carrier in an independent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted’. This gave the commander significant manoeuvrability.16 Soviets increasingly used ambushes of Mujahideen detachments. With experience, they increasingly improvised the ambush techniques using different type of groupings in an ambush to make it more effective. In a well-executed ambush, an observation group (2-3 men for reconnaissance), firing group (machine gunners, grenadiers and gunners which will shoot in the kill zone), snatch group (5-7 men which would capture prisoners, documents and weapons) and security group (which would cover flanks and provide cover during withdrawal) would act in an organized and coordinated way to achieve results. Success of any ambush depended on military cunning, thorough practical preparation of all participants, a well-defined organization, and coordination with supporting elements’.17 A large amount of both personnel and equipment was invested in convoy escort and protection duties. Soviets greatly improved communication and applied new tactics in convoy protection as they learned from their earlier experience. New Material Support Battalions (about 30 such units were deployed in Afghanistan) were used along with a separate transport Brigade to keep roads open and supplies moving.18
One arm, which was the critical component of the LCOSF and was used extensively beyond their capacity, was the army aviation. This was due to the fact that guerrilla nature of the fight made fixed wing aircraft less effective. Early during the operations, Soviets used MiG-21 Fishbed. This aircraft was suited for air to ground combat operations mainly in flat terrains which made it less effective in Afghan mountainous terrain. After failure of MiG-21s, Soviets introduced two fixed wings aircraft; Su-25 Frogfoot and Tu-16 Badger.19 These aircraft were also not very effective against guerrillas but devastated most of the countryside with carpet-bombing. Failure of fixed wings aircraft forced increasing use of helicopters. Helicopter was used in several roles including ‘transportation, mobile artillery, reconnaissance, communications relay, supply, artillery spotter, and command vehicle’. About 329 helicopters were lost in Afghanistan (127 helicopter gunship, 174 armed helicopter transports and 28 lift ships).20 Soviets deployed Mi-24 Hind, Mi-8 Hips, Mi-4 Hound and Mi-6 Hook in Afghanistan. Two independent Helicopter Regiments, 181st in Jalalabad and 280th in Qandahar and Shindand air base used large number of Mi-6 Hooks in various operations along border.21
The opposition, which Soviets were facing was given diplomatic, intelligence, technical and enormous material support by United States and Saudi Arabia. At operational level, Pakistani army officers seconded to the Afghan Cell of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) coordinated all operations on the ground. At political level, rapid changes at the top due to senility of the Soviet leadership in contrast to previous long tenure of leadership prevented any coordinated, well-thought out plans about Afghanistan. Afghan resistance fighters mainly used AK-47 assault rifles and RGG-7 grenade launchers in their operations. Later, crew-served weapons were introduced. The resistance never presented any meaningful alternative to the Afghan government. Their whole exercise was limited to show up unexpectedly, fire, create a lot of upheaval on the field and then disappear to come back another day to repeat this exercise. This was exactly what their forefathers have been doing for centuries. The only difference was that they were using modern weapons. They fought bravely suffering enormously but all their gains were only tactical. Thousand tactical victories did not translate into a single strategic win.
Age-old concept that terrain dictates the tactics is true in all battles. ‘The Soviet equipment was designed for a different war on a different terrain. It failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan’.22 More important than that is the fact that no amount of technological supe-
riority can be fully effective if there is a national will to fight and endure the hardships in a conflict between unequal foes. This was the decisive factor on part of the Afghan resistance. Soviet political and military leadership could not understand this fundamental fact, as ‘Marxist-Leninist dogma did not allow for a “war of national liberation” where people would fight against a Marxist regime’.23 Soviets would regret for not paying attention to the advice of Georgi Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia. In 1921, he advised the first Soviet ambassador to Kabul, “You should by all means avoid the fatal mistake of trying to plant Communism in the country”.24 His words proved to prophetic seventy years later.

US Operations
‘ If you are fearless, but combat inefficient, you can be killed easily by fearful troops who remain courageous and combat-efficient’. Major (Retd) Kelly McCann of US Special Forces

“Sir; If they kill me, I’ll be replaced. But if they kill you, the airplanes will go away”. A young Afghan soldier while covering Sergeant William Markham, January 2002
When on September 11, the twin towers were crumbling down in New York, it should have been crystal clear to everybody that the day of reckoning was on hand. Expecting anything less would have been too naïve. Once, President George Bush pointed his finger to Osama bin Ladin and demanded his delivery to US by express service, the die was cast. US military planning divisions went to work for possible coming operations. In the planning stage, staging bases in north were set up in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Soviets opened up their vast intelligence archives about who is who of Afghanistan. Pakistan, which has been more closely involved with the latest rulers of Afghanistan was put in line with a very big stick and a very small carrot. ISI Chief, Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad was in Washington and was going to catch his flight back to Pakistan on the evening of September 11. Mahmud and Pakistani ambassador were asked to come to State Department at 8 O’clock in the morning of September 12 for a chat. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gave Mahmud the wish list with a reminder that none of the items were open to any negotiation. The seriousness of US was emphasized again when Mahmud came back in the evening for another meeting at State Department.25 Pakistan fully knowing the gravity of the situation and blood lust of the US, wisely decided to move away from the coming fireballs.
United States announced its objective of eliminating Osama bin Ladin and his network in Afghanistan and removal of Taliban government replacing it with another. The Afghanistan in 2001 when US landed there was totally different than the Afghanistan of 1979 when Soviet troops rolled into the land.26 The first step in US operations was the psychological operations. ‘Command Solo’, a C-130 E aircraft from 193rd Special Operations Wing can broadcast radio and television signals. As Afghanistan had no television station, therefore only radio broadcasts along with different type of leaflets were dropped.27 In Langley at CIA headquarters, top experts on Afghanistan were invited for a frank and thorough analysis. In second week of September, the CIA station chief at Islamabad gave his assessment, which proved correct. His report stated that Mullah Omar with a small group will throw his lot with bin Ladin but a large number of tribal elders and even Taliban with more nationalistic attitude were increasingly skeptical of Mullah Omar and Arabs.28 Military operations were conducted from Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan, where about 1,000 troops of US Army’s 10th Mountain Division were stationed. Some small-scale special operations were carried from three facilities in Pakistan (Dalbandin, Jacobabad and Pasni). Once Taliban were cleared from northern Afghanistan, the operational bases were moved inside Afghanistan. Aerial campaign was conducted through various aircraft carriers stationed in Arabian Sea. The Combat Search And Rescue Teams (CSAR), helicopter borne forces for rescuing downed pilots were based in Uzbekistan for operations in North and in Oman and Pakistan for operations in south and east. Now a transportation hub is being built in Manas Air Base in Bishkek, Kyrghystan. Due to the nature of the battle, Bush administration was concerned about the definition of the mission. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had rightly cautioned that there should be broad beginning and ending and focus should not be on Osama bin Ladin.29
As Special Forces are a major player in Afghanistan, it will be helpful to define what are Special Forces. Special Forces are a small number of elite soldiers, which are selected after a rigorous training. In US Delta Force, Green Berets and Navy SEALs are the only real special forces, which are used for special combat missions. The Special Operations Command’s headquarters is at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This headquarter coordinates the functions of 47,000 strong US Army Special Forces, Delta Force, Rangers, Navy SEALs, Civil Affairs, Psyops battalions, army aviators called Nightstalkers and Air Force personnel who are special operations fliers. There is another category of troops called ‘Raiders’. Their training is also superior but they are trained for larger scale operations and, therefore, equipped for that role. 82nd Airborne Division is in the ‘Raider’ category of troops. US Rangers, another highly trained outfit, falls somewhere in between the Raiders and Special Forces. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in paramilitary operations for the first time since its wings were clipped in 1975-76 amidst uproar about the checkered record of such operations. When George Tenet became director in 1997, he rebuilt the Special Operations Group (SOG) of CIA. Since the American embassy bombings in Africa in 1998, CIA has been gradually increasing its contacts in Afghanistan in search of Al-Qaeda. About 30 Afghan agents code named GE/SENIORS had been stalking Bin Ladin for about two years at the cost of $10,000 per month. They were not given the green light to kill Bin Ladin.30 After September 11, the CIA operations were put on fast track. James Pavitt, deputy director of operations (DDO) as head of CIAs covert operations was involved in day-to-day planning. The first team (codenamed Jawbreaker) arrived in northern Afghanistan on September 26 and started to work with Northern Alliance in Panjsher Valley. This initial team of four men carrying two suitcases with $3 million in cash went to work and by the time of US attack in October 2001, about 100 CIA officers were scattered all over Afghanistan.31 According to one estimate, CIA had distributed about $70 million cash during Afghanistan operation.32
In the early part of the operation, US concentrated its efforts only against Arabs and Taliban leadership and did not generalize the war, which prevented alienation of Pushtuns. In North, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), special forces and CIA operatives got the ball rolling. In south, contacts were made with tribal elders. One Green Berets team was sent to Uzbekistan at the end of September 2001. From this base, small teams worked inside Afghanistan. A twelve-man team of Green Berets was working with Dostum while another small team with another commander Atta Muhammad.33 One team was working with Ismail Khan while another linked up with Karim Khalili of Hizb-e-Wahdat, who was operating in the area of Bamiyan. A Lt. Colonel in charge of 5th Special Forces Group’s 3rd Battalion was assigned to coordinate the battles of three commanders (Dostum, Muhammad Atta and Muhammad Muhaqiq)34 who were as likely to cut each other’s throat as of any Taliban. The special operations teams were given total freedom in the field at tactical level. The high command very frankly told the men, “You guys will be on the ground; you figure it out”.35 One or two members of the air force went with the special operations guys for coordination of air strikes. Team 555 (Triple Nickel) of Special Forces landed in Shamali Plains near Kabul on October 19.36
Afghan allies of US started to work in north first to wean supporters of Afghanistan. Abdul Rashid Dostum contacted Taliban commander of Kunduz, Mullah Dadullah who decided to call quits when agreement was reached with him that Afghan Taliban fighters will be allowed to go home. Dostum also negotiated directly with Mullah Nuri and Mullah Faizal, the two senior commanders in Kunduz. More than 5,000 Afghan Taliban fighters surrendered and the two Mullahs became personal guests of Dostum.37 General Muhammad Daud led about 3,000 fighters to take control of most parts of the Kunduz. About 6,000 Taliban and foreign fighters surrendered at Kunduz. In Mazar Sharif, Taliban evacuated leaving behind 900 Pakistanis dug up in a madrassah in the city. When the negotiators sent by Dostum were shot dead by the Pakistanis, their fate was sealed. A direct hit of the building from an air strike finished the story before it started. In Taloqan, with changing tide, the chief commander of Taliban Mullah Shabir Ahmad along with thirty commanders and about 3,000 men switched sides. Mullah Shabir while comfortably resting in the house of his host (a northern alliance commander) calmly stated that while he was filled with Islamic feeling, he realized that outside hands, especially terrorists were involved in the movement (Taliban), therefore for the good of the country, he decided to come over to northern alliance.38 There were very limited full scale battles. Some northern alliance troops really fought well and bravely although this was rare. A 250-man cavalry under commander Lal Muhammad charged the fortified lines of Taliban in a nineteenth century cavalry charge reaching on their heads at the same time when bombs from an air strike hit the positions.39 In Western part of the country, in Herat area, Ismail Khan was ready to move in the vacuum created by Taliban retreat.
Mazar Sharif was the first city to fall and the remaining big cities fell like a house of cards. With the turning tide, lot of commanders started to ditch Taliban. A large number of former Pushtun commanders met in Peshawar and advocated amnesty to those fighters who surrender to arrange for peaceful surrender of cities where there was Pushtun population to prevent casualties. A Pushtun Taliban commander with 4,000 fighters joined the Northern Alliance troops in the march towards Kabul. Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf placed about 500 of his fighters in Kabul. US was still distrustful of ISI and US intelligence was not sharing information with ISI. CIA operatives were working with many tribes in south and east.40 In November 2001, more attention was paid to the southern front. Generous amount of money was distributed among the tribes striding the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Durand Line) and Pushtun tribes of southern Afghanistan. Taliban were now trapped in Kandahar, cut off from the border with Pakistan, when tribal militias turned against them. Lt. Colonel David Fox of 2nd battalion coordinated the efforts in south where Special Forces Team 574 was active.41 Hamid Karzai worked with various groups and tried to convince them about the futility of resistance. US Special Forces teams worked with Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai in southern Afghanistan. When Abdul Haq was captured and promptly hanged by Taliban, his brother Haji Abdul Qadir worked in eastern and southern Afghanistan to wean Pushtuns from Taliban. Six Pushtun commanders of Taliban fighters in east met with Pushtun leadership in Peshawar and offered switching sides. No one had to convince them. Afghans may be anything but they are not stupid. They did not accept money and started shooting. They took the money and waited for the winning team. Once, it was clear that Americans had the day, they switched sides. There were no mass surrenders or marching armies. The leaders simply vanished and the foot soldiers went to their homes. Mullah Naquibullah’s (Chief of Alokazai tribe) stint as commander in essence gives the ground realities of Afghanistan and should be an eye opener for those who try to see civil wars through ideological prisms. During Soviet occupation, he fought in his area and earned respect. When Soviets departed, he was ruling the Argandhab valley. In 1992, when Burhanuddin Rabbani took over in Kabul as head of the coalition of various groups, Naquibullah was made military commander of Kandahar. In 1994, when the Taliban were on the rise in southern Afghanistan with weakening of the Kabul writ, he switched to Taliban. Later, he spent two years in Islamabad for ‘treatment’ purposes where he had frequent meetings with Hamid Karzai and American officials long before September 11. He later returned to his hometown. When Americans packed up Taliban in 2001, he switched again and ended up owning ten cars used by Taliban government. A retired Indian officer had more grip on the Afghanistan scene. Just few weeks after the start of aerial campaign, he wrote, “knowing the Afghan propensity towards treachery this writer, at this stage, would expect large-scale defections from the Taliban ranks”.42 And he was right. Local tribal leaders with their tribal militias gradually took control of all major cities in eastern and southern Afghanistan without any fight. Taliban local administrators simply packed up and left while foot soldiers joined new winners. In Jalalabad, more than 2,000 tribal fighters under the command of Hazrat Ali joined US troops to isolate foreign fighters in Tora Bora. On the part of Afghans, not everyone was in for the money, some genuinely thought about the hope for a better Afghanistan after expulsion of extremists. This group is a minority. For most of them, ‘A vision about the greater good of Afghanistan was too abstract, heady and distant a prize for some tribesmen – but they understood and would gladly accept cash’.43
Once the Taliban were completely neutralized and the whole country was free of any of their influence, the second phase of operations started. In Kandahar, Marines from 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit set up a base (Camp Rhino). Later 101st Airborne relieved Marines in Kandahar. In this phase, foreign fighters and some Taliban remnants that have fled to southern and eastern mountains were pursued. In December 2001, the cave complexes in Tora Bora were heavily bombed. In March 2002, heavy aerial bombing of the cave complexes was carried followed by a large scale combing by the ground troops in Operation Anaconda. 10th Mountain Division and 101st Air Assault participated in these operations. In March along with Afghan militia, US soldiers embarked on a large-scale combing mission (Operation Anaconda), which was a serious setback. The battleground was Shah-e-Kot valley southwest of Gardez. About twelve hundred US troops including two hundred special operations soldiers participated in this operation. Some suggest that locally recruited Afghans betrayed the US soldiers and when US soldiers landed from their helicopters at about dozen mountain passes, they were ambushed. A severe firefight went on for two days. Eight US soldiers were killed and about 100 injured.44 Other account of the battle states that the Afghan allies of US retreated when they encountered heavy fire. A six-man SEAL team with Air Force Combat Controller came under fire when they tried to land killing the controller and wounding two SEALs. The helicopter carrying Alpha company of Ist Ranger Battalion flew into the same kill zone and was brought down. Three Rangers were killed and remaining were pinned down for seventeen hours.45 In summer, 82nd Airborne (82nd Airborne is based at Bagram airbase near Kabul) replaced other units in this search operation. In October 2002, ‘Operation Allied Sweep’ was launched in eastern Afghanistan to eliminate remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. About 2,000 troops from 82nd Airborne participated in this operation. The dangers of using aerial power against small remnants with significant risk of civilian casualties became quickly apparent when a wedding party was bombed. In addition, the heavy handedness of US soldiers in dealing with local population during search operations raised the possibility of alienation of large scale of Pushtun population. US learnt its lesson very quickly and switched from massive bombing for small targets to more precise missions. In addition, they were well-advised by their Afghan allies and civilian casualties were given blood money, following the tribal traditions. The failure to catch important Al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders caused some frustration in Bush administration. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld met with head of US Special Operations Command, General Charles Holland to increase the role of Special Forces in this hunt.46 Disproportionately higher number of US soldiers was deployed near Pakistan border to try to stop infiltration from tribal areas. In Khost, a battalion of parachute infantry is stationed at a base called Camp Salerno. About 2,000 US troops are patrolling that area which is few miles from Pakistani border.47 Recently, in Spinboldak, near Pakistan border, about 80 fighters engaged in a firefight with US troops which resulted in killing of about 18 fighters.
US operation in Afghanistan was the first special operations war. Elite units of various branches of intelligence and armed forces branches participated. SOG of CIA and troops under Special Operations Command were the main bodies involved on ground. Personnel of Air Force special tactics were also involved. No one even the US media fully comprehended the nature of operations. Many skeptics stated that bombing has not damaged Taliban and a large ground force will be needed to defeat them. The reason was that no one knew about special operations and how they work. US had done their homework, knowing which tribal leaders will be reliable allies and which one would try to dupe them into eliminating their tribal rivals. In addition, they knew which Afghan would be trying to get the military hardware rather than fighting.48 In the early phase, special forces were involved in reconnaissance and surveillance of targets and acted as ‘advisors, putting eyes on targets, and putting lasers, designators, to direct fire power’.49 Later, they participated in different operations guiding the local Afghan allies.
There are several complex factors, which are at interplay in Afghanistan. The opposing forces to US in Afghanistan need a closer evaluation for getting a clear picture. The Al-Qaeda’s committed fighters, which were mainly non-Afghans, were aligned with Taliban. Only senior leadership of Taliban had close alliance with Al-Qaeda. The Afghan foot soldiers were mainly un-skilled fighters best at hit and run small-scale operations. Once the tide of battle turned, they just defected or surrendered. The non-Afghan elements had now a small number of local supporters but no large-scale popular support. They retreated in mountains to carry small-scale skirmishes. A number of them crossed over to Pakistan where more than 400 were apprehended. Although they gave some good fight at Highway 4, Sayed Salim Kalay and in southern mountains but the impact of these skirmishes on overall operations was limited. In this background, if US forces achieved what they have, this should have been expected. As one commentator has correctly pointed to the fact that ‘few 20th century combatants enjoyed anything like the power or efficiency of US high-tech fire support in Afghanistan’.50 It does not need a bright person to use sheer weight to achieve its goal. As one former US army officer has correctly pointed that ‘while surely the United States can put munitions on any place on the planet through sheer mass of resources, there is no corresponding superiority of individual troops or units – and more important, no superiority of operational result’.51 The resources available for US defence are enormous. It can be judged from the fact that US spends about $4 billion on 35,000-40,000 Special Forces alone, a budget which is more than total defence budget of most countries. The success of this type of investment is quite evident from the fact that in whole operation in Afghanistan, from the start of hostilities till fall of Kandahar in December only 110 CIA operatives and 316 special forces personnel were on the ground.52 These 316 special forces personnel were organized in eight A-Teams, four company level units and three battalion level commands. All these units reported to the Joint Special Operations Task Force based at Khanabad.53 There is a general agreement that US forces are casualty shy and that is correct. In Afghanistan, senior commanders have vetoed many missions for the fear of casualties. While genuine concern for the safety of troops should be every army high command’s concern but expecting the real battle to be like a mock exercise can result in inertia at the command level and frustration at lower level. This is a major handicap for US at strategic level. This means that rather than taking the fight to the remaining resistance in small pockets, the initiative is left to the resistance. They are allowed to take their time, plan and engage US troops at their ground of choice and US responds to it. Both time and money is lost in this approach. While money may not be a problem for US but time is precious as far as strategic view is concerned. The major component of resources, both in men and material has been directed towards force protection. In mountains, armour to protect the soldiers against the small arm fire (the only real threat to US troops in Afghanistan) cannot be deployed. In plains and in urban areas, US can use tracked vehicles (like M113 A3 Gavin fighting vehicle) to protect against small arm fire. In addition, usual inter-department rivalry has resulted in bureaucratic hurdles. CIA and Department of Defence (DoD) have different perspectives. The increasing role of SOG of CIA worries DoD. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld does not like the idea that the ‘CIA’s paramilitary operatives could start fights his forces might have to finish’.54 Rumsfeld’s arrogant and forceful style and tight control caused some discomfort among the senior military brass. In one of the meetings, President Bush asked General Tommy Franks about his opinion about a matter Rumsfeld had talked about. Franks replied, “Sir, I think exactly what my secretary thinks, what he’s ever thought, what he will ever think, or whatever he thought he might think’. Franks kept his channels opened to two former soldiers in State Department, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.55
State of the art communications equipment linking soldier on the ground to his immediate commanders few hundred miles and then thousands of miles away to Europe and America right into Pentagon and White House assured each and every piece of information was passed on quickly. On positive side, this assured timely information to the senior brass and change of plan according to the change situation. On negative side, this allowed micro-management of operations by generals, which is not good for overall success of operations. In addition, this approach can kill the spirit of junior officers in the field and generates frustration. Trying to fight a war with heavy emphasis on high technology warfare has its pitfalls also. One example will show that simple innocuous mistake can have devastating consequences. In early December 2001, near Kandahar, an errant 2200-pound satellite guided bomb resulted in death of three American and five Afghans and wounding another forty. Cause of mistake? The Air Force combat air controller changed the battery of his Global Positioning System (GPS). He did not realize that he had to re-adjust his GPS. After a battery change, the device would revert to displaying the coordinator’s position on the GPS instead of that of intended target.56 There are lot of lessons to be learned from Operation Anaconda regarding efficiency of state of the art equipment. Army deployed sensitive surveillance platforms to pinpoint enemy and then use precision bombing to bring the enemy out to engage. A recent study found that these ‘high tech eyes in the sky’ did not detect more than half of enemy positions. Similarly, the efficiency of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) was not always upto the mark. One enemy position kept engaging the forces for almost a week despite five direct hits from aerial PGMs.57
The most important part of any operation is the flexibility of the whole exercise, quickly adjusting to a changed scenario, which minimizes risks and improves efficiency. So far, US has shown reasonably good flexibility in Afghan operations. In July 2002, after an ambush of patrol outside Khost wounded five American soldiers, artillery was introduced for the first time. Six 105 mm Howitzers were deployed at Kandahar base. Equipped with counter fire radar, the system is able to identify the source of rocket fire and respond with a barrage of artillery fire when there is not enough time to call in air strike.58 One example of the unconventional style will give some idea about flexibility. The logistics for the earlier part of the campaign was carried by 200th Material Management Centre of 21st Theatre Support Command (TSC) based in Germany. In a record time, they were able to deliver not some high tech military gadgets but western-style saddles and 12,000 pounds of fodder to Afghanistan.59 This was essential as Special Forces and CIA operatives were using horses in northern Afghanistan. Americans never forgot the lessons of Vietnam and kept the media at arms length from any operational area. American public was given information about the operations only what the government wanted to give. Any independent reporting or coverage was not allowed which successfully kept tactical blunders in the cupboard.
Friendly fire in different operations resulting in death of combatants and civilians was a problem in Afghanistan. This caused significant apprehensions among the policy-makers. In November 2001, a F-18 dropped bomb near Mazar Sharif killing six Afghan soldiers working with American soldiers and injuring five Special Forces soldiers. The problem seemed to be due to poor coordination. A newly arrived headquarter member was made in charge of the calling the air strike for a Special Forces team. In December 2001, a B-52 dropped a bomb killing three US and five Afghan soldiers and injuring forty. GPS defaulting to the position of its own coordinates after a battery change was responsible for this mistake. In March 2002, an AC-130 gunship helicopter strafed a friendly convoy resulting in death of one Special Forces soldier and many Afghan allies. On April 17, 2002 a F-16 fighter dropped a 500-pound bomb on a group of Canadian soldiers from Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry who were conducting a night live fire exercise. This error resulted in the death of four soldiers and wounding another eight.60
Although US soldiers closely working with Afghans quickly developed a rapport essential for coordinated efforts, US soldiers are at a disadvantage. In the Afghan society of shifting alliances, it is almost impossible to ensure operational security when conducting joint operations. The major bulk of operation was done with small teams of special operations and SOG of CIA working with Afghans. This was the most crucial and delicate part of the operation. The betrayal of only a small number of teams could have derailed the whole operation right in the beginning. This fact was clearly pointed by General (Retd) Wayne Downing, former commander of Special Forces who was a deputy on National Security Council staff.61 This fact forced administration to pay more attention to the political problems of Afghanistan rather than focusing on only military aspect. It was this debate about political crisis, which resulted in slow down of military operations in early phase, which didn’t go beyond aerial bombing runs. This resulted in some frustration at the higher level. After receiving reports from the frontline CIA operatives, decision was made to now decimate the Taliban frontlines to make way for the advance of troops of Northern Alliance. Americans fully aware of the internal rivalries clearly stayed away from backing one against the other. In one case, when in Baghlan, Jaffer Nadiri tried to use US team assigned to him (Team 532) against Khalil Anderabi to wrest control of Pul-e-Khumri, US tried to mediate between two. After failure of their effort they evacuated the team.62 The current predicament at policy level is the dilemma that the US troops are performing the role of a police force in Afghanistan for which they are neither trained nor equipped.
The potential problems for the US operations in Afghanistan depend on several factors. The foremost is the clarity of the US policy-makers about its short and long term objective. If US consider keeping a significant number of troops for few more years, then it is quite natural that chances of more accidents, misunderstandings and small-scale ambushes of US soldiers will increase. This will increase the chances of entanglement of US soldiers in a no win situation. Another factor is the stability of the Afghan government. If the government is seen just as a puppet of US, very soon the general hostility of Afghan public against the government will escalate and attempts will be made to target government. These attempts will be limited to assassinations and detonation of explosives at public areas to discredit government. This will eventually bring US troops in picture, if the decision is made to support the government with US arms. President Hamid Karzai is well aware of this fact and that is the reason that he invited Iranian President Muhammad Khatami (archrival of US) to visit Kabul. US role in Afghanistan will also be affected by the military overstretch. Regardless of how big or powerful a military machine is, it has its limitations. With current accumulation of huge US resources in Gulf area against Iraq and spread of US troops in other parts of the globe may overstretch military capabilities beyond acceptable level with negative fall out. This factor may encourage increasing resistance to US military presence in Afghanistan. Keeping in view the historical experience of Afghanistan, the most important factor will be external support to any resistance against the US troops. The support could be state sponsored or by non-state actors. The anti-US sentiments are high especially in Pushtun areas and adjacent border areas of Pakistan. Individual sympathizers may give sanctuary to resistance fighters but if the government does not support this effort, its impact will be very minimal. Many mafias (luxury goods smugglers, drug barons, transport mafia) were making huge profits due to instability of Afghanistan. If they see a benefit in chaos at the border zone, they may back some resistance fighters but again its impact will be limited. The state support to resistance fighters will depend on which player sees continued US presence in Afghanistan as threat to its interests. If a state’s policy makers think that it can covertly support resistance to US soldiers in Afghanistan while not appear to be directly involved, they may embark on this adventurous course although it should be very clear that the consequences of such exercise could be devastating for every player. If Russia decides to stir up things, it will use its allies, which are concentrated in northern areas. In this scenario, more activity will be in northern part of the country especially Panjsher valley. If Iran decides to make life difficult for Americans, it will use its proxies, which are mainly in western Afghanistan especially around Herat and central Afghanistan (the Shiite Hazaras). Pakistan on its own is not likely to start a fire in the backyard and bring the American ire. If China along with Pakistan decides on action, then the area of activity will be eastern and southern Afghanistan, which borders Pakistan. These choices may seem plausible to many policy-makers as use of non-state actors to achieve objectives against a stronger foe are becoming in vogue. If this occurs, then it is not likely that US will quietly pack up in the dark of the night to the jubilation of its adversaries. US would most likely cut a deal with various warlords and use their militias for dirty work rather than exposing its own soldiers. This means that Afghanistan will see another cycle of civil war. US will also try to pay back the culprit countries by stirring up the ethnic groups and disaffected minorities of these countries, which can really mess up the region for a long time to come. The only non-violent possible scenario, which seem remote at present is that all regional players concentrate on peace and stability of Afghanistan with the hope that the quicker Afghanistan becomes stable, the earlier US will withdraw from the region. The most critical factor in this scenario is the ability of the US policy makers to convince all regional countries that it has no long-term hegemonic designs for Afghanistan. Indeed a very difficult task as trust level about US policies is at the lowest ebb at present.
Those who are thinking of a grand quagmire where a large number of US troops will be enmeshed should be rest assured that US game plan is much wiser than what the Soviets had. So far, US operations have been exactly opposite of Soviet operational strategy. As early as June 2002, all operations in Afghanistan were detached from Central Command (CENTCOM). Now a Combined Joint Task Force 180 led by Lt. General Dan McNeill is conducting all operations in Afghanistan. Total number of US personnel is about 7,000 while another about 2,500 non-American foreign troops are involved in Afghanistan. This lean force supported by high tech and versatile air power ensures that the casualties are kept at minimum and in case of decision of disengagement, the force can be very quickly moved out of Afghanistan. If Osama bin Ladin is killed or captured, US may declare mission accomplished. In addition, the security operations in Afghanistan may be contracted to private companies. Currently, Civilian Police (CIVPOL) section of State Department and International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Programme (ICITAP) run by Justice Department train officers for police and investigative work in foreign countries.63 State Department has contracted with a private company DynCorp to recruit, train and equip officers for civilian police works working under United Nations.64 This model may be expanded in case of Afghanistan and a locally recruited force trained, equipped and guided by a small number of US experts perform the police role. Contingents from other countries also participated in Afghanistan. In the early phase, 40th Commando Group of Royal Marines was involved. Later in early 2002, 45th Commando Group along with 7 Commando Battery (with 105 mm Light Guns), 59 Independent Commando Squadron of Royal Engineers, Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters from 27 Squadron and a detachment of Commando Logistics Regiment participated in ground operations. The total number of soldiers from United Kingdom involved was about 1,700.65 Canadian snipers from 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry were attached to 101st Airborne Division. US was very clear from the beginning that its forces will not be involved in the dirty business of policing the war ravaged Afghanistan. Few days after start of aerial campaign, in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approved of International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). In November 2002, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) held a conference in Belgium to finalize the ISAF structure. Turkey commands ISAF-2 while ISAF-3 will be run by Germany and Netherlands. All areas including force generation, intelligence, coordination, information sharing and communications will be part of this exercise. Now plans are underway to give all operations inside Afghanistan to NATO troops completely disengaging American soldiers. In January 2003, German Defence Minister Peter Struck visited Kabul to finalize the arrangements of take over of Afghan operations by NATO. Lt. General Norbert Van Heyst heads the German forces in Afghanistan. US will continue air force, intelligence and financial support but ground operations will be handed over to Europeans and Afghan forces.

Conclusion
The Soviets brought an army to Afghanistan, which was trained for a conventional battlefield. Their opposition decided on guerrilla warfare. Despite many innovations the Soviet army was forced to leave after ten years, as its allies were too weak and discredited to hold on their own. The whole deck was stacked against the Soviets including internal, regional and international factors. Soviets were too isolated militarily, politically, diplomatically and economically to go on any longer. The less equipped and fractious resistance groups were tenacious enough to endure the severe mauling but not giving up the struggle. The major drawback of a conscript army became apparent when the depressed and dejected Afghan veterans came back to their towns, cities and hamlets and the faith in the system shook to the core. The result was eclipse of the Soviet Union. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the many complex factors at play, which resulted in the disintegration of Soviet Union.
As far as the US operations in Afghanistan are concerned, the fundamental fact, which was totally ignored by all Pakistani defence analysts (many of former senior officers have worked with Afghanistan) was the changed scenario in 2001. Taliban after capture of a large part of the country and under the influence of their Pakistani handlers have come to resemble more like an army in infancy. They have changed from guerrilla fighters to organized and mechanized columns resembling army units, once they became effective rulers. This transformation was the natural outcome. Before, they were fighting a government (no matter how rag tag), now they were the rulers and have to fight their opponents who were using guerrilla tactics. This transformation meant that Taliban would be engaging in columns of trucks and tanks, artillery, fixed defensive positions and other paraphernalia of an army rather than a guerrilla war. In addition, in many technical and command and control functions, Taliban were helped by a small group of retired Pakistani armed forces personnel in their private capacity who have undergone a ‘reverse indoctrination’. Once the US started operations, all of them quietly came back to Pakistan preferring to contemplate rather than become martyrs. Taliban were on their own from now onwards. In northern areas, Taliban were ruling conquered ethnic groups with no support in the general population. In contrast, US mounted operations more resembling like guerrilla war with a lethal air power. In addition, there were no outside backers of forces opposing US troops.
At a policy level, it will be unrealistic to expect large-scale hand out to Afghanistan from US as it has more global interests. Individual states may be important to a certain extent both in economic and military terms but this does not mean that truck loads of dollar bills will be brought to Afghanistan or US forces will fight and accept high casualties in case of opposition to them. US will provide political, economic and military support to the current Afghan government but it has its limitations. ‘It does not necessarily mean nation building, or any form of long-term security or economic commitment in the region’.66 Unless a big blunder is made at policy level, most likely US will gradually pull out bulk of its troops in 1-2 years, although it does not mean complete disengagement from Afghanistan. The real challenge for US is not military opposition but its own policy decisions and strategic vision of its leadership. So far all the evidence emanating from Washington suggests that there is real lack of strategic vision on part of the key policy-makers. The result of this is that US is rapidly being isolated in the world despite coercion and bribing of various governments. History is witness that when this becomes the modus operandi of a state then disaster is not far away. One commentator has correctly cautioned that ‘it is not enough that nations be careful where they walk in the world. It is also necessary that nations take care how they walk in the world. This poses a daunting challenge to the national leadership who must practice restraint even when the field of action appears clear’.67
The sad fact is that all powers, big and small, states and non-state elements, fished in the troubled waters of Afghanistan with no concern for the people of the country. They were working for their own perverted ideas like ‘great games’, ‘ideological and religious extremism’ or ‘strategic depths’. In this exercise, Afghan pawns were picked and dropped with breathtaking speed. This dirty business has been sold to the outside world in a ‘sanitized’ version wrapped in ideological rhetoric. No amount of covering by nice idioms and wordings can hide the ugly truth that a nation has been crucified on the altar of interests of others. Little did all these players realized that by destabilizing Afghanistan, they had increased their own vulnerability to the demons released from Afghanistan. Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian States, Saudi Arabia and United States all suffered from the consequences of their shortsighted policies in Afghanistan. One Afghan after the conclusion of most recent operations has summed up the feeling of the whole nation. He said, “When a person is thirsty, he wants water. Afghans are thirsty for unity and peace. We are sick of war”.68 One sincerely hopes that the world also listens to this cry of peace from Afghans but if past is a guide, then the future of Afghanistan is a very unpredictable one.
‘ We are paying 8 million a year for the privilege of living in an ungrateful volcano’ Winston Churchill writing to Prime Minister David Lloyd George in 1922, advising withdrawing troops from Iraq.

Notes
1From the text of a lesson at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy cited in Mark Galeotti. Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 20
2cited in Galeotti. Afghanistan, p. 45
3cited in Galeotti. Afghanistan, p. 49
4Lester W. Grau & Michael A. Cress (Translators and Editors of the study by The Russian General Staff). The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Lawrence, Kansas. University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. xix
5Galeotti. Afghanistan, pp.7-9
6ibid, p. 15
7ibid, p. 15
8Grau. The Soviet-Afghan War, xix
9Mohammad Yahya Nawroz. General (Retd) and Lester W. Grau. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War. United States Army. Foreign Military Studies Office. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996.
http://www.bdg.minsk.by/cegi/N2/Afg/Waraf.htm
10For detailed account of operations during these phases see, Grau. The Soviet-Afghan War, p. 12-14 & 18-29
11Galeotti. Afghanistan, p. 16
12Muhammad Yousaf. Brigadier (Retd) and Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993, Fifth Edition), p. 181-82
13Geolitti. Afghanistan, p. 17
14Yousaf. The Bear Trap, p. 187
15Grau. The Soviet-Afghan War, xx
16ibid, p. 311-12
17ibid, p. 137-38
18Geolitti. Afghanistan, p. 197
19Afghanistan: A Country Study. Foreign Area Studies, The American University (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Press, 1986),
p. 312
20Grau. The Soviet-Afghan War,
p. 219-220
21Afghanistan: A Country Study,
p. 311-12
22Grau. The Soviet-Afghan War,
p. 312
23Nowroz & Grau. The Soviet War in Afghanistan
24Barnett R. Rubin. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 98
25Owen-Bennett Jones. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 2
26For the details of the change in Afghan society due to prolonged war see, Hamid Hussain. Afghanistan: A Changed Landscape. Defence Journal (Monthly, Karachi) January 2002, pp.122-27
27For details of these operations, see Herbert A. Friedman. Psychological Operations in Afghanistan. http://psywar.psyborg.co.uk/afghanistan.shtml
28Bob Woodward. Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 121
29ibid, p. 136
30ibid, p. 6
31Douglas Waller. The CIA’s Secret Army. Time, February 03, 2003, p. 25 & 28 & Woodward. Bush at War, p. 141
32Woodward. Bush at War, p. 317
33Robert Y. Pelton. The Legend of the Heavy D and the Boys in American Soldier, Nate Hardcastle. (Ed.) American Soldier (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002), p. 10-11
34Dana Priest. The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003) p. 161
35Pelton. The Legend of Big D in American Soldier, p. 11
36Woodward. Bush at War, p. 249
37Pelton. The Legend of the Heavy D in American Soldier, p. 5
38Jon Lee Anderson. The Lion’s Grave: Dispatches From Afghanistan (New York: Grove Pres, 2002), p. 82-83
39Pelton. The Legend of Big D in American Soldier, p. 14-15
40Woodward. Bush at War, p. 214
41Priest. The Mission, p. 168
42Thakur Kuldip Ludra. Lt. Colonel (Retd). Development of Operations in Afghanistan. Indian Strategic Review. http://members.tripod.com/israindia/isr/Nov7/Afghan.html
43Woodward. Bush at War, p. 232
44Dan Plesch. The Failure of 82nd Airborne. The Guardian, December 19, 2002
45Samuel A. Southworth & Stephen Tanner. US Special Forces (Cambridge, Massachusetts: De Capo Press, 2002), p. 266-67
46The Guardian, August 4, 2002
47Pelsch. Failure of 82nd Airborne
48John T. Carney and Benjamin F. Schemmer. No Room For Error: The Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 4
49Interview of Major (Retd) Kelly McCann with CNN. Kelly is a former Special Forces officer who heads a private company Crucible Security Specialists that trains some special forces personnel. http://asia.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/12/18/mccann/
50Steven Biddle. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defence Policy. Strategy Page, January 28, 2003. http://www.strategypage.com/articles/AFGHANISTANANDFUTURE/default.
asp
51John A. Gentry. Doomed to Fail: America’s Blind Faith in Military Technology. Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, Winter 2002-03, p. 97
52Woodward. Bush at War, p. 314
53Priest. The Mission, p. 143
54Time, February 03, 2003, p. 28
55Woodward. Bush at War, p. 251
56Priest. The Mission, p. 170
57Jason Vest. The Army’s Empire Skeptics. The Nation (Weekly, New York) Vol: 276; Number 8, March 03, 2003), p. 29
58The Future of Military Operations in Afghanistan. Centre for Defence Information. October 11, 2002 http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-future.cfm
59Dennis Steele. Unconventional Logistics. Army Magazine. http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf
60Mark Burgess. Killing Our Own: The Problem of Friendly Fire During the Afghan Campaign. Centre for Defence Information. June 12, 2002.
http://www.cdi.ord/terrorism/killing-pr.cfm
61Woodward. Bush at War, p. 233
62Priest. The Mission, p. 172-174
63Rachel Bronson. When Soldiers Become Cops. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81; No. 6, November-December 2002,
p. 127-28
64for detailed discussion on this topic from a proponent of this concept, see Eugene B. Smith. The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications. Parameters, Vol. XXXII ; No: 4, Winter 2002-03, p. 104-119
6510 Downing Street Newsroom. www.pm.gov.uk/output/page4802.asp
66Surinder Rana. Afghanistan Military Campaign Enters New Phase. Centre for Contemporary Conflict. Strategic Insights. http://www/ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/apr02/southAsia.asp
67Carl Conetta. Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and Afghanistan War. February 12, 2002. Project on Defence Alternatives. http://www.comw.org/pda/0202/Strangeves.html.
68Anderson. The Lion’s Grave,
p. 102.