Forbidden Fruit — Military & Politics
Columnist Hamid Hussain argues that military indulging in politics is not a good mixture in Pakistan.
Introduction
Politics and profession of soldiering has nothing in common. They are
totally different but essential elements of any society. Politicians
and soldiers have an interesting relationship in all societies. In societies
where civilians are in control, military officers act in accepted boundaries
though ready to defend their turf against civilian encroachment. In societies
where political institutions are weak and there is lack of consensus
on legitimate course of succession, soldiers gradually expand their area
of influence. They gradually restrict the role of civilians in various
areas and sometimes directly take over the state replacing the civilians.
This generally accepted model does not mean that military as an institution
has no relevance to the important policy decisions. Even in countries
where the tradition of civilian supremacy is well established, military
has a political role relating to national security, albeit a different
one. One commentator has correctly pointed that “the military’s
political role is a question not of whether but of how much and what
kind”.1
This article will evaluate soldier’s attitude towards political
activity and how it develops. This will be followed by the details of
Pakistani experience of politicization of officer’s corps and how
repeated and prolonged military rules have militarized the politics.
In the end, the complex relationship between soldiers and politicians
will be summarized.
Soldiers & Politics
Soldier’s disdain for politics and politicians is universal. Soldiers
by nature of their training and job requirement place high value on discipline,
recognized chain of command and espirit de corps. These values are essential
for any professional army. Soldiers generalize these values and attitudes
to the whole society without appreciating the difficulties and various
conflicting demands by interest groups in a modern nation state. In under-developed
countries, the problems are compounded by host of other negative social
and economic factors. Discussion, debate and arguments about different
points of view are essential ingredients of politics in every society.
The nature of political activity is more chaotic on surface. Soldier’s
concept of political order is based on the model of discipline, which
he has learned in his barracks and daily life. “Institutions that
permit disorder are condemned. The men who purposefully encourage disorder,
as well as those whose inactions inadvertently allow for disorder, are
dangerous”.2 This is how soldier sees the political activity of
his society. Political activity is seen as undermining of the discipline
of society and politicians as opportunists and self-seeking demagogues.
This thought process is at the root of how a military first withdraws
respect and later support of any civilian government which is followed
by kicking the quarrelling politicians out of the corridors of power.
The chaos and instability caused by the weak civilian institutions is
blamed for paving the way for military to take over the state. This is
the universal justification used by all military rulers. Once the politicians
are condemned as useless bunch, the question arises then who is competent
to run the state? Now the self-righteous attitude of officer corps comes
into play. In under-developed countries, military sees itself as the
most modern institution of the society. In addition, being a member of
a well organized and disciplined force and overdose of patriotic and
nationalistic symbols reinforces the notion that soldiers are more competent
than civilians. In countries where military is the dominant institution,
the military leadership considers itself as ‘final arbiters of
political process, final judges as to whether a particular turn of events
is acceptable from their standpoint as the guardians of national integrity’.3
Modern military is essentially a large bureaucratic organization. The
negative attitude of soldiers towards politics is partly related to this
fact, which is shared by the civilian bureaucrats. Soldiers look at the
policy decisions and difficult conflicts of the society in administrative
and technical terms. In case of Pakistan, this thought process is deeply
rooted in the colonial past of the country. British colonial policy makers
in twentieth century thought that natives were not educated enough or
mature enough to run their own affairs. What they needed was a good administration.
Make sure that law and order is maintained and there is peaceful environment
for economic activity. Natives were allowed to run the municipalities
and serve at Viceroy’s Council as advisors but had no role in vital
decision-making process. This colonial model of running the state was
based on the notion of ‘administration’ rather than ‘governance’.
The ‘sword arm’ and ‘steel frame’ of the Raj
was the real government. Politicians were men who were allowed to run
only ‘certain’ affairs and could be send home anytime when
it was determined by British that they were not doing their job. The
armed and unarmed bureaucrats of Pakistan who took control in the first
ten years after independence were the product of this system. From soldier’s
point of view, military’s direct control of the state was aimed
at ‘lifting government above politics’.4 The general negative
attitude of Pakistani officer corps towards political activity is not
different from any other military.5
The soldier has replaced the civilian. What to do next? Due to the nature
of their ethos and training, military leaders run a tightly controlled
and highly authoritarian model of government. The decision making process
is not seen a ‘political enterprise’ but ‘an apolitical,
problem-solving exercise’.6 Military leaders disdain political
activity and mass participation as it causes disorder. In the early part
of the military rule, this can be achieved easily without excessive use
of force. The circumstances under which Ayub Khan in 1958 and General
Musharraf in 1999 took over gave some transient room for personal charisma
of the coup leader. Unstable political activity from 1954 to 1958 (the
main cause of which was the authoritative intervention and intrigues
of Governor General) and charisma of Ayub resulted in initial welcome
of coup by general public. Similarly, complex problems of a soft state
like Pakistan in 1999 had caused sufficient apathy of general public
and personal charisma of Musharraf worked in favour of military. Both
cases proved once again that ‘legitimation through charisma alone
tends to be unstable and transitory’.7 The military men should
know better. Even genuinely populist civilian leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
could not last more than four years as he was unable to address the fundamental
issues facing the society. Once the military rule is prolonged some kind
of participation becomes essential. This means that the reluctant military
leader has to embark on a course, which he hates. He has to indulge in ‘the
demeaning and distasteful business of compromise and bargaining’.8
This confusion in soldier’s mind, believing that the particular
course is harmful but then he has no choice results in a very confusing
and complicated situation. Ayub Khan had extensively spoken and written
against politics and politicians. Once his rule was extended, he had
to shed his uniform (a fatal mistake which his successor would not repeat),
patronize a political party named Conventional Muslim League and had
to work with political entities. He ruled long enough to see the futility
of his exercise when he has to sit with quarrelling politicians of Pakistan
in a round table conference and to his utter dismay had to accept their
demands. General Zia-ul-Haq experimented with a non-party election in
1985 but it proved to be a non-starter. In less than three years, he
had wound up the whole facade of democracy without politics. General
Musharraf confident of his abilities to sort out the national mess also
held the simplistic notion. He declared the democracy, which he has kicked
out, was ‘sham’. In three years, he was recycling the same
politicians he had denounced and propped up a shaky coalition of diverse
interest groups on the shoulders of military. The chances of present
civilian set up to last even two years are very slim. If it lasts longer
than that it will be only due to the corruption of the politicians and
deliberate decision of the parliamentarians to work under the benevolent
patronage of the GHQ and never to question the will of the generals.
Politicization of Military
When military takes over the state, it needs ‘civilian allies or
backers for reasons of legitimacy, expertise, or policy implementation’.9
Military attempts to address the legitimacy dilemma by arranging for
an electoral process which is closely monitored and if needed adjusted
by the soldiers. Ayub’s experiment of Basic Democracies, Zia’s
holding of elections in 1985 on non-party basis and present civilian
set up carved by General Musharraf are examples of attempts of military
leaders to give some semblance of legitimacy. In all these cases, army
chief was the final arbiter of all major policy decisions. Military governments
use civilians in areas, which need special skills like economic affairs.
Military leaders usually choose non-political technocrats for such jobs.
Veteran bureaucrat Aziz Ahmad worked with Ayub, Mian Muzaffar Ahmad with
Yahya Khan, Ghulam Ishaque Khan and V. A. Jafri with Zia and Shaukat
Aziz with General Musharraf to run the economic sector and planning for
development programmes. In case of Pakistan, military rulers have used
civilian bureaucrats for policy implementation at all levels. All these
measures inevitably involve soldiers with political decisions.
In case of Pakistan, the political role of the military has been institutionalized
over the last fifty-five years. The methodology has been redesigned according
to the prevailing circumstances. Pakistan army like any other army is
a hierarchical organization with a visible chain of command and proper
methodology of carrying out the orders of the military leaders. The military
leaders have used what is called a ‘managerial approach’.10
Army chief works with Corps Commanders and Principle Staff Officers (PSOs)
about carrying out the will of the organization. At higher level, chief
informs and consults his colleagues with reasonable amount of debate
and discussion about various decisions. This approach actually strengthens
the command and control of the military as an institution. This helps
the chief when he is negotiating or dictating to civilians and when military
is in direct control of the state helps to implement policies with least
friction.
Politicization of army officers is the natural outcome of military intervention
although the degree may be different depending on the methodology of
the ruling regime. Once the military becomes the dominant institution,
a new class of officers emerges which elaborates military’s political
role. This is the ‘military intellectual’ class. In case
of Pakistan, this class of officers (exclusively senior officers) has
attended Command and Staff College at Quetta and National Defence College
(NDC) in Islamabad. Increasingly, officers belonging to two military
intelligence organizations, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military
Intelligence (MI) are visibly found playing plain politics. In Pakistan,
the most vocal proponents and defenders of military rulers are the most
politicized officers who have been directly involved in political intrigues.
When the military’s role is expanded to nation building tasks,
the political role of the military is not seen as a defence of specific
class or ethnic interest but as the autonomous representation of the ‘national
interest’. The external threat from a larger neighbour was seen
only in military terms, which resulted in no meaningful dialogue about
defence issues as generals kept everybody else out of this area. To this,
external threat was added the issue of internal subversion by dissatisfied
citizens. In this background, the expanding role of the state’s
intelligence and security apparatus is a logical outcome as ‘internal
threat’ is a significant one and military assign itself the mission “to
prevent the ‘internal enemy’ from threatening the economic,
social and political order”.11 In 50s and 60s Pakistan was closely
allied with United States through various defence pacts. A large number
of officers were trained in United States and it was quite natural for
them to view the world through the prism of cold war. The ‘anti-communist’ stand
of the officer corps was almost universal. Progressive and left leaning
officers were gradually eased out of the armed forces especially after
the failed coup attempt in 1951. This didn’t mean that ‘religious’ officers
replaced them. The senior brass was thoroughly westernized and secular
in outlook. The military brass came to the conclusion that the country’s
strategic interests will be served better with alliance with United States.
In 60s and 70s, there was close cooperation in defence areas with China.
Although China is considered a reliable friend by defence establishment,
they are not anxious to implement Chinese model for armed forces or society.
In 80s, Pakistani military intelligence agency, ISI worked closely with
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in not so covert operations in Afghanistan
against Soviet Union.12 This interaction was a bit different than earlier
cooperation in 50s and 60s. There were limited number of officers (mainly
from intelligence and military police branches) who were trained in US
institutions and role of CIA operatives inside Pakistan was limited.
Different weapons and explosives experts from various branches of US
armed forces trained their Pakistani counterparts. Since 1980s, more
officers are from middle and lower middle class due to shrinking employment
opportunities for youth. In addition, after the disintegration of Soviet
Union and retreat of leftists, the links between Pakistan defence establishment
and US first became estranged and later completely cut off. This new
generation of senior officers, which is now at the senior posts, is trained
at facilities inside Pakistan. The general trend of the society towards
closer look at Islam has also touched the armed forces. Many senior officers
are practicing Muslims like civilians. This does not mean that these
officers have turned extremists. They are more nationalistic and concerned
about issues affecting other Muslim communities and consider United States
as an unreliable partner as far as Pakistan’s interests are concerned.
This trend is reflective of the change, which has occurred in the society
in the last two decades. This change further reinforced the self-assigned
role for the military to directly administer the state. The army was
now not only responsible for the state of Pakistan but as a nuclear power
has some obligation to the imaginary Muslim community (Ummah) all over
the world. September 11 and its international aftermath forced the military
brass to think more rationally and take into account the ground realities
which had been conveniently ignored in the past.
Military officers generally blame civilians for politicization of the
armed forces and Pakistan is no exception. A former close associate of
General Zia-ul-Haq,
blaming the civilian politicians states that it is due to ‘immaturity
of political parties’ that show ‘lack of vision in politicizing
the defenders of the country’.13 General Musharraf after his coup in
1999 also accused Nawaz Sharif of trying to politicize the senior brass. The
issue is not that simple and one sided as generals try to put forward. Even
a cursory look at the fifty-five year history of the country gives a totally
different picture. It is actually the military rule, which politicizes the
army officers. Repeated military intervention has lowered the threshold for
the involvement of army officers in civil affairs. The fragmentation of boundaries
between civil and military life has resulted in now even middle rank officers
uttering partisan political statements. In Pakistan, with each successive coup,
the number of officers involved in political activities has gradually increased.
Ayub Khan after initial consolidation co-opted various civilian groups to run
the state, although various political programmes of the regime were discussed
in the armed forces. When Ayub decided to introduce the Basic Democracies,
the Navy Chief at a navy commanding officers meeting discussed the programme.14
Yahya Khan’s tenure was too short and traumatic (separation of Eastern
Wing as independent country in 1971) to ensure entrenchment of army officers
but some of them became adept to playing politics. Zia’s long haul gave
enough time for gradual spilling of army officers in political arena. Over
the last three years, many officers of present military government have gradually
got their feet wet in the art of politicking. When senior officers hob knob
with politicians and involved in making and breaking of political parties,
it is quite natural that these officers will make their own alliances for personal
or institutional reasons. This creates a very complex situation, further embroiling
them in political intrigues. Major General Rao Farman Ali was sent to East
Pakistan as political advisor of the Yahya regime and in this capacity was
involved in political manoeuvring. During 1970 elections, the Director of IB,
N. A. Rizvi collected Rs 4 million from ten leading industrialists to help
the candidates of different political parties. The money was given to senior
army officers in East Pakistan for election purposes. Farman was the main link
between politicians of East Pakistan and military government. After the 1977
coup, General Zia brought Farman to his newly established election cell to
make use of the political intrigues he had learnt in East Pakistan. Similarly,
Zia brought Major General (later General) Khalid Arif as his Chief of Staff
(COS) due to his previous experience with Martial Law duties. Arif had served
as President of a summary Military Court when he was Major in 1962. In March
1969, as Lt. Colonel, he worked at GHQ and was part of the team, which finalized
the details of Yahya Khan’s take over. After 1969 Martial Law, he worked
under Brigadier (later Major General) Rahim Khan in the nerve centre of military
regime at GHQ. In his long military career, in the senior position, Arif had
commanded only a brigade for two short years. It is quite natural that such
experiences will result in sharpening of political rather than military skills
of an officer. In 1988, when Zia died in a mysterious plane crash along with
top military brass, the military decided to work behind the scene. The blatant
interference of senior army brass in domestic political intrigues further complicated
the situation rather than solving problems. Army Chief, General Mirza Aslam
Beg summoned Provincial Chief Ministers to GHQ. He plainly told his audience
that, “the PPP must not win the forthcoming elections and Benazir Bhutto
will be unacceptable to the Army as Prime Minister”. He also reassured
his audience that Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM — a relatively new party
representing interests of the descendants of Muslim refugees who emigrated
from India in 1947. General Beg belongs to that community) was in his pocket.15
The task was assigned to Brigadier Imtiaz who served as Additional Director
of Political Wing of ISI in 1988. In this capacity, he worked to cob an alliance
called Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Front) against Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP). A former aid of Nawaz Sharif admitted that Brigadier Imtiaz
helped even in coining Punjabi slogans for the alliance.16 He became close
to Nawaz Sharif during this time. PPP got most of the seats and due to various
factors military had to allow Benazir Bhutto to become Prime Minister with
significant limitations. In late 1989, opposition parties at the encouragement
of military brass started to work on a no-confidence motion against Benazir.
In November 1989, Brigadier Imtiaz and Major Amir (heading the Islamabad section
of ISI) in a clandestine move offered large sums of money to two members of
PPP (Rao Rashid and Arif Awan) to encourage other members of PPP to support
no-confidence motion. Brigadier Imtiaz who was no more with ISI was sufficiently
politicized and had his own interests at play that he participated in this
plan. The government with the help of Intelligence Bureau (IB) trapped the
two officers and recorded their conversation and gave to army chief, who simply
retired the two officers and no action was taken against them.17 When Nawaz
Sharif became Prime Minister, he rewarded the two officers by giving them prestigious
posts. Brigadier Imtiaz was made Director of IB while Major Amir was made Special
Advisor to the Chief Minister of North West Frontier Province. The question
whether these two officers were acting on their own on a personal agenda or
had support of some in the GHQ has never been answered. Lack of accountability
of politicized officers by military brass sends a wrong signal to the officer
corps. Some officers may want to play the game of political intrigue as it
may bring rich dividends. In 1990, when Benazir government was dismissed and
new elections were scheduled, ISI collected Rs 140 million ($6.5 million) and
distributed to various politicians to influence the outcome of the elections.18
It is inevitable that officers who are involved in the political role of the
military will have different perceptions about various issues facing the country.
Few examples will show how the views of politicized officers are influenced
by their assignments and perceptions can change so quickly when they have to
deal with complex problems themselves. During Pakistan National Alliance’s
(PNA) agitation against Bhutto in 1977, one of the demand was withdrawing cases
against Pushtun and Baloch leaders who were being tried in Hyderabad on secession
charges and winding up of military operations in Balochistan. Bhutto referred
this particular demands to General Zia and military brass. There was a unanimous
opinion of military commanders against accepting this demand. Zia had a meeting
with leaders of PNA and vehemently opposed the idea. DG ISI Major General Ghulam
Jilani Khan also gave a presentation giving the evidence against the detained
leaders to Maulana Mufti Mahmud. After Martial Law in 1977, when Zia himself
had to handle the complex situation, he dissolved the Hyderabad Tribunal, set
everybody free and gave general amnesty to Baloch insurgents. Arif calls this ‘Zia’s
political understanding and statesmanship’.19 When civilians are running
the government (with all limitations), military brass accuses them for being
soft with India and any attempt of reconciliation is seen with suspicion. The
view takes a U-turn when army is in charge of the country. Arif calls Zia’s
decision to attend the funeral of Indira Gandhi ‘an act of considerable
acumen and foresight’.20 General Musharraf did not approve of Nawaz Sharif’s
attempts to negotiate with India and skipped the function of reception of Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vernacular press hounded the Prime Minister
for his ‘soft’ position towards India. When Musharraf took over,
the difficult situation of the country now dawned on him and in next two years,
he went out of his way to try to open a dialogue with India.
Assignment of political role to serving officers is not a simple and
straightforward of normal military chain of command issue. It raises
an important question of how a junior officer is supposed to act when
asked by the senior to perform an essentially political activity? The
officer is professional and does not believe in political role but ordered
by the senior. Can he refuse the order? If yes, then can he be punished
through military law? If he obeys the order, is he liable for his actions,
which are carried out on the orders of senior officers? Where lies the
responsibility? These are the critical issues, which need an in-house
dialogue and discussion at the highest level at GHQ. If military continues
to perform the task of running the state, they have to come up with a
working formula, otherwise it will further confuse the situation. The
officers, who have joined politics after retirement, have become highly
politicized during their service and have been accused of many transgressions.
Most of these officers have been at senior positions during 1971 crisis
or have served with military intelligence organizations. Just like politicians,
when the politicized officers are accused of some wrongdoing, it is quite
natural that they will defend themselves. Due to the nature of their
profession, the accusation will be related to defence or national security
area. In their defence, the officers tend to use arguments by using the
rhetoric of patriotism and try to label their accusers (usually politicians)
as non-patriotic. This is done to portray them in favourable light and
cast doubt about others. Recently, the over use of Islamic symbols and
themes by these officers to divert the onslaught against them are becoming
more prominent. A few examples will illustrate how this activity confuses
the situation and polarizes the society further. It is damaging not only
to the political process but also the institution of armed forces. When
Gul was heading ISI, three important events directly relating to the
institution he was heading occurred. In April 1988, the huge ammunition
dump at Ojhri Camp in Rawalpindi (a large amount of arms and ammunition
was stored in the centre of a major city against all normal military
safety rules for onward supply to Afghan resistance fighters) blew up
resulting in huge loss of life and property. In August 1988, army chief
and President of the country General Zia-ul-Haq along with top military
brass died in a mysterious plane crash. In February 1989, the ill-planned
Jalalabad offensive was launched which was a dismal failure with a large
number of casualties. Gul has been criticized on professional grounds
about the Jalalabad operation but he countered by blaming the civilian
government of Benazir Bhutto and using ideological rhetoric. The result
was that critical evaluation of a military operation gone wrong got bogged
down into personal accusations and counter-accusations. Nobody has yet
even asked the question of any responsibility about Ojhri Camp blast
and Zia’s plane crash. Later, when he was sacked, he added the
anti-American flavour to the debate. After retirement, as a private citizen,
he has the right to express his opinion about different issues, with
which one may agree or disagree but that should not cloud the basic concept
of responsibility for one’s actions while in service. Pakistan’s
Afghan policy (run exclusively by ISI and army) of the last two decades
has been embedded in the rhetoric of ideological and Islamic symbolism,
preventing any rational and critical analysis and lessons learned. The
political and ideological camouflage by various politicized officers
have prevented any meaningful dialogue and serious debate about various
military operations and national security policies, let alone any accountability.
A very curious and strange phenomenon has been operational in Pakistan,
where wearing two, three or four stars with associated perks and privileges
is considered an achievement without a grain of responsibility. The perverted
logic, which is used is that the officer deserve the lofty appointment
but is not responsible if something goes wrong during his watch.
In any society, the relationships between armed forces officers and various
civilians including politicians are not an anomaly as long as the armed
forces are not vying for direct power. In case of Pakistan, due to repeated
military interventions, both politicians and senior army officers have
used this relationship to mutual advantage. When one looks closely, a
very interesting picture emerges. Lt. General Fazal Haq had close relationship
with political leaders of all parties including Wali Khan (Awami National
Party), Mufti Mahmud (Jamiate-Ulamae-Islam) and Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao
(PPP). Chief of National Democratic Party (NDP) Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari
used to be personal guest of Fazal Haq in the Governor House whenever
he visited Peshawar. Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar is a
close friend of former Sindh military governor
Lt. General Jahandad Khan during Zia rule. As a senior leader of PPP,
not infrequently, arrest orders of Babar were issued. He would spend
the night in the Governor House and when he would come out in the morning,
the police will take him to another comfortable place. This pathetic
exercise was done when ordinary PPP workers were being tortured in different
jails and publicly flogged. Zia’s Air Force Chief Air Marshal Zulfiqar
Ali Khan had differences with Zia. This automatically brought him close
to Benazir Bhutto and PPP. He served as ambassador to Washington during
PPP government in 1989. This mutually beneficial relationship prevents
any accountability of politicians who have close personal ties with military
elite during military rule and any accountability of military brass during
civilian rule. This mutually corrupting influence has long-term negative
effects on the development of responsible political culture and has eroded
professionalism of the armed forces. On the other end of the spectrum,
mutually hostile relationship between some officers and politicians has
also unwanted consequences. When the differences between Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif and General Musharraf became apparent after Kargil operations
in 1999, a very difficult situation emerged. Several senior officers
aligned themselves according to the prevailing situation. Sidelining
of two Corps Commanders (Lt. General Tariq Pervez and Lt. General Saleem
Haider) by Musharraf who were perceived as having sympathies with Sharif
resulted in total breakdown of any trust between the Prime Minister and
army chief. Musharraf saw this act essential to keep cohesion of the
senior brass to confront civilian leaders while Sharif saw this move
as a deliberate effort to isolate him by removing all officers who may
have some soft corner for the civilians. Pakistan may have to wait a
decade before the details of October 1999 coup and the role of different
civilian and military players come into limelight. If past is any guide,
one can fairly easily visualize the scenario. While the initial takeover
by the military could be camouflaged under patriotic and idealistic symbols, ‘but
too often the military’s custodianship of government degenerates
into factionalism, extravagant defence budgets and corporate featherbedding,
and social irresponsibility’.21 Despite lofty ideals, this is unfortunately
the legacy of military rule.
The rise of intelligence and security apparatus is the inevitable outcome
of prolonged and repeated military domination of the society. The political
armies for effective control use increasing internal and external surveillance
for systematic information gathering. It painstakingly builds up ‘the
organization of permanent supervision through informants or political
commissars, and widespread practices of repression, intimidation and
political blackmail’.22 In case of Pakistan, there has been a meteoric
rise of the intelligence agencies in the last two decades. The clout
of intelligence officers in the society and military has dramatically
increased.23 This has further complicated the political scenario. The
effect on military itself can be judged from the fact that a large number
of heads of MI and ISI have been sacked/retired before completing their
terms. The list of generals includes Hamid Gul, Asad Durrani, Javed Ashraf
Qazi, Javed Nasir, Ziauddin Butt and Mahmud Ahmad. In addition, increasing
role of officers with intelligence background in different sections of
the society after retirement is another landmark of the complexity of
the problem.
Militarization of Politics
Once the domination of the military in a society is complete, the polity
undergoes a radical change. ‘Military leaders are thus wooed not
only by incumbent elites but also by their oppositions, each group seeking
to advance its own interests by allying to itself the managers of organized
coercion’.24 The politicization of military, the sole legitimate
arm of state coercion further complicates an already confused environment.
The politicians who are against the incumbent civilian government, knowing
the real source of power, hobnob with the military brass to achieve their
objectives. They see the major source of support and potential threat
from the military. This means that they will look for officers who are
loyal to their political party and try to influence the promotions, postings
and transfers of these officers when they are in power. This results
in undermining of the cohesion of armed forces. Politicians, rather than
fighting their political duels at polling booths and in the legislative
assemblies, tend to take the short cut by creating such a situation where
military steps in to remove the civilian foes. In addition, the political
parties seeing the odds against the entrenched army officers in all areas
try to woo army officer to their ranks. This helps them in two ways.
First, it makes them acceptable to military brass as they have a fair
number of former army officers in senior positions. Secondly, it gives
them ammunition and legitimacy in criticizing the ruling military regime
to extract maximum concessions from the military rulers. Criticism by
Benazir Bhutto is generally labelled as unpatriotic activity by defence
establishment but the scathing criticism by the military member of PPP,
Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar does not get similar treatment.
Pakistani politics has seen an interesting phenomenon where disproportionately
large number of retired officers of armed forces are finding place in
political parties. A close look at the career of officers who have joined
the much hated and despised political arena gives an insight into the
dynamics of power politics in Pakistan. Major General Akbar Khan (former
Chief of General Staff — CGS) was convicted in 1951 for the conspiracy
to overthrow the civilian government and sentenced to fourteen years
imprisonment but was released after four years. Later in his life, Akbar
talked about his thinking in 1951. He stated that ‘we had disagreement
with the government about Kashmir independence, agreement on ceasefire
and delaying the formulation of a constitution by Liaquat Ali Khan’.
He added that although we have fought in Kashmir, the government agreed
to ceasefire ‘without asking us’.25 After his release in
1955, he joined Awami League of Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy (he was member
of central working committee). In 1958, he was organizing a new political
party named ‘Millat Party’, when Ayub Khan took over and
banned all political activities. In 1968, he joined Pakistan Peoples
Party and served as the member of Central Working Committee. He lost
the election in 1970 for the National Assembly but served as Bhutto’s
National Security Advisor and later Minister for Internal Security. He
also served as ambassador to Czechoslovakia and labour advisor. Major
General Sher Ali Khan who was sacked by Ayub served as Minister of Information
and National Affairs during Yahya Khan’s government in 1970. Lt.
General Umrao Khan (a close confidant of Ayub Khan) joined Jamaat-e-Islami
briefly after his retirement. Lt. General Muhammad Azam Khan was a close
confidant of Ayub Khan and served as minister and Governor during first
military regime. After his disagreements with Ayub, when he was sacked,
he openly supported Miss Fatima Jinnah during 1965 elections against
Ayub. Later, he led his own faction of Muslim League called Jinnah League.
Major General (Retd) Tajjamal Hussain Malik (former General Officer Commanding
of a Division who was convicted for conspiracy to overthrow Zia government
in 1980 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released when Benazir
took power) joined Tehreek-e-Istiqlal (headed by former Air Force Chief
Air Marshal (r) Asghar Khan). In six months, he got fed up and announced
the formation of his own party, Islami Inqilab Party (Islamic Revolution
Party). Lt. General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi (Commander of Eastern Command
in East Pakistan in 1971, where he surrendered to Indian forces and became
prisoner of war) when he came back from India at one time became head
of another faction of Muslim League (Qayyum Group). Major General (Retd)
Rao Farman Ali was in-charge of Political Affairs in East Pakistan in
1971. The reason he was assigned this task that he had done an administrative
staff course which qualified him for political intrigues. His official
appointment was Chief of Staff to Governor. In this capacity, he had
close contacts with political leaders of East Pakistan. After his return
from India, he served as Chairman of Fauji Foundation. After Zia’s
coup, he was member of the election cell set up by Zia and was involved
in meetings with politicians. He lost the election bid in 1985 non-party
elections. Later, he joined National Peoples Party (NPP), a splinter
group from PPP orchestrated by the military government of Zia and headed
by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (a former colleague of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto).
Lt. General Khawaja Muhammad Azhar had served in ISI during Ayub regime
as Colonel and at one time was acting DG of ISI. In this capacity, he
was involved in surveillance of political and military foes of the regime,
especially during the crucial early part of Martial Law when Sikandar
Mirza was ousted. He had personally interrogated many prominent people
who were not considered loyal to Ayub. During Yahya regime he served
as Quarterm/aster General (QMG) and military governor of N.W.F.P. Later
he became Secretary General and Vice President of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan.
Major General Muhammad Hussain Ansari was GOC in East Pakistan in 1971.
After the surrender he spent few years in India as prisoner of war (POW).
This traumatic experience for many soldiers had its effects. A number
of officers during their sojourn as POW in India looked towards religion
for solace. A number of these officers joined Sufi organizations. When
Ansari came back from India, he was made Director of Lahore Development
Authority. He joined Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan and was elected to national
assembly in 1988 elections. He is in charge of Accountability Cell of
the party. Air Marshal Noor Khan was Air Force Chief when Yahya Khan
took over in 1969. In the loot for ministries during that time, he ended
up taking four ministries (Education, Health, Labour and Social Welfare)
under his wings. When the internal conflicts between ruling junta started
to strain the relationships, Yahya retired him and sent him as Governor
of West Pakistan (the Naval Chief, S. M. Ahsan was also retired and sent
as Governor of East Pakistan). He was elected to National Assembly in
1985 non-party elections from Attock. Colonel Abbasi was heading Azad
Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami in 1977. In 1985, Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti,
former Corps Commander and close confidant of General Zia who was retired
in 1980, toyed with the idea of forming a new political party (with the
help of Justice (Retd) Shaukat Ali who was head of Liberal Muslim League),
but seeing no response shelved it. Lt. General Fazal Haq was a close
confidant of Zia who served as Corps Commander and military Governor
of N.W.F.P.. He retired in 1985 and in 1987 was elected to Senate. In
1988 when Zia sacked Junejo government, Haq became caretaker Chief Minister
of N.W.F.P. In 1988 elections, he was elected to National Assembly. Lt.
General Abdul Majid Malik during Ayub regime as Major was involved with
Martial Law work as staff officer. He retired in 1976 and served as ambassador
to Morocco. He was elected to National Assembly in 1985 and 1988 elections
and served as Chairman of Anti-Corruption Committee. He joined the resurrected
military supported political party, Muslim League but later joined the
Nawaz Sharif faction of Muslim League. After the ouster of Nawaz Sharif
by military in 1999, he joined the splinter faction of Muslim League
named Quaid-e-Azam, organized by intelligence agencies of Musharraf government.
He is now member of National Assembly after the 2002 elections.
Lt. General Javed Nasir worked closely with Nawaz Sharif both during
active service and after his retirement though he was not a formal member
of Muslim League. He is also actively involved in the non-political,
proselytizing Tableeghi Jamaat. Nasir is not known for his intellectual
brilliance or political acumen but he was kept on board as he was the
former super spy of Pakistan. It is quite natural that he will have soft
corner for Nawaz Sharif. After the nuclear tests in 1998, he gave all
credit to Sharif. He stated, “Allah was very kind and put in his
heart a momentous decision”.26 Even a common man on the street
knows that no civilian leader has any clue about the nuclear programme
let alone making any important decision regarding this area. Lt. General
Hamid Gul is head of his own small party while former army chief Mirza
Aslam Beg leads another small party called Awami Qiadat Party.
The working relationship between officers of armed forces and political
parties is an interesting area of study in case of Pakistan. A closer
look at Pakistan Peoples Party, a party, generally viewed as against
military rulers gives an interesting insight into the dynamics of this
equation. Former Army Chief General Tikka Khan was for a long time Secretary
General of PPP. Major General (Retd) Akbar Khan worked closely with Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto in various capacities and was member of Central Committee
of the party. Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar (former Inspector
General of Frontier Corps — a paramilitary force responsible for
defence of western border of the country with Afghanistan) was the right
hand man of Benazir Bhutto and served as her Interior Minister during
her two stints as Prime Minister. Babar played a significant role in
Pakistan’s Afghan policy (1988-1990 and 1993-96) despite that his
responsibilities as Interior Minister were restricted to internal law
and order of the country. The former Provincial head of ISI in Sindh
province, Brigadier Aman is Secretary to Benazir Bhutto. Another member
of Central Committee of PPP is Major (Retd) Masud Sharif Khattak who
has served as Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB), a civilian intelligence
agency of the country. Major General (Retd) Ahsan Ahmad served as Minister
of Health and Population in Sindh during the military government of Musharraf.
In October 2002, he joined PPP. Government alleged that he had been removed
due to his malpractices and corruption while Ahmad in a press conference
criticized Musharraf for destabilizing the country.27 Interestingly,
after diligently serving as provincial minister with all perks for a
long time in a military government, the change of heart was so quick
that he resigned/sacked in the morning and joined PPP in the afternoon.
Major (Retd) Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao served for a long time the PPP
head in N.W.F.P. before deciding to venture into a solo flight.
In 1977, after the military take over, Zia faced a difficult dilemma
and he had to postpone elections as pre-coup conditions could not be
allowed to come back. For obvious reasons, PPP could not be allowed to
come back in power while assessment by various people aligned with Zia
was that in case of elections, PPP would win despite recent setbacks.
Zia established an election cell run by two serving generals (Lt. General
Faiz Ali Chisti and Major General Jamal Said Mian) and two retired Major
Generals (Rao Farman Ali and Ehsan-ul-Haq). In this capacity, these officers
held meetings with different political leaders. Military regime has to
work on re-engineering of the social and political scene before it could
give back some of the powers to civilians. It was with this aim that
the Muslim League was resurrected during Zia time. The DG of ISI Major
General (later Lt. General) Ghulam Jilani Khan started to work with a
large number of politicians who were opposed to PPP. He was instrumental
in connecting a large number of politicians with Zia regime. Later, as
Governor of Punjab province, he was solely responsible for grooming a
new political elite under the direct patronage of military rulers. Nawaz
Sharif along with most of his colleagues was the product of this experiment.
He gradually worked his way up from provincial finance minister to chief
minister and finally Prime Minister of the country twice before being
booted out by the army itself. Many colleagues of Nawaz Sharif were retired
army officers. Lt. General (Retd) Majid Malik (served as federal minister
for Kashmir Affairs), Lt. General (Retd) Javed Nasir (former DG ISI who
served as special advisor), Brigadier (Retd) Imtiaz (served as Director
of IB), Major (Retd) Amir (special advisor to Chief Minister of N.W.F.P.),
Major (Retd) Nadir Pervez (served as Minister of State for Interior after
1985 elections and Minister of State of Water and Power after 1990 elections),
Colonel (Retd) Mushtaque Tahir Kheli (political secretary). In addition,
many relatives and sons of senior officers have worked closely with Nawaz
Sharif. During the present military government, the Corps Commanders
held regular meetings with all political leaders. The political wing
of ISI headed by Major General Ihtesham Zamir was instrumental in the
formation of the Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) group before elections
in October 2002, which consisted mostly of former colleagues of deposed
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. After the military take-over, almost all
of his former colleagues gathered under the benevolent patronage of military,
made a new party and got elected to new assembly in 2002. After elections,
several senior officers were involved in political manoeuvring to instal
military’s nominated political party. The party, which Nawaz Sharif
led, had two third majority in the National Assembly in 1996 with 140
seats. After cleansing and restructuring, Nawaz Sharif’s party
has now only 14 seats in the assembly. This tells a lot about the sham
called democracy in Pakistan under the guidance of military. After the
2002 elections, the military has used the carrot of perks and privileges
and stick of accountability to line up politicians of different hue and
colour to support its nominees. After the October 2002 elections, ten
members of PPP rebelled and voted in favour of General Musharraf’s
nominee for Prime Minister (Zafarullah Khan Jamali). Out of ten dissident
members, six were awarded with cabinet posts out of which two were retired
army officers (Major (Retd) Tahir Iqbal and Major (Retd) Habibullah Warraich).
The exercise has been done in such a clumsy manner that it has created
a hilarious situation. Pakistan is the only country in the world the
Interior Minister of which is on the Exit Control List published by his
own ministry and wanted in cases of corruption. Two more Federal Ministers
(Minister of Power Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and Labour Minister Abdul
Sattar Laleka) are also forbidden to leave the country, as they are wanted
by National Accountability Bureau in various corruption cases. Another
interesting phenomenon, which has emerged in Pakistan, is that family
members of former senior military officers are increasingly finding place
in the political arena. Ayub Khan’s son Captain (Retd) Gauhar Ayub
has been elected member of national assembly and served as foreign minister
during Nawaz government). Ayub’s two sons-in-law were also members
of national and provincial assemblies. General Akhtar Abdur Rahman’s
(former DG ISI and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee) son Humayun
Akhtar is a multimillionaire businessman and now minister of commerce
and General Zia-ul-Haq’s son, Ijaz-ul-Haq was member of National
Assembly. The last fifty-year experience of Pakistan has given ample
proof that military’s guardianship has a ‘debilitating and
corrosive’ effect on the political system of the country. ‘In
many instances it stifles sorely needed change and reinforces social
inequality and injustice’.28 The reason is that all military take-overs
have been geared toward maintenance of status quo rather than attempts
to change fundamental anomalies of the structure through radical reforms.
Even the prospects of success of radical reforms by the military without
any popular participation are very limited. The best-case example of
such failure is that of Egypt under Gemal Abul Nasir.
Conclusion
The political role of the military has its negative effects in long term,
which may not be visible, in short term. In case of Pakistan, there has
been no radical coup and no violent showdown between different interest
groups (with the exception of Bengali nationalism which resulted in separation
of Eastern wing with the help of Indian arms). Even military rulers understand
the limitations of overt coercion and repression. They use ‘parallel
power mechanisms provided by intelligence services, paramilitary, private
or criminal armed entities’.29 Over the last two decades, Pakistani
military leadership has used informal types of coercion. Private armed
groups run by religio-political parties were not only used in the military’s
foreign policy agenda in Afghanistan and India in 1990s but were selectively
used to pressurize the civilian governments. In 2002, the military leadership
has learnt the hard lesson of futility of such shortsighted policy decisions.
The role of intelligence apparatus has been institutionalized while paramilitary
force (Rangers) has been rapidly expanded. This approach has resulted
in two negative consequences. First, it has eroded the cohesion of armed
forces and damaged its institutional integrity. Second, the political
entities have become more polarized making any reconciliation very difficult.
In the last fifty-five years, repeated military take-over have added
new complexities into the already fragile state of Pakistan. After every
coup, political manoeuvrings of military brass becomes essential, as
pre-coup conditions cannot be allowed to stage a come back. This had
resulted in two unfortunate consequences. One is politicization of the
officer corps and second is militarization of the politics. Military
guided civilian governments are neither more clean nor efficient than
any other government. Political institutions of a country are reflective
of the society. They do not prop up in vacuum. They are formed by interaction
of various forces including general public, judiciary, press and other
segments of society. They evolve with the evolution of the society and
are carefully nurtured and pruned according to the needs of the society
to serve its purpose. Painstaking efforts by a select group of self-righteous
senior officers to implant a model on the nation from above based on
their thinking and training has never been successful in the modern history
of the world. The fifty-five year history of Pakistan has amply shown
that such attempts have further polarized the society and added new complex
factors on national scene rather than solving old problems. Some fundamental
dilemmas facing the nation have to be discussed at various forums to
reach a ‘minimum’ consensus about basic elements of running
the state with some agreement on legitimacy, rules of succession and
role of various groups in this setup. Both civilian and military leaders
have to accept the fact that for smooth running of the state ‘the
areas of exclusive policy authority for each’ and ‘the areas
of shared policy authority’ needs to be agreed upon.30 The balance
between these two authorities constitutes civil-military relations. Without
addressing these issues simultaneously, it will be very difficult to
break the cycle of crisis, which is plaguing the country. The establishment
of effective political authority has two main ingredients: 1. the aggregation
of consent and 2. control over the means to organized coercion.31 Even
if the political parties are able to achieve the difficult task of aggregating
the consent which will bring political organization and legitimacy but
the armed forces are not subordinated to the direction of state, the
stability of the political process will be a mirage.
End Notes
1Welch E. Claude and Smith K. Arthur (Ed.) Military Role and Rule: Perspectives
on Civil-Military Relations (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury
Press, 1974), p. 6
2Nordlinger. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 54
3De Kadt, Emanuel. The Military in Politics: Old Wine in New Bottles?
in Koonings, Kees & Kruijt, Dirk (Ed.). Political Armies: The Military
and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy (London & New York: Zed
Books, 2002), p. 315
4Welch & Smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 65
5For details of the attitude of Pakistani officer corps towards politics,
see Hussain, Hamid. Back to Barracks - Pakistan Army’s experience
of withdrawal from active control of the state. Defence Journal, September
2002
6Nordlinger. Soldiers in Politics, p. 118-19
7Welch & Smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 66
8Nordlinger. Soldiers in Politics, p. 59
9Koonings. Political Armies, p. 339
10Nordlinger. Soldiers in Politcis, p.
11Koonings. Political Armies, p. 23
12For details of cooperation between CIA and ISI, see Hussain, Hamid.
Forgotten Ties: CIA, ISI & Taliban. CovertAction Quarterly (Washington,
D.C.), Number: 72; Spring 2002), pp. 3-5
13Arif, M. Khalid. General (Retd). Khaki Shadows (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2001), p. 366
14Quadir, F. Iqbal. Vice Admiral (Retd). Pakistan — A Political
Experimental Station. Defence Journal, May 2002
15Lt. General Fazal Haq’s (who attended the meeting) interview
with General Khalid M. Arif cited in Arif, Khalid. Khaki Shadows, p.
352-53
16Lodhi, Maleeha. Pakistan’s Encounter With Democracy (Lahore:
Vanguard Books), p. 139-40
17PPP Information Secretary Salman Taseer released the tapes to public
in August 1992.
18Former Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg and former DG ISI Asad Durrani
have admitted this in an affidavit submitted to Supreme Court of Pakistan.
The Supreme Court has not given its decision about the case which has
been pending since 1997
19Arif. Khaki Shadows, p. 196
20Ibid, p. 420
21Welch & Smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 72
22Koonings. Political Armies, p. 339
23For details of Pakistani intelligence organizations, see Hussain, Hamid.
Lengthening Shadows. CovertAction Quarterly, Number: 73; Summer 2002,
p.18-22
24Welch & Smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 54
25Interview of Major General (Retd) Akbar Khan in Hassan, Ali. Generals
aur Siyasat. Urdu (Generals and Politics) (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991),
p. 292-93
26Nasir, Javed. Lt. General (Retd) After The Nuclear Fever is Over. Defence
Journal, July 1998
27The News (Online Edition), October 24, 2002
28Welch & Smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 72
29Koonings. Political Armies, p. 343
30Welch and Smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 16
31Ibid, , p. 53.
