Great Britain, The United States, and the Security of the Middle East:
The Formation of the Baghdad Pact

By Magnus Persson. Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1998, 366 pp.

Lt Col Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army (Retd) reviews these books exclusively for DJ.

Great Britain was the undisputed victor in the Middle East during World War II. Faced with financial impoverishment and veritable exhaustion as a result of the war, however, Great Britain’s hegemony in the region was destined to be short-lived. The influence of the United States, conversely, was increasing, and it would only be a matter of time until the United States supplanted Great Britain as the dominant Western power in the Middle East. During the post-World War II era, the evolving and dynamic Anglo-American relationship was characterized by cooperation as well as confrontation.
The paradigm selected to conduct a detailed assessment of the British-American relationship in the post-World War Middle East is the formation of the Baghdad Pact. An examination of the strategic, political, and economic interests and ideas that guided British and American officials, using recently-released official, government, and other documents, is conducted thoroughly. The crucial aspect, according to author Magnus Persson (an historian at Lund University, Sweden, specializing in contemporary international history), for analysis is “the mutual relationship between Britain and the United States and to what extent cooperation or conflict dominated the relation and how that influenced the policy making” (p. 17).
A short initial chapter includes an historiographical review of the Baghdad Pact’s formation and identifies the study’s thesis. The purpose of the second chapter is to introduce and present the analytical framework for the chronological narrative and interpretations that follow, focusing on Anglo-American relations within the context of their historical “special relationship”. Three levels of analysis are enumerated as applicable to research in international politics.
There are a number of examples of Anglo-American cooperation and confrontation in the Middle East in the decade following World War II. From 1945 to 1948, Anglo-American views diverged over Palestine. Britain never succeeded in reconciling the conflicting Arab and Jewish demands, while the US generally supported Zionist views. The result was three years of diplomatic friction. The recovery of Western Europe, as manifested by the Marshall Plan and NATO, was of mutual British-US interest. Other examples abound.
The alliance of convenience of the Second World War evolved afterwards into an intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, with a concomitant formation of a somewhat rigid, bipolar alliance system. Primarily Britain and the United States, from 1950 to 1953, pursued negotiations for a defence organization to be the equivalent of NATO in the Middle East. The Middle East Command (MEC) was the first proposal, but after Egyptian rejection in 1951, MEC was rearranged and became the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO). Subsequent MEDO discussions included Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan, with Turkey actively seeking Arab participation in a regional defence system and arguing for such a defence organization to counter a Soviet threat.
After Egypt repudiated the MEDO, and after the Eisenhower administration came into office early in 1953, US Secretary of State Dulles travelled widely in the region and developed a new concept that focused on the states immediately south of the Soviet Union — the Northern Tier. The Northern Tier approach was devised to shield the Persian Gulf oil fields and British military installations from a threatened Soviet expansion southwards. This new US policy was to support and promote mutual defence arrangements among these countries, but in doing so infringed on traditional British interests in the Middle East. This strained Anglo-American relations, but forced the British to realize their nation’s decreased influence regionally and globally.
In late 1954, after an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez Canal base, British and American officials pursued in secret Operation Alpha, a joint effort to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict through a comprehensive settlement. Alpha, an example of Anglo-American political collaboration, was explicitly related to the Northern Tier strategy, and had repercussions on policy relating to the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact, in which the importance of Soviet containment overrode parochial national interests, was the resulting organization.
An in-depth analysis is conducted of the January 1955 meeting at which Iraq and Turkey agreed to begin negotiations on security issues. This is followed by a detailed assessment of the various Arab and Western perceptions of and reactions to the initial talks. The actual treaty, the Baghdad Pact, is evaluated, as is the strong, negative Egyptian reaction to it.
By chronologically narrating and evaluating events and factors that influenced the formation of the Baghdad Pact, Persson is successful in enhancing understanding of British and American foreign policymaking in the context of Anglo-American relations in the post-war Middle East. Impeccably researched, superbly referenced, and well-written with insightful analyses, this excellent study is highly recommended.