Chawinda-1965
An analysis from 12 Sept to 20 Sept

PART-II

Columnist Maj (Retd) SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN gives a detailed account of facts as they were on the ground. Part 1 was published in Sept 2002 issue of DJ.

Primarily it was 24 Brigade deployed in Chawinda to defend the town, it is therefore, essential to record its composition and deployment before we analyze the event after 12 th Sept.
After 8th, 25 Cavalry (under command 24 Brigade) was left with only two Squadrons for rest of the war. After loss of Sultan Bahadur on 11th, C Squadron was also left with two troops only. On 12th Sept one was deployed in area 15r in front of Chawinda and the other (my troop) along railway line behind Chawinda facing Jassoran to defend the town if attacked from that flank. B Squadron (Maj. Affandi) was deployed east of the town. 24 Brigade had three infantry battalions 3FF, 14 Baloch and 2 Punjab.
C Squadron was deployed in the area of 3FF but was not under command that unit which had its Bn HQ in the area of tall trees on railway station. The other two battalions were deployed east of Chawinda. The field of fire for my troop was clear up to three thousand yards from railway station to Jasoran and Mondekibarian.
The enemy launched probing attacks frontally on Chawinda on 12th and 13th. Khaliq handled the situation effectively by hitting enemy tanks and losing one along with the driver in the process on 12th. It was believed on 14th that the enemy had occupied Jasoran. My troop was ordered to move to Mondekibarian and eventually deployed in Khurpa to stop the enemy advance south of Jassoran. The enemy had not occupied Jassoran on 14th and therefore, I was called back to Nogazza at night. In the morning of 15th, two tanks of my troop were deployed in Buttardograndi and other two on railway station to support Khaliq’s troop which was under probing attack. One of our tank was shot which did not cause much damage. One enemy tank was shot up and the attack was repulsed.
In the Sept issue of DJ, I had commented upon the writings of two high ranking officers and tried to put the record straight in relation to the events of 14 and 16 Sept on the battlefield. Here I shall analyze the events of 16 and 17 Sept in the light of my observation and involvement in the battle. My two tanks were deployed in Buttardograndi and other two at a distance of 100 yards from railway station building in the west. There was no infantry in direct support. Infantry and armour were fighting independently.
Indian Armour took off from its base Wazirwali at first light. Myself and N/RIS Khaliq (Shaheed) simultaneously picked up this movement and reported to the Squadron Commander who was positioned at Nogazza (nick name given to an abnormally long grave on a small mound between Railway line and track where they come closest to each other) in general area MS 5 behind Chawinda. A regiment was moving from right to left in line formation which was picked through binocular when it negotiated a gap between two clumps in far distance in the direction of Kot Izzat. Distance was more than 3000 yards and, therefore, not possible to engage. My Squadron Commander asked me to direct Artillery fire on the tank column.
I showed my inability. Firstly, because I was not sure of myself and did not want to waste Artillery ammunition. Secondly, the Artillery officer whose primary job was to direct fire, should have come forward (Maj. Rasheed or Chaudhry of Artillery was with my Squadron Commander) and directed the fire. Eventually, Naib Risaldar Khaliq was ordered to direct the fire who complied but could not do it correctly. The shells were falling short, which I could observe and reported that the column was moving behind screen created by artillery fire. At this point of time the higher command should have acted and taken steps to counter the enemy move. But nothing happened and eventually the enemy column reached Jassoran unopposed around 0830 hour. I wonder who was responsible to defend the village and why this gap was left in the defence line which proved disastrous for us.
In a bid to capture Chawinda from the flank the enemy pushed a troop from Jassoran, parallel to track, towards railway station. Here we made a serious mistake. We fired at the enemy as it appeared from the clump on the outskirts of the village. We should have waited till such time they reached effective killing range of our guns. As the range over 2000 yards, we missed the target. The enemy tanks immediately fired smoke shells from a device fitted on the turret of Centurions and reversed into the clump behind smoke screen. It was a surprise to me as I did not know that enemy tanks had smoke throwers, mounted on turret, which could release smoke at such a short notice. Our tanks had smoke shells to be fired from main gun, which could not be used as effectively as the enemy device in such a situation. Here I must mention that Bn HQ bunker of 3FF was located on railway station but the exact location of the companies was not known to me nor I was in communication with them. But I was sure that they were deployed north of track Chawinda-Jassoran.
Much before the enemy appeared in Jassoran, I had noticed that men from 3FF were walking backwards in singles and twos. I talked to few of them who told me that enemy tanks in great numbers were advancing. Enemy tanks never operated in isolation but in close co-operation with infantry, where this aspect was totally neglected in our case.
After locating my four tanks they deployed a Squadron in Jasoran and a tank to tank contest with my troop started which continued for two to three hours, joined in by the Artillery of both sides. Enemy fighter planes also came in support of ground troops but their rockets missed our tanks. In the process my one tank received a direct hit on the turret ring and was put out of action. I fired 16 rounds, aimed at enemy tanks, from one position but cannot claim to have destroyed any because I did not see them catching fire. However, I did observe enemy tanks being toed backwards from front line. The enemy returned equal number of shots which were falling left, right and centre of my tank due to long range.
Again this was the time when the so-called Task Force Commanded by Lt Col Wajahat Husain (later Maj. Gen) should have reacted and hit the enemy in flank but no such thing happened. Having failed to dislodge the troop the enemy attempted to bypass my position.
While one Squadron lined up to engage my troop the other one started moving southwards from Jassoran. I passed the information to my Squadron Commander to the effect that my position was being bypassed, an enemy Squadron was heading south. I was told not to worry, as our friends would take care of them. After that I concentrated exclusively on the Squadron in Jassoran and continued the firefight. At about 1400 hours, my Squadron Commander called to inform that situation in Butterdugrandi had gone bad. I looked left and simultaneously called my tanks on wireless but received no reply. One or two of our tanks were burning on the east nearer to the village. No enemy was visible. Detailed description of the battle has been published in DJ of April 1998. In short the enemy shot up our eight tanks
(5 M48s and 3 Sharmans) and captured Butterdograndi at about 1400 hours with no loss to themselves. I may mention here that the enemy did not use Artillery in the operation.
I was completely surprised to know that enemy had reached Butter dograndi which was in my rear. It is a mystery for me that even today as to how enemy could reach that village when three of my tanks and three of 33 TDU were deployed there. The field of fire was absolutely clear up to Jassoran, Mondykibarian and Khurpa. There were no clumps, hutment or trees, which could provide cover, except four feet high maize crop. The enemy did not launch a conventional attack i.e., charging the objective under cover of Artillery fire or after preparatory bombardment. The enemy tanks could not dare to advance on the village without first neutralizing six of our tanks. There was no infantry with us. In my assessment five out of the six of our tanks were neutralized through one of the following methods.
a. After two to three hours of fighting there is always a lull in the battle. During that period the tank crew becomes slack/casual and may leave the tank for a respite after deputing one of the crew member as observer. It was during this period that enemy after foot reconnaissance stealthily placed his few tanks in such a position from where our tanks were shot up simultaneously.
b. During the lull period, jeep mounted anti-tank weapons pushed forward through maize field and shot up our tanks.
c. Tank hunting parties sneaked closer to our tanks through maizefield, while our crew was concentrating on enemy tanks far away, and shot them up.
d. It is also possible that fields of fire and observation of my three tanks were not overlapping and as such they could not support each other and were shot up in isolation.

After capturing Buttardograndi the enemy shot up my two tanks at railway station and the third commanded by Naib Risaldar Khaliq who was coming in to reinforce my position.
At this point of time the situation for us was most critical. The enemy had broken through our defences and had reached in the rear of Chawinda. Immediately after that our three tanks got shot up at railway station, panic had started. Brigade HQ, which was located in Chawinda was first to move out in order to take up position somewhere in the rear. If at this point of time the enemy had taken one of the following actions they would have carried the day.
a. Under cover of concentrated artillery fire on Nogazza, where our RHQ and two to three tanks were located, pushed a troop of tanks from Buttardograndi and reach track Pasror-Chawinda somewhere south of Nogazza.
b. Push a troop from Buttardograndi on to railway station which was undefended after the destruction of our three tanks.
c- Move a Squadron from Jassoran onto Railway Station. The enemy did not act for one hour after reaching Butterdograndi and we got a respite. Our Artillery dropped concentrated fire on Jassoran and Buttardograndi, controlled by Maj. Rasheed of 1 SP who was located at Nogaza. The fire was most effective and caused the death of Lt Col. Tarapur of Poona Horse who was directing this operation. The commanding officer of 8 Gharwal rifles, which was supporting the Poona Horse, was also killed at Jassoran due to Artillery fire.
The death of two leading unit commanders, at the crucial stage resulted in breaking the momentum of attack. Never the less the leading Squadron after consolidating at Buttardograndi, did try to advance southwards in the direction of Sarangpur which was tactically an unsound move because we were still holding on to Nogazza from where we destroted two tanks as the troop came out of Buttardograndi. Here the offensive came to a grinding halt.
At 1700 hours we counter- attacked after intensive preparatory bombardment on the village. The village was reached but as my tanks advanced west of it, concentrated fire was delivered by Centurions deployed in Jassoran and south of it. We had to retreat and take cover in the village.
Eventually, we were recalled to railway line. The details of this attack have been recorded in April 1998 issue of DJ. Although, we lost eight tanks in this engagement during the day but at no time more than a troop, which was not supported by infantry, faced the enemy tank regiment supported by infantry battalion plus. The enemy lost three tanks in Buttardograndi out of which one belonged to the Commanding Officer Poona Horse. How many tanks were lost by the enemy at Jassoran during the day’s battle cannot be ascertained.
Early morning on 17th, I was placed under command 3FF with three tanks, the fourth was disabled in the attack the previous day. The CO 3FF ordered Captain Raheem Shah to attack Jassoran with his company. Railway line was the FUP and my three tanks were in direct support. The details of this attack have been recorded in the June 1998 issue of DJ. We could not reach the objective and encountered the enemy en route. Our infantry was surprised when it was engaged from point blank range by the enemy which was entrenched in the middle of maze crop north of Buttardograndi. My tank also over-ran the enemy trenches but was shot up by tanks which were deployed in Jassoran, and went into flames. It was bitter contest but our infantry could not advance any further against superior force which was well-entrenched and supported by a tank regiment from Jassoran. It remained pitched against the enemy at close quarters throughout the day. Our this action produced demoralizing affect on the enemy which did not get reinforcements and retreated from Buttardograndi in the evening the same day.
The attack was destined to fail due to following reasons:
1. The objective was held by an infantry battalion plus supported by a tank regiment. The leading elements of this force were holding area Buttardograndi. This fact was known to all. It is one of those unique cases in history of warfare where such a small force was thrown in attack, without remorse, against such a large force as mentioned above. Our infantry suffered heavy casualties.
2. The distance from FUP to the objective was 3000 yards with clear field of fire for tanks. Attacking three tanks were sure to be shot up by the regiment holding the objective.

3. It was futile to assign Jassoran as objective to us when the enemy was sitting at Buttardograndi half way in between.

4. We were forming up under the nose of the enemy located at Buttardograndi and were subjected to artillery fire in the FUP.

5. Artillery support was not available to us.
The final effort to capture Chawinda was made by the Indians on night 19/20 Sept.
It was purely an infantry night attack with its focal point at MS 5 south of Chawinda. The area was held by 3FF. In spite of heavy preparatory bombardment they stuck to their guns and opened up when the enemy reached close to railway line between railway station and Nogazza. This time we were in trenches and the enemy was moving in open. Illuminating ammunition was used and we inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.
Very effective role was played by our two tanks, which had come from workshop after repairs. These tanks were parked on MS 5 and were to join the regiment in the morning.
The tanks moved on to railway line and engaged the enemy with machineguns and main guns at point blank range. It may be mentioned here that our Patton tanks were fitted with infra red night vision device. The attack was halted and eventually petered out. The enemy fell back to Jassoran. Keeping in view the quantum of troops used by the Indians and the opposition they faced in this engagement, their performance does not appear to be impressive.