“Lost Opportunity —
A Military Analysis 1971”

Columnist Lt Col (Retd) Mukhtar Ahmad Gilani

Introduction
According to various relevant facts between 21 November and 25 November 71, Pakistan high command had missed a viable opportunity to launch a bold counter-offensive in the Ravi-Sutlej corridor. To achieve surprise, with operational planning well in advance, it was possible to concentrate secretly, superior forces at the right place and at the right time. By capturing a big chunk of Indian territory of strategical, political and of economic importance Pakistan would have forced an early ceasefire in East Pakistan on advantageous terms and thus saved from suffering humiliation of the decisive defeat, surrendering of about 65,000 soldiers and above all the secession of East Pakistan. Since the creation of Pakistan it was the greatest tragedy of disgraceful nature, the scar of which would not heal till a decisive victory has been achieved against our deceitful adversary on battlefield.
During 1971, most of the battalion/regiment and senior commanders (from brigadier to general) were veterans of 1965 war and professionally well-groomed. Generals Yahya, Hamid and Tikka had commanded divisions in action. It was known that nearly all the general officers had been instructors in the Staff College, as such high quality of performance was expected from them. Most of the troops and junior leaders were also well-trained and had taken part in the 1965 war. Sufficient war material, including tanks, guns, armoured personnel carriers, recoilless rifles and small arms was available. There was no dearth of ammunition and petrol for at least 10 weeks of all out war. The Navy was capable of guarding our coasts and the PAF was in a position to provide air cover for our counter-offensive forces and vital installations. In the following paragraphs effort has been made to highlight some of the relevant facts for the interest of particularly our young generation. Political situation has not been discussed.

Relative strength of Pakistan forces and Indian forces — East Pakistan
Prior to the all-out war in East Pakistan the Indians had trained and armed one hundred thousand Mukti Bahini and supported the miscreants and anti-Pakistan political leaders. Insurgency activities had continued for many months. During September and October 1971 the Indians had provided support to the Mukti Bahini operations carried out inside East Pakistan. Many communication centres, bridges, ferries were damaged by saboteurs. The Indian intelligence personnel and troops of border security units were also operating well inside East Pakistan. The border of East Pakistan with India was about 2000 miles long. The Pakistan high command was over haunted by the fear that any sizable territory seized by the Mukti Bahini would be recognized by India as Bangladesh. To drive out the rebels and the Indian intruders the Eastern Command forces were scattered in penny packets all along the borders. The Indians had obtained complete information of the terrain and deployment of the Eastern Command forces. When the all out war started on 21 November 71 the relative strength was as under.

Pakistan Eastern Command Indian Attacking Forces

Corps - 1 Corps -3
Divisions - 3 Divisions -8 + 101
Brigades - 9 Line of Communication Area as big as a division Brigades - 34 (one parachute).
Infantry Battalions - 24 Infantry Battalions - 112 (8 Mukti Bahini + 32
Armour Regiment - 1 (Light Tank) Border Security).
Armour Regiments - 3 (Medium Tanks)
Tank Squadron - 1 (Light Tank) Tank Squadron - 3
Artillery Regiments - 6 Artillery Regiments - 46
Anti-Aircraft Regiment - 1 Anti-Aircraft Regiment - 4
Mortar Batteries - 5 Mortar Battery NIL
Air Squadron - 1 Air Squadron - 10
Navy - 4 Gun Boats Navy - Aircraft Carrier - 1
Battleship - 1
Destroyers - 8
Landing Craft - 3
Gun Boats - Numerous.

By 23 November 71 the Indian attacking forces were fully involved in fighting in the various sectors of East Pakistan. Whereas, there was complete lull on the western front although troops deployed on both sides of the borders were in eyeball-to-eyeball position.

Indian Strategy on the Western Front and deployment of their Forces
The Indian high command had carried out operational planning much before the deployment of their forces. The Indian high command had correctly deduced that Pakistan had considerably denuded its West Pakistan forces by sending two well-trained divisions to East Pakistan and although two new divisions were raised to compensate the imbalance but these were in the early stages of training and consisted of only two brigades each. Therefore, the Indian high command came to the conclusion that Pakistan was very weak in reserve so far as maintaining parity with India in quality and quantity was concerned, and its forces could not penetrate more than 20 to 30 miles deep at the chosen point of threat.
As the situation in East Pakistan deteriorated the Indian high command expected that Pakistan would launch a pre-emptive attack on the western front to achieve worthwhile results to ensuring the security of West Pakistan. The Indian high command, with contempt, took seriously the statements of Gen Yahya made in August 71 that “War with India is very near and in case of war Pakistan would not be alone”. Again in October 71 Gen Yahya made another statement that “he would teach that woman (Indira Gandhi) a lesson.”
From the information available from various sources, including the Bengali Armed Forces defactors and deserters, the Indian high command was well aware about the deployment of the holding forces in West Pakistan and also of one armoured division and one infantry division each had been positioned north and south of the Ravi. The task assigned as known to the Indians was to seize the initiative at the start of hostilities and launch an offensive to capture as much Indian territory of strategic, economic and of political importance while denying Pakistan territory to the Indian offensive forces.
During the first week of October 71, it was appreciated by the Indian high command that Pakistan would be ready to launch an offensive by mid-October 71 in the western front because of the move of the Indian forces on the borders of East Pakistan. It was decided to forestall the Pakistan forces on the western front with aggressive defensive action till the Indian forces had achieved decisive success in East Pakistan. Also Indian strike forces were to be kept within striking distance to check and crush the Pakistan offensive forces.
In view of the above the Indian forces were deployed as under on the western front:
Lt Gen Candeth was the Army Commander West and had three Corps under his command.
Lt Gen Sartaj Singh - 15 Corps (3 Division + 19 Division + 25 Division + 26 Division + 10 Division + one armoured brigade + two artillery brigades).
Task — Defence of Jammu and Kashmir and also to launch offensive action from Chamb-Jourian Sector and capture Tanda and area up to Gujrat,
Lt Gen K. K. Singh - 1 Corps (Strike Corps - 39 Division + 54 Division + 36 Division + 87 Brigade + two armoured brigades + two artillery brigades).
Task — to advance and capture Shakargarh, Pasrur, Narowal, Daska and Gujranwala.
Lt Gen Rawlley — 11 Corps
(15 Division with 5 brigades + 7 Division + one armoured brigade + Fox Trot Force equal to division + two artillery brigades).
Task — Defence of area from Dera Baba Nanak, Amritsar, Taran Taran, Khem Karan, Harike, Ferozepore and excluding Fazilka.
Maj Gen Ram Singh — F Sector (3 brigades + one armour regiment + two artillery regiments + 4 batteries medium artillery)
Task — Defence of area from Fazilka, Abhor, Sulemanke, Kanga Nagar and Anup Nagar. Also to capture Sulemanki Headworks and advance as far as possible.
Lt Gen GG Bewoor —Commander Southern Command (11 Division + 12 Division + 10 Parachute Battalion + Anti-Tank Guided Missile Unit + two armour regiments + one armour squadron + sufficient artillery cover).
The Indian reserve force consisted of 1 Armoured Division + 14 Division was concentrated in area Farid Kot, Kot Kapura and Turktesau. Its task was to capture Kasur, Luliani (now Mustafabad), Raja Jung, Raiwind and destroy Pakistan counter offensive force, namely 2 Corps.
Pakistan Strategy in the Western front and Deployment of its Forces.
Ever since the creation of Pakistan the nodal point of our strategy was that “the defence of East Pakistan would defend on the strength of West Pakistan.” Because of the location of our Central Government, vital defence installations, Armed Forces training centres and few other considerations the centre of gravity was in the West. Based on this dictum Pakistan had always kept major portion of its Armed Forces in West Pakistan for counter-offensive role in case East Pakistan was attacked. It was beyond Pakistan resources to keep a separate force for each wing, to match, or even to act as a deterrent to our enemy, but, however, sufficient force was always maintained in East Pakistan to involve at least three times bigger enemy force for a few weeks.
By the first week of September 71 reports indicated that concentration of the Indian forces along the borders of East Pakistan was increasing. Rebel activities had increased markedly. Reports of unusual movement of Indian troops along the west border was reported and also close to the ceasefire line in Kashmir, Pakistan high command had correctly appreciated that an Indian attack on East Pakistan was imminent and that movement along the western border was to forestall Pakistan retaliation to ease pressure on East Pakistan.
The GHQ planning cell, headed by the CGS, revised its plans where necessary to cater for launching a counter-offensive in the West into Indian territory. First the holding forces, with limited offensive action, were to capture area of immediate tactical nature. When those had achieved their objectives a major counter-attack was to be launched into Indian
territory. The deployment of Pakistan forces during October 71 in the West was as under.
Maj Gen Akbar Khan — 12 division (1AK Brigade + 2AK Brigade + 3 AK Brigade + 5 AK Brigade + 6 AK Brigade + 26 Brigade + 6 Wings of Frontier Corps + six mountain artillery regiments + one light anti-aircraft battery + one engineer battalion + one signal battalion.)
Task — Defence of about 250 miles of front of Azad Kashmir and capture of Poonch. For attack on Poonch 12 field/light batteries and two medium batteries were deployed.
Maj Gen Eftikhar — 23 Division (20 Brigade + 66 Brigade + 111 Brigade + 4AK Brigade + 7AK Brigade + 2 Armoured Brigade + four field regiments + two mountain regiments + two medium regiments + 3 batteries + Recce and Support battalion.)
Task — To capture area up to the River Tawi, including Chamb, and advance up to Akhnur.
Lt Gen Irshad Ahmad — 1 Corps (8 Division with four brigades + 15 Division + 8 Armoured Brigade + Changez Force with two armour regiments and one infantry battalion. Reserve force consisting of 6 Armoured Division and 17 Division was placed for counter offensive role. Artillery support consisted of
5 field + 3 medium regiments + battery medium + 2 batteries light
anti-aircraft).
Task — Defence of Sialkot Sector from Phukhian to Dharain enclave. To launch counter-offensive in Indian held territory on orders from GHQ.
Lt Gen Bahadur Sher - 4 Corps (10 Division with four brigades + 11 Division + 105 Brigade group + Recce and Support battalion + Eight field artillery regiments + Two medium regiments + One medium battery + Two mortar batteries + one armour squadron).
Task — Defence of Lahore Sector, Kasur Sector and Sulemanke Sector. To provide support to the counter-offensive force when launched.
Maj Gen Naseer Ahmad — 33 Division raised in the second week of December 1971 (only two brigades with little supporting arms and services).
Task - Defence of Northern and Central Sector Rajistan.
Maj Gen B.M. Mustafa — 18 Division (Three brigades + Two armour regiments + Two field + One medium regiment + Recce and Support battalion).
Task — Defence of Karachi Sector and capture of Jaisalmir.
Lt Gen Tikka Khan — 2 Corps (GHQ reserve for counter-offensive — 1 Armoured Division + 7 Division + support from holding force).
Task — Counter-offensive role as and when ordered. Its location was frequently changed to confuse to enemy.
Facts in favour of Launching counter-offensive in the West by Pakistan.
In the West the Indian forces were numerically superior in infantry but in armour and artillery had nominal superiority.
By 23 November 71 in East Pakistan the enemy forces were fully involved and it was not possible to pull out even a couple of brigades as reinforcement for the West.
In the West initiative for offensive action was with Pakistan. The enemy was aware that one armour and one infantry division each had been positioned north and south of the Ravi River but the chosen point of threat was not known. The enemy was unable to discover the exact location of 2 Corps because mostly it was kept on wheels.
From the deployment of the Indian forces in the West it was evident that area between Dera Baba Nanak and excluding Fazilka (Indian 11 Corps) was thinly held by about 11 brigades. The Indian high command had concentrated its reserve force about 20 to 30 miles in the south of the river Sutlej. Area between Hussainiwala Headworks and Amritsar, a front of about 80 miles, was held by about 7 infantry brigades and one armoured brigade. Bridges, communication centres, roads and towns of strategic and political importance were located only 20 to 30 miles away from the border, whereas the Hussainiwala Headworks and the river bridge were hardly a mile away.
On the word “Go”, even during peace time move, the formidable Indian reserve force would have taken 3 to 4 days to cross the existing canals and the River Sutlej and the Beas. In the event of all out war in the West the Indian reserve force would have been exposed to air threat and also when all the vital bridges over the rivers and communication centres were held by the opposing forces, it would have caused much delay and confusion. Therefore, it was not possible for the Indian reserve force to intervene in the progress of the onslaught of Pakistan counter-offensive forced at least for 5 to 6 days.
Sehjra salient ( 5 miles x 2 miles) but 1000 yards at the opening) could have served as a springboard for launching the counter-offensive force. From Sehjira the strategic town of Ferozepore was only 6 miles. A few Rangers posts of Sehjra salient were across the River Sutlej. Hareke bridge, Voltoha, Taran Taran and Amritsar were 12 miles, 8 miles, 20 miles and 28 miles respectively from Sehjra.
Whereas Batala was 45 miles and Jullundar 100 miles away from Sehjra.
The history of conflicts between Pakistan and India reveals that if an area was captured/occupied by one side but the opposing side inspite of efforts could not capture it. In the Kashmir war 1947-48, inspite of overwhelming superiority, the Indian forces had failed to recapture the territory controlled by the Mujahideens and the units of Pakistan Army. During 1965 war the Indian forces had failed to recapture the territory in Chamb Jaurian Sector, Kasur Sector, Sulemanki Sector and Rann of Kutch Sector. Likewise, the territory in occupation of the Indian forces during 1965 war could not be regained. The military leadership in Pakistan was all in all because there was no civil Government to create impediments.

Delay - Lost Opportunity
As mentioned above, the Indian forces had attacked East Pakistan on 21 November. In GHQ the general staff was making frantic efforts to obtain the decision of the Chief of Staff (Gen Hamid) and the President to start the war in the West. But unfortunately, the personalities at the helm of affairs remained silent and crucial time was passing fast against Pakistan. The CGS (Lt Gen Gul Hassan) had long and stormy session with the Chief of Staff on 24 November in an effort to obtain decision for opening up the Western front immediately, last hesitancy and indecisiveness continued to prevail.
Within a week of the start of war the Eastern command had lost control and thereafter most of the battalions, companies and platoons were fighting with courage and livelihood. Even many individual acts of valour had failed to stem the onslaught of the superior Indian forces.
Finally, as late as 30 November it was decided by the President to launch the preliminary operation on 3 December 71. By that time the enemy had occupied half of East Pakistan. On 3 December 71 the PAF attacked enemy airfields in East Punjab. It was late by 10 days.
The result of preliminary operation is briefly mentioned below.
a. 12 Division had failed to capture Poonch and lost a few heights of tactical importance.
b. 23 Division had captured Chamb and area up to the River Tawi. The capture of Chamb (now Eftikharabad) was a personal triumph of Gen Eftikhar who was killed on 9 December in a helicopter crash.
c. 1 Corps captured Dharam enclave (5000 x 9000 yards) but lost Phukhian Salient and some area of Shakargarh tehsil. 1 corps lost about 25 tanks but the enemy was stoutly prevented to break through. The enemy had suffered more losses.
d. In Lahore Sector both sides fought defensive battles. Pull Kaujri was lost just before ceasefire.
e. In Kasur Sector 11 Division captured Hussainiwala enclave but lost Sehjra Salient.
f. In Sulemanke Sector 105 Brigade group captured Indian posts and territory.
g. 18 Division had failed to capture Jaisalmir, lost over twenty tanks and a large number of vehicles. The operation had ended in fiasco.

Surrender and Defeat
On 16 December 71 the Eastern Command accepted unconditional surrender and lost East Pakistan. About 65,000 troops became prisoners of war.
In the West, two armoured divisions and about seven infantry brigades of Pakistan Army had not participated in the war. If the counter-offensive force had been launched between 21 November and 25 November in the West it is certain that Pakistan would have captured a big chunk of Indian territory including the strategic towns of Taran Taran, Amritsar, Ferozepore and vital communication
centres and bridges to force the enemy to offer ceasefire in East Pakistan on advantageous terms and thus saved us from suffering humiliation of the decisive defeat, surrendering of about 65,000 troops and the secession of East Pakistan.
Within 48 hours, Pakistan accepted ceasefire in the West and as losers it was our military humiliation. But by the Grace of Allah the Armed Forces did not disintegrate because inspite of the disgraceful conduct and performance of the top leadership at the helm of affairs, the virtues of patriotism and discipline helped to keep them intact and become a great tower of strength for the dejected and humiliated nation.

Conclusion
A lot has been written about the debacle of 1971. Our senior generation had tasted the bitterness of the humiliation. Particularly for the young generation this narrative of the sad episode has been confined to the military events on the western front.
Needless to say that our top leadership had made blunders. They failed to take timely bold action, lacked robustness and ability to stand the shocks of war. They displayed hesitancy and indecisiveness. They had no concepts of conducting a short war. They displayed utter lack of enterprise and daring in execution of their plans and allowed opportunities offered by the enemy to slip by.
On the other hand the Indian high command proved better strategist, better planner and never hesitated to take calculated risks. They had correctly considered in their appreciation the moral turpitude, indecisiveness and lack of boldness of the personalities at the helm of affairs in Pakistan.
I feel here, it is relevant to mention that I had the honour of translating the book “MEMOIRS OF LT GEN GUL HASSAN KHAN”, and in that process I had over 35 sittings with him. We also discussed many important events. I had asked him that as CGS of Pakistan Army was he also not responsible for the debacle of 1971? He accepted but added that the main culprits were the personalities at the helm of affairs and their cronies. As CGS he had tried his best to convince Gen Hamid and Lt Gen Niazi to concentrate the scattered forces of Eastern Command, on the already accepted strategy, for the defence of Dacca, but the Chief of Staff particularly was taken in by the optimism that prevailed in the Headquarters Eastern Command. According to Gen Gul Hassan between 10 Nov and 25 November 71 he had tried to convince Gen Yahya and Gen Hamid for launching the already planned counter-offensive in the western front but failed to obtain their timely decision. Particularly Gen Hamid, who had great influence over Gen Yahya was hesitant and indecisive. Gen Gul Hassan emphatically reiterated that he would not absolve himself of our failings in our two conflicts with India as he was very much a part and parcel of the general staff in GHQ. Many confidential events were revealed by him.

Bibliography

The Pakistan Army 1966-71
— Maj Gen Shaukat Riza

Indian Army After The Independence
— Maj Praval

Memoirs
— Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan

Prepare or Perish
— Gen Krishna Rao

Defence of The Western Border 1971
— Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh

And many articles.