Pak-India Relations: New Delhi’s Pakistan Policy

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA analyses India’s policy towards Pakistan.

Political rhetoric may not always be reflective of ‘real’ policy. Especially if it is produced for electioneering purposes. But when rhetoric becomes repetitive and its theme cuts cross policy statements, political positioning and press bytes, then the gap between rhetoric and responsible policy narrows considerably. As is increasingly the case with Delhi’s Pakistan policy. While the recent invitation to war that the Indian Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani thundered to Pakistan while kicking off the Gujarat election campaign in Bhuj on November 30, should pass as sheer shrill, the underlying message bears the stamp of policy.
As if beckoning a wrestling competitor Advani sought a battle between two nuclear-armed states. “Let us fight it out face to face, we have fought thrice, let there be a fourth war” Advani declared dangerously. Invoking Delhi’s convenient explanation for strained relations with Pakistan, Advani sahib according to Indian official news agency PTI, “charged Islamabad with nursing a wound since the creation of Bangladesh.” Blaming Pakistan pointedly he said “killing of innocent civilians by attacking temples like Akshardham and Raghunath is unacceptable”.
Advani sahib does not speak alone. His election rally rhetoric figures in interviews that politically powerful and strategically placed people like the Prime Minister, his key aide Brajesh Mishra, Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha and Sushma Swaraj all issue Pakistan-specific indictments. The list of Pakistan’s “terrorists” acts grows; ISI is training terrorists and opening madrassas along the India-Bangladesh border, its supporting terrorist activities in the North-East to destabilize India, Pakistan is trying to sabotage the Indian economy by creating trouble in Gujarat. The list is imaginative. Its endless. Everyday a “terrorist” from Lashkar-i-Tayyaba or Jaish is picked up by the Indian security forces. Spreading virtually across the Indian union, the BJP government sees these Pakistani planted “terrorists” as merely an extension of al-Qaida and the Taliban.
The contents of this policy are simple. Keep the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan; combine the cold shoulder with hot rhetoric. Exerting pressure paid off earlier. Islamabad acknowledged and subsequently reined in cross-LoC infiltration. Perhaps additional and consistent pressure can force Pakistan to accept Delhi’s Kashmir solution; making an international border of the LoC. India attempts to exert pressure on Islamabad by holding it responsible for every unfortunate terrorist incident taking place in IOK; by joining any ‘criticizing brigade’ , whether the Americans, the Russians, the Afghans, to make an international pariah out of Pakistan; by developments including the Godhra findings, the DNA scandal in Indian Occupied Kashmir and the controversial Ansal Plaza ‘terrorist encounter’ point even a deliberate ‘engineering’ of Pakistan’s involvement cannot be ruled out. The pattern is unmistakable. As is the rationale for adopting this policy.
This blame game can get tiring. Probably only for Pakistan. For the Indians, there is a method. India to some extent genuinely confronts the problem of violence and of terrorism and it also has a dispute to settle with Pakistan. India recognizes that despite Islamabad’s cooperation on the anti-terrorism front the international climate is conducive to exerting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. More so in recent weeks and months. Hence, Delhi believes that there is more to be ‘milked’ from the anti-terrorism cow vis-a-vis Pakistan. The recent developments on the North Korea-Pakistan nuclear front, the MMA’s victory in Pakistan, the allegations of Pakistan’s support for anti-American Afghan Pakhtun leader Hikmatyar, the uneasy transition from military rule to civilian rule and the spate of attacks on temples in India and in IOK, are all developments that Delhi believes it can cash on. It may earn a more pliable Pakistan. Delhi’s refusal to attend SAARC summit, is part of the same psy-war strategy.
The political and military situation has not significantly improved in the post-election period. The policy of limited engagement with the APHC and with the armed resistance advocated by Mufti Sayeed’s new government and by the Jethmalani Committee has not advanced the process of negotiations. Delhi’s rejectionist position on dialogue with Pakistan defies the wisdom of some within the Indian administration who recognize that without Pakistan a durable solution to the Jammu and Kashmir conflict is impossible; a position adopted by the Jethmalani Committee and the APHC. Solution-seeking is a distant dream. Unable to break itself away from its post-December 13 policy of coercive diplomacy, Delhi merely heightens its anti-Pakistan rhetoric in response to increased guerilla attacks. The tragedy of death and despair continues in IOK despite the elections. Innocent temple worshippers get killed. Many men in the service of the Indian state and those fighting the Indian Occupation perish away in the shadows of a policy that cannot hope for a solution.
Unfortunately, Delhi’s decision to link resumption of dialogue with complete absence of cross-LoC infiltration and with peace in IOK is one that guarantees the mindless cold war and hot rhetoric between the two neighbours. Pakistan’s post-October coup stated and operational India policy has been one of actively seeking diplomatic engagements. Concrete steps taken by Islamabad, even if some under external pressure, included stopping infiltration across the LoC, proposing a flexible dialogue approach to the Kashmir dispute and calling for resumption of a composite unconditional bilateral dialogue.
Pakistan has also refrained from rising to the rhetoric bait. Instead it repeats its offer for dialogue. But invitation to war got a sharper reaction from Islamabad. Pak Minister for Info and Media Development Sheikh Rashid Ahmad talked of Pakistan not wanting any war but of giving a “befitting reply” if India opted for any “adventurism”. In India no one should be under any illusion that a sovereign country Pakistan would “bow down its head under threats and intimidation of any country.”
None of this rhetoric will pay off. Delhi surely knows such a policy preference is understandable for short-term gains and political point-scoring. Not for substantive movement towards a settlement that Delhi too needs. Support at the international level cannot translate into a solution to the festering wound of Jammu and Kashmir. For that dialogue alone is the answer. But for now, Delhi appears to be opting for a rhetoric-loaded response to the continuing political and security turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir. Persistently calling upon the international community to declare Pakistan a terrorist state is Delhi’s response to the international community’s suggestion that Delhi should engage in a dialogue with Pakistan. Delhi is caught in the illusion of the justness of its stance on the one hand and the power of realpolitik on the other. Realpolitik it believes will dictate United States and others to ‘advise’ Islamabad into accepting Delhi’s terms of engagement. Islamabad believes Delhi must respond to its unconditional offer for dialogue. Also that Delhi has no option but to opt for a dialogue with Pakistan if it is interested in a durable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
In recent weeks, especially in the post-Gujarat victory Pakistan-India relations have been made hostage to India’s domestic politics. In Gujarat Pakistan-bashing, among other factors, proved to be a winning card. As it did in the bye-elections in Rajistan. In the coming weeks, the run-up to the February elections in five Indian states, Pakistan-bashing by the Indian leadership will acquire renewed momentum. Any change in Delhi’s Pakistan policy, therefore, in the near future, though traditional channels of diplomacy seems unlikely.