Heading towards cul-de-sac

Columnist Ansar Mahmood Bhatti sees no hope in the CYPRUS stalemate.

Recently held UN-sponsored meeting of Greek and Turkish Cypriots leaders in Hague has ended without any headway. Both sides seemed adamant on their previous stand and nobody was willing to give in. The reason why the negotiations did not end successfully was because of the insistence of TRNC president Denktash on the recognition of his state and the Greek side’s request to give back all rights back to those Greek Cypriots who left the North of the island 29 years ago. The guarantor states i.e Turkey, Greece and Britain also participated in the talks but unfortunately could not bring around both sides on an agreement for the permanent solution to the issue. The UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan expressed his disappointment over the failure of the talks and observed, “if the opportunity was missed, he was not sure if it was going to come around for a long long time and added he doubted if it would come around again during his term as Secretary General.”.

There was a good deal of euphoria at the prospect of a settlement of the Cyprus dispute on the basis of the new UN Plan when it was presented some time ago. It had been welcomed by all major states and by the European Union as a way forward, the last opportunity for a solution. Commentators in the Turkish press had seen it as clearing a way for Turkey’s entry into the European Union, firmly believing that the lack of a Cyprus settlement was a major obstacle. It had even been suggested that adoption of the UN Plan would be a victory for the Turkish Cypriots. 

The Greek Cypriot Government seemed prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Plan, but, like the Turkish Cypriots, did not want to be rushed into decisions. Among the Greek Cypriots, despite support from party leaders, there was resentment that the Plan did not allow all Greek Cypriots displaced in 1974 to return to their homes and live anywhere, and that the jewel in the crown of the TRNC, Kyrenia, and the formerly Greek Cypriot villages of Lapta (Lapitos) and Alsancak (Karavas), were not to be returned. 

Is the Plan acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots? It has been argued that as they have their own state within the proposed federation, as do the Greek Cypriots, their self-determination, independence and political equality are all ensured. It will even be possible, it is said, for a Turkish Cypriot to be President of the new State of Cyprus. The Turkish guarantee is also preserved. But before being carried away on a wave of hope and expectation, it is only sensible to look very carefully at what precisely is on offer. First, let us look at the all-important constitutional blueprint, and then at some of the other remaining proposals, namely on territorial changes, the return of property lost in 1974, the freedoms of movement and residence, and the little mentioned but extremely significant, freedom for all Cypriots to invest anywhere in the island that would be a normal attribute of EU membership. 

Under the 1960 Constitution the Deputies of each community in the legislature, and the President and Vice-President, had the right to veto legislation and decisions in vitally important policy areas. By using the veto mechanism, unanimity was required in major policies, and unanimity is the essential feature of an equal partnership or confederation. The system collapsed because the Greek Cypriots did not believe that the Turkish Cypriot “minority” (19 percent of the population) should be equal partners. The Turkish Cypriots, having reluctantly agreed to renounce their basic ambition for a division of the island, were in no mood to be dominated by the Greek Cypriots. Neither they, nor Turkey, accepted Archbishop Makarios’ proposals to turn the Turkish Cypriots as a result of the violence used against them to make them conform has not been forgotten by the Turkish Cypriots.

In 1984-86, and again in the 1992 Set of Ideas, the UN Secretary-General introduced constitutional proposals that included vetoes for both sides over legislation and executive decisions in major areas of concern. They were accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, but not by the other side. Now, however, in the new Plan we see a great change, a change which was heralded in the UN’s November 2000 proposals that led to a breakdown in the proximity negotiations. The UN clearly now accepts the Greek Cypriot position that in the central federal institutions of more important lower house of the proposed new parliament, (the Chamber of Deputies) would reflect the number of registered residents in each “component state”, with at least a quarter of the 48 seats being allocated to the representatives of each state. Decisions in the Chamber of Deputies would be by majority vote. The 48-member upper house, the Senate, would have an equal number of members from each of the two “component’ states but with, again decision by majority vote. 

Those who urge adoption of the Plan will argue that Greek Cypriot domination of the central federal institutions really does not matter because important legislation would anyway lie with the European Union. But, as is the case with other EU members, the central government still has important functions to perform. There would be the need for delegated legislation to be made. Moreover, the functions given to the federal institutions are important. They include control of external (including EU) relations, the supervision of Central Bank functions (and membership), communications, and immigration, which could be a very contentious issue.

The proposals for the return of territory are bound to be very difficult for the Turkish Cypriots. They include surrender of the large fertile area of Guzelyurt (Morphou) abandoned in 1974 by the Greek Cypriots. This would be a great blow to agriculture in the North. The surrender of Maras (Varosha) on the east coast would be less problematical. Turkish Cypriot territory would be reduced to some 28.5 per cent from the 36 per cent at present held. It is estimated that there would be some 50,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees, for whom new fertile land would be impossible to find. 

Under proposals regarding property vacated in 1974, the Plan envisages a very large measure of reinstatement of displaced owners. This is an important factor in determining how far the citizens of one component state may live in the other. The whole drift of the Plan is to induce both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be Cypriots first and foremost, but to do this by placing “common state” power in the hands of the Greek Cypriots without some worrying ambiguities. It is certainly not the sort of plan to be presented when there is little time for the lengthy study and negotiation it would need. One thing is sure. It is very unlikely that after 27 years of independence, the Turkish Cypriots are going to relinquish their freedom and place themselves in a position inferior to that of the Greek Cypriots. If the Turkish Cypriots decide to forgo riches for the sake of independence will it matter, will it really be an obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership? Most probably not. The decision to admit so large and populous a country as Turkey would be a decision of historic proportions, going far beyond the confines of the Cyprus issue. The Turkish Cypriots in fact wanted a long, hard look at a Plan. After thorough examination, TRNC leadership is still undecided whether the Plan will provide them the political equality.

Summing up, there is no doubt that the future would be even brighter for all Cypriots once they are united. Cyprus is a democratic European country with a competitive market economy. Due to the strategic location of the island, Cyprus can become a geographical, cultural, economic and political bridge between the European Union and its southern regions. The leaders of both sides, therefore, do not miss this opportunity and continue the negotiations process for a permanent amicable solution to the long-standing issue.