Opinion

OPINION

All Roads to Baghdad –
United States Military Operation in Iraq 2003

Columnist Hamid Hussain makes a very thorough analysis of the recent war in Iraq.

Introduction

The year 2003 saw the engagement of United States (US) military in second major operation in less than two years. After winding up operations in Afghanistan, US administration started to build up its case against Saddam Hussein. Politically and diplomatically, US failed to convince a significant portion of its own citizens and a large part of the international community about the wisdom of regime change. However, the hawks in Pentagon won and decision was finalized about military operation in Iraq to remove Saddam regime.

This article will review the military operations carried in Iraq. The article will start with the background information of current crisis, which has its roots in the first Gulf War in 1991. This component is important to comprehend to understand why US is at war with Iraq again in 2003. This will be followed by a brief review of recent civil-military relations in US to give a glimpse of the dynamics of these relations which can affect military operations and highlights of US military and political objectives. The details of different aspects of military operations will be presented including some notes on Iraqi side and concluded with a summary. The reader should keep few points in mind. First, the amount of credible information in the immediate aftermath of a war is clouded in many myths and sometimes it takes a while when more information or true information is available. Second, this article will look only at the military operational aspect and not the broader legal or moral part of war, which is beyond the scope of this review. It is always difficult to first find facts and later try to sort out what they mean when the noise of voices for and against the war are too loud.

Background
To understand the military operations of 2003, it is critically important to briefly review the 1991 Gulf War. It is also important as US armed forces went a dramatic transformation in terms of material and men from Vietnam War to Gulf War. Several dedicated senior officers undertook a colossal task of doctrinal and training reforms. Several new combat training centres were established.1 In terms of material, five key weapons systems; UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, AH-64 Apache helicopter, M 1 Abrams tank, M2/3 Bradley armoured personnel carrier and Patriot missile defence system oriented US military to a whole new combat structure and prepared it for future battlefields.

US military leadership was a step ahead of their political leadership. The signs of the crumbling of Soviet Union were picked up early and future threat perception changed. General Norman Schwarzkopf (he became commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) in November 1988) realized that Soviet threat is replaced by new ones. Schwarzkopf realized that large, well-equipped Iraqi military has replaced the Soviets as the most serious threat in the Persian Gulf. In November 1989, Schwarzkopf directed that the plan addressing possible Soviet invasion of Iran (codenamed OPLAN 1002-90) be revised as soon as possible to reflect an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. ‘In December Joint Chiefs Staff (JCS) gave him the permission to shift the geographic focus of the biennial Joint Chief’s war games from Iran to Saudi Arabia’.

In 1990, Saddam ordered his forces to take-over Kuwait, which they did with minimal resistance. US responded with an all out diplomatic, economic and military might to reverse this take-over. In 1991, on paper the Iraqi armed forces seemed a formidable force. Iraqi army had 950,000 men in uniform. The elite Republican Guard consisted of eight divisions. In terms of equipment, it had 5,000 tanks, 10,000 armoured vehicles and 4,000 artillery pieces. There were about 1,500 Scud surface-to-surface missiles. Two modified versions of Scud, Al-Abbas and Al-Hussein had 900 km and 600 km range respectively. Iraqi Air Force had 700 combat aircraft (360 fighter ground attack aircraft and 300 air defence fighters) operating from 30 main bases and a backup of 30 dispersed airstrips. The air defence system consisted of about 300 SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile launchers. In addition to this there were about 400 mobile launchers and more than 4,000 anti-aircraft guns to defend strategic assets.3 Quite an impressive force on paper but what happened in reality? After thirty-eight days of crippling air assaults, Saddam was still refusing to see the light and vacate Kuwait. On February 24, the ground battle started and within first twenty-four hours about 10,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered. Five days later and the whole game was over. Iraq had capitulated with 25,000-50,000 Iraqis killed and loss of about 4,000 tanks. Forty-two Iraqi divisions have been rendered combat ineffective, captured or simply destroyed.4 At the end of the day more than 80,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered some even to the television crew members.

Quite early in crisis, on August 28, 1990, Washington clearly stated that the objective was withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and not the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. One serious problem with US decision- makers during 1991 Gulf War was lack of information about the thought process of Saddam Hussein. Although they were warned by Israeli intelligence about the possibility of escalation if attempt was made to unseat Saddam but US ignored the importance of this point. On February 25, 1991, Iraq fired a missile with a concrete warhead into Israel’s Negev desert. ‘This “blank” had the weight and speed profile of a biological warhead’. Israeli intelligence concluded that this was a message from Saddam.5 US publicly stated that the objective of military operation was freedom of Kuwait and not removal of Saddam Hussein but they were not aware of the critical importance of this one point. When the war was over, two factors were important in dealing with Iraq. First, there was a sense of frustration in Washington about the unfinished business meaning removal of Saddam when he was most vulnerable. Second and more important was the fact that key policy-makers now evaluated Saddam more closely and the threat, which he could pose in future. US response was twofold. One was ‘demonization’ of Saddam, which indirectly exaggerated his importance. This was partly due to the frustration in Washington.6 The second aspect was the realization after war in Washington about Saddam’s intentions. While US knew that Saddam has missiles but the reckless use of these missiles, firing at Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and especially Tel Aviv shocked many. Though Iraqi’s missiles were primitive but their use as weapons of mass destruction (with chemical and biological warheads) and reckless behaviour of Saddam sealed his fate as early as 1991-92. Firing missiles at military targets is one thing but random launching at cities has a whole different connotation. Saddam’s ‘this capacity and the will to use it changed the American calculus enormously’.7 During Clinton administration’s two terms, the frustration in Washington was vented with occasional forays into Iraqi air space and firing missiles. Since mid-nineties, a number of think-tanks and policy-makers started to argue for removal of Saddam and possible methods to achieve this goal. In 2001, when George Bush Jr. took over, his team had plenty of hawks. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Chairman of Defence Policy Board Richard Perle and number four in Pentagon Douglas Feith perceived Saddam as a serious threat. After September 11, it was getting quite clearer that Saddam’s days are numbered. The only thing to be sorted out was timing. Afghan operation necessitated postponement of removal of Saddam for a while.

US Civil-Military Relations 2003
US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld came to Pentagon in 2001 with a vision of transforming the military. Both his ideas and personality resulted in clashes with several senior officers of armed forces. The head of United States Army General Eric Shinseki (a Japanese-American who came to office in June 1999 and will be retiring in June 2003) never got along with Rumsfeld. Shinseki had the vision as when he talked about the idea of ‘transformation’ of army, he suggested that army need to adjust from thinking about traditional enemies to ‘complicators’ including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. He thought of combining the adaptability of light infantry with power of heavily mechanized forces. Rumsfeld’s idea of ‘transformation’ meant more air power and ‘space age’ warfare where army had almost no role.8 In Rumsfeld’s vision of transformation of armed forces, army had only peripheral if any role. The two never got along and in an unprecedented move, which meant to snub Shinseki, Rumsfeld announced Shinseki’s replacement 18 months ahead. During a congressional committee hearing about Iraq, Shinseki told that several hundred thousand troops will be needed to police Iraq after the removal of Saddam. Rumsfeld responded by saying that Shinseki was ‘far off the mark’. In addition to Rumsfeld, many other civilians at Pentagon had problems with their uniformed colleagues.

In 2001, General Tommy Frank’s initial plan of tackling Iraq envisioned invading Iraq from three fronts. Forces from Kuwait in south, Jordan in west and from Turkey in north will converge on Baghdad. Rumsfeld overhauled the whole project. There was a constant struggle between civil and military brass at Pentagon. In addition, State Department staffers were disgusted at the ‘macho’ attitude of everybody at Pentagon. Rumsfeld had to walk a tight rope as civilian super hawks wanted to replicate Afghanistan experience while military brass wanted to repeat the Gulf War I with huge forces in the area. In addition, he has to fend off his critics from State Department. Despite his shortcomings, it goes to Rumsfeld’s credit that he kept firm control on all affairs including operational planning and deployment. He wanted less than 100,000 troops in theatre but later agreed to compromise with Franks to increase it to 150,000. He also cut the air war timetable to seven days or less followed by a combined assault. He also insisted that once the first shots are fired, US armour should race toward Baghdad ahead of their supply line. Senior brass was upset with this micromanaging. Former General Norman Schwarzkopf stated that he was ‘nervous’ about total control by Rumsfeld. General Merrill McPeak (Air Force Chief of Staff during first Gulf War) also expressed his concerns that ‘Rumsfeld is running this on a very short string’.9 On surface, these mutual incriminations may seem to have negative impact on military operations. Later events proved that it kept everybody at edge and they took extra care in performing their functions as the one who dropped the ball would be roasted. The result was that all loose ends were tied up before the first shots were fired in Iraq.

US Objectives
After the September 11, 2001 devastating attacks in US, an ad-hoc analytical group was established at Pentagon. The group was named Office of Special Plans. Its director Abram Shulsky was reporting to Under-Secretary of Defence, William Luti.10 This group brought a whole new dimension to Iraq strategy by challenging Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and State Department’s analysis about Iraq. The overall strategy of US, which includes both political and military factors was based on policies developed in Defence Department. State Department had little if any input in this regard.

The overall political objectives both short and long-term included:

Overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Destroy Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability and infrastructure.
Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq and gather intelligence on global terrorism.
Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.
Ensure territorial integrity of Iraq and installation of a broad-based government, which renounces WMD development and use, no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbours.
Use the success in Iraq as leverage to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.

The immediate military objectives given to the military command from the political leadership were:

Destabilize, isolate and overthrow the Iraqi regime.
Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure.
Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.
Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq.
Support a new broad-based government when in place.

The operational military objectives and tasks included:

Neutralizing regime leadership.
Defeating or compelling capitulation of Iraqi forces.
Neutralizing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, chemical and biological.
Controlling WMD infrastructure.
Gain and maintain air, maritime superiority.
Ensure territorial integrity of Iraq.
Deploy forces in post-hostility operations to assist in humanitarian operations and set military conditions for provisional government to assume power.

Military Operations

Prelude
In early 2003, small groups of US intelligence officials and diplomats were regularly infiltrating northern Iraq and making contacts with opponents of the regime. US Special Operations Forces (SOFs) were also training Kurdish fighters in weapons and tactical skills to prepare them for the coming battle. Three airfields in north (near Arbil, Sulaimaniyah and Dohuk) were surveyed and upgraded. Four months before the start of hostilities, about 100 members of SOFs and about 50 CIA officers were inside Iraq cataloguing and monitoring sites of missile launchers, minefields and suspicious sites of chemical and biological weapons. In Iraq, US was successful in fusing electronic surveillance with human intelligence on the ground, which was a key factor in quick capitulation of Iraqi regime.

There have been many analyses of possible operations in Iraq and few were proved to be accurate.13 Enough information was available few weeks before war about US operational military strategy. On March 3, Washington Post gave a general outline of the coming war. It correctly pointed that there will be simultaneous air and ground assault. Special Operations forces will be involved in two main objectives of securing Iraqi oilfields and deny Iraqi access to chemical and biological weapons sites. The plan included sparing of Iraqi military if it decides not to fight. US intelligence estimated that most Iraqi regular units will not fight. The main attack will be from Kuwait with most army units heading north towards Euphrates River while British Forces along with Marines will jump off further east and move along southern marshes to capture Basra. From all points all units will race towards Baghdad.14 Some of these pre-war estimates proved correct.

Psychological Operations
The psychological warfare had many facets. Psychological Operations (Psy-ops) units were in place several months before the operations. Television and radio broadcasts, videos and leaflets were used to address Iraqi civilians and troops. US stressed the point that they only want to remove Saddam regime and had no desire to kill Iraqis be civilian or soldier. Fixed and aerial platforms were used for communications with Iraqis. They advised civilians to stay from military targets and report to US soldiers any information about the regime. They were also advised to try to prevent any damage to oil facilities. Soldiers were advised to stay away from their heavy equipment. Anti-aircraft operators were warned that switching of radars would be suicidal for them. Several Iraqis and other Arab-speaking operatives were busy all over Iraq to ensure neutrality of general populace. Leaflets were dropped giving guidelines to Iraqi soldiers. They were directed to park their vehicles in squares with white flags. Soldiers were advised to move about one kilometre away from their tanks. Officers could keep their side arms while soldiers should disarm and wait for further instructions.

During war in north of Baghdad, US troops had loudspeakers mounted on their hum vies repeatedly broadcasted insulting remarks about Iraqi soldiers such as Iraqi men are impotent to try to bring Iraqi soldiers out of their defensive positions in fit of anger.

Special Operations
Members of Navy SEALs, Rangers, Green Berets and Air Force Special Operations Combat Special Operations constituted Special Operations Forces (SOFs). Members of Special Air Service Units, Royal Marines of 45 Commando from Britain and Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) from Australia also participated in these operations. SOFs were involved in many delicate operations during Iraq war. About 10,000 soldiers of Special Forces ‘punched enormous holes in Saddam’s ability to defend his country, playing a disproportionate role in the swift and decisive victory’.15 A number of SOFs worked closely with Kurdish fighters and civilians to control northern area of Iraq. This was critically important when US forces could not use Turkish border to use large-scale troops in a northern offensive. This large area was denied to Iraqi forces for any manoeuvre. All possible responses from Saddam to slow down US onslaught were carefully worked out and neutralized mainly by SOFs. One scenario which was war gamed was possible ‘flood earth’ policy where by breaking dams and flooding vast areas could stop armoured vehicles. Initial measurement of water level in reservoirs by covert SOF operators showed an alarmingly high level. SOFs were ordered to secure the dams around Karbala where a bottleneck for US forces could be easily created by flooding the area. Contacts were also made with several managers working at oil wells. Handsome cash to several managers persuaded them not to follow the orders of setting them on fire. Another threat was the possibility that Saddam may use missiles or non-conventional weapons against Israel or US bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia thus broadening the conflict. SOFs secured three airstrips in western Iraqi desert to ensure that any attack against Israel could not be launched from there.16 In addition, many possible sites of chemical and biological weapons were secured by SOFs. H2 and H3 airfields in western Iraq near Jordanian border were quickly secured by SOFs at the start of hostilities. Few days later, SOFs and soldiers from 75th Ranger regiment carried a night time parachute assault on H1 airfield.17 Small teams of SOFs operated all around Iraq to deny Iraqi forces any operational mobility.

Britain’s Special Boat Service infiltrated oilfields in Faw peninsula and engaged the attention of Iraqi troops. In the meantime, commandos of Royal Marines attacking from Kuwait quickly overwhelmed the defenders and occupied the area thus preventing any damage to oilfields.18 Sensitive Site Exploration Teams (SSETs) moved in quickly after the attack on targets such as possible weapons sites and terrorist camps (Ansar-ul-Islam camp in northern Iraq) to comb through the debris to get information. SOFs performed a very vital task for successful conclusion of military operations and prevented many complicating situations, which could have slowed down US onslaught.

Showdown
On March 19 the military operations started by volleys of missiles and air strikes against many targets in Iraq. The military command had designated a special set of targets called Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs). This list of very important targets was based on potential devastating and unpredictable consequences of these variables. Three types of targets were defined as TSTs, which included Leadership, WMD and terrorists. A joint strategy was developed with special capability to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess these TSTs.19 SOFs played a crucial role in this task.

Air campaign consisted of elimination of a number of targets. This included regime’s centre of power in Baghdad, military depots and air defences. As there was no large-scale concentration of troops, therefore decimation of large groups of Iraqi soldiers didn’t occur. Only small company size groups of soldiers and irregulars who fought ground battles were targeted. In addition, US was very careful in avoiding damaging roads, bridges and economic targets. It was interesting to see that Baghdad city was fully illuminated with lights for several days after the start of campaign.

The ground attack from Kuwait started in two columns. From the western route the US V Corps (led by Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace) raced towards Baghdad taking al-Samawah, al-Hillah, Najaf and Karbala route. British forces along with US Marines took the eastern route taking Um-e-Qasr, Basra, al Amarah, al-Kut route to Baghdad. The initial plan was to bypass all small towns along the way to Baghdad. The hope was to leave Iraqi troops hunkered down in these towns in defensive positions while US takes out the centre of the regime.

V Corps when reached near Karbala and Hillah, launched a five-way assault on Iraqi troops, which totally confused the defenders. Forces from 3rd Infantry Division attacked a point between Hillah and Karbala, 7th Cavalry just south of Karbala gap, troops from 101st Airborne attacked from Najaf towards Hillah, troops from 82nd Airborne moved towards al-Samawah while two aviation squadrons attached to 101st Airborne were involved in armed reconnaissance of the western flank. However at some places, Iraqi troops came out of their defensive positions and attacked US formations. US commanders expected that Iraqi troops would stay put in their defensive positions and try to drag on the defence thus slowing US advance. This occurred in Al-Samawa, Najaf, Hillah and Karbala.20 However, this token resistance was not significant enough to slow down US advance. In addition, US commanders were quick to change their tactics. This five-pronged attack, which achieved its objectives relatively easily, cleared the path all the way towards Baghdad and three days later US forces were in control of Baghdad airport. On road to Baghdad, the only resistance offered by Iraqi forces mainly irregulars was near three highway junctions. Soldiers of 3rd Battalion of 15th Regiment of 2nd Brigade of 3rd Infantry Division of US were involved. At the junction of Highway 8 and Qadisiyyah Expressway (named Objective Moe by US), they came under Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks but only seven soldiers were wounded, one seriously. The junction of Highway 8 and road crossing Tigris river at Al Jadriyah Bridge (Objective Larry) and southernmost part of interchange (Objective Curly) were secured when the patchy resistance was silenced. Now road to Baghdad was clear. The brigade commander (Colonel David Perkins) rather than moving slowly to first clear and then to secure intersections decided to push. He sent two tank units (Ist and 4th battalions of 64th Armoured Regiment) race into the heart of Baghdad to seize key installations and later send mechanized infantry (3rd Battalion) to secure supply routes and occupy intersections.21 This signalled the end of game to most Iraqis and the hope of any meaningful resistance further diminished. On April 5 US forces entered Baghdad and four days later Saddam Hussein and his regime was disposed of to the archives of history. On April 14, all major military operations in Iraq ended. In the original plan, 4th Infantry Division was to open northern front from Turkey but when Turkey refused, the plan had to be quickly overhauled. Small number of SOFs and later some airborne troops did not allow any room of manoeuvre in northern Iraq. By the time 4th Division reached Kuwait by sea, most of fighting was over.

Overall, despite some hitches, US commanders showed enough flexibility when things did not turn out as expected to achieve their objectives without much damage. The initial plan was to completely bypass small towns on road to Baghdad. When in some towns, Iraqi soldiers came out of defensive positions to attack on US supply line, tactics was quickly changed for that particular area. In Najaf, when resistance started to slow the US advance, the town was quickly isolated and armoured raids were carried in town to take control of the town. Similarly, when due to quick thinking of an Iraqi forward observer the attacks by Apache helicopters did not perform as expected, US commanders changed the tactics of use of helicopters.22 However, these were small skirmishes. Even if few thousand dedicated Iraqis had decided to resist, there would be much more difficulties for US troops.

Other side of the fence – Iraq Background
While no one had any delusion of defeat of US forces in set engagements but many including senior US commander expected some serious resistance from Iraqi forces. After all it was not a minor skirmish but US had embarked on a big task of conquering a country with an area of 4,000,000 square kilometres and population of about 24 million. If one estimates that 1-2 percent of population was diehard supporter of Saddam or wanted to defend against US, the numbers come out be in thousands.

Some Pakistani defence analysts gave totally unrealistic assessment of the whole military situation. Some described imaginary grand ‘combat zones’ set up by Saddam where motley crew of soldiers, tribal Bedouins, Mujahideen and volunteers would have a turkey shoot. They used very lofty terms such as ‘siege and fortifications’, ‘cauldron of Baghdad’, ‘killing grounds’ for US soldiers and fighting force of ‘60,000 Republican Guards, 50,000 Fidayeen and 40,000 foot soldiers’ not omitting their favourite Jihadis and non-Iraqi Mujahideen.23 If these respected gentlemen were just carried away by emotions and intense hatred of US to cloud their judgment, wanted to sooth general public sentiment or did not have the basic information about Iraq then this is fine and excusable. But if this kind of analysis is based on their assumptions and serious thought process and they firmly and sincerely believe in that, then Pakistan has some very serious problem, which can have very dangerous consequences for the country. In Arab and Muslim world there was so much anger against US that the general hope was of some bloody fights and rising US casualties. They were expecting the fall of Baghdad but wanted a sanguine battle to satisfy their raw emotions. Sadly, they were disappointed just as they were disappointed few months earlier by Afghans. The reason for this irrational thought process and vain hopes is almost complete lack of understanding of ground realities. For most of these people, Iraq and its inhabitants became relevant when US started military operations but they had no clue about what Iraqis have gone through in the last three decades. Of course US had its own reasons and interests but that should not cloud the facts on ground. Iraqis were not in love with US and were not going to shower them with flowers but deep in their heart they knew that only US could do the job of removal of Saddam. This was the reason that the leaders of all groups regardless of their political and ideological inclinations directed their people to stay neutral and do not resist US forces. The superficial symbols of nation state did not project the real fault lines of Iraqi society. Kurds in north actively cooperated with US while Shias and other groups decided to stay neutral and watch for the outcome, a stark reminder of recent events in Afghanistan.

Iraqi Decision-Making Process
Saddam Hussein has ruled Iraq for about three decades with an iron hand. After 1991, increasingly he had relied only on his close relatives and clans of Tikrit (his birth place). Saddam’s cousin General Ali Hassan al-Majeed has served as Defence Minister, director of security and commander of southern military command. Adnan Khairullah, a brother-in-law has also served as defence minister. A half-brother Watban Ibraheem and a cousin Sadun Shakir had served as interior ministers. The general intelligence apparatus (Jihaz al Mukhabarat al Amma) and special guards of Saddam were headed by his younger son Qusay. Older son of Saddam, Uday was in charge of information, culture and youth. General Security Directorate (Mudiriyat Al Amn al Amma) was headed by another half-brother Sabaui Ibraheem (Sabaui has also served as head of Saddam’s private office). Saddam’s Aid-de-Camp was his brother-in-law Arshad Yasin Rashid. His son-in-law, Hussein Kamil al-Majeed served as director of military industries and in charge of palace security. Saddam Kamil al-Majeed, another son-in-law of Saddam Hussein served as director general of Presidential Security Agency (Jihaz-al-Himaya). The father-in-law of Saddam’s son Uday, Izzat-al-Duri was deputy to Saddam. A large number of other positions were occupied by men belonging to Tikrit. In a country where Shia are in majority there was only one Shia general who was close to Saddam.

In the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam made a series of not errors but blunders. It is very hard to try to understand what was on Saddam’s mind. There are several explanations for this attitude. States and societies which are ‘closed’ in the sense that there is little critical evaluation of policies by different segments of the society and government relies solely on coercion to show an artificial sense of peace and calm. In case of Iraq the ruling regime was led by a paranoid person whose close associates were his kith and kin. All others were attached to the regime by the thin thread of fear. In this situation, the decision-maker has his own assumptions, which are far removed from reality, and he acts on these assumptions thinking they are the correct view. The others who are simply appendages to the ruler accept these assumptions without any question. One example will give some insight into this behaviour. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met US Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva on January 9, 1991. Aziz told Baker that ‘your Arab allies will desert you. They will not kill other Arabs. Your advance will crumble and you will be left lost in the desert. You don’t know the desert because you have never ridden on a horse or a camel’.24 Time would prove how far off from the mark Aziz was.

In 1991, every move of Saddam including taking western civilians as hostages, staging television charade of Saddam talking to hostage children, preventing diplomats from leaving Baghdad, holding Russian technicians against their will, seizing assets of nations complying with United Nations resolutions (practically the whole world), threats of attacking Saudi oil fields and Israeli cities and many other actions isolated him completely. There was no one who could dare tell Saddam anything, which Saddam may dislike. The reason was that one might lose his head if Saddam became unhappy. Fear was the only factor, which was operational all the time, so the results should not surprise anybody. ‘A dictator in a totalitarian state easily becomes immune to external signals because his own unchallenged beliefs and the complete absence of analysis and policy pluralism in the decision-making process; there are no devil’s advocates or institutionalized dissenters in Baghdad’.25 This was the dilemma of Iraq from which there was no escape. In 2003, Saddam did not have the luxury of choices. He had to exit the world stage either willingly or be removed by force.

Holes in the Wall – Role of Dissidents
One cannot underestimate the importance of the society and its perception about any war in which the country engages. One has to carefully evaluate the Iraqi populace and its experience and the government in place and its modus operandi. The nature of the regime headed by Saddam was based on fear factor. For three decades, he had ruthlessly tackled any opposition to him. One factor, which has not been seriously evaluated is the number of influential Iraqis who had suffered under Saddam and were willing to help US get rid of him. One has to keep in mind the fact that most of these Iraqis are patriotic people who have no special love for US. At the same time they were realistic enough to understand that it is only US, which has the ability and will to remove Saddam for reasons of their own. There was a temporary convergence of interests of these two different forces. In the absence of US military intervention, one can easily visualize that Iraq would be under the control of Saddam as long as he lived and then the throne would be passed on to one of his equally pathological killer sons.

After the first Gulf War, Saddam took a medieval approach towards his commanders. Iraqi air force chief and two senior officers heading air defence and support aviation arms survived the US onslaught in 1991 but later disappeared after war (presumably executed by Saddam). This is not the best way to instill confidence and increase morale of senior brass. After 1991 war, during the popular uprisings in north and south, there were many fratricidal battles between military units. Many officers joined the civilians against Saddam. After the suppression of these uprisings there were many purges and disappearances (presumed executed) of officers. The most prominent defections were of Saddam’s sons-in-law, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamil Hassan Majid and his brother Colonel Saddam Kamil Hassan Majid. Hussein Kamil had served as chief of Iraq’s secret weapons procurement programme while Saddam Kamil has served as head of President’s personal security guard. The two were promised pardon by Saddam and enticed back to Iraq. Saddam’s both daughters (Raghda and Rana) divorced their husbands and later in a prolonged machine gun and mortar attack on their home, both were killed.26 There has been a steady flow of defections of a large number of senior members of armed forces, diplomats and other civilians who have worked closely with Saddam. I will only review some of the defections of officers of armed forces as they are relevant to the military operations. General al-Shammari had commanded nine divisions during Iran-Iraq war. He defected in 1986 and settled in United States. In June 1995, there was a mutiny in the armoured unit of Republican Guards and mutineers attacked a radio transmitter in Abu Gharib with tanks. Other Guard units took care of the mutineers. The exact cause of the mutiny was not clear but one report suggested that when a senior tribal chief of Dulaymi (a Sunni tribe) tribe was tortured to death on charges of plotting against Saddam, the soldiers belonging to Dulaymi tribe mutinied. Major General Wafiq al-Sammari served as chief of Iraqi military intelligence. In 1996, he escaped from Iraq along with some other senior officers when Saddam began to suspect that they were plotting a coup. After his defection he settled in London and became member of Iraqi opposition in exile. General Nizar al-Khazraji is a four star general that was Chief of Staff of Iraqi army from 1980 to 1991. He had participated in Iran-Iraq war and in Kuwait invasion. He later defected and settled in Denmark. General Mahdi al-Duleymi commanded the Third Corps in Basra during Iran-Iraq war. He later headed the armed forces technical and scientific department. He defected in 1996 and settled in Germany. General Najib al Salihi served as a general of Republican Guards. In 1995, he defected and later moved to Washington. He organized the group of Iraqi officers who had defected. This exiled group was named Free Officers Movement and has been active in many countries. Another group of exiled Iraqi officers established Iraqi Military Council in July 2002 in London to organize military officers against Saddam. It also ran offices in US, Australia and Scandinavian countries. The group is headed by Major General Tawfiq al-Yasiri (Yasiri participated in the uprising in 1991 against Saddam and was wounded). Among its members are fifteen former senior commanders of Iraqi armed forces.27 Khidir Humza who headed Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme also defected and spilled the beans.

In early March 2003, about 36 Iraqi officers including a Colonel of Republican Guards defected and took refuge in Turkey. They disclosed the general feelings among Iraqi soldiers about impending doom and fear from Saddam’s vengeance. General Fawzi al-Shamari was coordinating with military personnel who defected and were in different countries. Some of the best intelligence information about Iraq was provided by these officers to US. Few days before start of war, General Nizar al Khazraji (former Iraqi Chief of Staff) disappeared from his house in Copenhagen, where he was under house arrest by Danish authorities. One report was that he was frisked away by CIA and he was sitting with US generals in Kuwait to coordinate the attacks against Saddam. Many senior dissident officers actively participated in the planning phase while many officers fought alongside US soldiers inside Iraq.

Iraqi Response
There has been not enough information available about how Iraqi military leadership planned to counter US forces. Some early information available gives an insight into the dilemma of a totalitarian regime. Iraqi military leadership and military capability was severely compromised due to Saddam’s fear of betrayal. This was a major contributing factor in undermining the Iraqi armed forces. Saddam’s military intelligence chief, General Zuhayr Talib Abd al Sattar al-Naqib (He surrendered to US authorities after war) stated that most staffing decisions were made by Saddam and the major underlying factor was his fear of betrayal, which severely undermined military’s effectiveness.28 Special Republican Guard were under the command of Saddam’s son Qusay and Chief of Staff General Ibraheem al Sattar Muhammad al Takriti. This special unit was not designed for fighting enemy forces but to keep regime safe from its own people.

Even in most crucial stages of planning for defence of the country, Iraqi regime could not fully trust its own citizens. Documents recovered from Iraqi army’s 51st Division (the commander of this division surrendered to US forces with 8,000 troops and 200 tanks) showed that the commanders were instructed to prepare for quelling uprisings of Iraqis. Group presentation appears showed instructions about supporting military units involved in quelling riots in Basra and neighbouring Zubayr to ‘terminate enemy agents and mobs’ if it occurs.29 When the war started, due to fear of betrayal, Saddam made his son Qusay and three key commanders in command of Iraq’s defence and gave them the sole authority to order to use aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles. This gives an idea about the pathetic situation at highest military decision-making.

Within first twenty four hours of war, there was no effective communication between the military high command and troops scattered all over the country. All Iraqi local commanders were working in total darkness due to effective disruption of communications. There is no question about the superiority of US arms but even in areas where Iraqis could at least resist to slow down the advance, there was no action. There was a large gap between the two advancing columns (eastern and western) towards Baghdad. Even small scale harassing attacks by Iraqis could have threatened the US flanks. The slowing of advance could have then provided the opportunity for 2-3 man teams to harass the long supply line. There was no resolute defence of a series of key areas, which US could not afford to bypass such as river crossings and bridges.30 This clearly shows that within first twenty eight hours US had achieved its major objective of destroying the ‘will to fight’ before it even seriously attempted to destroy the ‘ability to fight’ by eliminating weapons systems.

The question of the ‘will to fight’ becomes more important when one looks at the contact of US military with key Iraqi commanders. During war there was constant flow of communications between US and various commanders of Republican Guards. Reports are now emerging which suggest that secret channels were opened with commanders of Republican Guards and Fedayeen of Saddam, which may explain why there was no resistance in defence of Baghdad. According to one report when the commander of Fedayeen came to know about the deal made between elite officers of Republican Guards and US he also realized the shifting sands. He got his deal and Fedayeen were ‘instantly beheaded’.31 The members of Fedayeen were a pampered lot good at thrashing unarmed civilians and had no love for Saddam or ideological zeal. After helplessly roaming for a while they melted in civilian population and the rest is history. In an organized way, there was no well-planned operational strategy but some small units at individual level fought well whenever they had chance. In some small pockets in Nassiriyah, Najaf, Hillah and Karbala, some Iraqis fought ferociously and were literally blown away to clear the path. Their story may never be told as they were on the losing side.

Weapons System & Tactics
US deployed 466,985 personnel in the operational theatre. This included 42,906 British and Australian troops. Modern militaries are a complex gigantic machines where a large part is dedicated to support arms. One example will give this disproportionate assignment. US Air Force about fifty five thousand personnel in this operation but out of that only 4,456 officers and 2,584 enlisted aircrew were in combat arms.

Many upgraded versions of the US weapons system were used in this war. The new versions of Tomahawk missiles have many added features. Up to fifteen targets can be pre-programmed in the missile and during the flight the targets can be reprogrammed or redirected to any GPS coordinate. After firing, now the missile can hang out in the air for few hours before hitting the target. Most US fighters and bombers were equipped with air-to-surface standoff missiles, which can be launched several miles away from target.

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) used in Iraq war hit their target with pinpoint precision. Relatively very little civilian casualties occurred in Iraq when one keeps in mind the intense bombing. JDAMs carry a tail kit, which makes these bombs ‘smart’. They can be launched from fighters and bombers up to 15 miles from the target. They can be used in any weather and strike within 10 feet of the intended target. Before the first US soldier crossed the border of Iraq, about 18,000 targets were hit by precision-guided munitions.

In modern war, communications to coordinate a complex set of weapons systems and men is critical. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) passed real time audio and video and other information back to headquarters day and night. Global Hawk UAV can fly for 12-24 hours and its powerful synthetic aperture radar (SAR) can distinguish objects three feet wide on ground and can zero in at one foot resolution. Its major advantage in Iraq was that it could see through sand storms.34 Some reconnaissance units were directly connected to brigade headquarters, bypassing normal chain of command and speeding up the decision making process in a fluid situation. Many soldiers wear earpieces and boom mikes, which enables rapid passage of information and orders between forward troops and commanders. The negative side of this overwhelming communication is too much radio chatter. The use of GPS and computerized communications enabled the troops to decrease overcrowding and unnecessary chatter as well as knowing their positions more precisely usually within a meter.35 US used newly designed Global Mobility Assessment Teams (GMATs) to capture hostile airfields and open these newly acquired airfields. In Iraq’s Marines had their longest inland march. Marine’s role is mainly in coastal battlefields. Their equipment and training is geared towards this role. Most of the support units of Marines are manned by sailors. Marines role is mainly amphibious operations to open the way for army and air force units, a task Marines call ‘kicking in the door’. In Iraq they marched over 300 kilometres inland at a rate of 25 kilometres per day. From the experience of Afghanistan, Marines now went in by helicopters to secure an airfield to be later used by army or air force. A tactic they call ‘kicking in the roof’.36 Marines learned many valuable lessons from this experience.

After 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi military’s numbers and efficiency had severely degraded.

In 2003, Iraqi armed forces were numbered around 400,000. Operationally, they were divided into 23 divisions. Seventeen of these divisions were of regular army (3 armoured, 2 mechanized and 11 infantry) while six were Republican Guard (3 armoured, one mechanized and 2 infantry). The Special Republican Guard was created after dismal performance of Guard in 1991 war. In terms of equipment, Iraqi army had about 2,500 tanks, 900 combat APCs, about 2,000 towed and self-propelled artillery. Air Force had approximately 180 combat and 130 ground attack aircraft. In addition about 350 helicopters and additional 270 transport helicopters supplemented this force. Air defences included air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles, ROLAND ground-to-air missiles and about 5,000 anti-aircraft guns. In late nineties, Iraqi armed forces conducted several exercises to try to rehabilitate the weapons systems and increase the morale with very little positive effect. The aging aircraft and tanks were not at their full functional capacity.

The total number of aircraft lost by US was seven (4 Longbow Apaches, 2 Cobras and one A-10A Warthog). 125 US service personnel and 31 British soldiers died in this operation. No data is available about the numbers and types of Iraqi equipment destroyed. No one has done a detailed work of collecting data about the number of Iraqis killed. According to some human rights groups collection of data inside Iraq has given some estimates but they are sketchy. According to 19 major Baghdad area hospitals records about 2,300 civilians died while 6,800 civilians were wounded. The major hospital in Najaf reported about 286 civilians and 57 military dead.37 Due to the nature of the conflict where large scale set battles were not fought and some Iraqi soldiers fought in civilian clothes will make it very difficult to calculate Iraqi human loss with reasonable accuracy.

Conclusion
The US operations in Iraq in 2003 are consistent in the sense that the western philosophy of war based on ‘excess’ (either in numbers or equipment) rather than ‘finesse’ was the fundamental principle. To this is added another factor which reflects change in western societies in last few decades and that is to achieve the objective with less ‘bravado’ and ‘wholesale slaughter’. ‘The force that destroys without being seen is the war machine of the society that cannot tolerate visible killing of its own troops, or even those of the enemy’.38 In terms of tactics it was ironic that it was in US interest to carefully avoid any civilian damage in Iraq and not attack any communication system on large-scale while on Iraqi part it was advantageous for the regime to have large number of casualties and destruction of infrastructure. This would cause embarrassment of US and will put more pressure on US military commanders and also will make difficult for US soldiers to govern a shattered post-conflict Iraq.

A large military machine without careful planning cannot guarantee success. Use of a large organization with highly complex weapons systems can slow down an operation as bureaucratic slumber and cautious attitude of high command can pour cold water on initiative. US strategy was based on not only to destroy the enemy’s ability to fight by destroying equipment but to crush the enemy’s will to fight. The latter part was achieved within days although this was largely due to peculiar circumstances of Iraqi society. In Iraq war, US military once again showed its ability to transform quickly and be innovative. In one military analyst’s words, ‘rather than using our technological advantages to be cautious, to be safe, we used our advantages to be quick and decisive’.39 No other modern army has enjoyed such material and technical superiority, which is available to US commanders and soldiers, and they are expected to deliver when asked by political leadership. However, professionalism of US soldiers was again re-affirmed when the switch of role from active combat to post-conflict control was achieved literally within days. Two examples show this quite high degree of professionalism. After US forces took control of Baghdad, when a US soldier covered the face of a Saddam statue with US flag but realizing the symbolism it was quickly replaced with Iraq’s flag. Similarly, in Najaf, when a US patrol came face to face with an emotionally charged Shia crowd going to the sacred Ali Mosque, the officer leading the patrol told his soldiers to turn the barrels to ground and kneel. The officer then gestured his respect and traditional signal of greeting and took his patrol away from the crowd.

On part of Iraq, as the major issue was Saddam Hussein himself and not a larger national issue, therefore, there was little room for a general participation. Saddam was a ruthless, megalomaniac, pathological killer with a history of trail of blood of his own countrymen spanning some three decades. He was neither a popular leader nor a ruthless revolutionary, therefore the question of a ‘popular war’ was not even on the table as long as he was ruling the country. The only meaningful option, which Iraq had if there was a ruler who had some acceptance by the population was the concept, which is called ‘demodernization of war’ by Paul Bracken. When confronting a foe that consider itself more advanced, to ‘demodernize’ the war means to make it more ‘primitive, barbaric and frightening’. This was the technique successfully used by Viet Cong. Saddam could not do anything as the war was fought on US terms and not on Saddam’s terms.

I hear people asking angrily why Saddam’s forces ‘crumbled like a biscuit under US troops’. That outcome is logical. Saddam’s artificial support was a result of a culture of hypocrisy, not conviction. – A Tunisian history teacher

References
1For details of this aspect see, Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr. Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. Desert Storm Study Project (Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army, 1993), p. 10-15 & 20-28
2ibid, p. 43
3All these figures are from Strategic Survey 1990-1991. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p.60-61
4Colonel (Retd) Arthur H. Blair. At War in the Gulf: A Chronology (Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1992), p.116-17
5Paul Bracken. Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), p. 121
6ibid, p. 131
7ibid, p. 151
8The Guardian, March 29, 2003
9Time, January 27, 2003, p. 24
10The New Yorker Online, May 12, 2003
11For a general review of changed Pentagon strategy, see. Carl Conetta. The Pentagon’s New Budget, New Strategy, and New War. Project on Defence Alternatives Briefing Report # 12, 25 June 2002. http://www.comw.org/pda/0206newwar.html
12USCENTAF Assessment and Analysis. Operation Iraqi Freedom – By the Numbers. Assessment and Analysis Division of USCENTAF. United States Air Force, 30 April 2003
13For a good pre-war analysis see Richard L. Russell. War and the Iraq Dilemma: Facing Harsh Realities. Parameters, Autumn 2002, pp. 46-61
14Washington Post, March 03, 2003
15The Scotsman, April 26, 2003
16The Scotsman, April 26, 2003
17Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 03, 2003. http://www.janes.com/regional-news/africa-middle-east/news/jdw/jdw030403-1-n.shtml
18The Guardian, April 13, 2003
19CENTAF Assessment and Analysis
20The Boston Globe, May 08, 2003
21Washington Post, April 20, 2003
22The Boston Globe, May 08, 2003
23For one example of this type of analysis by former Pakistani Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg, see his two articles, Iraq’s Strategic Defiance: A New Dimension of Warfare and Battle for Baghdad and Beyond posted at website of FRIENDS. http://www.friends.org.pk/iraqs-Strategic.htm and http://www.friends.org.pk/Battle%20for%20Baghdad.htm
24Strategic Survey 1990-1991, p. 59
25Bruce W. Watson (Editor) Military Lessons of the Gulf War (London: Greenhill Books, 1991), p.154
26BBC, July 04, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle-east/1422340.stm
27International News Analysis, September 01, 2002. http://www.newswithviews.com/news-worthy/news-worthy33.htm
28The Guardian, April 25, 2003
29International Herald Tribune, April 10, 2003
30The Observer, April 13, 2003. http:/www.observer.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12239,935797,00.html
31Pepe Escobar. The Baghdad Deal. Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/PrintN.html
32CENTAF- Assessment and Analysis
33Arnaud de Borchgrave. War by Remote Control. The Washington Times, April 28, 2003
34Strategy Page, May 12, 2003. http://www.straegypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target+HTINTEL>HTM
35The Observer, April 13, 2003
36Strategy Page, May 15, 2003. http://www.strategypage.com/fueo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target+htamph
37The Age, May 03, 2003
38Bracken. Fire in the East, p. 136
39The Scotsman, April 26, 2003
40Bracken. Fire in the East, p.
139-40