Two views on LFO

Columnist M B NAQVI sums up different views on the present political impasse.

The problem Number One of Pakistan politics today is said to be an agreement or lack thereof over what is called Legal Framework Order. A joint committee of government and Opposition has been meeting and has drawn up, it is understood, parallel recommendations over the controversial questions in the LFO. It is said that there is a school of the partisans of General Pervez Musharraf who are thoroughgoing pragmatists — in the usual vulgar sense.

The opposition parties, one is told, are divided. Within the opposition camp there are two main groups: one comprises the moderates such as the MMA. These religious parties have proved to be not so committed or puristic than the members of the PML(N) and PPP. The latter stands for total rejection of LFO as an abomination, or so we are now told.

The moderate parties in the MMA are ready to compromise on a number of subjects but they are stuck on the position of the President. They are unable to accept the legitimacy of the COAS-President — still in uniform. What they would like is a deal: let the President give a timeframe when he would give up his job as the Army Chief and should seek to be re-elected by the Parliament. The MMA promises that should President Musharraf decide to give a date on which he would take off his uniform and become a civilian, they would undertake to get him elected as the President through the normal parliamentary method.

Insofar as main Musharraf-supporting ruling parties are concerned, they have no difficulty in accepting the LFO in toto. They are singing praises of the LFO. They say that it is necessary for the stability and security of Pakistan and its continuance in force is in the national interest. Insofar as the presidency of Mr. Pervez Musharraf is concerned, they hold that the President’s remaining the Army Chief — the meaning of keeping his uniform — is in the national interest, as they define it.

The case of the pragmatists assembled in the PML(Q), National Alliance and even MMA is that the COAS Gen. Musharraf when he took over the country and after having given a roadmap for the restoration of democracy at the demanded price of accepting the LFO, he began transferring power to the elected civilians. The pragmatists that these gentlemen are have no difficulty in accepting the fact that Mr. Musharraf is a legitimate ruler of the country, especially because the Supreme Court has accepted his deviation from the Constitution’s rule as a state necessity — and thus justifying and validating it.

But it has put certain limitations. These limitations include that within three years he would hold an election and would transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. Incidentally the SC had also given him the green signal to amend the Constitution. The significance of this authorisation to amend the Constitution is now controversial. Some say that it is limited to removing the constitutional difficulties in the way of governing the country in the interim period so that his rule can run smoothly. He was authorised to make only minor amendments within the framework of the original Constitution.

The others say that the authorisation was there and since he has made the changes in the Constitution, i.e. the LFO, there is nothing to do except to accept it as a fact of life. It is a part of the ground reality. It is best to accept the ground reality, and thus the regime of the COAS-President. It should be accepted as adequately democratic. Otherwise there will be trouble: the President might sack the Assemblies; he might impose Martial Law; or he may order re-elections. There can be other troubles if the fiat of Gen. Musharraf is not accepted.

That is the call of the pragmatism in the Pakistani ambience. Well, the PML(Q), the NA and MQM have no difficulty in accepting the LFO and the COAS President because they think they are pragmatic. They found it to be a part of the ground reality because it confirmed the widely held view that the ultimate power resides in the Army. It is assumed by all pragmatists that since the ultimate power in Pakistan resides with the Army, therefore it is also legitimate, fallacy or no fallacy. And, therefore, it is also pointless to struggle against it. There is nothing to do except to realise the necessity. Also there are other arguments why the ground reality should be accepted: since Army rule is a fact of life in Pakistan whenever the Army chooses to rule directly, it has to be accepted willingly. Indeed it would seem to be a part of patriotism to accept the Army rule.

Some of the more sagacious among the pragmatists assert that not only it is inadvisable (and wrong) to oppose the Army’s rule, it is best to cooperate with it so that its rigidity, sharp corners and harshness can be reduced by the association of civilian politicians. It is the high road to encourage the military rulers to take the path of constitutionalism: to set up a Parliament and a government and rule according to the Constitution. And if a military ruler wants any guarantees to safeguard his own position, let him write his own safeguards and put them in the Constitution.

Which is what the LFO is. Opposing LFO today means opposing the Army as such. After all the coup that took place on October 12, 1999 was not staged by Gen. Musharraf himself. It was done by other Generals and it was they who decided that Musharraf should be the head of it. Thus it is an Army regime and it is the volition of the entire Army that Musharraf should remain the head of the government for at least five years. That would ensure national security. Therefore fighting it will imperil national security and so forth. The argument is familiar and widespread, accepted by a wide range of PML factions at different times.

On the other side are democratic purists or so they pose. In terms of parliamentary politics, they are the representatives of the PPP and PML(N). They appear to believe in undiluted democracy and the basic national policy of sending back the Army to the barracks. Not only sending it back to the barracks but also subordinating it to the rule of law, to the rule of the Constitution and to the will of the constitutional government in Islamabad.

It is fine in theory. But it runs smack into the reality of the situation. The Army is entrenched; the rest of the country automatically or instinctively believes that the locus of true power in Pakistan is Army. This fact is accepted in toto without reservations. It is now the question of attitude toward this fact. Some would want to fight with existing facts so as to change them. Others, more practical people, would want to go along with the facts and see what lies within their four walls. All the political opportunities lie within the four walls of the political architecture that Gen. Musharraf has constructed. The purists would want the present Parliament to stay constituted as it is and also the way the government has been formed but they somehow refuse to do a deal with Musharraf, isolate him, force him to resign or whatever.

While the theory of undiluted democracy is certainly comprehensible, what is not easily accepted by many is the chief implication of accepting the whole theory: this implication translates into having to wage a long political struggle to end the powers that the Army has acquired within the society. This would involve a tremendous convulsion. That tumult may be acceptable to purists. But pragmatic politicians abhor it; it is too unsettling. God knows how many settled facts will become unsettled.

The fact of the matter is that the purists do imply the unsettling of things. But are they in a position to carry this Parliament with them after what the COAS has done in rigging up the present configuration, including the government and the political support behind it. What the COAS-CE did was a major operation and required a lot of effort. Now the General is going to resist the destruction of his political architecture. Are the purists in a position to defeat the General? Who would honestly say that the chances of PML(N) and PPP’s victory over Army are higher than the continuance of General Musharraf? After all General Musharraf is the only locus of power in both the Army and the government and its supporters; the parties that are outside the circle of those who wield power stand little chance of succeeding in any of their objectives.

They are not even in numbers which can shoot down the proposals of the General’s men. So what is the point of struggling against Gen. Musharraf if the outcome is unlikely to be the victory of the rebels against the Army rule. The Army rule would continue anyhow. Meantime, it will have ample incentive to crack down hard on those who oppose the Army rule. The Army can enforce its will by force. The opposition is in no shape or condition to prevent the Army from getting what it wants.

The purists would continue to argue that the beauties of the ideal democracy are overwhelming. In the longer run, Pakistan would be better off with a democracy than a military regime. Even if one were to agree with this proposition wholeheartedly, the chances of the success of the supporters of PPP and PML(N) are next to nil. The parties themselves are in a bad shape. The leadership has more or less betrayed their followers. Why the PPP and PML(N) are opposing Musharraf is not because of democracy or its theory, it is because the General has refused to do a deal with Benazir, on the one hand, and another compromise with Mian Nawaz Sharif, on the other.

Should Gen. Musharraf allow Benazir Bhutto to come back safely and to operate in Pakistan freely, all PPP followers would withdraw their opposition to Gen. Musharraf and may even join his government under this very LFO. Benazir had earlier given ample indications that she would be happy to make a deal with Musharraf and would accept him as the President. The same can be inferred in the case of Mian Nawaz Sharif. As he had done in the past, he would have agreed to let the Army rule while allowing him to continue with his business — and perhaps with some politics. He certainly hopes one day to retake Punjab from his opponents.

The point is that here are these two views and the people listen to both. It is a moot point whether initiating a big opposition alliance heroically with a view to struggling against the Army to establish a purer form of democracy, undiluted with military influence is a better goal to follow; or to accept the ground realities and work within the system established by the Army to ensure that its sharp corners are smoothened out and rigidities are reduced. It is a debate that is likely to go on. There is no reason why the people cannot resolve the debate, eventually. The point is about the current interregnum; is pragmatism (in the current non-philosophical sense) a better guide to current action or should the purists be followed. Probably the events will overtake everyone before the people finally decide.